Medow v. Medow, 2026 ONSC 3657

COURT FILE NO.: FS-20-00019678-0000

DATE: 20260323

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

ALEEN MEDOW

Applicant

– and –

ALEXANDER MEDOW

Respondent

Lisa A. Johnson and Olivia Oprea, counsel for Ms. Medow

Self-represented

Anthony Macri, Amicus Curiae

Deborah Stewart, Office of the Children’s Lawyer

HEARD: Thursday March 19, 2026

REASONS ON RESPONENT’S MID-TRIAL MOTION TO AMEND HIS ANSWER

SHIN J:

1This 18 day trial began on Monday March 16, 2026. The respondent Mr. Medow, who is self-represented, has brought an oral motion at this trial seeking to amend his Answer to add claims for retroactive and ongoing spousal support. On the first day of trial, Mr. Medow stated that he wanted to claim spousal support. I indicated that we would revisit this issue after the first witness’s evidence regarding the views and preferences of the child was complete (Ms. Greengarten, the social worker called by the Office of the Children’s Lawyer).

2The issue of amending the Answer requires a determination before the applicant Ms. Medow starts her case. As a result of this compressed timeline, there was no evidence filed on this motion and it proceeded by way of oral submissions. Amicus also provided written submissions.

3Mr. Medow’s position is that he ought to be allowed to claim retroactive and ongoing spousal support in these proceedings. I understand from submissions that Mr. Medow claims there was a period of time during the marriage when he worked less and was the child’s primary caregiver so that the applicant could work for an employer in Vancouver. He also claims that his mental health began to decline during the marriage. He submitted that he has been in need of financial support since early 2022 as he lost his employment and has experienced a decline in his income since then. He said that he had no income in 2024 aside from Ontario Works and that he began to receive ODSP sometime in 2025 (which continues to date). He has been unable to work for a variety of reasons including his mental health, prior bail conditions and periods of incarceration.

BACKGROUND

4This matter has a long history marked with significant delay. The Application was issued on October 30, 2020 and Ms. Medow has made no claim for spousal support: Trial Record, tab 1. Mr. Medow’s Answer is dated January 15, 2021 and makes no claim for spousal support: Trial Record, tab 3.

5Mr. Medow was represented until his counsel was removed from the record on April 14, 2022: Trial Record, tab 21. He has been self-represented since then. As noted below, amicus was appointed in January 2024.

6This is the third trial date. At a trial management conference held on August 26, 2022, Nakonechny J. set the first trial date to commence on September 11, 2023 for 23 days: Trial Record, tab 25. The August 26, 2022 Trial Management Conference Endorsement and Trial Scheduling Endorsement Form (“TSEF #1”) make no mention that Mr. Medow may want to claim spousal support. I note the following from TSEF #1:

• On the last page, Nakonechny J. wrote: “Reviewed and consented to by counsel and parties. The Court signs on their behalf.”

• The “Pleadings” section indicates no amendments were needed and Nakonechny J. wrote: “Applicant and Respondent have 30 days from August 30 to advise if pleadings require amendments.”: para. 5. I understand that neither party advised that the pleadings required amendments within this deadline.

• Possible issues and motions were discussed, including motion(s) Mr. Medow wished to bring, and Mr. Medow was granted leave to bring a motion for the release of funds being held in trust: paras. 14 and 20.

7On July 31, 2023, the first trial date was adjourned at the request of Mr. Medow and on consent: Trial Record, tab 32. Shore J. expressed serious concerns about the delays in this case. She found that the parties, and more importantly the child, needed a final resolution of this case.

8In an endorsement dated August 4, 2023, Shore J. wrote again that this matter had been in the court system for too long without final resolution and that the delay was not in the best interests of the child: Trial Record, tab 33.

9On January 4, 2024, Rhinelander J. appointed amicus to assist the court with ensuring the trial is orderly and fair to all parties: Trial Record, tabs 37 and 38.

10On May 31, 2024, Diamond J. set the second trial date to commence on March 24, 2025 for 21 days: Trial Record, tab 39. This date was made peremptory to all parties: January 15 and 29, 2025 Endorsements of Nakonechny J., Trial Record, tabs 41 and 42.

11A trial management conference for this second trial date was held on January 29, 2025. The January 29, 2025 Trial Management Conference Endorsement and Amended Trial Scheduling Endorsement Form (“TSEF #2”) make no mention of the possibility that Mr. Medow may want to claim spousal support: Trial Record, tab 42. The list of Mr. Medow’s issues in TSEF #2 does not include spousal support: para. 3. TSEF #2 indicates that no amendments to the pleadings were needed, issues and motions were discussed and Mr. Medow was granted leave to bring a Charter motion: paras. 6, 14 and 20.

12On March 12, 2025, Nakonechny J. adjourned the second trial date at Mr. Medow’s request and on consent and set the third trial date to commence on March 16, 2026 for 18 days: Supplementary Trial Record at Tab 2.

13In an endorsement dated May 13, 2025, Kraft J. summarized the long and protracted litigation history of this case and noted that, up to that point, Mr. Medow had requested and received adjournments of 10 court appearances. She found that: “there is no doubt Ms. Medow has been put to increased legal fees because of these ongoing requests by Mr. Medow.”: Supplementary Trial Record at Tab 3, paras. 11-12.

14The Trial Management Conference for the third trial date was held on September 26, 2025. The September 26, 2025 Endorsement and Trial Scheduling Endorsement (“TSEF #3”) again make no mention of the possibility that Mr. Medow may want to claim spousal support: Supplementary Trial Record, tab 4. TSEF #3 does not list spousal support in Mr. Medow’s issues and indicates that no amendments to the pleadings were needed, issues and motions were discussed and Mr. Medow was granted leave to bring a motion to remove Applicant’s counsel as counsel of record: paras. 3, 6 and 14.

15This third trial date was made peremptory to Mr. Medow: Endorsement of Diamond J. dated November 17, 2025, Supplementary Trial Record at Tab 5. At the start of this trial, I dismissed Mr. Medow’s request for an adjournment of this trial.

LEGAL PRINCIPLES

16The importance of pleadings was described by Justice Myers in Moghimi v. Dashti, 2016 ONSC 2116, para. 16, as follows:

… Pleadings have important purposes in the just determination of a dispute. They provide notice to the other party of the case that she has to meet. There is no principle more important to the fairness of a dispute resolution process than that each side is entitled to fair notice. Once the parties know what the case is about, they make choices and take actions. They produce relevant documents based on the issues raised and facts pleaded in support of those issues. They may question the other parties and possibly third parties as well on the facts that underlie the issues or which arise from the documents produced. At trial, the pleadings set the scope of the admissibility of evidence. Evidence presented at trial must be relevant to an issue joined in the pleadings.

17This motion to amend pleadings is governed by Rule 11(3), which provides:

(3) On motion, the court shall give permission to a party to amend an application, Answer or reply, unless the amendment would disadvantage another party in a way for which costs or an adjournment could not compensate.

18At para. 21 of Moghimi, Myers J. set out the following:

Accordingly, Rule 11(3) requires that a motion to amend be allowed unless:

a. the amendment would cause an unjust process that cannot be fixed by an adjournment or costs;

b. the amendment proposed is untenable i.e. not properly pleaded and not prima facie meritorious in law; or

c. the amendment is made in bad faith.

ANALYSIS

Whether there is disadvantage or prejudice that cannot be compensated by costs or an adjournment

19I find that Ms. Medow and the child would be prejudiced by Mr. Medow’s request for an amendment at this very late stage of the proceedings. It is clear that, if this amendment is granted, an adjournment of this trial, likely a lengthy one, will be required.

20During the hearing of this motion, Mr. Medow said that he had previously told the court that he wanted spousal support from Ms. Medow. Counsel for Ms. Medow disputes this and submitted that the first time they heard of a claim for spousal support was on the first day of trial. Amicus and counsel for the OCL did not indicate that they heard Mr. Medow raise this issue prior to this trial. I have reviewed all of the endorsements and orders contained in the Trial Record (tabs 9 to 42) and the Supplementary Trial Record (tabs 2 to 8) which stem from approximately 40 motions, conferences and TBST court appearances between October 28, 2020 and March 4, 2026. I did not see any indication that Mr. Medow previously raised that he wanted to claim spousal support from Ms. Medow and no party brought any such indication in the endorsements or orders to my attention during the hearing of this motion.

21Based on the record and information before me, I find that Mr. Medow did not raise the issue of spousal support earlier. Even if I accepted that he did, it is evident that he did nothing to advance this claim prior to trial, such as seeking leave or bringing a motion prior to trial. The endorsements reflect that Mr. Medow understood that he could raise issues at prior court appearances and that he could seek leave to bring motions (as he regularly did). Moreover, he did in fact obtain such leave and participate in prior motions.

22Ms. Medow prepared for this trial on the basis of the pleadings, disclosure and issues discussed as set out in TSEF #3. In my view, it is not possible for either party to properly deal with these additional claims during the remaining 13 days of this 18 day trial. Even if it were possible, it would be unfair to, and would fundamentally disadvantage, Ms. Medow to require her to proceed in this unorganized fashion.

23I agree with Ms. Medow that claims for retroactive and ongoing spousal support are not simple issues. Mr. Medow will have to amend his Answer and set out the factual basis for his claims in writing. Ms. Medow will likely need to file a reply. Further disclosure will be required, not just on financial issues (and I note that Mr. Medow has already failed to provide proper financial disclosure), but also regarding Mr. Medow’s ability to work and mental health issues in the past, present and future. Other steps may also be required prior to a trial on the merits of these issues. At a trial on the merits, different evidence, including from new witnesses or additional evidence from witnesses who the parties already intend to call, will likely be required. I agree with Ms. Medow that these additional steps may require significant time to complete, especially in light of the protracted history of this case. Mr. Medow recognizes that, should I allow him to add these claims, he would need to provide further disclosure and that other steps may be required.

24Mr. Medow’s position is that any prejudice can be cured by an adjournment of this trial only with respect to the spousal support issues. He suggests that the trial continue on all other issues at this time and then that the trial be adjourned to a later date to deal with his claims for retroactive and ongoing spousal support.

25I find that Mr. Medow’s proposal is not practical or workable. The time it would take to provide the necessary disclosure, determine what other steps may be required and to take such steps would be lengthy. Witnesses may be required to testify a second time, months after they first testified. Financial and other issues addressed at the first part of the trial (regarding equalization and the corporation though which Mr. Medow may have received income) may need to be readdressed based on the new disclosure. The final determination of this trial will likely be delayed in these circumstances.

26Significant, if not the most significant, issues in this matter relate to parenting and the best interests of the child. The parties separated six and a half years ago when the child was 7 years old and the Application commenced almost five and a half years ago when the child was 8 years old. This litigation and the parenting relationship have been high conflict. The child is now 13 years old and has been interviewed by the OCL nine times between October 2022 and March 2026. Mr. Medow has not seen or spoken to the child since January 2024. The child has invariably experienced difficulties and has suffered as a result of the parenting conflict, the protracted nature of these proceedings and interviews by the OCL. I do not doubt that Ms. Medow has suffered emotionally and mentally as a result of the protracted and high-conflict nature of these proceedings. I also understand that Mr. Medow has experienced emotional and mental strain from these circumstances.

27The need for a final resolution has become increasingly pressing with every delay. Delay increases the distressing elements of the litigation. Any further delay is clearly not in the child’s best interests and it is not in the parties’ interests. Moreover, further delay is contrary to the interests of the administration of justice. Valuable trial time that could have been allocated to other families would be lost. Adjournments contribute to delays, scheduling issues and use up scarce judicial resources: W.A.C. v C.A.F., 2021 ONSC 5140, at paras. 27 and 51.

28Ms. Medow is currently on long term disability leave from her job. She is solely caring for the child. She has undoubtably been put to increased legal fees because of the delays in this case, most of which have been at Mr. Medow’s request as outlined above. She will incur increased legal costs from any further adjournment of this trial. The parties agree that the prejudice cannot be compensated by costs as Mr. Medow has no ability to pay a costs award today or in the foreseeable future. In any event, even if they could be paid, costs cannot compensate for all the prejudice to the mother and child that would be caused by an adjournment of this trial: Moghimi, at para. 8.

29I find that in all the circumstances, allowing the proposed amendments at this late stage would cause an unjust process that cannot be fixed by an adjournment or costs. While Mr. Medow argues it would be unjust to not allow him to amend his Answer, I find that allowing him to amend would be contrary to the primary objective of the Family Law Rules to deal with cases justly: Rule 2(2) and (3). The following observations of Pazaratz J. in Mio v. Mio, 2014 ONSC 2186, at paras. 32-34, apply equally here (emphasis added):

Rule 11(3) is an important rule, but it’s not the only rule:

a. The primary objective of the rules is to enable the court to deal with cases justly. (Rule 2(2).

b. The court must ensure procedural fairness to all parties; time and expense should be reduced (Rule 2(3).

c. The parties and their lawyers are required to help the court promote the primary objective (Rule 2(4).

Courts generally take a flexible and even forgiving approach to amending pleadings. But in an era of heightened concern about the cost, duration and emotional drain of family litigation, we cannot allow Rule 11(3) to relieve litigants of their fundamental obligation to pursue their claims in a diligent and efficient manner.

The reason why the Respondent waited so long may not matter. But the consequences of her delay matter a great deal.

30It has been over five years since this Application was commenced and this is the third trial date. The parties and the child are entitled to timely justice. I dismiss Mr. Medow’s motion to amend his Answer on the basis that the proposed amendments would prejudice or disadvantage Ms. Medow and the child in a way that could not be compensated by an adjournment or costs.

Merits of the proposed amendments and bad faith

31While it is unnecessary for me to make any determination in relation to the merits of Mr. Medow’s proposed claims for retroactive and ongoing spousal support and whether he has acted in bad faith, I make the following comments.

32Based on the limited information, limited submissions and lack of an evidentiary record before me, I am unable to make any finding on the merits of the proposed claims. I therefore make no finding as to whether his proposed claims are untenable or prima facie meritorious in law.

33Mr. Medow submitted that he has not been acting in bad faith in these proceedings generally or specifically in relation to failing to bring this motion earlier. Any non-compliance in these proceedings or delay in raising or dealing with issues has not been deliberate, willful or his fault. He submitted that he has acted in good faith throughout.

34Mr. Medow made specific submissions regarding his delay in providing required financial disclosure. He stated that he understands the particular importance of adequate, accurate and timely financial disclosure as set out in Colucci v. Colucci, 2021 SCC 24, paras. 48-54. He understands that a court can strike out pleadings for failing to comply disclosure obligations and court ordered disclosure: Roberts v. Roberts, 2015 ONCA 450; Manchanda v. Thethi, 2016 ONCA 909. He said that he has always wanted to provide the required/requested disclosure and to pay child support and has tried to do so to the best of his abilities. He submitted that I ought to find that his non-compliance was not willful or in bad faith, but rather caused by his extraordinary circumstances: Manchanda, at para. 9; Colucci, at paras. 96-108.

35Mr. Medow submitted that his inability to deal with issues such as financial disclosure or this motion in a timely fashion or at all have been caused by a combination of extraordinary circumstances which includes the following inter-related issues:

(a) His disability/mental health issues which make it very difficult for him to deal with all the different issues he is facing, including his difficult financial circumstances.

(b) He has other ongoing legal proceedings (criminal proceedings and a human rights proceeding in B.C.).

(c) His periods of incarceration.

(d) He is not competent to deal with or raise issues in these proceedings on his own.

(e) He has not had counsel representing him since April 14, 2022 despite his best efforts to retain counsel.

(f) In his view, the court system has not provided him with adequate assistance and accommodation – which he has repeatedly requested – despite his disability and lack of competence in family law and procedure, in breach of his rights under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and human rights legislation.

36I note that Ms. Medow did not submit that Mr. Medow’s delay in bringing this motion was in bad faith.

37On the record before me, I am not prepared to find that bringing this motion at this late stage was a deliberately wrongful tactic or that this motion was brought in bad faith. To be clear, this does not mean that I accept as fact all of Mr. Medow’s submissions, particularly his allegations regarding the actions of others such as Ms. Medow, her counsel, other counsel and the court.

Other issue raised by Mr. Medow

38Mr. Medow submitted that given his disability and mental health issues, the court is required to provide accommodations. He suggested that the court has not adequately accommodated him to date and that this motion ought to be allowed on this basis.

39While Mr. Medow believes that the court has not provided him with accommodation in the past, in my view, significant accommodations have been made. Amongst other things, steps in these proceedings, including the trial, have been repeatedly adjourned to accommodate Mr. Medow and the court appointed amicus to assist with these proceedings. The January 4, 2024 order (Trial Record, tab 38) includes that amicus shall:

• assist Mr. Medow in understanding the trial process and the procedural issues: para. 2(e);

• consider the views and preferences of Mr. Medow in this matter: para 2(a); and

• make submissions relevant to and consistent with Mr. Medow’s views and preferences: para 2(g).

40At this trial, amicus has been assisting in accordance with the January 4, 2024 order. I have and will continue to provide Mr. Medow with reasonable breaks to allow him to prepare, gather his thoughts and speak with amicus. I have answered Mr. Medow’s questions where appropriate and attempted to provide guidance and will continue to do so. I have also sought to find solutions to issues he has raised where appropriate. While I appreciate that Mr. Medow feels incompetent to represent himself at this trial, I have found his submissions on this motion and on other matters, and his cross-examination of the OCL witness, to have been largely cogent and organized. He has shown the ability to understand objections and the guidance provided and to adjust his submissions and questions accordingly.

41I do not accept the suggestion that I ought to allow this motion on the basis that Mr. Medow has been insufficiently accommodated by the court.

Order

42Mr. Medow’s motion to amend his Answer is dismissed.

The Honourable Justice L. Shin