Jilaev v. Nasriddinova, 2026 ONSC 3739

Jilaev v. Nasriddinova, 2026 ONSC 3739

COURT FILE NO.: FC-24-1204

DATE: 20260625

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

Andrei Jilaev

Applicant Husband

– and –

Madina Nasriddinova

Respondent Wife

Christopher Mamo and Patricia Gordon, for the Applicant Husband

Alla Koren, for the Respondent Wife

– and –

Sveltana Jiliaeva and Iouri Jiliaev

David Tobin, for the Added Respondents,

but not in attendance.

Added Respondents

(not in attendance)

HEARD: May 13, 2026

JUSTICE ALEX FINLAYSON

PART I: NATURE OF THIS LONG MOTION

1These are my Reasons for Decision respecting the Respondent wife’s long motion for an interim disbursement of $250,000.00. The main parties in this proceeding are Andrei Jiliaev (the “husband”) and Madina Nasriddinova (the “wife”). This case has been hotly contentious to date. While the usual parenting and financial claims have been pleaded, the wife has also added the paternal grandparents as respondents to this family law proceeding.

2In late December 2023, the husband sold a property he owned in North York (referred to as the “Walker Road property”), title to which was in his name alone. The wife says the Walker Road property this was a matrimonial home and the husband did not identify her as his spouse when he sold it, in contravention of section 18 and 21 of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F-3, as amended.

3The husband spent all the sale proceeds. This included giving the grandparents approximately $1 million, to repay them for debts he allegedly owed them. The grandparents in turn paid off their own mortgage, and then re-encumbered their property, taking out a reverse mortgage to purchase an out of the country vacation property in Costa Rica. The wife asserts that the husband and the grandparents committed fraud. She seeks recovery claiming a fraudulent conveyance, or based on other legal theories in the alternative.

4The husband denies impropriety. The date of separation is in dispute, as is whether the parties lived in the property. The husband disputes that the property was a matrimonial home when he sold it.

5The husband relies on a number of disputed promissory notes and related documents in this case, that purport to justify the approximately $1 million of sale proceeds that he paid to his parents. The husband maintains the debt accumulated over many years, in some instances, over the span of more than a decade. He paid them back what they were owed.

6The wife challenges the authenticity of the husband’s promissory notes and related loan documents. Even if the Court at trial finds some or all of these documents to be valid, the wife would also have the Court at trial significantly discount the debt.

7To add to this complexity, the husband, for many years, was a part owner in his family’s jewelry businesses. The wife initiated this motion over a year ago. Back then, her request for an interim disbursement was joined with an extremely contentious disclosure motion, which included many requests for documents relevant to the businesses. The parties each sought an adjournment of part or all of this motion; first the husband sought and obtained one, and then the wife did too.

8For the first several months while that broader motion remained, the parties’ disclosure dispute was a major, frustrating distraction. After much unnecessary wrangling, in or around April of 2025, the husband changed counsel for the second time.¹ By August 2025, he agreed to retain a Chartered Business Valuator (“CBV”). He abandoned an earlier position taken about bifurcation. He agreed to supply many documents in tandem with the later production of his valuator’s reports. The disclosure dispute calmed down. The Court nevertheless ordered some disclosure on August 6, 2025, mostly in connection with the wife’s requests against the grandparents. The motion otherwise got adjourned for a second time, now at the request of the wife (in part). The wife sought to adjourn the disclosure portion of her own motion in view of the husband’s change in position. She wanted still to proceed with her request for an interim disbursement. I ruled in part, that it was premature given the new developments.

9There are now valuation and income reports before the Court from the husband’s valuator. They show that the husband’s interest in an operating company has no value, his interest in a holding company decreased between the relevant dates, and the husband has earned negligible income since 2019. At the wife’s date of separation, the husband owes her no equalization payment based in part on these valuations, according to him. The wife asserts that husband’s valuation and income reports do not show the real financial state of affairs, particularly when regard is had to their prior lifestyle.

10These income and valuation issues are not entirely disconnected from the wife’s challenges to the promissory notes. The wife offers alternative explanations to explain the source of funds to which the husband had access over the years, and those explanations are that the funds did not come to him by way of a loan. The wife’s alternative explanations, if true, not only call into question the propriety of the husband having given approximately $1 million to his parents in early 2024, but the accuracy and reliability of the husband’s valuation and income reports in general. There are allegations about improper accounting practices, with documentary support for that, too.

11Following receipt of the valuation and income reports and the accompanying scope of review documents, the wife chose not to pursue further disclosure on this motion. All that remains is the wife’s request for an interim disbursement. The wife argues that without funds, she cannot pursue her entitlements. She says she was subject to coercive control. She lacks resources. She says the playing field needs to be levelled.

12The husband’s challenges to the wife’s request for a disbursement include that she is not entitled to one. He essentially argues that there is no merit to the wife’s claims against the husband and the grandparents rooted in fraud. The wife is trying to access the grandparents’ money through the backdoor by way of this motion against him only, to which she is not entitled on a stand-alone basis. He separately takes issue with the size of the request, and the number of items for which the wife seeks funding. He argues that he cannot afford to pay an interim disbursement on his own.

13There is no question that the wife’s request for a disbursement is large, and in certain respects broad. At one point, she sought funds to pay for up to three different experts, and to pay her lawyer for both fees already incurred, and to be incurred. The Court tends to agree with the husband’s submissions about the size of the disbursement, the breadth of the expert analyses she says she wants to pursue, and the extent of the next steps in the litigation that she proposes may occur, and for which she requires funding. It does not agree with the husband’s other submissions about the merits of this motion.

14There are a myriad of unresolved factual and credibility issues. Most of the disputed factual and credibility issues cannot be resolved dispositively on a motion. But that is not necessarily a barrier to ordering a disbursement, and some of what has gone on here is suspicious.

15The Court need not conclusively resolve the factual and credibility disputes to order an interim disbursement. While a motion for an interim disbursement requires some assessment of the merit of the underlying claims for which funding is sought to pursue, the threshold for the assessment of that merit is not that which applies at trial. The required analysis is less onerous. The wife has not just made bald allegations; there appears on this record to be something more to her assertions.

16I am unpersuaded at this stage of the case, that the husband is as financially separate from his parents, and impecunious, as he would have the Court believe. There are many unanswered questions arising out of the valuation and income reports that he produced. So while the trial judge will have to sort much of this out on a final basis, for the reasons that follow, there will be an interim disbursement ordered now, to ensure that the wife can present her case. Albeit, the amount of the disbursement to be ordered, will not be in the sum sought by the wife.

17In my view, the wife’s request for funds is too high. I intend to fix the amount of the interim disbursement at $137,500.00, calculated below in the section of these Reasons for Decision that discuss the wife’s budget. This $137,500.00 sum is net of a previous advance of $10,000.00 that the wife obtained. When this motion was first adjourned on April 2, 2025, the husband agreed to pay that sum, as a term of the adjournment. The parties agreed it was to be credited against anything ordered at the return of this motion, so I have applied that credit.

PART II: BACKGROUND

18To place the above summary of this ruling into its proper context, I will first elaborate upon this background.

A. The Disputed Relationship Dates

19There is a dispute about the length of this relationship. Both the date of cohabitation and the date of separation are in dispute. Both lead into the wife’s eventual claims of fraud at the time of her date of separation, as I will explain. The date of marriage is not controversial. For the purposes of this motion, the weight of the evidence currently before me favours the wife’s position about the relationship’s dates.

(1) The Date of Cohabitation: 2010, 2012 vs. 2015?

20According to the wife’s initial affidavit sworn February 7, 2025, the parties began cohabiting in 2010. She says that at first, they alternated between their respective homes, but by 2012, they shared the same residence entirely. This was around which time the husband bought a condominium on Capilano Road in Port Moody, BC (the “Capilano Road condominium”).

21This 2010 or 2012 date of cohabitation is not agreed to. The husband claims the parties didn’t move in together until 2015, although he agrees they met earlier, in 2010.

22While the resolution of this dispute about when the relationship started may eventually also have some bearing on the calculation of spousal support, it matters for a different reason now. It appears that the husband owned, and sold, a previous property before he bought the aforementioned condominium and allegedly took his first loan. The wife says she knew about this, perhaps because they were already in a relationship. She says he used the sale proceeds from that first property, to buy the Capilano Road condominium, and seems to have caught the husband in an untrue sworn statement made for this motion. If she proves this at trial, this is the first source of funding, alternative to a loan, that the wife offers up to cast doubt on the legitimacy of the husband’s significant debt to his parents that he claims to owe. In other words, the wife’s challenges to the husband’s historical narrative of borrowing from his parents, and to his credibility, start right at the beginning of the relationship, wrapped up in this first dispute, about the date of cohabitation and the history of property ownership, as it then was.

(2) The Parties’ Marriage on April 2, 2017 and The Parties’ Child’s Birth Three Days Later

23When the wife moved in with the husband, perhaps as early as in 2010, she brought her son A. from a previous relationship. The wife became pregnant with the parties’ child, N, in 2016. The parties would later marry on April 2, 2017, three days before N.’s birth. N. is now 8 years old.

(3) The Date of Separation: June 2019 or March 4, 2024?

24The husband, the wife, and the children (and other family members on both sides), lived in the Vancouver area of BC at the outset of the relationship. According to the husband, the parties separated in 2019, while still in BC. He attributes the separation, at least in part, to A.’s behavioural issues in the household, that he says caused strain in the marriage.

25Yet by 2020 or 2021, the grandparents would move to Ontario. The parties would follow thereafter, in 2021. If there was a separation, the parties continued to live in the same home, now with the grandparents in Ontario.

26The wife’s proposed date of separation, by contrast, is March 4, 2024. This is less than two months after the husband sold the Walker Road property, and paid his parents. MacPherson J. has already identified this as the date of separation, in his ruling on an early parenting motion.

B. The Parties’ Residential History and the History of Property Ownership

(1) The Husband Omitted to Tell the Court About the Ownership of His First Condominium

27The next area of factual dispute concerns the history of property ownership. It is not agreed whether the husband already owned a condominium when the parties got together as indicated already, or whether the husband bought the first condominium with his parents’ assistance in 2011. The husband denied owning another property before the Capilano Road condominium, only to be confronted with title documentation to the contrary. The story then changed;² the husband’s credibility regarding this, is in issue.

(2) The Capilano Road Condominium, Purchased Pre-Construction in 2011

28The husband bought the Capilano Road condominium as a pre-construction condominium in 2011; it closed in around 2013. The husband claims that his parents helped fund the purchase through various advances, documented by a promissory note.

29The husband says he borrowed $250,000.00 from his parents, at 8% interest, to complete the purchase of the Capilano Road condominium. The remaining amount was financed by way of a RBC Mortgage. The funds apparently advanced from his parents came over a two-year period, and mostly after the date of a promissory note that he purportedly signed.

30If true, this was the first loan, that with interest accumulated over the next more than a decade, contributed to the large amount of debt that he eventually repaid to his parents, when he sold the Walker Road property in late 2023.³ By contrast, the wife, as I have said, asserts that the sale proceeds from the first, initially undisclosed condominium, may have financed the purchase of the Capilano Road condominium.

(3) The Renovations to the Capilano Road Condominium

31The parties lived in the Capilano Road condominium for a time. It is common ground that they were not living there until 2021, when the family came to Ontario, though.

32According to the wife’s initial affidavit sworn February 7, 2025, the parties moved out of the Capilano Road condominium in about August 2019, for it to be renovated, two years before the family came to Ontario. Although the husband now claims to have separated already by this point, the wife says the parties lived with her sister in BC for a few months, and then in a rental from February 2020 until mid-2021, while these renovations were underway.

33Notably, the husband did not this time borrow money from his parents to fund these renovations, either. The funding came from other sources, including from the wife’s sister, despite the alleged 2019 separation.

(4) The Sale of the Capilano Road Condominium

34It is also common ground that the husband sold the Capilano Road condominium in 2021, although the parties disagree as to whether the condominium was sold in March or June of 2021. This dispute does not really matter for the purposes of this motion.

35The husband’s accounting is that the sale price was $1,260,000.00, and he netted $820,050.88. Although according to him, the husband then owed his parents the $250,000.00 sum, plus interest, they were not then repaid. This was unlike what he claimed mid-motion had happened with the first condominium, once his apparent earlier ownership of that property was revealed. It was unlike what would happen when he would later sell the Walker Road property in late 2023.

36The husband’s explanation for this differential treatment of the first tranche of debt at the time the Capilano Road condominium was sold, was that the family jewelry businesses were closing when his parents, and he, the wife and N. moved to Ontario. He no longer had a primary income source. So his parents apparently agreed to defer the loan repayment, to support his relocation here.

37The other debt owing to the wife’s sister was repaid though. And as I also address below, there are unanswered questions about the amount of the husband’s actual income, that he purportedly lost as a result of this move.

(5) The Parties’ Move to Ontario

38The parties’ move to Ontario occurred about two years after the husband’s June 2019 date of separation. The husband did not move to Ontario alone in 2021; the wife and N. would join him later in the year (or perhaps in early January 2022), as indicated.

39At first, the allegedly separated family lived with the grandparents. It is disputed if they ever lived anywhere else, in particular in the Walker Road property, and consequently whether it was a matrimonial home, or not.

(6) The Purchase of the Walker Road Property

40Around the time of the move to Ontario in 2021, the husband purchased the Walker Road property, in his name alone. It is common ground that he used the sale proceeds of the Capilano Road condominium to fund the purchase. What is not common ground though, is whether those sale proceeds ultimately belonged to the grandparents.

41The wife did not have a proper accounting as to what went into the purchase of this property when she swore her initial affidavit of February 7, 2025. The husband’s evidence on this point, sufficient to dispose this motion, is that the purchase price was $1,688,000.00. The husband says he had $686,677.98 from the sale of the Capilano Road condominium. He says he secured a mortgage of $1,105,900.00 to pay for the balance of the purchase.

(7) The Walker Road Property’s Status As A Matrimonial Home At the Time of Its Later Sale

42Regardless of the dispute about whether the parties ever lived in the Walker Road property, it is common ground that the parties did not move in right away. There were renovations.

43The wife’s version of events is that they moved into the Walker Road property in September of 2022 after the renovations were complete, making it a matrimonial home when it was later sold, and thus highlighting one of the husband’s acts of fraud on the later sale documentation. The husband’s claim was that he was no longer able to earn money in the jewelry industry after the move to Ontario, and so he decided to become a house flipper. That, he says, is why he purchased the Walker Road property. The husband claimed that the renovations continued until May of 2023, after which he listed the Walker Road property for sale right away. For these reasons, the parties never lived there. He did nothing wrong when he sold it later that year. As he was already separated, and in any case because the parties never lived in the property, it had not become a matrimonial home. He also says the wife knew about the sale.

(8) The Husband’s Alleged Increased Debt to Fund the Renovations to the Walker Road Property and to Pay for Living Expenses

44The husband’s debt to his parents allegedly increased further, around the time the family came to Ontario in 2021. According to the husband, he borrowed from his parents the additional sums of $300,000.00 on October 27, 2021, and $100,000.00 on November 5, 2021, to fund the renovations.

45Once again though, the wife has put forward an alternative explanation for the source of this funding, too. The timing of this alleged borrowing coincides closely with the sale of a commercial property on Hornby Street in Vancouver, that was owned by one of two corporations that were part of the family jewelry businesses’ structure, in which the husband had an interest, that he minimized owning.

46The husband claims that no money was owing or paid to him on that sale of the commercial property. According to him, the family businesses really belonged to his parents solely, and they had invested all the money, including to acquire the Hornby Street commercial property that was sold. He (and his brother) were really just employees of the businesses, according to him.

47In contrast to that explanation, the wife says that the husband did in fact receive $350,000.00 in 2021 in connection with that sale of the commercial property, further calling into question the husband’s characterization of the 2021 advances for the Walker Property renovations, as additional loans. And like respecting the Capilano Road condominium, there is an allegation that the husband had an interest in another commercial property before that too, the sale proceeds from which he used to acquire the Hornby Street property.

48Just like what would happen with the Capilano Road property, the husband acquired separate other debt for the renovations after the Walker Road property’s purchase too, and not from his parents. The husband explained that as an inexperienced “house flipper”, he entered into this flipping project with some naivety. He says he discovered “significant latent structural defects in the building”. He also says the housing market experienced an unforeseen downturn in the spring of 2022. Therefore, he borrowed from his RBC and CIBC lines of credit, he took credit card advances, and once again he obtained a loan from the wife’s sister, that was repaid on the later sale.

49The husband claims not to have worked in the jewelry industry while this renovation went on. Although the family businesses are apparently closed post-move to Ontario, the husband says that he would later resume doing “freelance design work” in 2023, but he earned only about $20,000.00. I address below, his income, and the wife’s lifestyle arguments, which raise questions about this. There is also a police report in the record before me on this motion, relating to a robbery in the grandparents’ home in Ontario, that the wife obtained on the contested disclosure motion against the grandparents. There are contradictory statements in it, about the closure of the family jewelry businesses and the value of the businesses’ assets, made to the police.

(9) Other Alleged Advances

50The husband has produced other IOU type documents claiming to have borrowed an additional $105,700.00 from his parents, to finance “our ongoing financing shortfall”, after this. This was similar to what he claimed he had to do in 2014, when he couldn’t carry the Capilano Road property either.⁴

(10) The Sale of the Walker Road Property and the Husband’s Distribution of the Sale Proceeds

51The husband sold the Walker Road property in late December of 2023 for $2,300,000.00. By January of 2024, the net proceeds were spent. Curiously (and this may be a weakness in the wife’s case that the husband points out), the wife was aware of the sale, it having happened about two months before her date of separation. She may have had some involvement in the sale. The wife’s explanation for this, is that the funds were supposed to be shared with her in some fashion, the husband having promised to give her $350,000.00 to fund the purchase of a day care business. Yet he did not do so.

52Of course, registered encumbrances, like the bank mortgage, were paid off using the sale proceeds. The wife’s sister was repaid for the money she advanced to contribute to some of these renovations, just as she had been repaid after the Capilano Road condominium sold. But in addition, the husband says he transferred $1,028,487.00 to his parents, to repay their loans, with interest. ⁵ The grandparents’ initial account of how much they were paid back in January of 2024, was slightly lower.⁶

(11) The Circumstances Surrounding the Wife’s Date of Separation on March 4, 2024

53On March 4, 2024, about two months after the sale, and about one month after the grandparents were repaid, the wife and the child went to a shelter, where they would stay for four months. The husband did not pay child support.

54After this proceeding got underway in June, MacPherson J. allowed the wife and N. to relocate to BC. He did so on another hotly contested motion in this case. I will have more to say about how the mother’s return to BC came to be, as it too reflects poorly on the husband.

55The wife’s financial circumstances since her return to BC are poor. She is working in early childhood education. She qualified for subsidized housing upon her return to BC.

C. The Grandparents’ Use of the Funds They Received in January of 2024

56Meanwhile, the grandparents have spent the money the husband gave them. They paid off their mortgage. They then took out a reverse mortgage and bought a vacation property in Costa Rica.

57The wife obtained a title search, that revealed the new mortgage, registered on May 30, 2024, was for $2,535,000.00. She also obtained the affidavit of a real estate agent Elena Shapiro, to establish that the amount of this encumbrance exceeds what the grandparents’ property was then worth at the time. According to the grandparents’ affidavit sworn March 4, 2025, the reverse mortgage was approved for $1,149,200.00 only, and only $700,000.00 was advanced.

58When this case got underway, the wife sought a certificate of pending litigation, but the request did not get dealt with. Pursuant to my Order of August 6, 2025 made on consent, there is now a form of a preservation Order respecting whatever equity is left, in the grandparents’ Ontario property.

D. The Promissory Notes, Loan Agreements and ‘IOU’ Documents

59The productions in this case include a series of promissory notes, loan agreements and other ‘IOU’ type records, purporting to document what the husband says he borrowed from his parents over time. Specifically, these documents are:

(a) a promissory note dated May 22, 2011, for the alleged loan in the sum of $250,000.00, said to relate to the purchase of the Capilano Road Condominium, with interest at 8%. The promissory note provides that the $250,000.00 amount was advanced in different installments between 2011 and 2013. There are corresponding cheques for some of the advances produced, too;

(b) a promissory note purportedly dated June 23, 2014, for a further alleged loan in the sum of $100,000.00, again with 8% interest. These are the funds the husband says he borrowed to pay for carrying costs, for the Capilano Road condominium;

(c) two loan agreements purportedly dated October 27, 2021 and November 5, 2021, for alleged loans in the additional sums of $100,000.00 and $300,000.00, said to be advanced to fund some of the renovations undertaken on the Walker Road property, to be repaid on the sale of the property, or on June 1, 2024, when the mortgage was due. These agreements bear interest at 7%; and

(d) additional documents that the husband signed, purporting to document “most of” the husband’s additional borrowings of $105,700.00 (or $107,200.00) after that, for living expenses.

E. The Conflicting Statements Made About the Husband’s Business Interests and Income

60In her initial affidavit sworn February 7, 2025, the wife says that the husband is a “well-known, well-respected and solidly established jewellery designer who has received the numerous awards listed on the website [JiliaevJewellery.com]”. She says his family claims to be a “dynasty of jewellery designers, dating back to the eighteen centuries”. She says that during the relationship, he operated the jewelry businesses, and that financed the family’s “luxurious lifestyle”. She alleges the husband continues to operate a jewelry business here in Ontario, despite what he now claims to the contrary. The husband by contrast, says all the wife has pointed to, to prove the latter, is a website, and he says he tried his luck at “house flipping”, after the close of the family businesses in BC.

61The wife did not have comprehensive information about the ownership of the jewelry businesses when she swore her first affidavit in early 2025 (when her motion then included a request for much disclosure). She was able to identify through corporate searches though, that the directors changed over time. The husband was either named as a director, or removed, at different points in time, that the wife theorizes conveniently lined up with the timing of different important events in this case.

62The husband provided additional information about the businesses and his shareholding in them thereafter. In his initial affidavit sworn June 2, 2025, the husband says that there were in fact two businesses, named Jiliaev Jewellery Ltd. (the “operating company”) and Jilliaev Jewellery Collection (a “holding company”). Even though he was a shareholder in both, both were really “businesses belong[ing] to [his] parents”.

63The husband says that after immigrating to Canada in 1997, his parents re-established a boutique in Vancouver, focusing on high-end, custom-designed pieces featuring diamonds and other precious and semi-precious gemstones”. The husband says the establishment of the businesses in Canada required “significant upfront capital”, which emanated entirely from his parents. He says that neither he nor his brother invested any capital into the business. And he says that “recent economic downturns have severely impacted the luxury jewelry sector, leading to declining demand and rising costs”, further compressing “already narrow profit margins”.

64The husband does not consider himself to be the owner of either company. He says that when he and his brother helped his parents in the businesses in the past, they functioned “more like employees”. He says they had no control over the businesses’ operations, and they were compensated for their work, with a salary until 2021. But how much he was compensated by way of a “salary” and whether that was appropriate compensation for his work, is by no means clear on the productions he has made, including in his own valuator’s income report.

65Despite his attempt to distance himself from ownership, the husband did own shares in both businesses, as indicated. According to the husband’s initial affidavit of June 2, 2025, the operating company was incorporated in 2000. Initially each of he and his parents held a 1/3 share in the operating company, but his inclusion as a shareholder was apparently just to assist his parents “with the incorporation process”, whatever that means. The husband says eight years later in 2008, the paternal grandmother was diagnosed with cancer, and he and his brother began assisting with administrative tasks. He also contributed to the design work.

66The husband says that the operating company was incorporated in 2008, and this time each of himself, his parents and now his brother were 25% shareholders, although again not in reality. The husband says that this corporation served primarily as a holding company, for the 2015 purchase of a commercial property on Hornby Street in Vancouver, for $1,138,500.00. The purchase of the Hornby Street commercial property, he says, was financed with shareholder loans from his parents apparently, and a mortgage from RBC for the balance. He says his parents also loaned the company a further $500,000.00 for renovations.

67But what the holding company was used for, during the 7 year period between its incorporation in 2008 and 2015, was not explained. In this regard, the Court notes the other factual dispute that appears to have some relevance here, being the wife’s claim that there was in fact a different commercial property in which the husband had an interest too, before the acquisition of the Hornby Street commercial property.⁷

68Apparently after the family acquired the Hornby Street property, they learned that the building could only be used for office space, and not for a showroom. In his initial affidavit of June 2, 2025, the husband says that there were substantial legal expenses due to subsequent litigation over this. Then the Covid-19 pandemic hit, which dealt a significant blow to the business. RBC eventually commenced an action respecting the sale of the property. So the husband says that the family sold the property in October of 2021 for $1,980,000.00. There were no remaining funds to distribute to him and his brother.⁸

F. The Conflicting Statements About the Parties’ Lifestyle

69The wife says that the parties lifestyle was “luxurious”. For instance, she says the husband and his family “demanded” that N. be registered in private school. She says that N. attended their “prestigious and expensive tennis club where she had a private trainer”. She says that they took her and the child on “expensive family vacations”, including to Costa Rica for weeks at a time. She says they paid for various tutors. She says they purchased designer clothing for the child.

70The wife says that she drove a Mercedes that the husband gifted to her. She says he also gave her expensive designer jewelry. The wife added in her Reply affidavit of July 24, 2025, that the parties went on two vacations per year, including regularly to Mexico, where they stayed at five star, all-inclusive resorts. She also made reference to a trip to Monaco, where the husband spent significant funds on clothes shopping for the child. Yet post-separation, the wife ended up with the child in a shelter, without proper support, and had to apply for subsidized housing in BC.

71In his initial affidavit of June 2, 2025, the husband says that the family’s lifestyle was “comfortable” but “far from luxurious” He minimized the wife’s statements, saying things like the Capilano Road condominium only had two bedrooms, or that her Mercedes was of an inferior B-class (i.e. less expensive than other models of Mercedes).

G. The Husband’s Valuation and Income Reports

72Disclosure did not come easy early on in this case; it should have. The husband eventually retained CBV Patrick McCade and produced two valuation reports dated December 15, 2025, setting out the value of his interests in the corporations at the date of marriage, and at both dates of separation. At an appearance before me on August 6, 2025, the husband also agreed to expand Mr. McCade’s mandate, to obtain an income analysis for the years 2019 to 2024, covering both dates of separation, up to what was then the most current income year. That income report was produced a bit later, on February 3, 2026.

73Mr. McCade used an adjusted book value method to determine the value of both the operating company and the holding company. He valued the husband’s interest in operating company at each of the date of marriage, and as at both dates of separation, as Nil. His report states that the husband’s percentage share of the holding company was worth $212,983.00 on the date of marriage (before tax), $123,618.00 (before tax) on the husband’s 2019 date of separation, and nothing on the wife’s 2024 date of separation (in part because the building it held no longer existed).

74Mr. McCade’s income analysis starts in 2019. It reveals what the husband was paid starting in 2019, two years before the family came to Ontario, up to 2024. In 2019, the husband purportedly was paid employment income of $9,000.00 only, which the expert then adjusted to $10,682. The other years after that right up until 2024, go no higher than $28,325.00 in 2024 (in one of two scenarios). After he came to Ontario, the husband reported self-employment income, as opposed to employment income through the businesses.

75What Mr. McCade’s analysis does not show (given that the years 2019-2024 only, and not earlier years, were analyzed), was whether the husband was properly compensated at the time of the 2011-2013 and the 2014 alleged loans from his parents. Despite the absence of expert analysis pre-dating 2019, there is some information in the Schedules to the Income Report summarizing the corporate financial statements from prior years, starting in 2016. And if that information is consistent with the financial state of affairs that existed earlier, for example between 2011-2014, it raises additional unanswered questions.

76That summary, starting in 2016, reveals that very little was paid in total salaries and wages going back as early as 2016.⁹ Now, that summary from 2016 onwards only, shows total salaries and wages, not broken down to show the portion that was paid to the husband. How much, if any of this the husband received, is not explained by the summary, therefore. But the overall totals are not great. In other words, even when the Court reviews the total salary expenses, the Court has questions about whether the husband was properly compensated for his work “as an employee” in the past.

77Mr. McCade’s analysis does show the husband’s income for 2021 (the last year of the businesses’ operations before the move). And it appears that in 2021, the husband was not properly compensated for his work as an “employee” either, when the tranches of funds totaling $400,000.00 for the purchase of the Walker Road property, were allegedly advanced as a loan to him

78The import of this in my view, is twofold. First, how this family lived on incomes as low as $10,000.00 per year seems impossible to explain whether either party’s account of their lifestyle, either “luxurious” or “comfortable”, represents the truth. People who earn $10,000.00 per year cannot afford Mercedes cars, even if they are “B-Class” only, BC condominiums, even if they are only two bedrooms, or trips to Mexico, Costa Rica, and Monaco, or tutors and private schools for their child.

79Second, whether the husband was properly compensated for his work in the family businesses at the material times, is relevant to the veracity of this assertion that the funds he received were loans (as opposed to some other attribution for the funds, such as proper compensation for his share of the sale proceeds of a commercial property held by a corporation, shares in which he owned, or proper compensation for his work in the businesses). Could it be, that if he was underpaid, the sums advances were re-cast as loans instead, for some reason? As I also explain below, the family businesses’ accounting records were a mess, further compounding the problems and the unanswered questions here.

H. The Contentious Onset of these Proceedings

80The husband put his credibility into issue right from the outset of this case, in a very contentious, and frankly cost inducing manner, to the wife.

81It was the husband, not the wife, who commenced this proceeding on June 24, 2024. He claimed a divorce and parenting orders only. Incidentally, he then said the parties’ date of separation was February 16, 2024, not June 2019 as he now maintains.

82Urgent parenting issues came then before the Court via a series of motions, almost immediately. MacPherson J. heard those motions on August 21, 2024, and rendered a ruling on August 23, 2024. His Endorsement of August 23, 2024 reveals that financial pressure was being exerted on the wife, and the husband was behaving in an underhanded way.

83At ¶ 18 of his ruling, MacPherson J. wrote that the date of separation was March 4, 2024. 2019 was not then a theory that the husband was even advancing, as I just indicated. MacPherson J. found that the separation happened when the wife and the child moved into a shelter for four months. The husband did not pay child support during that four month period, as I have indicated. By late June of 2024, the parties agreed that the wife and N. would move back to Vancouver. But there was a caveat. The child would first travel with the grandparents to Costa Rica for a month of vacation that summer. So the wife went to British Columbia on her own, while the child was away with the paternal grandparents, with the plan being for the child to join her later. But once the wife was out of Ontario, the husband blocked her telephone number and restricted communications with the child, according to the ruling.

84In addition to noting a number of inconsistencies in the husband’s affidavit material, MacPherson J. found that the wife had been the child’s primary parent, the relocation provisions in the Divorce Act had been complied with, and the husband had not only not objected to the proposed move, but he consented to it. MacPherson J. found that once the wife moved first without the child, the husband either reneged on the agreement, or that he had agreed to the move in a clandestine manner to get the mother out of Ontario, only to then file an Application in Ontario, to oppose the move.

85In the result, MacPherson J. allowed the move. This whole ordeal caused the wife to incur unnecessary costs right from the get go, for which she was only partially compensated by way of a costs Order. ¹⁰

86As far as I am concerned, this prima facie sneaky behaviour undermines the husband’s credibility. This conduct followed soon after the December 2023 and January 2024 financial transactions described above. This behaviour right out of the starting gate, contributes to my conclusion below, that the playing field has not been level here for some time, and that it needs some levelling.

PART III: ANALYSIS

A. Applicable Legal Principles Concerning Interim Disbursements

87The Court’s authority to award an interim disbursement is contained in rule 24(25) of the Family Law Rules. It reads, “[t]he court may make an order that a party pay an amount of money to another party to cover part or all of the expenses of carrying on the case, including legal fees”.

88Rule 24(25) is discretionary. In exercising its discretion, the Court should be guided by the primary objective of the Rules, in rules 2(2) to 2(4), which is to deal with cases justly. That means ensuring a fair procedure, among other things. The Court is required to apply all the rules to promote the primary objective. The parties and their representatives are required to help the Court promote that primary objective.

89As Rogers J. wrote at ¶ 3-6 of Stuart v. Stuart, 2001 CanLII 28261 (Ont. S.C.J.), family law is no longer a “guessing game” as to the facts. The duty to ensure a fair procedure means an equal ability to assess disclosure and tackle complex valuation issues. One party should not be disadvantaged by being unable to test the evidence of the other side.

90At ¶ 8 of Stuart v. Stuart, Rogers J. identified a number of themes that then presented in the case law in the family context. These themes inform how the Court exercises its discretion to order interim disbursements (or not), under rule 24(25). The principles that I apply to this long motion brought by the wife are:

(a) The onus is on the wife, to demonstrate that her claims being advanced are meritorious;

(b) The wife must demonstrate that absent funds, she will not be able to present or analyze settlement offers, or pursue her entitlements;

(c) The wife must demonstrate that the expenses for which she seeks funds, are necessary;

(d) Some cases say the exercise of discretion should be limited to exceptional cases. However at ¶ 9, Rogers J. held that the [then “new”] Family Law Rules called upon the Court to exercise its discretion in a less stringent manner: see also Ludmer v. Ludmer, 2012 ONSC 4478 ¶ 15; and Fiorellino-DiPoce v. DiPoce, 2019 ONSC 7074 ¶ 13, decided subsequently, which re-state this;

(e) That is because interim disbursements may be granted to level the playing field. At ¶ 9, Rogers J. wrote that levelling the playing field means allowing a person to test disclosure, make or consider offers, and to go to trial; and

(f) Monies might be advanced against an equalization payment. But it is not necessary to order a disbursement, only as an advance.

B. The Threshold Merit to the Wife’s Claims

(1) Applicable Legal Principles

91Rea v. Rea, 2016 ONSC 382 is one of several interim disbursement cases that discuss the amount of merit that needs to be established. When the Rea v. Rea decision was written, that case was at its early stages. At ¶ 24, Douglas J. found there was no reason to conclude that the claims advanced by either party were without merit, saying “[a]ll claims advanced by the parties are, prima facie, meritorious at this early stage of these proceedings….”

92Like in Rea v. Rea, this case before me is still at its (relatively) early stages. But that is not the only factor that informs my analysis about merit.

(2) Merit Analysis Regarding the Wife’s Claims that the Husband Engaged in Fraud Respecting the Purchase and Sale of the Walker Road Property

93I begin with the dispute about the date of separation, and its relation to the wife’s claims that the husband, and then the grandparents engaged in fraud. The wife has satisfied me that there is sufficient merit underpinning both her position on the date of separation, and her claims respecting the husband’s conduct when he paid approximately $1 million of the Walker Road property’s sale proceeds to the grandparents.

94Real estate documents now produced show that the husband bought and sold the Walker Road property in 2021 and 2023 without identifying that he had a spouse on certain of those documents.¹¹ But if the parties had not yet separated, and if they ordinarily occupied the Walker Road property at the time the husband sold it (as the wife said they did), then the Walker Road property was, at the time of its sale, a matrimonial home. That is because section 18(1) of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3., as amended (the “FLA”) defines a matrimonial home as follows:

Every property in which a person has an interest and that is or, if the spouses have separated, was at the time of separation ordinarily occupied by the person and his or her spouse as their family residence is their matrimonial home.

95And if the property was a matrimonial home within the meaning of section 18(1), then the wife’s consent to the sale was required: see section 21 of the Family Law Act.

96On the one hand, perhaps militating against her position, the wife’s 2020 tax return says she was separated. The husband also points out that the wife claimed that she did not reside with him (or have a partner or spouse) on certain other documents in 2021 and 2023.

97The wife says that to the extent that she made these statements on certain documents, she was the victim of abuse and coercive control in the relationship. She says that she neither read nor understood documents that contain her signature, and which refer to a date of separation earlier than 2024. She says that the husband gave her the documents to sign, and she did not have the power to object. One document, she specifically says, she did not even write. While the trial judge may believe or disbelieve some of that after cross-examination, and while the trial judge may even have problems with the wife’s attempt to distance herself from these documents, the husband’s statements about the 2019 date are not exactly above reproach either.

98In support of the wife’s March 4, 2024 date of separation, and militating against the husband’s earlier 2019 date of separation, are the following facts:

(a) The husband and wife moved to Ontario separately (in time), but then lived together after the husband’s alleged 2019 date of separation;

(b) When he first launched this proceeding, the husband more or less agreed with the wife’s date of separation, only to change that position concurrent with changes in counsel. The wife submits this change in the date of separation offers a convenient defense, to her claims of fraud;

(c) Although perhaps he did so in obiter, MacPherson J. already accepted a March 4, 2024 date of separation. The husband’s credibility has already been questioned by the MacPherson J.;

(d) The wife pointed to the fact that husband referred to himself as married on his 2019, 2020, and 2022 tax returns.¹² She also pointed me to an email that the husband sent in February of 2023, referring to her as “his wife”;

(e) The husband’s claim that the move from BC to Ontario, despite the separation, was to secure “superior schooling for N.” and “enhanced career prospects for both of us”, does not make sense to this Court, on this record. Elsewhere he claimed that the educational plan was for N. to go to a public school or a Catholic school in Ontario, and she only went to a private school after they could not secure a space due to “overcrowding”, whatever that means. If the plan was to come here for “superior schooling” I fail to see how pursuing a plan for publicly funded school is any superior to what could have been in place in BC. And neither his career, nor the wife’s, was enhanced once here. To the contrary, according to the husband, he changed careers entirely, to become an unsuccessful house flipper; and

(f) The wife has filed the additional affidavits of Richard Himelfarb sworn December 14, 2024, her sister Tamila Khyrullaeva, sworn December 28, 2024, and Bonnie Tse sworn December 28, 2024, all of which speak to a date of separation that post-dates the husband’s June 2019 date of separation, and/or which support the wife’s March 4, 2024 date of separation.

99Without needing to conclusively make the call (the trial judge can do that), there is sufficient merit to the wife’s argument that the parties separated on March 4, 2024, that the Walker Road property was a matrimonial home when the husband sold it, and the husband misrepresented his spousal status on the real estate documents. Starting with the date of separation dispute, the wife’s arguments rooted in fraud are not entirely devoid of merit, as the husband tried to argue.

(3) Merit Analysis Regarding the Wife’s Claims that the Husband and the Grandparents Engaged in a Fraudulent Conveyance When He Paid the Grandparents Approximately $1 Million from the Walker Road Property’s Sale, Depleting the Proceeds

100The husband argues that the wife’s fraud claims are “fabricated” and “wholly without evidentiary foundation”. The Court disagrees, particularly respecting the latter comment about the lack of evidentiary foundation.¹³

101On the one hand, the Court does find the timing of the transaction curious, insofar as it concerns the wife’s conduct. Although the husband didn’t identify her as a spouse on the sale documents, she was aware of the sale. The husband says she participated in it. The veracity of her explanation for this will have to be explored at trial.

102At the same time, the Court can’t help but remark, that this entire conundrum could have been avoided, had the husband taken a clear position on the date of separation, involved the wife in signing the sale documents when he sold the Walker Road property, and parked the sale proceeds, until questions about his income, his interests in the corporations, and the validity of the alleged loans from the grandparents could be properly determined. But that is not the path the husband chose. Whether the grandparents were actually entitled to the money he transferred to them, is by no means clear on this record.

103Then there are the wife’s disputes about the legitimacy of the various promissory notes and loan agreements that the husband has produced. Each of her arguments have some merit that is worthy of exploration.

104First, one of the wife’s principal arguments, is that these documents were made up after the fact, signed recently and retroactively backdated. That is why she seeks a disbursement for either a handwriting expert, or an ink expert, or both.

105This assertion that these are after the fact documents, is not without any evidentiary foundation at this point. Some of these loan documents were apparently prepared by an accounting firm. The grandparents produced an unsworn letter from a person with the accounting firm dated January 8, 2025, saying that the accounting firm had in fact been involved in providing “consulting an documentation services” in 2011, 2014 and 2021.

106Previously when disclosure was being hotly contested in this case, the wife asked for production of the accounting files. On August 6, 2025, the husband consented to “obtain from accountant Ksana Oleinikova and/or Navigator Consulting Group Inc., any files in her/Navigator’s possession that pertain to the preparation of promissory notes or loan agreements”.

107No file was then obtained; it apparently doesn’t exist. Nothing more came of my production Order of August 6, 2025, except for an invoice from June or July 2021, for consulting. That does not address the accounting firm’s involvement in papering the alleged loans in 2011 or 2014 at all, it does not even fully address the alleged 2021 loan. The trial judge can decide what weight to place on the letter, the absence of files from this accounting firm, and I suppose the accountant’s oral evidence if called at trial, assuming it will align with the contents of the unsworn letter. But for the purposes of this motion, the absence of a file is clearly relevant, and speaks to the wife’s argument that these loan documents are not authentic.

108Second, there is a question in this case about whether the husband even needed to borrow money from his parents between 2011 and 2013 to buy the Capilano Road condominium at all, when he purportedly signed the first promissory note. Yet again, the wife already caught the husband in an inconsistent statement, about whether he owned and sold the previous condominium, before that. There needs to be cross-examination on the veracity of the husband’s mid-motion claim, not initially disclosed, that he gave that money from the sale of the previous condominium to his parents. If the husband did indeed have another source of funds, then the veracity of the 2011 alleged loan, which in turn accumulated interest over the years and formed a not insignificant part of the basis for the husband’s 2024 payment of approximately $1 million to his parents, is in issue.

109Third, the veracity of the husband’s claim that he borrowed the next $100,000.00 for carrying costs, and therefore the validity of the next promissory note of June 23, 2014, is also in issue. No one, the husband’s expert included, has looked into what the husband actually earned before 2019. If the husband was undercompensated, then doesn’t that call into question the reasonableness of characterizing any advances from his parents in the past as a loan? The valuator that the wife wants to retain, may indeed be inclined to look into this.

110Or, even if the husband proves that he did not legitimately earn a more significant income stream back then and the advances to him are properly characterized, the wife seeks to impute an income to the husband from a pattern of gifts or other payments from his parents. This too, is perhaps alternative to her arguments about the loans. The wife’s argument to impute an income to the husband, is not devoid of merit: see Bak v. Dobell, 2007 ONCA 304; see also Korman v. Korman, 2015 ONCA 578.

111Fourth, the situation respecting the latter two loan documents of October 27, 2021 and November 5, 2021, is similar. These documents coincide with the timing of the sale of the Hornby Street commercial property in BC. While the husband claims he did not share in the sale proceeds, the wife claims that he did. All of which is tied up further in the competing arguments about whether the husband also had an interest in a previous commercial property, whether it is reasonable for the grandparents to hold all of the shareholders loans, and the adequacy of his compensation in 2021 as well.

112For the purposes of determining threshold merit on this motion, these issues too, are worthy of exploration. There is yet another potential competing explanation as to where the 2021 funds came from. There is not, as the husband said, a lack of “evidentiary foundation”.

113Fifth, separate from all this, the Court queried during the motion, whether there were any issues with limitations periods, as the first alleged loan advance is as much as 15 years old at this point. Counsel had not looked into that fully, and so I will not analyze this one further at this time, but perhaps this will be looked into and explored.

114Finally, even if there are no limitations period issues per se, and even if the promissory notes and loan documents are ultimately found to be authentic, the wife is separately asking the Court to discount the debt based on established principles in the case law: see Cade v. Rotstein, 2004 CanLII 24269 (Ont. C.A.) ¶ 8; see Rados v. Rados, 2019 ONCA 627 ¶ 13, 14, 20-26; see also Zavarella v. Zavarella, 2013 ONCA 720 ¶ 39. After all, the parents were never repaid for any of these advances until less than two months before the wife’s date of separation. Allegedly, they even previously agreed to postpone repayment when the husband sold the Capilano Road condominium in 2021 to fund the family’s move to Ontario, at a time, according to the husband, that he and the wife were already separated. Then, he says, they loaned him more money.

115The end result is that there were no repayments for years and years. Counsel for the wife even argued that the husband cannot fully prove that advances were made in some instances.

116There is sufficient merit to the wife’s request to discount some or all of the debt too, as an additional or alternative argument to the several ones summarized above.

(4) Merit Analysis Regarding the Wife’s Claim for an Equalization Payment

117Throughout the lifespan of this motion, the Court was given numerous, sometimes changing draft net family property statements and comparison net family property statements. By the time the motion was ultimately argued a year after it was originally scheduled to be heard, the Court had before it two fresh comparison net family property statements, showing the parties’ competing positions, in two different scenarios.¹⁴ I need only refer to one of these comparison statements to address the threshold merit of the wife’s claim to an equalization payment. ¹⁵

118The husband was prepared for the purposes of this motion, for the Court to use the wife’s March 4, 2024 date of separation.¹⁶ Counsel argued that the wife’s position on these statements contained a number of inaccuracies. I also need not address that in any detail. I can simply refer to the husband’s position on the statement, to address threshold merit.

119The husband’s position is that he will not owe an equalization payment to the wife as at her March 4, 2024 date of separation. That is because his net family property is negative (i.e. 0). He says his net family property is Nil because:

(a) The value of the husband’s business interests (which he said were not really his anyway) had some value on the date of marriage, but no value by the wife’s date of separation, (i.e. a decrease in value over the marriage);

(b) The husband has a date of marriage deduction for the Capilano Road condominium that he no longer had on the date of separation (i.e. a decrease in value over the marriage);

(c) The husband owed debt to his parents on the date of marriage ($350,000.00 + interest) that no longer existed on the wife’s date of separation, because he paid it off in early January 2024 with the Walker Road sale proceeds (i.e. a corresponding increase in his net worth). But this is offset by the decreases in (a) and (b) above; and

(d) The husband did not have any sale proceeds from Walker Road property by the wife’s March 4, 2024 date of separation, because of the payment to his parents in (c) above, less than two months earlier.

120But if the Court at trial adds back in the $1,028,487.00 that the husband says he paid to his parents in January 2024, because it was not properly owing to them, either on the wife’s theory that was a fraudulent transaction, in a section 5(6) analysis, or on some other legal basis, and if the Court gives effect to the wife’s claims to remove or discount the husband’s debt to his parents, then the husband does owe the wife an equalization payment. Using the husband’s numbers, modified for these adjustments to illustrate this, the equalization payment becomes $123,945.12 (see the husband’s position on the Comparison Net Family Property Statement, modified as per the above by the Court, which I have labelled as the Court’s Version 1).¹⁷

121And, if the business is removed entirely, based for example on the husband’s claim that he was a shareholder for administrative convenience only, and he is not an actual owner, then he should not be entitled to a date of marriage deduction for the holding company’s value that he didn’t later share in, on the disposition of the commercial property. In that scenario, the husband’s equalization payment owing to the wife increases to $228,491.12 (see the husband’s position in the Comparison Net Family Property Statement, modified by the Court, which I have labelled Version 2).

122Or the equalization payment could be different (higher or lower), once the wife’s valuator reviews Mr. McCabe’s reports, if he comes up with different numbers.

123I acknowledge the husband’s counsel’s argument that there are a number of “ifs” here. But that is the entire point of the not onerous threshold for merit. Otherwise the wife would always be in a ‘catch 22’ situation. The wife cannot prove any of the ‘ifs’ conclusively until trial. She needs to get there. She needs funds to get there. Without the funds, she cannot get there. The resolution of these ‘ifs’ will never happen.

124Sometimes that could be appropriate. But not in this case before me, where there is sufficient individual threshold merit to each of these ‘ifs’.

125I find there is adequate merit that the wife may be entitled to an equalization payment, at the end of the day. Even if there wasn’t, the wife is not required to prove entitlement to an equalization payment, to secure an interim disbursement: see Stuart v. Stuart ¶ 14; see also ¶ 100(4) of Samis (Guardian of) v. Samis, 2011 ONCJ 273, per Sherr J.

(5) Merit Analysis Regarding the Wife’s Claim for Child and Spousal Support

126Post-separation, the wife has continued to be N.’s primary parent. The wife has a meritorious claim for child support. There is sufficient merit to the proposition that the wife has an entitlement to spousal support.

127To pursue these claims, the husband’s income needs to be determined, which is the husband’s onus to prove. There are unanswered questions about what he produced.

(6) The Businesses’ Bookkeeping and Accounting Was Not Properly Done In the First Instance

128There may also be issues with the reliability of the source documents upon which the husband’s valuator relied.

129Earlier on during the prior proceedings, after the husband finally agreed to retain a valuator, he alerted the Court to the prospect of some delay. He said that when he was organizing the necessary documents to give to the valuator, he discovered “significant issues with the accounting for the companies” and so he engaged a new accounting firm to “review and rectify” over 10 years of records.

130In her supplementary affidavit sworn March 3, 2026, the wife says that there is nothing in the subsequent valuation reports to explain what “errors and inaccuracies” were discovered. She says she asked for, but had not been given the original accounting records, or any explanation.

131The husband denies that no explanation was given at all. In addition to what he says in his affidavit sworn April 8, 2026 (that his valuator was given and reviewed the corrected documents), the husband says that his counsel had obtained a written response from the accountant who corrected the records, and forwarded it to the wife’s lawyer on April 7, 2026.

132The accountant’s response is far from being fully responsive. Verbatim, she says:

The originally filed financial information was not prepared in accordance with applicable accounting standards (4200S). Instead, the corporate tax returns were prepared using internal bookkeeping records that contained numerous inaccuracies.

No proper year-end adjustments were performed. Bank transactions were not reconciled to supporting purchase invoices, and entries were recorded on a document-by-document basis without adequate verification. This resulted in duplicate postings and material inconsistencies in the accounting records.

While revenue from regular operations appears to have been recorded with reasonable reliability, other sources of income, such as reimbursements for leasehold improvements and insurance proceeds, were either incomplete or not recorded at all. In addition, cost of goods sold was recognized in incorrect reporting periods.

As a result, the internally prepared financial statements did not fairly present the financial position or results of operations of the company and could not be relied upon for financial reporting purposes.

The financial statements were amended to ensure that all revenue and expenses are properly recognized and presented in accordance with applicable accounting principles, and to provide a fair and accurate representation of the companies’ financial position.

We can provide you with the original trial balances and the amended ones if needed.

133While an explanation was provided, the actual, precise and specific details of the apparently extensive changed accounting records, was not produced (i.e. the original accounting records, before the changes).

134A review of the original records before they were changed, may raise further questions about how the husband’s compensation, the alleged loans, the shareholders loans, and the sale proceeds from the commercial property were recorded initially, and whether there were any post-separation changes to line up the accounting practices with the husband’s theory of his case, now advanced. And if changes were made in this regard, then that is a significant issue about the extent to which the corrected documentation upon which the husband’s valuator relied is reliable. All of which is another reason why the wife needs her own expert to undertake a review of this.

I. The Wife’s Income and Financial Circumstances

135Having addressed threshold merit, I turn to the wife’s ability to finance this litigation on her own. She lacks that ability.

136I find that the wife is without significant income or other financial resources. I find that without a disbursement, she will not be able to pursue these matters.

137The wife’s education and employment history is in the field of early childhood education. In her initial affidavit of February 7, 2025, the wife says that after she returned to BC, she obtained a contract at a day care center earning $25.00 per hour, at 37.5 hours per week (annualized to $48,769.00). While she then said that her contract would end in August of 2025, it appears she has continued to work. Her Financial Statement sworn March 2, 2026 reveals current annual income, now in the amount of $59,400.00, exclusive of child support and child tax benefits.

138It bears repeating that when the wife initially left the relationship, she went to a shelter. The husband did not initially pay child support. He only began paying child support of $500.00 per month in the fall of 2024.¹⁸ Whether this is adequate, the Court does not know, as the determination of the husband’s income is tied up in all of the above. The wife has not been able to pursue interim spousal support yet, for similar reasons. The wife was put to the expense of the early parenting motion.

139Now the husband did pay $15,000.00 to the wife in June of 2024 (money he says he obtained from his parents), to assist her with her support and her CRA debt. He says he made other uncharacterized payments to the wife too, between March 11, 2024 and April 10, 2025, totaling $22,000.00. These will have to be accounted for. Indeed, $10,000.00 of that amount is being credited now, pursuant to the consent Order dated April 2, 2025, which requires this.

140Finally, the husband claims that he also gave the wife some jewelry, which he estimates has a value of $53,000.00. That, in my view, is of little assistance here. Firstly, the wife says it is not worth that much. Regardless, the wife and the child cannot meet their expenses, and the wife cannot fund this lawsuit with jewelry, short of selling it. Jewelry is illiquid.

141In addition to her having minimal income, her receiving minimal child support, and her receiving no spousal support yet on account of the ongoing uncertainty about the husband’s income, the wife’s March 2, 2026 Financial Statement reveals very few assets. She mostly has debt.

142Other than her car and the jewelry, the wife had a mere $1,382.75 in the bank at the time she swore that Financial Statement, contrasted with $122,655.20 in debt. $88,000.00 of the debt disclosed on the Financial Statement pertains to money borrowed from her sister to pay for legal fees, and to relocate back to BC. The rest is tax debt, credit card debt, and money she owes pursuant to a consumer proposal that she entered into, because she could not manage her debt. The wife’s supplementary affidavit of March 3, 2026 reveals that the debt owing to her sister increased $98,000.00, and her lawyer was then carrying an account receivable of $19,000.00 for unpaid legal fees.¹⁹

143The wife says that her sister cannot loan her any more funds to fund this litigation, to pay for the child’s expenses, or for any other purpose. The wife says she cannot borrow from other sources, because of her consumer proposal.

144I am satisfied therefore, that the wife not only lacks funds, but she cannot access funds from any other source.

J. The Wife’s Inability to Repay the Award

145It may be that the wife will be unable to repay any award for an interim disbursement, if for example the Court at trial finds that her entitlements are less than the disbursement being awarded herein. But the inability to repay the award is not disqualifying. To find otherwise, would undermine the overriding objective of enabling an impecunious litigant to pursue a meritorious claim: see Makepeace v. Brenninkmeyer, 2024 ONSC 1405 ¶ 19.

K. The Husband’s Ability (or Inability) to Pay A Disbursement

146The husband says he is without resources to pay a disbursement. According to his financial statement sworn April 8, 2026, the husband claims to have current gross business income of only $29,400.00. He claims to have no savings in the bank, and he claims to still owe his parents $192,743.00, despite already paying them over $1 million. He also claims to owe $60,000.00 to someone named Ellanah Sinclair, to fund the cost of the valuations. He says he is living in a shared condominium with his brother.

147If this is true, these are relevant considerations. Citing other jurisprudence, at ¶ 15 of Makepeace v. Brenninkmeyer, Faieta J. added to the list of considerations from Stuart v. Stuart, that the opposing party, in this case that is the husband, should have the resources, or access to resources, to pay the disbursements requested [my emphasis added]. But unlike the wife, the true state of affairs regarding the husband’s actual financial circumstances, is less than clear.

148I am unpersuaded by the husband’s argument, that this motion is a disguised attempt on the part of the wife, to access his parents’ resources, in circumstances where the wife did not seek a disbursement from them. While he may in the end be right about the value of the wife’s family law entitlements, this argument may equally pose yet another ‘catch 22’ problem’. The husband depleted resources in early 2024 when he paid his parents. Had he not done that, then there would have been money available, sitting in trust, from which the Court could consider allowing the wife some access. But he acted first. If the husband’s actions are found at trial to have been improper, then it was not his parents’ money; it was his.

149And as Faieta J. said, the Court considers not just whether a payor has resources, but also whether he can access resources. On the husband’s own account, he has had no problem accessing resources from his parents over the years. It bears repeating, yet again, that there are also unanswered questions about the husband’s compensation going back many years, it is ultimately the husband’s onus to prove his income, and his assets and liabilities on the relevant dates, and he has not yet done so persuasively, at least not until the wife gets an opportunity to have his expert’s analyses scrutinized.

150I did not find persuasive the husband’s counsel’s argument that the wife should have compelled the grandparents’ attendance on this motion, and sought relief against them. The wife is not required to litigate this motion against three persons instead of one. She chose to seek the disbursement against the husband.

151I am unpersuaded that the husband cannot recover a fraction of the funds from the sale of the Walker Road property to cover the disbursement being ordered, if that is where he has to seek access to these resources, just as easily as he transferred that money to his parents in the first place. He and his parents are aligned in this case, and there is a long history of money allegedly flowing between them.

152At this point, the disbursement is ordered as against the husband, whom I find based on history, has the resources, or access to resources, to fund it.

L. The Playing Field is Not Level

153The husband argues that the playing field is level. I disagree. The playing field is not level here.

154The husband and his parents control the money. They have controlled the disclosure. They have controlled the yet to be fully explained amendments to the accounting records. This matter is sufficiently complex. There are a myriad of unanswered questions. The husband’s behaviour during this litigation has also contributed to a not level playing field, from the outset.

M. Necessity and the Wife’s Budget

155In his Factum, the husband cites various authorities, to point out that the wife’s claim for an interim disbursement was lacking in detail as to what she needed, and why. At one point, I would have agreed with the husband that the wife’s motion was lacking in some detail, and perhaps premature. In fact, when the husband wrote that Factum for this motion, that was at a time in the prior proceedings when this motion was then supposed to be argued in August of 2025. But it got adjourned, in part based on prematurity, after the husband said he was going to retain a valuator. Now that the reports have been produced, the wife has updated the record, with better details. And so in this new context, the husband’s arguments changed to challenge the excess in the wife’s budget that she has placed before the Court, rather than resting on a more general argument, about its initial lack of detail.

(1) Professional Fees for A Valuator

156The wife intends to retain Steven Rayson, CBV. According to his letter dated March 1, 2026, the wife intends to undertake her own valuation analysis and income report. The wife seeks funds to pay for Mr. Rayson’s valuation work.

157Mr. Rayson says that he would normally require a slightly lower retainer, but “due to the high level of conflict”, he expects this work to cost more. He therefore quoted between $46,500.00 and $52,545.00 plus HST.

158I considered whether this was excessive, in that perhaps the wife’s valuator could simply review and critique the husband’s reports, rather than undertake an entirely new set of reports. And the wife’s valuator may be able to do this in part.

159However, the wife has identified gaps in Mr. McCade’s analysis, just as has the Court identified potential gaps. For example, the wife has persuaded the Court that her intention to look at lifestyle issues is reasonable. The husband’s valuator did not do this. The wife’s valuator may find it necessary to look at the income situation at sample periods of time, prior to 2019, which Mr. McCade did not do either.

160There was no sworn evidence placed before the Court about what the husband spent on Mr. McCade. But speaking as an officer of the Court, Ms. Gordon told the Court that the husband paid him $40,000.00. Therefore, I will allocate as part of the disbursement being ordered a similar amount.

161I recognize this is less than what the wife’s valuator said he would require, because of the “high level of conflict”. It is imperative that there not be another repeat of what went on during the first year of the case respecting disclosure. If additional documents are reasonably required by the valuator, and there is any obstructionist behaviour, this will only increase the wife’s costs, and there may be further financial consequences to that. The Court expects the wife’s valuator to be put in a position for his analysis to be done efficiently and smoothly.

(2) Handwriting and Ink Dating Analysis

162The wife originally sought funds to retain multiple experts to undertake a handwriting analysis and ink dating analysis. This is the area that her request for disbursements was perhaps most obviously excessive, and not entirely necessary.²⁰ I agree with the husband’s counsel on this point, in part.

163It seems to me on this record, that the handwriting analysis is unnecessary. There is no dispute (as far as I am aware) as to the fact that the documents were signed; the issue is the timing of the documents having been created and signed. Even if I am mistaken and both kinds of analysis are warranted, the Court must be mindful of proportionality. To some degree, the wife may have to decide which of her arguments are the strongest, and pursue those.

164But the wife’s counsel then tempered this request during oral argument. The figures quoted in the footnote below are for the analysis of multiple documents, and multiple signatures on multiple documents. Ms. Koren said that samples only could be analyzed instead. I agree this is a reasonable tailoring of the initial request. I am prepared to award a further $25,000.00 for this, consistent with the wife’s pared down request for funds for ink dating, for certain samples only, during oral submissions.

165To have this analysis done, the wife requires the original documents. When the disclosure motion against the grandparents was argued on August 6, 2025, the wife had not retained any experts yet, and the grandparents objected to turning over the originals. I commented on that in my August 6, 2025 Endorsement. At the risk of repeating myself, once the wife retains her expert, counsel are to cooperate respecting productions of the originals to the expert, for the analysis to proceed.

(3) Prior Legal Fees

166Rule 24(25) of the Family Law Rules authorizes the Court to award an advance sum for legal fees. The wife includes in her request for a disbursement, sums for past legal fees.

167I am not prepared to award amounts for the past legal fees because:

(a) The wife has borrowed funds from her sister (i.e. she has accessed other sources of funding already);

(b) The wife has already recovered some costs from MacPherson J. for the August 2024 parenting motion. To the extent that the wife’s budget includes any fees relating to that motion, for the difference between what the wife spent and the lower amount that MacPherson J. ordered in costs, that is not proper; and

(c) While Ms. Koren is apparently carrying an account receivable, costs of this current motion have not yet been adjudicated. That will happen in due course. The amount of costs, if any, will depend on the submissions, and the Court’s yet to be undertaken analysis about that.

(4) Future Legal Fees

168I do agree though, that there should be some budget for future legal fees, for steps yet to be taken. But the wife’s budget in this regard includes estimates for multiple motions that may or may not be necessary. That includes a request for funding to defend against a summary judgment motion that the grandparents want to bring, that may never be brought.

169During the prior proceedings in this case, the grandparents’ counsel did tell the Court, that they want out of this proceeding, and perhaps will move to do so by way of a summary judgment motion. But the grandparents need leave to bring that motion. If they intend to still seek it, the grandparents’ counsel is going to have to explain to this Court at the next case management date, exactly how some of the issues in this case, like the validity of their loans, are capable of resolution on a summary judgment motion. If leave is given, the wife may need to seek costs recovery after the fact, if she is successful. On this motion, I am not prepared to award further funding for a future summary judgment motion that may never be brought.

170So having considered the submissions about what might be a more modest and reasonable amount for future legal fees (including the alternative arguments from the husband’s counsel),²¹ I am prepared to award the sums of $15,000.00 for questioning, and $7,500.00 for preparation for a Settlement Conference and a Trial Scheduling Conference.

171That leaves the cost of the trial. Perhaps, like the summary judgment motion, a trial will never proceed, but at this point, and given what has transpired here to date, that is by no means clear. Without predetermining the length of this trial, which has not yet been planned out, I will estimate for a five day trial. Whatever it ends up being, the parties are going to have to be efficient, which is to include the use of affidavits in substitution for much of their evidence in chief, and the preparation of joint documents books. If I allocate the sum of $15,000.00 per day for trial, that adds another $60,000.00 to the disbursement.

172These are my best estimates right now. I cannot calculate with complete precision what the cost of these further steps will be, how long a trial might take, and what might then be on the table. Five days may be too conservative. Perhaps it won’t be. Perhaps the parenting issues will settle for example, given that the mother and the child are back in BC pursuant to MacPherson J.’s Order. The wife isn’t necessarily entitled to an advance order for full recovery of her trial expenses, anyway.

(5) Total Disbursement

173Therefore, I am prepared to award the wife a disbursement in the amount of $137,500.00. This is after deduction of the sum of $10,000.00 already advanced pursuant to the consent Order of April 2, 2025, explained earlier.²²

N. Summary and Conclusions Respecting the Wife’s Motion for Interim Disbursements

174In summary, the Court finds the wife is entitled to an interim disbursement in the amount of $137,500.00 because:

(a) The wife has satisfied the Court that her claims are sufficiently meritorious;

(b) The wife is without resources to fund the cost of her case;

(c) Absent a disbursement, she will not be able to settle her case or pursue her entitlements;

(d) The Court finds the modified amounts, above, to be necessary;

(e) The Court finds the husband has, or can access to the funds needed to pay the disbursement; and

(f) The playing field needs to be leveled.

O. Allocation

175The wife’s counsel argued with reference to various cases about how courts allocate interim disbursements when ordered. Because of the Court’s inability to quantify what the wife’s entitlements at the end of this case will be with more precision right now, the disbursement will be uncharacterized at this time. That is one of the options available in the case law that the wife cited. The trial judge can decide against what it should be credited, or if appropriate, whether it should be repaid, and if so, over what time period. Or it can be allocated between the parties on consent, in any final settlement, should this matter settle prior to trial.

176It is worth reminding the parties that they are free to make offers at any time. They can seek on consent a date before me for a Settlement Conference that is earlier than what I am providing for below, if they feel they can have substantive and meaningful settlement discussions. They can do that even before all of the above steps are completed.

P. Next Steps

177When I eventually heard this motion on May 13 2026, I said I would set the next steps in this case, in this ruling.

178Barring some unforeseen event, the next step before the Court, should be a Settlement Conference. I am ordering the parties to book that now through the trial coordinator’s office. Given my available dates (currently booking into December), it will be several months from now anyway, which should be enough time for the wife to get her expert analyses done (assuming complete cooperation).

179The parties should not turn any other routine procedural issues that may arise, into major area of contention. Everyone is represented by experienced counsel, and so I trust counsel should be able to sort out such issues, such as if the wife’s valuator needs some additional documents not captured by Mr. McCade’s scope of review documents or any other productions already made. But if they cannot, I may be contacted through the trial coordinator’s office, and I will schedule a TBST date earlier to sort it out. The Court hopes that will not be necessary.

180At the hearing on May 13, 2026, the husband and wife agreed to questioning. They should schedule that, to include the grandparents. (The grandparents were not there to consent, but I imagine counsel can sort this out too). If they cannot, I may be contacted for a TBST date to address that. Questioning should probably wait until after the wife produces her expert reports, unless the parties agree to proceed with it earlier, for some reason that make sense.

Q. Costs

181I encourage the parties to settle costs of this motion. If they cannot, then a timetable for the exchange of costs submissions, and restrictions on what may be filed, is set out below.

PART IV: ORDER

182I make the following Orders:

(a) The Applicant husband shall pay to the Respondent wife an interim disbursement in the amount of $137,500.00, within 30 days;

(b) The parties are to book a Settlement Conference before me, though the Trial Coordinator’s Office. Other next steps are set out above in the section of these Reasons for Decision that address next steps (Part III, Section P.);

(c) If the parties cannot settle costs, the wife may submit her costs submissions in writing by July 9, 2026, limited to 5 pages double spaced, plus a Bill of Costs and any Offers to Settle. Case law is not required, but should be hyperlinked in the submissions. The wife’s costs claim is not to include any not recovered costs of the parenting motion. MacPherson J. already dealt with those costs; and

(d) The husband may file his costs submissions in writing, subject to the same restrictions on contents, length and attachments, by July 23, 2026.

Justice Alex Finlayson

Released: June 25, 2026

CITATION: Jilaev v. Nasriddinova, 2026 ONSC 3739

COURT FILE NO.: FC-24-1204

DATE: 20260625

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

Andrei Jilaev

Applicant Husband

– and –

Madina Nasriddinova

Respondent Wife

– and –

Svetlana Jiliaeva and Iouri Jiliaev

Added Respondents

REASONS FOR DECISION

Justice Alex Finlayson

Released: June 25, 2026

(a) $951,108.50 to pay off the mortgage to Equitable Bank;

(b) $98,310.00 for commissions and other levies;

(c) $1,028,487.00 to repay his parents’ loans, with interest;

(d) $30,000.00 for “loan repayment”;

(e) $27,050.00 to repay the wife’s sister; and

(f) The husband says he spent “the remainder” on “our joint living expenses”.

Footnotes

1. 1He is now working with his third lawyer(s).
2. 2When the wife’s counsel attached to her initial reply affidavit proof by way of a title search, the husband’s third lawyer said that the husband did have a previous property, but that on sale that money was given to his parents, too. That of course, was not in evidence as the husband had previously denied owning the condominium. It was also inconsistent with how he said his parents treated the funds allegedly owing to them when he sold the second condominium, too (discussed later).
3. 3But see again, the previous footnote.
4. 4Later on in his affidavit, he says that he borrowed $107,200.00 from his parents between February and November of 2023. He says that “most” of the latter amount of $107,200.00 is documented by more promissory notes. I am unclear whether these amounts are intended to be the same, or if in fact these are different amounts allegedly borrowed.
5. 5The wife did not, at the outset of this proceeding when she swore her first financial statement, have a complete or accurate accounting, as to the net sale proceeds or the distribution of these funds either. For example, she thought there were net sale proceeds of $1,051,448.77. The husband’s accounting of how the sale proceeds were spent in his initial affidavit of June 2, 2025 was:
6. 6In their affidavit sworn March 4, 2025, the grandparents say they were repaid $978,487.00, not $1,028,487.00.
7. 7Indeed, the wife told the Court in her initial affidavit of February 7, 2025, of two commercial properties. She says the jewelry business had a store front location in the Vancouver area, that this “original” location was sold, and the husband, his brother and their parents shared the proceeds in some fashion. The wife claims that the husband received proceeds of sale of $400,000.00, and not as a loan from his parents. She says that the husband and his brother then invested into the Hornby Street location. She alleges that location was sold in 2021, when the family moved to Ontario, and the husband did in fact receive money on the sale (i.e. $350,000.00), although an amount she believes that is less than he paid to acquire it. This is part of the wife’s alternative explanation, for where the money came from to acquire the Walker Road property.
8. 8Hence why the husband says he obtained $400,000.00 by way of loan from his parents in the fall of 2021.
9. 9Based on my review of those summaries, the operating company paid out total salaries and wages of just $17,255.00 in 2016, nothing in 2017, $12,557 in 2018, $54,037.00 in 2019, $14,775.00 in 2020, and $16,445.00 in 2021. Salaries and wages were not paid thereafter. The holding company paid out salaries of $53,054.00 in 2016, $18,994.00 in 2017, $27,889.00 in 2018, $5,624.00 in 2019, and nothing after that.
10. 10On September 16 2024, MacPherson J. ordered the husband to pay costs of $7,500.00; the wife’s claim, according to the Costs Endorsement, was for $21,000.00.
11. 11Notably, the husband, when represented by previous counsel, refused to waive privilege over the real estate lawyer’s file, which contained some of these documents. (He also erroneously took the position that all documents in that file were privileged, which they weren’t).
12. 12This is not entirely conclusive and there are more inconsistencies. The husband also said he was separated on his 2021, 2023 and 2024 tax returns.
13. 13Even if the wife doesn’t make out a case of fraud, there are also alternative theories of liability in her pleading. She has raised various trust claims against the grandparents for example. She may also pursue recovery as an unequal division: see for example section 5(6)(d) of the Family Law Act.
14. 14Even then, the Court had to direct that these be refiled, to correctly identify the husband’s position.
15. 15With these Reasons, I will release one of the Comparison Net Family Property Statements that the parties supplied, along with the Court’s modifications to it, labelled Version 1 and 2, to illustrate the points made in the following paragraphs. The Court will not include these Comparison Statements with these Reasons for publication, as they contain other data that need not be put out into the public domain.
16. 16Incidentally, if the husband’s 2019 date of separation prevails, there may not be an equalization payment at all. The parties were then living in BC: see section 15 of the Family Law Act. No one presented any evidence as to what the law of BC would provide instead.
17. 17This also assumes that the values of the husband’s business interests on the relevant dates are accurate, which has yet to be determined (they have yet to even be reviewed by the wife’s valuator). It assumes that the other figures are accurate, also yet to be proven.
18. 18In addition to his payments of $500.00 per month, beginning in April of 2025, he increased the amount to $1,130.00, to pay an additional $630.00 per month towards his share of the child’s school tuition in BC. But even then, his consent was only a temporary arrangement for a few months until the end of the year, and it only got extended when the wife’s long motion got adjourned for the second time, as a term of that further adjournment.
19. 19Why this was not included in the Financial Statement sworn the day before, is not clear to me. Perhaps it was an error.
20. 20The affidavit of Anton Mostovoy sworn November 26, 2025, an associate of Ms. Koren’s, says the cost might exceed $100,000 USD for ink dating analysis alone, in addition to another $15,800.00 to $25,800.00 for handwriting analysis.
21. 21I have not adopted the husband’s counsel’s submissions in their entirety, but agree with his submission about the cost of questioning, for example.
22. 22I.E. $40,000.00 + $25,000.00 + $15,000.00 + $7,500.00 + $60,000.00, less $10,000.00 = $137,500.00.