CITATION: Abbasi v. Jabbar 2026 ONSC 3638
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO
491 Steeles Avenue East, Milton ON L9T 1Y7
RE: Junaid Abbasi, Appellant
AND:
Sara Jabbar, Respondent
BEFORE: Justice Kurz
COUNSEL: Abeer Iftikhar, Agent for the Appellant
Sean Johnson, for the Respondent
HEARD: June 10, 2026, virtual
ENDORSEMENT
Introduction
1This is a motion by the Appellant, seeking 19 heads of interim relief in his appeal of the interim order of Hacklander J. of the Ontario Court of Justice (the “OCJ”), dated May 21, 2026 (the “Order”).
2In addition to three heads of relief regarding a finding that this motion is urgent, abridging the time for service and validating service, the Appellant seeks numerous other overlapping heads of relief. The relief the Appellant seeks would effectively stay both the enforcement of the Order and any further procedural steps in the OCJ Proceedings in which the Order was made (the “OCJ Proceedings”), pending appeal.
3The Appellant even seeks an order prohibiting any party from relying on the findings made in the Order and its underlying endorsement. He also seeks to expedite his appeal of the Order.
4In his notice of motion, the Appellant makes clear that he is seeking only to stay “the procedural steps, findings, and timetable flowing from the Endorsement and Order dated May 21, 2026”. He is not looking to stay any existing support obligation or support enforcement order.
Brief Background
5The parties were married on March 23, 2003, and separated on July 20, 2012. They have one child, who is eighteen years old. That child has been in the Respondent’s primary care since separation.
6The parties entered into a Separation Agreement on November 4, 2012 (the “Separation Agreement”). Under that agreement, the Appellant agreed to pay the Respondent child support of $2,000 per month as well as spousal support, all based on an income of approximately $73,000 per annum.
7The Respondent deposed that the Appellant quickly fell into arrears, unilaterally reduced support and refused to provide necessary disclosure. She ultimately filed the Separation Agreement with the Family Responsibility Office (the “FRO”) for enforcement.
8The FRO commenced default proceedings against the Appellant, which led to a hearing on May 21, 2024, more fully described below. Less than three weeks later, on June 10, 2024, the Appellant commenced a Motion to Change in the OCJ. The Respondent contends that at the time he commenced his motion to change, the Appellant was $171,118.93 in arrears of support under the Separation Agreement. According to an FRO Statement of Arrears, he is currently $155,687.21 in arrears of support, again based on the terms of the Separation Agreement.
9The Appellant claims that his income decreased since the time he signed the Separation Agreement. Ultimately, he changed careers, becoming a real estate agent. The Appellant asserts that the arrears claimed by the Respondent fail to account for the sums he paid for the child’s private school and the $70,700 loan he provided to the Respondent to purchase a home. As the motion judge states in her endorsement, the Appellant takes the position that this arrangement was in lieu of support. He adds that the Respondent failed to disclose the payments he made, as set out above.
The OCJ Proceedings
10The Family Responsibility Office commenced default proceedings against the Appellant in the OCJ and provided notice of its intention to suspend his driver’s licence. As a result, the Appellant moved for a refraining order. On May 21, 2024, Kim J. of the OCJ ordered that the Appellant continue to pay the $2,000 per month child support set out in the Separation Agreement and a further $1,000 per month towards arrears. She found that:
i. The Appellant had assets which could be used for payments and may have further assets within his corporation. His corporate value was not disclosed at the time.
ii. He had only provided limited income information. That disclosure was limited to the T4A form provided by his corporation. He had not provided disclosure of his corporate income.
iii. Even if the Appellant were given full credit for the payments which he claimed to have made, and there are no adjustments for any increase in his income since entering into the Separation Agreement, his arrears would still amount to $41,000.
11On June 10, 2024 twenty days after the hearing before Kim J., the Appellant commenced a Motion to Change in the OCJ. He did so with the assistance of an experienced family lawyer. In her endorsement of May 21, 2026 (the “Endorsement”), the motion judge stated that from her review of the court record, including the first appearance court, there have been approximately 15 appearances in the OCJ Proceedings, including multiple case and settlement conferences.
12The Respondent asserts that the disclosure she pushed for in the OCJ Proceedings demonstrated that the Appellant had made enormous deposits into his various bank accounts between 2020 and 2024 as follows:
2020: approximately $957,000;
2021: approximately $2,793,338;
2022: approximately $2,474,500;
2023: approximately $834,600;
2024: $1,474,633.
The Respondent claims that the Appellant was unable to account for most of those deposits.
13In her Endorsement, the motion judge recounts that at a February 18, 2026 appearance, the Appellant, who was represented by counsel at the time, indicated that he “seeks to bring an Application in the SCJ/seeks to amend his MTC [motion to change]”. However, he did not do so at that time.
14The Endorsement also shows that the Appellant had been ordered to amend his motion to change within 20 days, presumably from February 18, 2026, but failed to do so.
15A trial management conference was scheduled for April 13, 2026. When the Appellant and his counsel failed to attend the conference, the motion judge rescheduled it for June 23, 2026. She also ordered the Appellant to pay costs of $500 for the aborted conference, within ten days.
16The motion judge also scheduled the Respondent’s proposed motion to strike the Appellant’s motion to change, based on alleged non-disclosure and breach of previous court orders, for May 20, 2026. As set out below, both parties ended up bringing motions returnable that day.
17On May 13, 2026, just one week before the motions were to be heard, the Appellant commenced an application in this court (the “SCJ Proceedings”). In his Form 8 Application form, the Appellant sought a variation of the support provisions of the parties’ Separation Agreement. He had already sought that relief in the OCJ Proceedings. In addition, the Appellant’s prayer for relief sought:
a. A declaration that the parties’ 2021 agreement regarding his $70,700 “contribution” to the Respondent’s home is “binding by promissory and equitable estoppel”;
b. An order “vacating, varying or replacing” two orders made in the OCJ including the Kim J. order cited above;
c. “interim adjustment” of child support;
d. “Reconciliation, credit, and/or repayment in respect of amounts deducted by FRO from the Applicant's income from May 21, 2024, to date”;
e. Retroactive adjustment of the funds that the Appellant paid towards the child’s private school tuition;
f. Requiring the Respondent to provide a complete accounting and supporting documentation in respect of her home;
g. A permanent stay of the OCJ Proceedings;
h. An interim suspension of FRO enforcement pending final determination.
18By the time the parties appeared before the motion judge on the motion to strike, each had filed a further motion. The Respondent moved to lift what she incorrectly understood to be an automatic stay of the OCJ Proceedings under s. 36(1) of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F3 (the “FLA”). The Appellant moved to: 1. stay the OCJ Proceedings altogether in the face of his proceedings in this court; 2. dismiss the Respondent’s motion to lift the “automatic” stay; and 3. adjourn the Respondent’s motion to strike.
The motion judge’s Order
19The motion judge heard both parties’ motions on May 20, 2026 and released the Endorsement the following day. She ordered as follows:
She granted what she described as the automatic stay pursuant to s. 36(1) of the FLA;
If the Appellant seeks to amend his motion to change, he shall serve and file his amended pleading by June 12, 2026;
The Respondent’s motion to strike the Appellant’s pleadings is returnable June 18, 2026 at 3:30 by Zoom.
If the Appellant seeks to reschedule the June 18th date, he must do so by 14B motion, setting out whatever pre-scheduled medical appointments he has on that date which would interfere with his attendance at the motion;
If costs are unresolved, they shall be dealt with on a timetable to be determined on the return of this matter.
20As set out below, the motion judge erred regarding the notion of an automatic stay of the OCJ Proceedings in the face of the SCJ Proceedings. Rather, the opposite was the case: the stay is not automatic. A person seeking a stay must move for that relief.
21The motion judge is the judicial case manager of the OCJ Proceedings, meaning that she has had carriage of it for some time. In the Endorsement, the motion judge made the following factual findings:
a. Most of the relief sought in the SCJ Proceedings relates to issues raised in the OCJ Proceedings.
b. While represented by counsel, the Appellant chose to commence his motion to change in the OCJ.
c. There had been a total of 15 attendances in the OCJ Proceedings, over 710 days (20 days shy of two years);
d. The Appellant had failed to amend his pleadings within 20 days as ordered on February 18, 2026;
e. The Appellant had failed to attend the April 14, 2026 court appearance.
f. The Appellant’s decision to commence the SCJ Proceedings is “problematic” and a “tactical decision to delay the matter before the OCJ on almost identical issues”.
g. The OCJ Proceedings have been “thoroughly case managed and to halt the proceedings at this time on the eve of setting this matter for trial and/or face a motion to strike pleadings to start the process over would be inequitable and a waste of time”.
h. The property issues raised in the SCJ Proceedings are limited to the Appellant’s contributions to the Respondent’s home and any set-off to which the Appellant is entitled. As the motion judge noted, Kim J. pointed out in her May 21, 2024 endorsement that even if the $70,700 amount advanced by the Appellant as well as the tuition he had been paid for the parties’ child had all been set off against the arrears under the parties’ separation agreement, he would still have about $40,000 in arrears under the Separation Agreement.
i. The Appellant “has incurred costs orders against him and has not followed court orders”. [I note that in argument before me, the parties agree that the Appellant owes the Respondent $10,300 in outstanding costs in the OCJ Proceedings].
j. There would be prejudice if the OCJ Proceedings were stayed because:
i. There would be significant delay;
ii. Most of the issues in the SCJ Proceedings are already before the court in the OCJ Proceedings;
iii. The Appellant chose the OCJ venue in 2024;
iv. The parties have incurred significant legal costs to date;
v. Over 15 court appearances had taken place in the OCJ Proceedings;
vi. Rulings have been made re interim support orders;
vii. Costs orders have been made regarding various steps in the OCJ Proceedings.
22The motion judge found that the Appellant had acted in bad faith in commencing the SCJ Proceedings because:
i. The Appellant chose the OCJ venue in 2024;
ii. There have been numerous OCJ appearances, as set out above;
iii. The Appellant commenced the OCJ Proceedings “on the eve of setting a trial date”.
iv. Most of the relief sought in the SCJ Proceedings is similar to the relief sought in the OCJ Proceedings;
v. Although the Appellant and his counsel had been identifying his intention to amend his pleadings to narrow the issues for months, he failed to do so;
vi. This is an unfair tactic;
vii. The Appellant has not complied with existing orders;
viii. There are outstanding costs orders against the Appellant;
23The motion judge believed that the Respondent’s motion to strike the Respondent’s pleadings had to be adjourned because of what she understood to be an automatic stay of the OCJ Proceedings.
Summary of Arguments for this Motion
24The Appellant argues that the Order was made in error regarding an automatic stay of the OCJ Proceedings. He asserts that the error infects all other aspects of the Order.
25The Order purports to lift an automatic stay of proceedings under s. 36(1) of the FLA, occasioned by the Appellant’s application to this court. However, as the Appellant corrects points out, that provision of the FLA applies only to an automatic stay of an OCJ support application which has not been adjudicated when a divorce proceeding has been commenced. That provision also allows a judge to order otherwise; in other words, to lift that automatic stay in the face of a divorce application.
26But here, the parties were not married and the Appellant’s application to this court did not seek a divorce.
27It is clear from the Endorsement that the motion judge was under the mistaken impression that the Appellant’s application in this court sought a divorce order. That misunderstanding is understandable in light of the competing motions, particularly their focus on a stay. As the Endorsement sets out, the Respondent’s motion sought, among other relief, what was described as a lifting of the automatic stay of the OCJ Proceedings. For his part, the Appellant moved to permanently stay the OCJ Proceedings and an adjournment of the motion to strike.
28The motion judge clearly made her Order on the erroneous assumption that the Appellant’s application to this court was a divorce application.
29The Appellant also argues that the motion judge did not need to make the findings set out above because the only issue before her was a stay. He asserts that the motion judge’s findings against him are wrong and unfair, particularly as he was self-represented in the motion. He claims that the motion judge should have done more to explain the process to him. He says that even though he was assisted by counsel, either on the record or as agent, throughout most of the OCJ Proceedings.
30The Appellant argues, citing the well-known test for a stay cited by the Supreme Court of Canada in RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 1994 CanLII 117 (SCC), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311, that:
a. The motion judge’s error raises a serious issue;
b. He would suffer irreparable harm if the Order were not stayed. He would be forced to meet the deadlines set by the motion judge and choose whether to participate in the scheduled hearings in the face of his appeal and the fact that he commenced the SCJ Proceedings;
c. The balance of convenience favours a stay for the reasons cited above and because all issues could be dealt with in one proceeding, in the SCJ Proceedings.
31For her part, the Respondent argues that the motion judge’s error was of no real moment. It was an error of form not substance. The issue of a stay was clearly before her, whether it was lifting a stay or applying one. If anything, the lifting of an automatic stay requires a party to meet a higher burden than simply imposing one.
32The Respondent further asserts that the motion judge had ample reason to refuse to allow a stay of the OCJ Proceedings, particularly in light of the Appellant’s conduct and the timing of his commencement of the SCJ Proceedings.
33She contends that there would be no irreparable harm if the Appellant were to follow the OCJ Proceedings he commenced to their conclusion. If the stay were refused, he would only have to meet three scheduling deadlines some of which were set some time ago.
34The Respondent adds that the Appellant had access to legal counsel, even when not formally represented. In fact, his wife is a lawyer who practices family law.
35Regarding balance of convenience, the Respondent has deposed that she is willing to give the Appellant credit for the $70,700 advance and even to set it off against child support arrears. If the stay were allowed, she would suffer because the Appellant, who has been delaying and stonewalling her disclosure requests, would nonetheless obtain an effective do-over of the OCJ Proceedings. That would be the case even though he behaved so unreasonably and contrary to court orders that she is seeking to strike his pleadings. She has spent a great deal of time and money in almost two years of litigation, which would be wasted if the OCJ Proceedings were to be stayed.
Applicable Authorities
36As set out above, s. 36(1) of the FLA is inapplicable to this motion because the SCJ Proceedings does not involve a divorce. However, s. 2(1) of the FLA does allow the court to stay a proceeding brought under that Act in appropriate circumstances. It reads as follows:
2 (1) If, in an application under this Act, it appears to the court that for the appropriate determination of the spouses’ affairs it is necessary or desirable to have other matters determined first or simultaneously, the court may stay the application until another proceeding is brought or determined as the court considers appropriate.
37Some context to that provision is offered by s. 2(2), which calls for all proceedings under the FLA to be heard in one court. It also allows the transfer of proceedings from one court to another in appropriate circumstances. It states:
All proceedings in one court
(2) Except as this Act provides otherwise, no person who is a party to an application under this Act shall make another application under this Act to another court, but the court may order that the proceeding be transferred to a court having other jurisdiction where, in the first court’s opinion, the other court is more appropriate to determine the matters in issue that should be determined at the same time.
38In addition, the general jurisdiction to stay a proceeding is found in s. 106 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 ("CJA s. 106"), which reads as follows:
A court, on its own initiative or on motion by any person, whether or not a party, may stay any proceeding in the court on such terms as are considered just.
39The test for a stay, as set out above, is the same as the test for an interim injunction. It is found in RJR-MacDonald, at para. 43 as follows:
Serious issue to be tried;
Irreparable harm to the applicant if the request is denied;
Balance of convenience between the parties: "which of the parties would suffer greater harm from the granting or refusal of the remedy pending a decision on the merits."
40In applying the RJR MacDonald test, the court must be mindful that "[t]hese three criteria are not watertight compartments. The strength of one may compensate for the weakness of another. Generally, the court must decide whether the interests of justice call for a stay": Circuit World Corp. v. Lesperance (1997), 1997 CanLII 1385 (ON CA), 33 O.R. (3d) 674 (C.A.), at p. 67; Trop v. Trop, 2024 ONCA 855, at para. 3.
41I will consider each of these arms of the RJR MacDonald test within the context of this case, below.
Serious Issue
42The first part of the RJR MacDonald test requires the court to make a preliminary assessment of the merits of the appeal in order to determine whether it presents a serious issue (RJR MacDonald at paras. 48-49). The threshold for this test is a low one. It must not be "frivolous or vexatious" (RJR MacDonald at paras. 54-55). The issue is not whether the decision below will be upheld (Berry v. Berry, 2010 CarswellOnt 10983, at para. 6 (Ont. C.A. in chambers), at para. 6).
43Clearly the Order is wrong in that there was no automatic stay, arising from the commencement of the SCJ Proceedings. Thus, there is no stay to lift. Rather, it was for the Appellant to prove that a stay of the OCJ Proceedings was merited. He seeks such a stay here in this motion.
44While ordinarily, an error such as that in the Order would be determinative of this arm of the test, that determination is not quite so clear. That is because the motion judge clearly turned her mind to the issue of a stay. She set out powerful reasons to refuse to allow a stay of the OCJ Proceedings, based on facts which were before her.
45If anything, the motion judge’s analysis assumed that the onus was on the Respondent to lift the stay rather than the Appellant to prove that it was appropriate. She found that the Respondent met that test. That determination was a matter of discretion, to which courts are entitled to defer.
46Further, accepting the error of the Order, there is no automatic stay of the OCJ Proceedings. Thus, setting that order aside would accomplish little in that the portion of the order which purports to lift the stay on the OCJ Proceedings is a nullity. Setting it aside would not, in itself, result in a stay of the OCJ Proceedings.
47I also note that s. 2(1) and s. 2(2) of the FLA, would have to be considered in any appeal of the Order. Taken together, they bar duplicative proceedings and allow a remedy of either a stay or a transfer of proceedings. But that stay could be a stay of the support portions of the SCJ Proceedings, leaving the non-support issues extant.
48Thus in summary, while there is a serious issue to be tried in the sense that an error was made in the Order and the bar is low, the serious issue is more complicated than the Appellant wishes it to be made out. Even accepting that there is a serious issue in the appeal, that complication is relevant in my analysis of the other two arms of the RJR MacDonald test.
Irreparable Harm
49At para. 59 of RJR MacDonald, Sopinka and Cory JJ. wrote for the Supreme Court that "[i]rreparable' refers to the nature of the harm suffered rather than its magnitude. It is harm which either cannot be quantified in monetary terms or which cannot be cured, usually because one party cannot collect damages from the other."
50As set out above, the Appellant argues that his irreparable harm, if a stay were not granted, would come in the form of 1) being required to meet the deadlines already set in the OCJ Proceedings and 2) facing the hearings and trial scheduled, in the face of his appeal of the Order.
51But it is not clear how that would irreparably harm the Appellant. He would be required to comply with procedural directions in that proceeding, some given months ago and some of which are extensions of time previously offered, after he failed to meet the original deadlines. I note as well that due to the delay in releasing this endorsement, those deadlines would have to be extended if the OCJ Proceedings continue.
52Even if the Appellant were to win his appeal, the OCJ Proceedings would not necessarily be stayed. The order, which mainly lifted a non-existent stay, would simply be set aside.
53Further, the Appellant’s property claim in the SCJ Proceedings could not only proceed, it likely could do so via summary judgment or consent. I say that considering the Respondent’s admission that she owes him the debt and that she is willing to set it off against any child support owing to her (even though it is now trite law that child support is the right of the child). Thus, it is not necessary that both support and property be dealt with in the same proceeding.
54In his factum, the Appellant also refers to arguments about having to litigate the OCJ Proceedings in the face of previous findings of the motion judge. He alludes to a lack of procedural fairness and even reasonable apprehension of bias, without offering any substantive proof of either. No bias allegation has been raised against the motion judge in the OCJ Proceedings, despite her almost two years as judicial case manager. If such allegations were raised, they would first have to be brought to the motion judge.
55The fact that the motion judge made adverse findings against the Appellant regarding his choice to seek most of the same claims he makes in the OCJ Proceedings in the SCJ Proceedings amounts to neither procedural unfairness nor a reasonable apprehension of bias. That finding is indisputably true.
56The process of single judge case management in the OCJ is not a bug but a feature of that court. It is an extraordinary engine of resolution of cases in that very busy court. It allows one judge to shepherd a case to trial or consensual resolution; ensuring that the presiding judge always knows the people and issues before the court. That process would be undermined if any adverse decision by a case managing judge would, in itself, raise arguments of bias and procedural unfairness.
57Thus, I do not find that the test of irreparable harm is met here.
Balance of Convenience
58As set out above, the three arms of the RJR MacDonald test do not represent watertight compartments. Not only can considerations regarding irreparable harm apply to the determination of balance of convenience, so too can the comparative strength of the parties’ cases: Quizno's Canada Restaurant Corporation v. 1450987 Ontario Corp., 2009 CanLII 20708, [2009] O.J. No. 1743 (SCJ), at para. 46 (where Perell J. spoke of balance of convenience within the context of an injunction motion).
59Here, I find that the balance of convenience favours the Respondent and mitigates against a stay of the OCJ Proceedings for the following reasons:
a. The Appellant chose to commence the OCJ Proceedings almost two years ago. He did so with the assistance of experienced legal counsel.
b. The Appellant does not come to the court with entirely clean hands. He is $10,300 in arrears of costs awards. The motion judge cites his breaches of other court orders in the OCJ; both costs and deadlines. At the commencement of this motion, I raised the issue of whether this court should even hear it in light of the comments of the Supreme Court of Canada in Dickie v. Dickie 2007 SCC 8, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 346, at paras. 4 and 6. There the court adopted the dissent of Laskin J.A. below, that in the face of continuing disobedience with court orders, a court may exercise its discretion to refuse to hear an appeal. The Supreme Court added that in the face of the record before it, “showing continuing disobedience with court order, [the Ontario Court of Appeal, below] should have exercised its discretion [to adjourn the appeal before it until the appellant had taken steps to comply with court orders below.]”
c. While there are significant arrears under the Separation Agreement and even the Kim J. order, I understand that an interim OCJ order reduced the Appellant’s ongoing support payments and he is current with that order. Thus, I chose to hear the motion but can consider the Appellant’s conduct below within the context of the balance of convenience.
d. The Respondent has been forced to invest thousands of dollars in litigating the proceeding which the Appellant commenced in the OCJ. If the stay were granted, the value of that money as well as the time already invested in that proceeding may well be lost.
e. The chronology of the OCJ Proceedings set out above, particularly the timing of the commencement of the SCJ Proceedings at the metaphorical 11th hour before the Respondent’s motion to strike his pleadings, is troubling, to say the least. It was open to the motion judge to see it as tactical.
f. While it would be advantageous had the Appellant originally commenced his proceedings against the Respondent in this court, he chose, for his own reasons, not to do so. He was aware of the funds that he had advanced to the Respondent and could easily have included them in a motion to change or application in this court. But, with the assistance of counsel, he chose not to do so. The Respondent should not be required to suffer the cost of his change of mind.
g. The Appellant would lose little other than a tactical advantage if the OCJ Proceedings were to continue. The Respondent has already conceded the $70,700 claim that is the only meaningful substantive basis for commencing the SCJ Proceedings. While his counsel argued that that concession is not binding, it is an admission which would require leave to withdraw: r. 22(5); see also: Antipas v. Coroneos, 1988 CanLII 10348 (ON HCJ), [1988] O.J. No. 137 (H.C.), at para. 7 citing Baydon Corp. Ltd. et al. v. DuPont Glore Forgan Canada Ltd. et al. (1974), 1974 CanLII 593 (ON HCJDC), 4 O.R. (2d) 290 and Gould v. Arliss Haulage Ltd. et al. (1979), 1979 CanLII 2002 (ON HCJ), 27 O.R. (2d) 291.
h. On the other hand, the Respondent would be prejudiced by the cost and delay which would inevitably arise if the stay being requested were granted. Ignoring the motion to strike, the support issues are ripe for resolution in the OCJ, where a trial is at hand. While the Appellant’s counsel speaks of a short delay, that is not likely the case. His appeal will likely take months to perfect, be argued and determined. During all of which, the support issues will remain in limbo. Facts that are current would become increasingly stale and in need of updating. The horizon for resolution will recede. If this were the beginning of the OCJ Proceedings, the delay would be of little moment. But the parties are two years into the OCJ litigation and heading toward trial.
i. The OCJ is as well placed as this court to determine the support issues. In fact, single judge case management may be seen to give it an advantage in that regard. In any event, there is no necessity to deal with the support issues in this court as opposed to the OCJ, especially in light of the Respondent’s concession regarding the $70,700 advance.
Conclusion
60For all of the reasons set out above, I find that the Appellant has failed to meet the test for a stay of either or both of the Order or the OCJ Proceedings. Thus, I dismiss this motion.
61I note that the Respondent has moved for security for costs of this appeal. The Appellant’s motion was brought as an urgent motion. The issue of security for costs of the appeal is not urgent. In the limited time available, the court lacked the time to hear it. It is adjourned sine die, to be returned on a date agreed upon by the parties. If they are unable to do so or agree to a timetable for that motion, the Respondent’s counsel may arrange to attend at triage court to deal with that issue.
Costs
62The parties should attempt to resolve the issue of costs on their own. If they are unable to do so, the Respondent, as the successful party in this motion, may submit her costs submissions of up to three pages, double spaced, one-inch margins, plus a bill of costs/costs outline and offers to settle within 14 days of release of this endorsement. She need not include the authorities upon which she relies so long as they are found in the commonly referenced reporting services (i.e. , LexisNexis Quicklaw, or WestlawNext) and the relevant paragraph references are included. The Appellant may respond in kind within a further 14 days. No reply submission will be accepted unless I request it. If I have not received any submissions within the time frames set out above, I will assume that the parties have resolved the issue and will make no costs order.
________________________ Kurz J.
Date: June 22, 2026