CITATION: E.L.R. v. D.M.S., 2026 ONSC 3706
BARRIE COURT FILE NO.: FC-21-00000450-0000
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: E.L.R., Applicant
AND:
D.M.S., Respondent
AND:
E.W.C. and E.C.M., Added Parties
BEFORE: McDermot J.
COUNSEL: All parties unrepresented
HEARD: June 1 and June 11, 2026
Amended Ruling: The text of the original Ruling was amended on June 20, 2026 and the description of the amendment is appended.
ruling on motion for contempt
1This is the Applicant’s motion for a declaration of contempt against the Respondent. She says that the Respondent is in contempt of a number of orders of this court and the Court of Appeal for Ontario. She asks that the Respondent be incarcerated as a result of his contempt.
2The Applicant Wife, E.L.R., and the Respondent Husband, D.M.S., were married in 2001 and they separated in 2018. They have a daughter, D.G.E. who is now 19 years of age. Since separation, they have been locked in litigation, firstly with an arbitrator, former Superior Court Justice C. Perkins, and later, after the arbitrator resigned at the request of D.M.S., in this court. To protect the privacy of the Applicant, who is a lawyer in Durham Region, the matter was moved to Barrie for case management, and a focused hearing was heard in Barrie by me in 2023 and 2024.
3On July 26, 2024, the Respondent’s pleadings were struck pursuant to r. 1(8) of the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99, due to his failure to provide disclosure. That was upheld in a later hearing for relief from forfeiture heard on April 30, 2025. Both the striking of pleadings and the motion for reinstatement were upheld at the appellate level. An uncontested trial was heard in November and December, 2025 and the final endorsement in this matter was issued on March 25, 2026.
4I use the word “final” advisedly. Since the final trial endorsement, four different motions have been placed before the court. The Applicant has brought this contempt motion as well as a motion requesting corrections to be made in four different endorsements issued in this proceeding. The Respondent brought a recusal application which was later abandoned. The Respondent has issued a Statement of Claim against E.L.R. and the parties’ child, D.G.E., for malicious prosecution, defamation, intentional infliction of mental suffering, and intentional interference in economic relations. D.M.S. seeks damages in excess of $3 million. That statement of claim is the subject matter of a motion brought by the court under r. 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, and an endorsement was released on June 25, 2026, striking the Statement of Claim as being frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process. Finally, the Respondent’s partner, W.B., has brought a lawsuit against E.L.R. and her counsel, Joan Cushon for an alleged improper access to her own matrimonial file to gather evidence for this litigation. There appears to be real potential for these parties to be locked into perpetual litigation arising from the breakdown of their marriage.
5All of this has used immense resources of the family courts in Simcoe County which are scarce and stretched to the limit. There have been numerous court appearances, including an 18-day hearing for the striking of the Respondent’s pleadings and striking several agreements. There has been a day long uncontested trial and two long motions. As discussed with the parties, who are now unrepresented, the courts in Barrie can no longer bear the burden of this litigation when the parties have no connection to this jurisdiction. They have been told that all future motions and matters not yet heard must be heard in the jurisdictions where they reside, namely Durham or Peel Region.
6This endorsement addresses the Applicant’s contempt motion.
7This contempt motion is brought in the context of the Applicant’s concerns for privacy for both herself and her daughter. She is a lawyer in Durham region and, since these proceedings commenced, has requested privacy because of her profession and reputation in the community. In 2020, at the commencement of the litigation in court, she obtained an order that the matter be case managed in Barrie and that the parties’ names and her child’s name be initialized in the proceedings. She included a claim in her application for damages for intrusion on seclusion which was found to have been made out at the uncontested trial and for which damages were awarded.
8This conflicts with the Respondent’s perception of the facts. He has said throughout that the Applicant alienated him from his daughter and that this was particularly egregious as she was a family law lawyer who knew exactly what she was doing. He asked to make a claim for “alienation” against the Applicant in the focused hearing even though he had abandoned his parenting rights in 2022. He alleged in his Statement of Claim that the Applicant had crafted her daughter’s claims for sexual abuse to bring it within the criteria for charges to be laid for that alleged offence. His objections to the motion to initialize the parties’ names at the appellate level makes it apparent that he favoured publicizing the Applicant’s name and making public her behaviour in alienating his daughter from him.
9Unsurprisingly, many of the claims for contempt in this motion arise from the Respondent’s publication of the Applicant’s name and that of the parties’ daughter. The remaining claims arise from the breaches of restraining orders preventing communication between the parties, again issues raised in the intrusion upon the Applicant’s privacy and that of her daughter.
10In this matter, neither party raised the issue of a viva voce trial of the contempt issues. As noted in Carter v. Carter, 2026 ONCA 29, a claim for contempt may be heard on affidavit evidence only where the facts are clear and uncontested. In the present case, the contempt issues arise from the Respondent’s statement of claim and service of that claim. The facts are not seriously contested; the Respondent’s objections arise from whether the remedy of contempt is available under the terms of the orders relied upon by the Applicant as well as whether a contempt remedy should even be brought for those issues. No party saw the need for a trial of those issues.
Discussion
11In her Notice of Motion, the Applicant says that the Respondent is in breach of six different orders. Those orders, made in the family law proceedings, the appeal of the final orders in those proceedings, and in the criminal proceedings, can be classified as being either non-publication orders or restraining orders described as follows:
Non-Publication Orders
(a) Order of Justice Kaufman dated November 17, 2020
12Justice Kaufman ordered that the names of the parties and the child be initialized to protect their privacy. His endorsement stated:
[T]he Title of the Proceedings will be forthwith initialized on a temporary, without prejudice basis.
13In his endorsement, Justice Kaufman said that this was necessary to protect the Applicant’s identity due to her vocation as a family law lawyer in Durham Region. He also noted that there were, at the time, “serious allegations concerning the child.”
(b) Order of Justice Kaufman dated February 22, 2021
14On that date, at para. 5 of his endorsement, Justice Kaufman clarified what was necessary to comply with his previous order:
The Title of Proceeding has been initialized on a temporary and without prejudice basis. As such, I order that the Applicant shall be referred to as “ELR”, the Respondent as “DMS” and the added parties as “EWC” and “ECM.”
(c) Publication Ban made by Justice Hunter on May 31, 2021
15D.M.S. was charged with sexual offences concerning his child, D.G.E. As part of those proceedings, Justice Hunter made an order in the Ontario Court of Justice for a “Publication Ban s. 486(1)”. Under that section of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C.43, a judge may make “an order directing that any information that could identify the victim or a witness shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way” concerning the criminal proceedings for sexual assault and interference. The terms of the publication ban are according to the section in the Criminal Code.
(d) Order of Justice Trotter dated September 5, 2025
16Over the objections of the Respondent, who asked that the initialization of the proceedings be discontinued, Justice Trotter of the Court of Appeal made the following order:
(1) The names of the parties, the subject child, and members of the subject child’s family shall be anonymized; and
(2) No person shall publish or make public information that has the effect of identifying the parties to this litigation or the child who is the subject of this proceeding.
17Justice Trotter did this to protect the anonymity of D.G.E. even though she was now an adult. It is telling that the Respondent determined that the Court of Appeal was the forum to argue that the initialization of the file could be discontinued. It is also telling that he argued for the right to have the Applicant’s name publicized through the naming of her and the child in the ongoing family proceedings. That request was dismissed by Trotter J.A.
Restraining Orders
18Two restraining orders have been made in this proceeding. These orders specifically prevent contact between the Respondent and both the Applicant and the child:
(a) Order of Justice Jain dated January 21, 2022
19On consent on this date, the Respondent gave up his parenting rights to D.G.E. As part of this consent final order, the Respondent agreed that he would have no contact with D.G.E.:
The Respondent Father, [D.M.S.] shall be prohibited from directly or indirectly contacting or communicating with [D.G.E.] or any of [D.G.E.]’s service providers nor shall he attend at any place where [D.G.E.] is known to be.
(b) Order of Justice McDermot dated November 28, 2025
20This was a final restraining order made on the date that the uncontested trial was held:
[DMS] born August 17, 1965 shall not directly or indirectly contact or communicate with the Applicant [ELR] born December 30, 1970 or the dependent child of the marriage, [DGE] born October 10, 2006. The Respondent [DMS] may email the Applicant [ELR] pursuant to the Order of Justice Jain dated January 12, 2022 for the service of court documents only by way of PDF attachment (not google links).
General Law of Contempt
21Contempt is a quasi-criminal proceeding. To prove contempt, the Applicant must prove the following beyond a reasonable doubt:
a. the order alleged to have been breached must state clearly and unequivocally what should and should not be done;
b. the party alleged to have breached the order must have had actual knowledge of it; and
c. the party allegedly in breach must have intentionally done the act that the order prohibits or intentionally failed to do the act that the order compels: Carey v. Laiken, 2015 SCC 17, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 79, at paras. 32-35; Greenberg v. Nowack, 2016 ONCA 949, 135 O.R. (3d) 525, at paras. 25-26; and Moncur v. Plante, 2021 ONCA 462, at para. 10.
22Even if all of these elements are present, the court retains an overall discretion as to whether the make a declaration of contempt: see Carter v. Carter, supra, at para. 66.
23Because this is a quasi-criminal matter, the Respondent must have adequate notice of the particulars of the Applicant’s claim for contempt so that he may make answer to that claim. The Applicant’s claim must be limited to the particulars as contained in the Applicant’s Notice of Motion and affidavit served on the Respondent.
24The issues of contempt in this motion arise from the Respondent’s issuance of the Statement of Claim noted above. The Applicant says that the Respondent breached the non-publication orders by his issuing of the Statement of Claim insofar as he used her name and her daughter’s name in the Statement of Claim. She also says that the Respondent breached the restraining order in tracking down her address and then arranging for personal service of the Statement of Claim on her and her daughter.
Breach of Non-Publication Orders
25The Applicant in her Notice of Motion argues that the Respondent was clearly in breach of the two orders of Justice Kaufman, Justice Hunter’s Criminal Code non-publication order, and Justice Trotter’s order of September 5, 2025, that states that no person shall publish or make public the parties to the proceeding before him.
26The first step is to determine whether the orders are clear and unequivocal and are therefore capable of enforcement by way of a contempt order.
27The Respondent is correct that the orders of Justice Kaufman appear to be related to the title of proceedings in this proceeding. That refers to anonymizing the parties within the family law proceedings only through the title of proceedings and through the reference to the parties throughout by initialization. The order confirms the importance of the Applicant’s privacy in those proceedings as well as the privacy of the child due to “serious allegations concerning the child.”
28Those allegations were made public in the Statement of Claim. It outlines that D.G.E. “perjured” herself in the criminal proceedings. It also outlines how E.L.R. also lied under oath as part of the family proceedings. The Statement of Claim makes public details of the family proceedings intended to be protected by Justice Kaufman’s two orders.
29However, the rationale and intention of the order is not enforceable through contempt. It is the order, not the “spirit of the order” that may be enforced through these contempt proceedings. The Kaufman J. orders speak to initialization of the parties in the family law proceeding and in the Title of Proceeding and that was not breached by the issuance of the Statement of Claim on its own as it was a separate proceeding.
30That is not the case in the two other orders in issue. As noted above, the s. 486(1) order states that no one may “publish in any document” and “any information that could identify the victim or a witness shall not be published in any document”. That order cannot be clearer. Moreover, Justice Trotter’s order states that “No person shall publish or make public information that has the effect of identifying the parties to this litigation or the child who is the subject of this proceeding.” That order also provides for clear direction as to publication of the Applicant’s and child’s name.
31There are no time limits to either of these orders. Neither of them are specified to be interim orders and neither has an expiry date. They are both non-publication orders preventing the identification of either E.L.R. or D.G.E. or the details of the family law proceedings or criminal proceedings.
32A statement of claim is a public document. Any person may have access to it by going to the courthouse and obtaining the civil litigation file. The Statement of Claim clearly names both E.L.R. and D.G.E. and provides details of the family law proceedings and the criminal prosecution and investigation. The main claim in the Statement of Claim are damages for malicious prosecution. Therefore, the names of E.L.R. and D.G.E. as well as the details of the family case and the criminal prosecution have been published contrary to both of these orders.
33I have noted that neither of these orders were made by the Superior Court of Justice. One is an order of the Ontario Court of Justice in the criminal proceedings. The second is an order of the Ontario Court of Appeal. Therefore, it is necessary for me to address the enforceability of both the Criminal Code order, and the Court of Appeal’s order.
34Rule 31(1) of the Family Law Rules states that “An order… may be enforced by a contempt motion made in the case in which the order was made.” This would suggest that, since the Criminal Code order was made in another proceeding or “case”, it is not enforceable by contempt motion in this court under r. 31.
35However, the order of Justice Trotter was made in an appeal in this case. Therefore, it was an order made in this case. It is important to note that, when the order was made by Trotter J.A., D.M.S. had asked that initialization of the Title of Proceedings in this matter be removed; that request was dismissed. Because of this, D.M.S. cannot be heard to say that the order in the Court of Appeal is not applicable in this case when he had actually asked for an order in the Superior Court proceedings at the appellate level.
36There is authority for the suggestion that an order made in an appellate court cannot be enforced by contempt in the Superior Court of Justice. In Fredericton v. Carvent Enterprises Ltd., 1989 CanLII 8094 (NB QB), [1989] N.B.J. No. 447 (Q.B.), Russell J. cited Borrie and Lowe's Law of Contempt, Second Edition, page 438 as follows:
The jurisdiction to commit a person for disobeying a judgment or order vests in the court whose judgment or order has been disobeyed, and an application for committal should therefore be made to the appropriate court.
37The court determined that the Trial Division of the New Brunswick Court of Queens Bench had no jurisdiction to enforce an order made in the Court of Appeal: the issue had to be brought before the Court of Appeal as it had made the order in question.
38However, in Manitoba, the opposite was proven to be true. In Todosichuk v. Daviduik Estate, 2006 MBQB 6, the court examined enforcement of an appellate order where the applicable rule allowed the Queens Bench court to enforce an order by way of contempt “in the proceeding” in which the order was made. The court concluded that the Court of Queens Bench had jurisdiction to make an order for contempt for a breach of an order of the Manitoba Court of Appeal based upon the rule and based upon the fact that an order of the Manitoba Court of Appeal is filed in the Court of Queens Bench for enforcement.
39The rule in Manitoba is similar to r. 31(1) of the Family Law Rules. As well, as in Manitoba, an order of the Ontario Court of Appeal is entered in the Superior Court office from which the appeal originated, presumably for enforcement purposes: see r. 59.05(3) and (5) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, I find that this court has jurisdiction to enforce by way of contempt an order of the Court of Appeal made in this case.
40Further, in Fatahi-Ghandehari v. Wilson, 2024 ONSC 4275, LeMay J. dealt with the enforceability of costs orders of the Court of Appeal and the question of whether the Superior Court had jurisdiction to enforce orders of the Court of Appeal. LeMay J. relied on r. 1(8) of the Family Law Rules: “if a person fails to obey an order in a case or a related case, the court may deal with the failure by making any order that it considers necessary for a just determination of the matter”. LeMay J.’s interpretation turned on the words “in a case or related case.” The court found an appeal of a decision that was made in this case is a “related case.” I find this to be applicable to the contempt motion before me. This Court can similarly rely on r. 1(8) of the Family Law Rules to assert its jurisdiction to enforce the Court of Appeal’s order as it was an appeal made in the family law case.
41The order of the criminal court is similarly enforceable in this court. In Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 2019 ONSC 1079, the Crown sought to enforce by way of orders of criminal and civil contempt a non-publication order concerning individuals who had been held as hostages in Afghanistan, and later were high profile parties in criminal and family law proceedings in the Ottawa area. A non-publication order was made in the case similar to that made in the present case.
42The case for criminal contempt was not made out. However, the court ruled that the court was not restricted by r. 60.11 to make a contempt order only in the civil proceedings. Beaudoin J. of this court held, at para. 99:
These decisions make it clear that the inherent jurisdiction Superior Court (sic.) cannot be ousted by statute. The exercise of that jurisdiction, however, can be limited only by clear and express language. I conclude that r. 61 does not oust the Superior Court's core jurisdiction nor does it limit the exercise of its contempt powers.
43Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that r. 31(1) only speaks to the order for contempt being made in this case, that does not restrict this court’s inherent jurisdiction to make a contempt order concerning a criminal non-publication order made in related criminal proceedings. I therefore find this court has inherent jurisdiction to enforce both the non-publication orders of both the Court of Appeal and the Ontario Court of Justice.
44The fact is that the Respondent issued his Statement of Claim on October 28, 2025, less than two months after the order of Justice Trotter which was made on September 5, 2025. The Statement of Claim names the Respondent and his daughter and contained details of the criminal prosecution in which D.G.E. was a witness and complainant whose identity was protected by the s. 486(1) order. That indicates to me that the breach of the order by D.M.S. was both wilful and intentional.
45The Respondent says that he only followed the rules in naming both his wife and daughter in the Statement of Claim. He says that if E.L.R. or D.G.E. had wanted the proceedings initialized, they could have done so.
46It is somewhat disingenuous and offensive to suggest that E.L.R. and D.G.E. were responsible for initializing their names in the civil proceedings. In effect, the Respondent argues that the Applicant and her daughter were responsible to remedy his own breach of the order. To do so would have incurred costs for them and the Respondent has not yet paid the costs awarded against him in the family proceedings or at the Court of Appeal. Moreover, once the Statement of Claim was issued and then served, the damage had already been done, and the breach had occurred. If the Respondent had truly wanted to comply with the order, he should have minimized the breach and complied to the best of his ability through his own motion to initialize. A motion to initialize could have been brought in writing before a judge of the Superior Court in Brampton where proceedings were initiated. Moreover, he had time; he did not serve the Statement of Claim for more than two months after it was issued.
47Moreover, just because you can do something does not mean that you should. The Respondent was aware of the non-publication orders noted above. One of them was made less than two months prior to the Statement of Claim being issued. He could have easily complied with the orders by bringing his own motion without notice, prior to service, to anonymize the proceedings. The fact is that the Respondent did not want to do so. He demonstrated this in his arguments before the Court of Appeal to remove the initialization of the Applicant in the Superior Court proceedings. He has always been a concerned that the Applicant was a family law lawyer who succeeded, in his view, in alienating his child against him. He wished his wife’s perceived wrongful acts publicized. According to the Applicant’s affidavit, the Respondent argued at the Court of Appeal that:
“[T]he “public” had a “right to know” his false narrative that I was “a senior family law lawyer” who “used my expertise” to “alienate” D.G.E. from him and “brought false criminal charges” against him as evidenced by his mistaken belief that the criminal court acquitted him for “factual innocence”.
48By the time that the Statement of Claim was served, the order had already been breached and the names and details of the case published by the Respondent. However, assuming that the Statement of Claim was issued in good faith, the Respondent could have taken steps to minimize the harm done by publication of the Applicant’s and child’s name. He did not. Trotter J.A. of the Court of Appeal indicated that the child deserved confidentiality even though an adult and the Respondent was clear in his intent of publicizing the name of the Applicant. His breach of the non-publication order was wilful and intentional on the evidence and this has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
49I find that the Respondent is in breach of the criminal non-publication order as well as the non-publication order of the Court of Appeal.
Breach of the Restraining Orders
50The restraining orders in this matter prevent “communication” or “contact” either directly or indirectly between the Respondent and the Applicant or his daughter. The final order made on the parenting issue prevent the Respondent from “directly or indirectly contacting or communicating with [D.G.E.]”. The restraining order made on November 28, 2025 prevented direct or indirect contact or communication with E.L.R. or D.G.E.
51The Respondent did not allege that he was unaware of either order when the Statement of Claim was personally served on December 30, 2025. He was present when the consent order was made by Justice Jain on January 12, 2022. The restraining order was served on the Respondent by email on the same day it was granted. It is without a doubt that the Respondent was aware of both orders when the Statement of Claim was served.
52The Applicant asserts that the Respondent breached these no-contact orders by serving process personally on both of them on the Applicant’s birthday, December 30, 2025.
53It is concerning that the Respondent had issued the Statement of Claim on October 28, 2025, and waited to serve the Statement of Claim on both the Applicant and his daughter on the Applicant’s birthday, more than two months later. There is no evidence that this was by design, but it may not be coincidental that the service took place during the Christmas season and on E.L.R.’s birthday and surely would have affected the enjoyment of the holiday by the Applicant and D.G.E.
54Moreover, the restraining order endorsement served on the Respondent on November 28, 2025 contained a method of service of court documents. The order provided for an exception to the restraining order allowing the Respondent to “email the Applicant [ELR] pursuant to the Order of Justice Jain dated January 12, 2022 for the service of court documents only by way of PDF attachment”. The Respondent argues that the Rules of Civil Procedure require personal service, but that is not strictly true. The Respondent could have easily obtained an order for substituted service on both the Applicant and the child by email, relying upon the terms of the restraining order to obtain the order. Rules 16.03 and 16.04 both provide for alternatives to personal services and considering the terms of the restraining order, personal service on either Defendant in the civil claim would be “impractical” under rule 16.04. The Respondent could have obtained an order for service by email as provided for in the restraining order; he also could have obtained an order for service by ordinary mail. He did not bother to do so.
55In my view, personal service of the civil claim on the Applicant’s birthday was intended to send a message to the Applicant and his daughter. It was a malicious act. It was communication of the message that, notwithstanding orders of this court, their location was known to him and that he could communicate with them at any time including on the Applicant’s birthday. It has to be remembered that the jurisdiction for the restraining orders in this matter were both s. 46(1) of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F. 3, and s. 35(1) of the Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12, which permit a restraining order where the “Applicant has reasonable grounds to fear for his or her own safety or for the safety of any child in his or her lawful custody.” That fear of harm was exacerbated by the method and date of service chosen by the Respondent.
56I find beyond a reasonable doubt that the Respondent was in wilful breach of the two restraining orders through his personal service of the Statement of Claim on December 30, 2025.
Exercise of Discretion
57Once the breaches of the orders has been found, there is a residual jurisdiction in the judge hearing the matter as to whether or not to make a declaration of contempt. In Carey v. Laiken, at para. 37, Cromwell J. stated that a “a judge may properly exercise his or her discretion to decline to impose a contempt finding where it would work an injustice in the circumstances of the case.” An example given was where “an alleged contemnor acted in good faith in taking reasonable steps to comply with the order.”
58D.M.S. argues that the contempt remedy sought by the Applicant is inappropriate at this stage of the proceeding. He says that enforcement of the order through contempt is a remedy of last resort and that the Applicant has not exhausted other more appropriate remedies to ensure compliance with the orders in issue. He argues that I should exercise my discretion to dismiss the motion for contempt when there are other, less intrusive, methods to obtain compliance.
59In this, he relies upon Hefkey v. Hefkey, 2013 ONCA 44, in which the court stated at para. 3:
The civil contempt remedy is one of last resort. It should not be sought or granted in family law cases where, as here, other adequate remedies are available to the allegedly aggrieved party. The courts have repeatedly stressed that great caution must be exercised when considering contempt motions in family law proceedings. Contempt findings in such cases should be made only sparingly and, as we have said, as a last resort "where conferences to try to resolve access problems or motions for enforcement have failed".
60However, I think that these parties are at that stage of last resort. After an 18-day hearing and a long motion, the pleadings of D.M.S. were struck by reason of his failure to comply with disclosure orders made in this case. Hundreds of thousands of dollars in costs were ordered and D.M.S. advised during this hearing that he is unable to pay those costs and is now unemployed and collecting disability benefits. D.M.S. transferred the majority of his interest in his home to his partner which may very well be an attempt to avoid enforcement of the costs awards against him. Where the striking of D.M.S.’s pleadings and costs were ineffective in ensuring compliance with the orders of this court, it is difficult to see how any remedy short of contempt would be effective to have D.M.S. obey orders of this court.
61Moreover, the damage is now done. The Statement of Claim is issued and served. Those actions cannot be taken back. There was no offer of initialization by the Respondent who said that it was up to E.L.R. and D.G.E. to anonymize these proceedings. He has not offered to make any move to undo the damage that he has done and there is, in fact, little that he could do to remedy the wrongs that he has done. There is no possibility of purging the Respondent’s contempt. Costs would be of little effect and would add to what D.M.S. says is an impossible burden to satisfy. Contempt and punishment for those wrongs is all that the court is left with.
62Therefore, there will be a declaration that the Respondent is in contempt of the s. 486(1) publication ban of Justice Hunter dated May 31, 2021, the non-publication order of Justice Trotter dated September 5, 2025, the parenting and no contact order of Justice Jain dated January 12, 2022, and the restraining order of this court dated November 28, 2025.
63The parties are to schedule a date for a hearing on penalty on a date before me, to be set by the trial coordinator.
MCDERMOT J.
Date: June 30, 2026
Amendments: June 30, 2026
Para. 2, first sentence now says: The Applicant Wife, E.L.R., and the Respondent Husband, D.M.S., were married in 2001 and they separated in 2018.
Para. 51, second sentence now says: He was present when the consent order was made by Justice Jain on January 12, 2022.
Para. 62 now says:… the parenting and no contact order of Justice Jain dated January 12, 2022…
Para. 63 now says: The parties are to schedule a date for a hearing on penalty on a date before me, to be set by the trial coordinator.