2026 ONSC 3727
COURT FILE NO.: FS-24-00108004-0000
DATE: 2026 06 25
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
Alejandro ESTRADAS TRUJILLO
Tanya Stroedel, for the Applicant
Applicant
- and -
Veronica BARRUETA RODRIGUEZ
Monty Sheena, for the Respondent
Respondent
HEARD: April 30, 2026
REASONS ON CONTEMPT MOTION (LIABILITY PHASE)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Overview.. 2
Hyperlinking. 2
Evidence. 3
Background Facts. 4
Positions of the Parties. 6
Contempt Law Generally. 6
The moving party materials are sufficient to define the motion and to permit Ms. Rodriguez to understand the case to be met. 8
First Order: the court finds breaches by Ms. Rodriguez but cannot find contempt. 9
Second Order: the court finds breaches by Ms. Rodriguez but cannot find contempt. 11
Third Order 12
An enforcement motion is warranted. 16
Police endorsement is unwarranted given the current circumstances. 17
Additional Orders. 19
Costs. 20
Stewart J.
Overview
The applicant father (Mr. Trujillo) moves for an order that the respondent mother (Ms. Rodriguez) is in contempt of three court orders which provided for parenting time between the father and the three children of the relationship. He also seeks an order for police enforcement of parenting time.
For the reasons that follow, the court declines to find Ms. Rodriguez in contempt, but this is not a victory for her. The court finds that she is in breach of the three orders and requires the parties to take specific steps, including attending an enforcement motion.
Hyperlinking
The applicant relied on five affidavits. Four affidavits were not hyperlinked. The fifth affidavit had no exhibits. The applicant’s factum was only partially hyperlinked. The applicant uploaded almost 1000 pages of material.
The respondent’s two affidavits were hyperlinked, but her factum was only partially hyperlinked. The respondent uploaded almost 200 pages of material.
Hyperlinking is required. The court requires it to ensure that the court and the parties can efficiently review and reference materials.
Going forward, the court may refuse to review any materials which are not hyperlinked.
This is not the first time that the parties have received this warning. The parties should refer to the endorsement from the motion argued September 23, 2025, at paragraphs 4 to 6.
Evidence
As noted above, each party relied on voluminous materials. The applicant filed five affidavits, and the respondent filed two.
Neither party cross examined the other out of court.
No oral evidence was given during the hearing. (To be clear, a responding party on a contempt motion cannot be compelled to give any evidence but the court inquired about oral evidence given that the respondent elected to file affidavit evidence).
The parties were given the option of conducting cross examinations during the hearing and elected not to.
The court therefore relied on the affidavit evidence, factums and oral arguments.
Background Facts
The parties married in 2010 and have three children: DS, born June, 2015 (currently 11 years old) and twins, FR and DA, born February, 2017. The twins are currently 9 years old.
Mr. Trujillo says the parties separated in October 2022. Ms. Rodriguez says they separated in July 2023. It is not necessary for the court to determine the separation date to decide this motion. The parties lived separate and apart in the same dwelling until October 2023, at which time the applicant was charged criminally (he was acquitted in October 2025).
In February 2025, the police and CAS were involved with the family regarding allegations made by the respondent against the applicant regarding his treatment of some of the children. No charges were laid. The CAS closed its file.
The Office of the Children’s Lawyer (OCL) is also involved with this family. An OCL clinical investigator provided an interim report in September 2025. The parties advise that the OCL is in the process of doing follow up interviews and a final report is expected in future.
This motion focused on three court orders. This case is high conflict. At the time of writing this decision, there are 30 orders and endorsements in the Orders and Endorsements bundle in CaseCentre. For ease of reference, the court refers to the three orders which are the subject of this contempt motion as the first, second and third court order.
First Order: the first order was in place between April 9, 2024, and March 4, 2025. It provided that Mr. Trujillo was to have supervised parenting time twice a week: Wednesdays from 3pm to 7pm and Sundays from noon to 4pm.
Second order: the second order was in place from March 4, 2025, to October 6, 2025. It provided for a graduated and expanded parenting time schedule for Mr. Trujillo, including:
a. March 2025: supervised, Wednesday and Sunday, four hours each.
b. April 2025: same schedule as March, no supervision.
c. May 2025: expanded parenting time hours: Wednesday, after school to 7pm and Sunday, 9am to 5pm,
d. June 2025: addition of one overnight (Friday, Saturday or Sunday).
e. July 2025: expansion to two overnights.
f. August 2025: if parties cannot agree on expanded schedule, parties will reattend.
g. All exchanges to be at police station.
- Third Order: the third court order came into force on October 6, 2025, and remains in effect. On October 6, 2025, the court found that the parenting time proposals by both parties were unrealistic (for different reasons). The court noted the recent involvement of an OCL clinical investigator and found her interim report and findings to be informative and helpful. The court incorporated the OCL interim recommendations into an order and added further provisions. The order contains 16 clauses. The major requirements are:
a. Parenting time: Mr. Trujillo to have parenting time two days per week: Wednesday (330pm to 7pm) and Sunday (noon to 5pm).
b. Exchanges: inside police station. Dad shall arrive 15 minutes early.
c. Reunification: The children shall immediately start reunification therapy. The parties shall abide by all reunification therapist recommendations.
d. Schooling: M. Trujillo will not attend at the children’s school. Ms. Rodriguez shall ensure children attend school on-time and ensure regular attendance. Ms. Rodriguez shall contact the school social worker if there are any issues abiding by this order.
e. Mr. Trujillo’s current partner: the partner’s child attends the same school as the children in this case. Mr. Trujillo shall not pick up those non-party children from school, nor shall he attend school events.
Positions of the Parties
The applicant/moving party, Mr. Trujillo, says that the respondent’s breaches of the three orders are so numerous, serious, and intentional, that they meet the four-part test for contempt. Mr. Trujillo also submits that the breaches are so long standing that the only remedy is police enforcement.
The respondent/responding party, Ms. Rodriguez, says that she has complied with each and every court order so that a contempt finding is not possible. She argues that, at most, the facts warrant an enforcement motion prior to a finding of contempt. She also argues that police enforcement is not needed and is not in the best interests of the children.
Contempt Law Generally
Civil contempt is governed by Rule 31 of the Family Law Rules and the common law.
Civil contempt proceedings are quasi criminal. The contempt test requires proof to the criminal standard (beyond a reasonable doubt). The burden of proof rests with the party seeking the contempt order.
The respondent on a contempt motion is permitted, but cannot be compelled, to respond.
There are four elements to the civil contempt test:
a. Is the order alleged to have been breached clear and unequivocal?
b. Did the respondent have actual knowledge of the order?
c. Did the respondent intentionally do the act prohibited by the order or intentionally failed to do the act compelled by the order?
d. If the first three parts of the test are proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the court then must consider whether to exercise its discretion to find, or decline to find, contempt1.
- Great caution must be exercised when considering contempt motions in the family law context. In the case of Jackson v. Jackson, the court summarized the concepts for using contempt in family law proceedings:
a. It ultimately remains a matter for the Court’s discretion;
b. Because of its seriousness and quasi-criminal nature, it must be used cautiously and with great restraint;
c. It cannot be reduced merely to a mechanism for enforcing judgments;
d. It should be used sparingly and as a measure of last resort where there are no other adequate remedies available;
e. It is reserved for cases involving defiant conduct that is at the most significant end of the spectrum and where it appears to be the only reasonable means of sending a message to a litigant that court orders cannot be flaunted;
f. The complex emotional dynamics involved in family law disputes and the desirability of avoiding further escalation of the conflict between the parties are additional factors that prompt a cautious approach2.
- The civil contempt remedy is an enforcement remedy. It exists where a party fails to comply with a live or operative order of the court3. The contempt remedy is not available for the purpose of sanctioning historical breaches of orders that have been superseded or are no longer governing the parties as of the time when the contempt finding is made4.
The moving party materials are sufficient to define the motion and to permit Ms. Rodriguez to understand the case to be met.
Ms. Rodriguez argues that Mr. Trujillo’s notice of motion and supporting affidavits fail to give sufficient particulars to permit her to respond to the motion.
Ms. Rodriguez relies on the Ontario Court of Appeal case of Follows v. Follows5 which states that contempt motions in civil proceedings have a criminal character. Such motions seek to punish past misconduct. The requirement that the appellant be given reasonable particulars is important.
In Follows, the Ontario Court of Appeal expressed the view that it would have been preferable for the notice of motion to set out the particulars of the breaches of the order, but the court was satisfied that sufficient particulars and sufficient notice was provided in the supporting affidavit6.
Ms. Roderiguez’s argument has no merit.
Even if the notice of motion was lacking in particulars (it is not), the affidavit materials set out, in detail, the occasions on which Ms. Rodriquez is alleged to have breached the order. Indeed, the affidavit material contains inventories of the precise dates when Ms. Rodriquez is alleged to have failed to deliver all or some of the children for parenting time.
In addition to providing specific dates when parenting time did not take place (allegedly in breach of the three court orders), Mr. Trujillo’s unchallenged evidence is that:
a. His last visit with DS was on January 12, 2025;
b. His last visit with FR was April 13, 2025;
c. His last visit with DA was June 29, 2025.
d. He has not had parenting time with all three children together since September 4, 2024.
When the orders are compared to those data points, that information alone provides Ms. Rodriguez with the core case to be met.
The notice of motion and affidavits from the moving party define, clearly and in detail, the alleged scope and instances of contempt.
First Order: the court finds breaches by Ms. Rodriguez but cannot find contempt.
Mr. Trujillo asks the court to find Ms. Rodriguez in contempt of the first court order, which was in place from April 19, 2024, to March 4, 2025.
As noted above, the order required Mr. Trujillo to have supervised parenting time twice a week: every Wednesday from 3pm to 7pm and every Sunday from noon to 4pm.
This order is no longer is in force. It was replaced by the second order which came into force on March 4, 2025.
Because this order is no longer operative, it is not open to the court, in 2026, to find Ms. Rodriguez in contempt of the first order7.
The court finds that Ms. Rodriguez breached this order.
Ms. Rodriguez states, in her affidavit, without any detail that she has “always complied with every court order and have never missed a scheduled parenting time”8.
Ms. Rodriguez lists some dates on which the children did not go with Mr. Trujillo and/or did not engage with the supervised parenting coordinator, Ms. Carr.
The theme of Ms. Rodriguez’ affidavit (for the first order, but also subsequent orders) is that she put the children in the car, took them to the drop off location, and that is sufficient.
However, the evidence shows that for the supervised parenting time period between April 1, 2024, to April 1, 2025, there were 89 scheduled supervised visits and one or more of the children failed to attend 71 of those visits9. Those breaches cannot be laid at the feet of the children.
The supervised parenting coordinator documented, on some occasions, that the children seemed encouraged or empowered by their mother to not attend visits.
Further, when the children were in school in the fall of 2024 and Mr. Trujillo was supposed to pick the children up at school at the end of the day, Ms. Rodriguez would sometimes attend at the school and pick the children up early, although they were not sick.
This behaviour was sufficiently concerning that the school documented the concern and had Ms. Rodriquez sign the document. For instance, on October 2, 2024, the principal required Ms. Rodriquez to sign a document which stated that she picked up the children, therefore they were not available for the parenting time visit. The document notes that the children were not ill. The younger two children did not ask to go home (although the older child later said she wanted to call her mother). The document, which is on school letterhead, states that “this was a parent decision to pick up the children and does not reflect the intentions of the school”.
Mr. Trujillo states that he received similar letters on October 9, 16 and 30 and November 30, 2024. Ms. Rodriguez does not dispute that information.
The school documents reflects that the school was aware that Ms. Rodriguez was in breach of the court order and wished to document that the school was aware of Mr. Trujillo’s parenting time and was not trying to fetter it.
Because contempt is not an available remedy for the first order, it is not necessary to define, with any further specificity, the extent of Ms. Rodriguez’ breaches of the first court order. There is ample evidence that Ms. Rodriguez breached the first order frequently and clearly. Had the contempt analysis been available for this order, the court would have had no difficulty finding that intentionality on the part of Ms. Rodriguez had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Second Order: the court finds breaches by Ms. Rodriguez but cannot find contempt.
The second order was in force from March 4, 2025 to October 6, 2025.
It required Mr. Trujillo to have one month of supervised parenting time, followed by a transition to unsupervised parenting time with a graduated schedule.
Mr. Trujillo asks the court to find Ms. Rodriguez in contempt of the second order. For the same reasons articulated with respect to the first order, the court cannot find Ms. Rodriguez in contempt of the second order. The second order is no longer operative.
However, the court finds Ms. Rodriguez in breach of the second order.
Almost none of Mr. Trujillo’s parenting time ordered in the second order took place. As of September 23, 2025, the older child had not seen her father since 2024. The younger children had seen their father only a few times. This was a far cry from the twice weekly parenting time (including a graduated expansion to two overnights) ordered by the court.
Despite the court ordering overnight parenting time for June and July (one night per week in June and two nights per week in July), this did not occur.
Ms. Rodriguez took an extremely passive approach, stating that she drove the children to the exchange location (the police station parking lot), but the children would not exit the vehicle.
The court finds that Mr. Rodriquez breached this order and her breaches were flagrant. The vast majority of the order was not complied with, over the entire life of the order. Had this order been the subject of a contempt analysis, the court would have had no difficulty finding that intentionality on the part of Ms. Rodriguez had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Third Order
For the most part, parenting time is not happening as per the order. Wednesday parenting time has been taking place at the reunification counsellor, although the children do not always agree to attend. Sunday parenting time is usually not occurring, although Ms. Rodriguez submits that there have been small and gradual changes. The children usually refuse to meet their father at the police station.
Ms. Rodriguez says that she is following the recommendations of the reunification counsellor and “encouraging” the children. Like her stances on the previous orders, Ms. Rodriguez’ approach seems passive, at best. During the hearing, in response to questions from the court, Ms. Rodriguez said that she had not yet had any sessions alone with the reunification counsellor because the counsellor had not requested it.
Given the events of the last three years, the court would expect Ms. Rodriguez to take very proactive steps to help her children, who are clearly in crisis. To be clear, this is not a criticism of the reunification counselor who is a qualified professional. The court simply finds it notable that Ms. Rodeiguez again, has elected to take a passive approach. There is no evidence of her asking the counsellor for assistance, nor is there any evidence of Ms. Rodriguez seeking other professional assistance with a view to complying with the current court order.
Recently, the parties agreed that Ms. Rodriguez would take the children into police station and leave the parking lot for 15 minutes. During the hearing, the parties agreed that this plan was not being followed.
Ms. Rodriguez, says, without evidence, that the reunification counsellor told her not to leave the parking lot. The court cannot accept that as a fact in the absence of any evidence.
However, what is in evidence is an email from the reunification counsellor dated April 9, 2026. Using professional, neutral language, and without proving any more information than is necessary, Ms. Iafrate expresses concerns about the children not being engaged in the sessions in recent weeks. Specifically, the counsellor observed a lack of engagement by the children:
a. During the children’s therapy sessions; and
b. During joint sessions with Mr. Trujillo.
The counsellor specifically states that she has no concerns regarding Mr. Trujillo’s actions or behaviour during the sessions.
This begs the question of why the children are not engaged even with the assistance of a professional reunification counsellor. There is no evidence on this point, but the court must consider whether Ms. Rodriguez is continuing to influence her children, overtly or not, intentionally or not. That is a question that may have to be considered on another motion.
Turning to the contempt analysis with respect to the third order, the court finds that the first step of the civil contempt test has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt: the third order is clear and unequivocal. Ms. Rodriguez did not dispute that the first prong of the test was met.
The court also finds that the second step of the civil contempt test has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt: Ms. Rodriguez had actual knowledge of the order in question. Mr. Rodriguez did not argue otherwise on this motion.
The court further finds that the third step of the civil contempt test has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt: Ms. Rodriguez has failed to ensure her children attend the parenting time and attend the reunification therapy sessions, contrary to the third court order. The court finds that Ms. Rodriguez’ actions were intentional.
Ms. Rodriguez argues that she did not intend to breach the third court order. However, that is not the test. The question is not whether the contemnor intended to disobey the order. Rather, the intention must relate to the act done itself – that the contemnor intended to avoid doing the act required by the order (taking the children to the parenting time and reunification therapy)10.
Although Ms. Rodriguez could not be compelled to respond to this motion, she elected to do so. Her own materials provide proof of her intention – she feels it is reasonable and sufficient to encourage the children to attend and not take further steps.
A parent cannot abdicate their parenting responsibilities. Compliance with a court order is up to the parents, not the children. A parent must do all they reasonably can to secure compliance with a court order. Failure to do so may constitute deliberate and willful disobedience sufficient to support a finding of contempt. A parent must do everything they can do, but they are not required to do the impossible11.
Ms. Rodriguez is the primary parent to all three children. She has parental authority. It is a reasonable inference that she, like every other parent, is required to use her parental authority for daily tasks that children might otherwise not want to do. The court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that her failure to use that parental authority to have her children attend parenting time and reunification therapy is intentional.
This leads to the final prong of the test, which is whether the court should exercise its discretion and not find contempt if it would be unjust to do so. This fourth prong reflects the law that contempt should not be used on a routine basis to obtain compliance with court orders. Contempt is a power of last, and not first, resort.
As noted in Jackson v. Jackson, contempt orders are reserved for defiant conduct that is at the most significant end of the spectrum and is the only reasonable means of sending a message. Further, in the family law context, the court must be mindful to avoid further escalation of the conflict (not only between the parties but between the parties and the children)12.
Mr. Trujillo did not bring an enforcement motion for this third order prior to bringing his contempt motion. There is no evidence before me that finding Ms. Rodeiguez in contempt will assist with the circumstances involving the children.
It is for these reasons that the court is exercising its discretion and declining to find Ms. Rodriguez in contempt at this time. As explained below, the court is keeping carriage of this matter, and the contempt issue may well come back before the court in future.
An enforcement motion is warranted.
Having decided not to exercise the court’s discretion in favour of a contempt finding, the court agrees with Ms. Rodriguez that an enforcement motion is warranted. It is necessary for the court to consider the wide remedies available to it pursuant to Family Law Rule 1(8) to ensure that Ms. Rodriguez complies with the current order, including, but not limited to: financial penalties, striking pleadings, barring further motions, and/or considering whether there has been a sufficient change of circumstances that the parenting arrangements must be varied.
The factual findings of this motion are applicable to an enforcement motion. I am therefore seized of the motion.
However, given that the potential relief is different, the parties shall be given an opportunity to file further materials.
The motion shall be argued, in person, before me at 9am on a date the parties shall set with the Brampton Trial Coordinator during the weeks of August 17, 24 or 31, 2026 or the week of September 14, 2026.
The parties shall agree on a timetable for materials. If they refuse to agree, they may contact the Brampton Trial Coordinator for a 9am appearance before me and the court will impose a timetable.
In the event that the enforcement remedies, if any, ordered by the court are not effective, the court reserves the right to reconsider contempt as the court will remain seized of this series of motions.
Police endorsement is unwarranted given the current circumstances.
Mr. Trujillo seeks an order for police enforcement of his parenting time.
The Peel Regional Police (PRP) were put on notice of this motion. Although PRP filed materials, they were not in attendance on the motion. (The court understands that this motion was called on April 27 and the PRP counsel attended, but the motion did not proceed that day. Counsel was unavailable when the motion was recalled on April 30).
The court had the benefit of reviewing the PRP factum on this issue.
Police enforcement orders pursuant to section 36 of the Children’s Law Reform Act are extraordinary remedies. They should be used only as a tool of last resort and where there is evidence of unlawful withholding13.
In the event that police enforcement is ordered, it should be for a specific period of time (typically no more than six months)14. Police enforcement orders are not to be used as a long-term, multiple use, open-ended, and on-demand endorsement tool15.
The question is whether there is unlawful withholding within the meaning of the CLRA in this case.
This case is not the typical situation of withholding in which a parent refuses to return a child either over the long or short term.
In this case, the children are currently being taken to the twice weekly parenting time, but the children refuse to go with their father.
The parties have competing evidence about why this is happening.
The irony of Mr. Trujillo’s request is that he is requesting police enforcement when the exchange location is already the interior of a police station.
The court agrees that the parenting time must happen. This is not a choice to be left to the children, nor should they be blamed for parenting time that does not occur.
However, given the children’s disengagement as recently described by the reunification counsellor, the court is extremely concerned that a police enforcement clause will make the situation worse, not better.
The court is also concerned that it does not have the benefit of professional inputs (the reunification counsellor and/or the OCL clinician) as to the precise process to be followed during the exchange process to make things as smooth as possible for the children.
The court therefore makes the following temporary orders:
a. Effective immediately, and until further order of this court, Ms. Rodriguez shall pay $250 for every date that the children do not attend scheduled parenting time with Mr. Trujillo and/or scheduled therapy sessions.
b. The parties are ordered to consult with the reunification counsellor and the OCL clinical investigator regarding the best exchange protocol. These consultations shall be completed by July 13, 2026.
c. Once the professionals provide an exchange protocol, the parties are required to follow it. Any failure to follow the protocol may result in further findings and sanctions.
d. If it is necessary to modify the October 6, 2025, order to facilitate transition (for instance, the current order requires Mr. Trujillo to arrive 15 minutes early and this may need to be revisited), the parties shall take out the appropriate consent order.
e. If there are any additional professional fees billed by the reunification counsellor to deal with the exchange protocol, Ms. Rodriguez shall pay those fees within 30 days of the invoice being rendered.
f. If a protocol is not in place by Wednesday, July 15, 2026, the parties shall contact the trial coordinator and schedule a 9am attendance before me. The purpose of that attendance will be do schedule a further motion as to whether police enforcement is required and/or any other sanctions that may be merited at that time.
g. If a 9am scheduling attendance is required, counsel for the PRP is welcome to attend and is of course welcome to file materials and appear on any further motion on the topic of police enforcement.
Additional Orders
- In addition to the orders made throughout this decision, the court makes the following additional orders:
a. The parties shall provide a copy of this decision to the OCL clinical investigator, Ms. Majewski.
b. The parties shall provide a copy of this decision to the reunification counsellor, Ms. Iafrate.
c. The parties shall provide a copy of this decision to counsel for the Peel Regional Police.
d. The parties shall file and upload the final report of the OCL clinical investigator once received.
Costs
The parties did not consult on costs, in breach of the Central West practice direction in place at the time this motion was argued on April 30, 2026.
The applicant uploaded a costs outline. The respondent did not do so, saying that she needed billing information from her prior lawyer.
The parties also advised the court that there were offers which impacted costs.
The parties are urged to agree on costs. If they will not, written costs submissions will be served, filed and uploaded to Case Centre on the following schedule:
a. Applicant by July 13, 2026 at 4pm;
b. Respondent by July 31, 2026 at 4pm.
No reply is permitted.
These deadlines cannot be varied unless by court order. If submissions are not received by these deadlines, the court will proceed on the basis that costs are not being sought. If costs are resolved, the parties should inform the court.
Costs submissions will be double spaced, in 12-point font, and three pages, maximum (exclusive of offers, authorities and bills of costs).
Stewart J.
Released: June 25, 2026
2026 ONSC 3727
COURT FILE NO.: FS-24-00108004-0000
DATE: 2026 06 25
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
Alejandro ESTRADAS TRUJILLO
Applicant
- and –
Veronica BARRUETA RODRIGUEZ
Respondent
REASONS ON CONTEMPT MOTION (LIABILITY PHASE)
Stewart J.
Released: June 25, 2026
Footnotes
- Carey v. Laiken, 2015 SCC 17, at paragraphs 33 to 36.
- Jackson v. Jackson, 2016 ONSC 3466
- Fiorito v. Wiggins, 2015 ONCA 729, at para 17.
- Jackson v. Jackson, 2016 ONSC 3466 at para 49.
- Follows v. Follows, 1998 CanLII 4629 (ONCA).
- Follows v. Follows, 1998 CanLII 4629, at paragraph 3 (ONCA).
- See Fiorito and Jackson cases, above.
- Rodriguez affidavit, October 9, 2025, paragraph 9(a).
- This inventory includes March, 2025, which was the first month of the second order, which also required supervised parenting.
- Greenberg v. Nowack, 2016 ONCA 949 at para 27.
- Godard v. Godard, 2015 ONCA 568 at para 28.
- Need Jackson para numbers
- Patterson v. Powell, 2014 ONSC 1419.
- Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O 1990, chapter 12, section 36(7).
- Patterson, at para 14.