CITATION: Jason Lappan v. Estate of Florence Bevins et al, 2026 ONSC 3722

COURT FILE NO.: CV-25-00000154-0000

DATE: 2026/06/25

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

JASON SCOTT LAPPAN, by his litigation guardian, THE PUBLIC GUARDIAN AND TRUSTEE

Applicant

– and –

SANDRA HEASLIP, in her capacity as estate trustee of the ESTATE OF FLORENCE BEVINS, CRYSTAL LAPPAN, in her capacity as estate trustee of the ESTATE OF FLORENCE BEVINS and the ESTATE OF FLORENCE BEVINS

Respondent

Elena Mamay, for the Applicant

Charles Hammond, for the Respondents

HEARD: April 24, 2026

K.A. Jensen J.

Introduction

1This application is brought by Jason Lappan for dependant’s support pursuant to s. 58(1) of the Succession Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.26 (the “SLRA”), arising from the estate of his mother, Florence Bevins. Florence died on September 30, 2023, leaving a will dated November 14, 2022. Under that will, her principal asset — a residence in Gananoque — was left to her granddaughter, Hallie Muttoo. Jason was left a 10 per cent share of the residue, amounting to approximately $6,000, and he is also the designated beneficiary of Florence’s Registered Disability Savings Plan valued at approximately $29,000.

2Jason seeks further provision from the estate. The issues are whether he is a “dependant” within the meaning of the SLRA and, if so, whether the provision made by Florence was adequate, having regard to her legal and moral obligations.

Factual Background

3Florence was survived by four children, including Jason, and several grandchildren, including Hallie Muttoo. Jason is 50 years of age and has developmental disabilities affecting his cognitive functioning and independence.

4Jason has lived apart from Florence for many years. Prior to 2016, he resided in an apartment with assistance from support workers. He was later admitted to the Brockville Mental Health Centre and, since approximately 2018, has lived in a supervised group home operated by Community Living Kingston & District, where staff are available as needed.

5Jason’s needs are met through this structured residential environment together with government benefits. As of 2026, he receives income from various sources totalling approximately $1,687 per month, together with additional assistance directed toward groceries and basic supplies. His property is now managed by the Public Guardian and Trustee.

6The evidence establishes that Jason’s expenses have been paid from his own income. While Florence, and then Hallie, were joint holders on his bank account, that arrangement existed to facilitate access to Jason’s funds so that his expenses could be paid. When funds were required, support workers would notify Florence or Hallie, and payments would be made from Jason’s account.

7The Public Guardian and Trustee (the PGT) has acted as Jason's guardian of property since August 16, 2024, and, as such, serves as his litigation guardian in this proceeding.

8Amel Ben Slimene is the Senior Client Representative with the PGT who is responsible for Jason’s file. Among other responsibilities, Ms. Ben Slimene is responsible for monitoring Jason’s well-being and needs, and developing an individual budget for him based on an assessment of his current and future financial resources, personal needs/expenditures, lifestyle, prior capable wishes, etc.

9Ms. Ben Slimene suggested that Florence may have provided financial support to Jason. However, her evidence on this point was based on information obtained from others and not on personal knowledge. In the absence of direct evidence and in light of the contrary testimony that I accept, I treat that evidence as hearsay and assign it little weight.

10There is no persuasive evidence that Florence contributed her own funds toward Jason’s maintenance. To the contrary, the evidence establishes that Jason’s account consisted of his own benefits, and that Florence’s role was administrative.

The Estate

11Florence's Estate is modest. It consists of the following assets:

(i) The Property with an estimated value of $269,258.38;

(ii) an Estate account with a balance of $51,709.07 as of February 18, 2026;

(iii) and 153 shares in Sun Life Financial Inc., with a market value of $12,230.83 as of September 4, 2025.

12Florence did not have any major debts on the date of death. The Estate has ongoing expenses including the legal expenses of this proceeding, expenses related to the Property, and other routine administration expenses and debts which are depleting the remaining liquid assets of the Estate. As a result, the bulk of the Estate’s value lies in the Property, which is where Hallie is living.

13Under the 2022 Will, Florence made a specific bequest of the Property, together with certain personal effects, to her granddaughter Hallie, and divided the residue among 15 beneficiaries, including a 10% residual gift to Jason and a 40% residual gift for Hallie in the form of a testamentary trust. In addition, Hallie was the designated beneficiary of Florence's life insurance proceeds of approximately $79,800, which passed outside the Estate.

Jason’s Assets and Current Needs

14As of early 2026, Jason had limited assets, including approximately $3,600 in cash and a further amount of roughly $5,700 under the management of the Public Guardian and Trustee. His financial position is therefore modest and dependant on his ongoing income.

15Jason’s expenses reflect his supported living environment and include housing, a personal allowance, and insurance. The Public Guardian and Trustee submits that Jason’s current level of funding does not adequately support his lifestyle and that additional expenditures would improve his nutrition, clothing, personal care, and opportunities for social engagement.

16It is also suggested that Jason may have future needs relating to health and mobility. However, the evidence in that regard is not supported by expert opinion and remains uncertain.

Statutory Framework

17Section 58(1) of the SLRA permits the court to order adequate provision for the proper support of a deceased’s dependants. The analysis proceeds in three stages: whether the applicant is a dependant, whether adequate provision has been made, and, if not, what provision should be ordered: Cohen v. Cohen, 2019 ONSC 4456, at para. 43.

18A “dependant” includes a child to whom the deceased was providing support or was under a legal obligation to provide support immediately before death. Support may include the provision of the necessities of life and need not take the form of direct financial transfers: Khemraj v. Khemraj, 2016 ONSC 7796 at para. 120.

Is Jason a “Dependant”?

19The first issue is whether Jason is a “dependant” within the meaning of the Succession Law Reform Act. A dependant includes a child to whom the deceased was providing support, or was under a legal obligation to provide support, immediately before death. These are distinct bases upon which dependency may be established.

20With respect to actual support, the evidence does not establish that Florence was providing support to Jason within the meaning of the SLRA. Jason’s living expenses were met from his own income, derived primarily from government benefits, and applied within the structured residential setting in which he resides. While Florence, and later Hallie, assisted in administering Jason’s finances, that role involved the management and disbursement of Jason’s own funds. There is no persuasive evidence that Florence contributed her own resources toward Jason’s maintenance or assumed responsibility for meeting his financial needs.

21The case law distinguishes between true financial support and incidental or intermittent assistance. In Bolte v. McDonald, 2022 ONSC 1922, at para. 52, the court held that occasional or discretionary transfers are insufficient to establish dependency; rather, the evidence must demonstrate that the claimant was reliant on the deceased for support. Assistance that is administrative in nature, or that facilitates access to the claimant’s own funds, does not on its own establish the kind of reliance required by the statute.

22The analysis therefore turns to whether Florence was under a legal obligation to support Jason by reason of his circumstances. The jurisprudence recognizes that an adult child with a disability may, in appropriate circumstances, remain dependant notwithstanding the receipt of independent income. The relevant inquiry is whether, having regard to the child’s condition, means, and needs, the child has withdrawn from parental charge or remains in a relationship of dependency giving rise to a continuing support obligation.

23As explained in Weber v. Weber, 2020 ONSC 4098, at para. 58, drawing on appellate authority including Lewi v. Lewi (2006), 2006 CanLII 15446 (ON CA), 80 O.R. (3d) 321 (C.A.), and Senos v. Karcz, 2014 ONCA 459, the question is not whether an adult child can meet basic subsistence needs, but whether their resources are sufficient to meet their reasonable needs having regard to their circumstances. The analysis is contextual and must take into account the child’s actual functioning, independence, and the extent to which they remain dependant in a practical sense.

24Similarly, the receipt of government benefits is not determinative of dependency. In Fatima v. Agha, 2024 ONSC 1441, at para. 17, the court confirmed that the existence of public support does not, on its own, establish that an adult child has withdrawn from parental charge or eliminate a potential support obligation. Rather, such benefits form part of the overall assessment of whether the individual’s needs are being met independently.

25Jason’s circumstances engage these principles. He is a vulnerable adult who requires structured support and supervision as a result of his developmental disabilities. At the same time, the evidence establishes that he has lived apart from Florence for many years and that his daily needs—including housing, food, and personal support—are met through a comprehensive combination of public benefits and institutional services. The financial resources used to meet those needs are his own, and there is no evidence that Florence supplemented those resources or that Jason relied on her to do so.

26In these circumstances, while Jason’s vulnerability is significant and weighs heavily in the analysis, I am not satisfied that he remained dependant on Florence within the meaning of the SLRA at the time of her death. The evidence does not establish that he was reliant on her for his support, nor does it establish that a legal obligation to provide support persisted in light of the manner in which his needs were being met independently of her.

27Even accounting for his disability, the evidence does not establish that Jason remained in a relationship of dependency giving rise to a continuing obligation on Florence, as opposed to reliance on state and institutional structures independent of any parental role.

28This is not a case free from difficulty. However, on balance, I find that Jason had withdrawn from Florence’s charge within the meaning of the governing jurisprudence and was not a dependant within the meaning of the statute.

29I therefore conclude that Jason has not established that he is a dependant. Given the closeness of the issue, I proceed to consider adequacy in the alternative.

Adequacy of Provision for Jason

30If Jason was found to be a “dependant”, I would be required to apply the framework for assessing the adequacy of Florence’s provision for him in her will as set out in Tataryn v. Tataryn Estate, 1994 CanLII 51 (SCC), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 807 at para. 33:

In many cases, there will be a number of ways of dividing the assets which are adequate, just and equitable. In other words, there will be a wide range of options, any of which might be considered appropriate in the circumstances. Provided that the testator has chosen an option within this range, the will should not be disturbed. Only where the testator has chosen an option which falls below his or her obligations as defined by reference to legal and moral norms, should the court make an order which achieves the justice the testator failed to achieve. In the absence of other evidence a will should be seen as reflecting the means chosen by the testator to meet his legitimate concerns and provide for an ordered administration and distribution of his estate in the best interests of the persons and institutions closest to him. It is the exercise of the testator of his freedom to dispose of his property and is to be interfered with not lightly but only in so far as the statute requires.

31The Supreme Court made clear in Tataryn that adequacy must be assessed having regard to both legal obligations and moral obligations, balanced against the principle of testamentary autonomy.

32However, the moral obligation analysis described in Tataryn v. Tataryn Estate does not operate at large. As the Court of Appeal emphasized in Verch Estate v. Weckwerth, 2014 ONCA 338, at para. 5, the court’s jurisdiction under the SLRA is confined to claims brought by those who fall within the statutory definition of “dependant.” Moral considerations cannot be used to expand that class. Rather, they inform the adequacy of provision only after entitlement has been established.

33Even where a claimant establishes dependency, the moral obligation must be grounded in the particular circumstances of the parties and balanced against competing claims and testamentary autonomy. It does not invite the court to re‑craft the will according to its own view of fairness.

34While Jason may have a meaningful moral claim as a disabled adult child and one might wish to improve his quality of life, that claim must be balanced against his current circumstances and against competing claims.

35Based on the evidence provided by the Public Guardian and Trustee, Jason's average monthly income is $1,687.38 and his recurring monthly expenses are $1,303.60 (including housing, allowance and insurance), resulting in a net monthly surplus of $383.78. The PGT confirms that this surplus is being directed to Jason's savings, paying for his pharmacy bills and other daily needs.

36While his budget reflects a modest monthly surplus, it remains tightly constrained and supports only a basic standard of living within a structured environment. He will also now benefit from a modest inheritance that can be used to supplement his income to allow for some of these expenditures. While these savings may not fully address Jason’s future needs, the evidence in that regard was not clear. In fact, it was speculative at best.¹

37In determining whether adequate provision was made by Florence (on the assumption that Jason is a “dependant”), the court would consider the factors set out in s. 62(1) of the Succession Law Reform Act, which guide the assessment of a dependant’s circumstances, the competing claims on the estate, and the means and intentions of the deceased.

38In considering those factors, Jason’s circumstances reflect a person with limited means, modest assets, and a degree of vulnerability arising from his developmental disabilities. His income is derived primarily from government benefits and is sufficient, at present, to meet his essential needs within a structured and supported living environment. While the evidence suggests that additional financial support could enhance his quality of life, his current resources allow him to live at a basic but adequate level. The evidence does not establish that he is deprived of the means to meet his reasonable needs, and the projections of future needs are uncertain and not supported by expert evidence. His ability to contribute to his own support, though limited, is nevertheless meaningful in the context of the statutory analysis.

39These considerations must be weighed alongside the circumstances of the estate and the competing claims upon it. The estate is modest and largely illiquid, consisting primarily of a residence occupied by Hallie, who has also been financially vulnerable and dependant on Florence for housing. Hallie’s long-standing reliance on Florence and her continuing need for stable accommodation give rise to a significant competing moral claim. The court must also take into account Florence’s expressed testamentary intentions, which reflect an effort to balance these competing interests within the constraints of limited resources.

40This is not a case in which the testamentary scheme leaves the claimant unable to meet his reasonable needs, nor one in which the deceased failed to recognize a clear legal obligation.

41In these circumstances, the factors in s. 62(1) do not suggest that the provision made for Jason falls below the range of what is adequate, just, and equitable, having regard to both his needs and the legitimate claims of other beneficiaries.

Conclusion

42It has not been established that Jason is a dependant within the meaning of the SLRA. In any event, if he were a dependant, I would find that Florence made adequate provision for his proper support.

43The application is therefore dismissed.

Costs

44The parties are encouraged to come to an agreement with respect to costs, failing which they may schedule an appointment with trial coordination for one hour to speak to the issue of costs. They will need to file their Bills of Costs in Case Center prior to that appearance.

Justice K.A. Jensen

Released: June 25, 2026

CITATION: Jason Lappan v. Estate of Florence Bevins et al, 2026 ONSC 3722

COURT FILE NO.: CV-25-00000154-0000

DATE: 2026/06/25

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

JASON SCOTT LAPPAN, by his litigation guardian, THE PUBLIC GUARDIAN AND TRUSTEE

Applicant

-AND-

SANDRA HEASLIP, in her capacity as estate trustee of the ESTATE OF FLORENCE BEVINS, CRYSTAL LAPPAN, in her capacity as estate trustee of the ESTATE OF FLORENCE BEVINS and the ESTATE OF FLORENCE BEVINS

Respondent

Footnotes

1. 1Ms. Ben Slimene purported to address Jason's future medical and personal care requirements despite the fact that during cross-examination she acknowledged she is not a medical professional, did not perform any clinical assessment, and is not qualified as an expert in future care planning. Therefore, I did not accept this evidence. It was proffered as though Ms. Ben Slimene is an expert in Jason's future medical and personal care requirements. However, she is not an expert and Rule 53 was not complied with in this case.