REASONS FOR DECISION

LAW J.:

1The Applicant brings a motion seeking a finding that the parties entered into a binding and enforceable final agreement with respect to equalization and spousal support. She seeks the enforcement of those terms, and in particular, an equalization payment in the amount of $2,150,000 and a lump sum spousal support payment of $925,000.

2The Respondent argues that the parties had not entered into a binding and enforceable agreement. In the alternative, the Respondent argues that if this court finds there to be a binding and enforceable agreement, enforcement of the lump sum spousal support payment would be unconscionable and unjust.

Background Facts

3The parties were married on March 22, 2001 in Hong Kong. They separated on June 1, 2023 after a 22 year marriage.

4The parties have two children. The oldest child is now independent. The youngest child is currently in his second year at the University of Toronto.

5The Respondent was a Senior Director with Oracle Systems Hong Kong Limited. He joined Oracle Hong Kong on July 9, 2012 and continued to be employed there until March 23, 2026. The Applicant does not work.

6A court application was commenced on June 6, 2023. During the course of the litigation, the most contentious issues related to the amount of equalization and the quantum of spousal support payable by the Respondent to the Applicant.

7The Applicant was also concerned that the Respondent was trying to defeat her claims by dissipating assets and removing money to offshore accounts. This was the subject of various motions and temporary orders made by the court. I note that these allegations have not been proven at trial, and they form no part in my decision, except as context to inform me of why certain litigation decisions were made.

8In March 2025, the court ordered the Respondent to pay interim without prejudice spousal support of $7,888 per month and child support of $919.00 per month. The Respondent’s income for support purposes was determined to be $342,353. The Applicant’s income was imputed to be $50,000.

9On January 2, 2026 at 10:00 am, the parties attended a settlement conference before Bateman J. Both parties were present with counsel. What occurred during and after the settlement conference before Bateman J. was not seriously disputed, and much of it was supported by emails and letters between counsel and the court.

10According to Bateman J.’s endorsement, the following issues were discussed at the conference:

(a) The Respondent’s failure to prove his claimed debt of $461,396.74 to the Canada Revenue Agency during periods where he apparently resided in Hong Kong.

(b) The equalization payment owing to the Applicant, including the transfer of the matrimonial home to the Applicant, as well as the major assets in Canada available to pay the equalization payment owing.

(c) The issue of lump sum spousal support, and in particular, employment income, age of retirement, and imputation of income.

11After receiving an initial opinion from Bateman J., the parties engaged in settlement discussions largely documented through email exchanges. The following is a summary of the correspondence that was exchanged that day:

(a) At 11:51 am, the Applicant’s lawyer proposed that the matrimonial home be valued at $950,000 for the purpose of crediting it against the equalization payment to be made to the Applicant.

(b) At 12:32 pm, the Respondent’s lawyer responded that the Respondent had already reduced his initial position on the value of the matrimonial home from $1,038,000 to $980,000, which represented a 5% reduction, and that he would not reduce it further.

(c) At 12:35 pm, the Applicant’s lawyer stated he would ask the Applicant about the $980,000 proposed value for the matrimonial home. He also asked whether the Respondent would agree to freeze his Royal Bank of Canada GIC and consider a lump sum spousal support payment.

(d) At 12:40 pm, the Respondent’s lawyer confirmed that her client was willing to freeze the GIC. However, she stated that the Respondent did not agree to pay lump sum spousal support. The Respondent proposed mediation to settle both equalization and spousal support.

(e) At 1:21 pm, the Respondent offered to settle equalization on a final basis for $2,000,000 with $980,000 to be paid by transfer of the matrimonial home.

(f) At 1:38 pm, the Applicant’s lawyer responded that he estimated the equalization payment to be between $2,000,000 and $2,321,815, and the offer of $2,000,000 was not a major concession. He also stated that the Applicant’s position was that lump sum spousal support on the high end should be $1,900,000. The Applicant’s lawyer emphasized that his client wanted a clean break, and she was concerned the Respondent would stop paying monthly support given that he had moved money overseas.

(g) At 1:46 pm, the Respondent’s lawyer proposed that equalization be settled separately from spousal support and asked whether the Applicant would accept $2,000,000 as an equalization payment.

(h) At 1:59 pm, the Applicant’s lawyer proposed $2,200,000, with the value of the home at $980,000 to be credited against any lump sum spousal support to be determined at trial.

(i) At 2:07 pm, the Respondent’s lawyer said his client did not agree to pay lump sum spousal support but would pay $2,100,000 for equalization with $980,000 paid by transferring the home within 45 days. This was accepted by the Applicant.

12After the parties agreed to an equalization payment, they received additional input on spousal support from Bateman J. According to the Applicant, the parties subsequently reached an agreement that the Respondent would pay her $2,150,000 as an equalization payment and $925,000 for lump sum spousal support. The total payment agreed to was $3,075,000.

13At 11:11 pm that night, the Respondent’s lawyer circulated a draft Partial Final Minutes of Settlement which included the terms as set out above.

14Over the weekend, the parties did not sign minutes of settlement as anticipated by Bateman J. On January 5, 2026, court staff contacted both lawyers to request an update with respect to the minutes of settlement. In response, the Respondent’s lawyer indicated that her client was revoking his offer to settle spousal support on a lump sum of $925,000. She cited the high likelihood of a significant reduction in the Respondent’s income in the next five years. However, she confirmed that her client still agreed to the equalization terms in the agreement.

15Upon receiving the Respondent’s revocation of his offer to settle spousal support on a lump sum of $925,000, the Applicant sought a motion to enforce the terms of the agreement, indicating that an agreement had been reached.

16Instead of proceeding to schedule the motion, on January 5, 2026 at 2:47 pm, the Respondent’s lawyer responded to the Applicant’s lawyer as follows:

My client has agreed to proceed with the substantive terms as set out in the draft Minutes – equalization payment of $2,150,000 to be partially satisfied by matrimonial home transfer, lump sum spousal support of $925,000. Please review the Minutes of Settlement and let me know your comments so we can finalize them for signing.

17On January 6, 2026, the Respondent’s lawyer wrote directly to Bateman J.’s judicial assistant and confirmed that her client was proceeding with the settlement. She indicated that no enforcement motion was necessary and that counsel was finalizing the language of the minutes.

18Bateman J. released her endorsement on January 8, 2026. As a result of the foregoing, Bateman J. included the following at the end of her endorsement:

The court was advised that the parties had resolved all issues on a final basis. Signed final minutes of settlement were to be provided to my JA by 10:00 a.m. January 5, 2026.
The court followed up with counsel on January 5th, 2026 to ascertain the status of the minutes of settlement. At first it appeared that they would be forthcoming. Later in the day the court was advised to provide an endorsement.

19Between January 8, 2026 and January 19, 2026, the parties continued to exchange correspondence about the wording in the draft minutes of settlement and with respect to the issue of child support. There was no evidence provided that either party sought to resile from the equalization and spousal support terms during this period.

20It is clear from the evidence provided that during that time, the Respondent, through his counsel, reiterated on multiple occasions that he was ready to proceed pursuant to the agreement on equalization and lump sum spousal support reached as a result of the settlement conference.

21In fact, as a result of perceived tardiness to respond to her correspondence, on January 13, 2026, the Respondent’s lawyer threatened to bring an enforcement motion against the Applicant. Her email reads as follows:

Since there has been no reply from your client, I have instructions to bring an enforcement motion against her to enforce the agreement reached on spousal support and equalization payment.

22On January 14, 2026, the Applicant confirmed that she was prepared to proceed with the settlement on equalization and lump sum spousal support, while leaving the issues of child support and s.7 expenses to the next court attendance. This was confirmed again on January 16, 2026.

23On January 19, 2026, the Respondent’s lawyer circulated revised minutes of settlement limited to equalization and lump sum spousal support. The Respondent’s lawyer proposed obtaining a consent order through a 14B motion on the terms of the revised minutes of settlement.

24The revised minutes of settlement included the following substantive terms:

(a) The Respondent shall pay an equalization payment of $2,150,000 to the Applicant.

(b) The Respondent shall pay lump sum spousal support of $925,000 to the Applicant.

(c) The Respondent’s total obligation of $3,075,000 (comprising of the equalization payment and the lump sum spousal support) shall be satisfied by the Respondent transferring title of the matrimonial home to the Applicant, funds held in trust from the sale of a property, funds held in a Royal Bank of Canada GIC, and the remaining balance in cash within 45 days.

25The revised minutes of settlement also included a spousal support release and property and estate release. The spousal support release included the following:

The Applicant and the Respondent specifically anticipate that one or both of them may lose their jobs, become ill and be unable to work, have child care responsibilities that will interfere with their ability to work, find their financial resources diminished or exhausted whether through their own fault or not, or be affected by general economic and family conditions changing over time. Changes in their circumstances may be catastrophic, unanticipated or beyond their imagination. Nevertheless, no change, no matter how extreme or consequential for either or both of them, will alter this agreement and their view that the terms of this Agreement reflect their intention to always be separate financially…

26The full text of the revised minutes of settlement is included with this decision at Schedule A.

27The January 19, 2026 minutes of settlement is the version of the settlement that the Applicant seeks to uphold through a finding by this court.

28The parties did not end up signing the revised minutes of settlement. The evidence is that after this time, the parties continued to negotiate minor wording with respect to the description of the matrimonial home and costs. Again, no evidence was provided that the parties disputed the major elements of the minutes of settlement during this time and, in particular, the agreement on equalization and lump sum spousal support.

29On February 24, 2026, the Respondent’s manager told him in a one-on-one meeting that his position at Oracle Hong Kong would not continue into the new fiscal year. Despite this information, the parties continued to negotiate with each other, primarily on the issue of costs. For example, emails were exchanged on February 26, 2026 and February 27, 2026 about costs. At no time did the Respondent’s lawyer indicate that her client was revoking his agreement to the equalization or lump sum spousal support payment.

30On March 2, 2026, the date of the parties’ trial scheduling conference, the Respondent served an affidavit asserting that there was a material change in circumstances and sought to resile from the agreement on equalization and lump sum spousal support. This was the first time the Applicant learned of the Respondent’s repudiation of the agreement. As a result, this motion was set.

31On March 23, 2026, the Respondent was terminated from his employment at Oracle Hong Kong.

32The Respondent’s severance comprised of one month’s pay in lieu of notice which was HKD $161,264.60, a statutory severance payment of HKD $206,850.00 and an ex-gratia payment of HKD $183,150.00, totalling approximately $69,572.00 CAD. The Respondent’s evidence is that given his age, he will be unable to secure a comparable director-level role in Hong Kong. He says he has, instead, decided to relocate to Canada. The Respondent’s evidence is that since his termination, he has applied for over 17 positions in Toronto with no response. He also says that he intends to upgrade his schools by enrolling full-time in the Cloud Architecture and Administration graduate diploma program at Seneca College beginning in September 2026, which will delay his re-entry into the workforce to May 2027. The Respondent expects that with the diploma, he will find a job earning around $125,000 per year in Canada.

Law and Analysis

Formal Requirements of a Domestic Contract

33 Section 55(1) of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 (“the FLA”), states as follows:

55 (1) A domestic contract and an agreement to amend or rescind a domestic contract are unenforceable unless made in writing, signed by the parties and witnessed.

34A domestic contract is defined at s. 51 of the FLA as including a separation agreement. Section 54 defines separation agreements broadly as an agreement entered into by two persons who cohabited and are living separate and apart, with respect to their respective rights and obligations including division of property and support obligations.

35Although s.55(1) of the FLA requires domestic contracts to be in writing, signed by the parties, and witnessed, this section does not oust established legal principles that allow the court to find a binding settlement reached orally or through exchanged correspondence under certain circumstances.

36In Geropoulos v. Geropoulos (1982), 1982 CanLII 2020 (ON CA), 35 O.R. (2d) 763, (C.A.), the Ontario Court of Appeal was asked to decide whether an agreement settling the claims in a family law action, contained solely in an exchange of correspondence between solicitors, was enforceable. In that case, as in this one, one of the parties refused to sign the agreement that incorporated the terms of settlement set out in previously exchanged letters between the parties’ lawyers. The Ontario Court of Appeal specifically considered whether s.54 (1) of the Family Law Reform Act (the predecessor provision to s.55(1) in the FLA) meant that the parties’ failure to have the agreement signed and witnessed made it unenforceable. The court held:

I share the view that settlement agreements concluded by solicitors or counsel resolving outstanding claims in pending litigation under the Act are beyond the reason and purview of s. 54(1). The formal requirements laid down by the section are intended to ensure that asserted domestic contracts, be they marriage contracts (s. 51), cohabitation agreements (s. 52) or separation agreements (s. 53), are reduced to writing and in fact agreed to by the parties as evidenced by their witnessed signatures; this in essence is a Statute of Frauds type provision made referable to domestic contracts by the Family Law Reform Act.

In my opinion, the section plainly is not aimed at or intended to apply to authorized settlement agreements like the present, made with legal advice during the pendency of court proceedings which, to be effective, require the intervention of the court. Such agreements derive their effect from an act of the court; their authenticity is assured by the court's supervision and control over them; and ample protection is afforded the parties to these agreements, wholly independent of the section. The court's jurisdiction to enforce settlements or refuse to do so, notwithstanding any agreement between solicitors or counsel, is well established; whether they should be enforced or not, in the final analysis, is a matter for the discretion of the court and, in litigation under the Family Law Reform Act, a matter that would be subject to the court's overriding jurisdiction with respect to domestic contracts. Scherer v. Paletta, supra; 3 Hals. 4th ed., paras. 1182-83, pp. 650-651 and ss. 18(4) and 55 of the Act.

No purpose is to be served in compelling agreements of this kind to comply with the formalities of s. 54(1) and, if not, permitting parties to withdraw at will from compromises properly entered into by their legal representatives before trial of their action or, if the appellant's position were to be accepted, compromises concluded even during the trial of the action. It may well be that, given the nature of matrimonial litigation, prudence would dictate that lawyers ensure that settlement agreements are signed by the parties personally witnessed. But I cannot construe the section as requiring that an otherwise valid compromise of an action must be rendered void and defeated on this ground alone, nor do I believe that the legislation could have contemplated or intended that result. Such a construction would be wholly inconsonant with the established policy of encouraging the settlement of disputed claims and recognizing and preserving the validity of settlements freely and properly entered into under advice. [emphasis added]

37It is undisputed that in this case, the formal requirements set out at s.55(1) of the FLA were not met. The parties had before them a draft minutes of settlement that was not signed or witnessed. However, it is clear from the facts that the parties entered into negotiations with counsel with the purpose of settling the litigation. There was no suggestion that counsel was not authorized to enter into the settlements on behalf of their client. Therefore, a lack of compliance with the formal requirements set out at s.55(1) is not a bar to finding that a binding settlement was reached. Rather, the court must determine whether, on these facts, a binding settlement was reached.

Was a Binding Settlement Reached?

38In Fernicola v. Fernicola, 2022 ONSC 1041, Woodley J. set out three lines of inquiry the court must consider when determining whether the parties have reached a settlement. She stated at para. 55:

To determine whether the parties have reached a settlement, the Ontario Court of Appeal in Halpern v. Halpern, 2014 ONSC 4246, citing Andrews v. Lundrigan, 2009 ONCA 160 and Ward v. Ward, 2011 ONCA 178, has set out three distinct lines of inquiry to consider:

(1) was there a “meeting of the minds” or consensus ad idem, that was manifest to the reasonable observers?

(2) was there a consensus on all of the essential terms of the agreement? and

(3) did the parties make the agreement conditional upon any other term, or subject to execution or a formal contract?

39The test is objective and the parties will be found to have reached a meeting of the minds where it is clear to the objective reasonable bystander, in light of all the material facts, that the parties intended to contract, and the essential terms of that contract can be determined with a reasonable degree of certainty. See Fernicola v. Fernicola, 2022 ONSC 1041 at para. 56 and Cook v. Joyce, 2017 ONCA 49.

40Given that it is the Applicant who seeks to enforce the agreement, the onus is on the Applicant to show that a binding settlement was reached. I have found that the Applicant met her burden of establishing that a binding settlement was reached on these facts.

41In this case, it is clear that there was a meeting of the minds between the parties. The email exchanges between counsel clearly indicated that both parties agreed to settle equalization and lump sum spousal support on a global amount of $3,075,000 from as early as January 2, 2026, when the Respondent’s lawyer circulated a draft partial final minutes of settlement on those terms. This was further affirmed on multiple occasions thereafter, including on January 5, 2026, when the Respondent’s lawyer confirmed that her client agreed to proceed with the substantive terms set out in draft partial final minutes of settlement and on January 13, 2026, when the Respondent’s lawyer threatened enforcement proceedings.

42Although the Respondent argued on this motion that in fact, it was the Applicant who had failed to agree to the terms as proposed and thereby failed to secure finality through favourable minutes of settlement, I reject this argument. On the evidence provided, it is clear the Applicant accepted a settlement on the global amount of $3,075,000, comprising of an equalization payment of $2,150,000 and lump sum spousal support of $925,000. This was clearly demonstrated when the Applicant sought a motion to enforce the settlement when it appeared that the Respondent had revoked his offer on the morning of January 5, 2026. It was also clearly demonstrated on January 14, 2026, when the Applicant responded to the Respondent’s threat to enforce the settlement by reaffirming that she was prepared to proceed with the settlement on equalization and lump sum spousal support, leaving the issues of child support and s.7 expense to next court attendance.

43There was, furthermore, a consensus on all the essential terms of the agreement. Specifically, the parties agreed that the Applicant would receive a global amount of $3,075,000 (comprising of an equalization payment of $2,150,000 and lump sum spousal support of $925,000), in exchange for full and final releases of property and spousal support claims. The parties agreed as to how the payment would be made, including via the transfer of the Respondent’s title in the matrimonial home, funds held in trust, and cash. This was agreed to as of January 19, 2026, when the Respondent sent over revised minutes of settlement limited to equalization and lump sum spousal support.

44The Respondent argues that the fact the parties continued to negotiate after the January 19, 2026 minutes were circulated is evidence that no binding agreement was reached. I reject this argument. In Salminen v. Garvie, 2011 BCSC 339, the court discussed the effect of subsequent conduct on the determination of whether a binding agreement has been reached at first instance. While subsequent conduct is a factor in determining whether parties have reached an agreement, the "mere proposal of additional or better terms does not negate the existence of a binding contract". Put alternatively, further negotiations are not necessarily inconsistent with a fully-formed agreement. The question is whether the parties reached a meeting of the minds or a consensus on all the essential terms of the agreement. I have found that they did so.

45The terms set out in the January 19, 2026 minutes of settlement were not contingent or conditional upon any other term. While the parties were attempting to settle other outstanding issues in this matter, namely child support and costs, the agreement, with respect to equalization and lump sum spousal support, was not conditional upon the settlement of those other collateral issues. This is reflected by the Respondent lawyer’s offer to send in the January 19, 2026 minutes of settlement via a 14B motion to obtain a consent order on the issue of equalization and lump sum spousal support only. It is clear from the parties’ actions and words that there was a binding agreement with respect to equalization and lump sum spousal support according to the terms in the January 19, 2026 minutes of settlement.

Should the Court Exercise its Discretion Not to Enforce the Settlement?

46The Respondent concedes that if this court finds there is a binding agreement, the equalization should be paid. With respect to the lump sum spousal support, the Respondent argues that even if this court finds there is a binding agreement, that term should not be enforced because the agreement with respect to lump sum spousal support is unconscionable and improvident.

47Although the Respondent also alternatively argued that the spousal support term should be varied due to a material change in circumstances, this request was not properly raised before the court as the Respondent had made no application for this relief. I will not be considering this ground of relief.

48The family court retains jurisdiction not to enforce a binding settlement. However, the court’s discretion not to enforce a settlement is a limited one given the importance of certainty in the resolution of family disputes: See: Van Delst v. Hronowsky, 2020 ONCA 329, 447 D.L.R. (4th) 702, at para. 1., Dembo v. Hannas, 2020 ONCA 564 at para. 17.

49Settlement agreements in matrimonial proceedings should ordinarily be respected, and parties should not be entitled to resile on their agreement to resolve their differences. As a general rule, minutes of settlement entered into by parties with the benefit of legal counsel should be upheld. Such agreements put an end to the financial cost and emotional drain of ongoing matrimonial disputes. The conclusion of the matter allows the parties certainty, finality and autonomy: Miglin v. Miglin, 2003 SCC 24, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 303; Steine v. Steine, 2010 ONSC 4289; Simpkins v. Simpkins (2004), 2004 CanLII 28909 (ON CA), 187 O.A.C. 325 (C.A.); Bogue v. Bogue (1999), 1999 CanLII 3284 (ON CA), 46 O.R. (3d) 1 ( C.A.).

50While the caselaw suggests there are various circumstances which would cause the court not to exercise its discretion to enforce a settlement, I will confine my comments to the ground raised by the Respondent, which is, that enforcing the lump sum spousal support term is unconscionable and unjust. The Respondent argues that the lump sum was calculated based on his prior income of $324,000, which is no longer available to him due to his recent termination of employment. Coupled with his alleged tax liability of approximately $422,000, payment of the lump sum would result in hardship. His calculations show that mid-point lump sum spousal support would be approximately $584,800 instead of the $925,000 agreed to prior to his termination of employment.

51In general, a settlement will be determined to be unconscionable where it was negotiated under circumstances involving oppression, pressure, or other vulnerabilities and if one party’s exploitation of such vulnerabilities during the negotiation process resulted in an agreement that deviated substantially from the legislation. See Rick v. Brandsema, 2009 SCC 10, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 295, at para. 44. It is the circumstances at the time of the drafting and signing of the contract which must be examined, not the results. See Toscano v. Toscano, 2015 ONSC 487, at para. 63.

52In Rosen v. Rosen (1994), 1994 CanLII 2769 (ON CA), 18 O.R. (3d) 641 (C.A.), the Ontario Court of Appeal held that to establish unconscionability, a party must prove that the parties to the agreement were in an unequal bargaining positions and that one preyed upon the other’s weaknesses to extract an agreement that was improvident on its face. Both elements are necessary. As stated by the court:

On the proper test for unconscionability I refer to the words of Schroeder J.A. in Mundinger v. Mundinger, 1968 CanLII 250 (ON CA), [1969] 1 O.R. 606 at pp. 609-10, 3 D.L.R. (3d) 338 (C.A.):

If the bargain is fair the fact that the parties were not equally vigilant of their interest is immaterial. Likewise if one was not preyed upon by the other, an improvident or even grossly inadequate consideration is no ground upon which to set aside a contract freely entered into. It is the combination of inequality and improvidence which alone may invoke this jurisdiction. Then the onus is placed upon the party seeking to uphold the contract to show that his conduct throughout was scrupulously considerate of the other's interests.

This is slightly different from the test set forth by the trial judge in the case at bar. It is, however, the basis of our modern law of unconscionability and I would unhesitatingly follow it. The question therefore becomes was there an inequality between the parties, a preying of one upon the other which, combined with improvidence, cast the onus upon the husband of acting with scrupulous care for the welfare and interests of the wife. I think not.

We must always remember that it is not the ability of one party to make a better bargain that counts. Seldom are contracting parties equal. It is the taking advantage of that ability to prey upon the other party that produces the unconscionability. I can find nothing in the reasons for judgment quoted above to denote that advantage taken. [emphasis added]

53As the party seeking to depart from the enforcement of the agreement, the onus is on the Respondent to demonstrate that the court should exercise its discretion in his favour.

54The Respondent did not meet his onus. In my view, the agreement on lump sum spousal support is not unconscionable or improvident. I reject the Respondent’s argument for the following reasons:

(a) The settlement was negotiated fairly; there were no circumstances of oppression, pressure, or other vulnerabilities that would lead the court to conclude that the negotiation process was unfair.

(b) The Respondent is a sophisticated litigant and was represented by counsel during these proceedings and throughout the negotiation. There is nothing to suggest that the agreement was not fairly entered into with independent legal advice.

(d) The Respondent was clearly aware that he could have a significant reduction in income when he entered into the agreement. On January 5, 2026, the Respondent’s lawyer indicated that the Respondent wished to resile from the agreement because he felt that it was likely that his income would be significantly reduced in the next five years. The Respondent nevertheless proceeded with the settlement.

(e) The January 19, 2026 minutes of settlement clearly included a release anticipating that either of the parties might lose their jobs and that notwithstanding this risk, the agreement was not to be altered. The parties, including the Respondent, clearly wanted finality and autonomy from this agreement.

(f) The Respondent took a calculated risk in proceeding with the settlement. Put another way, if the Respondent had secured another position paying him significantly more than $324,000, he would have reaped the benefit of an increased salary without any right by the Applicant to seek an increase. The fact that the Respondent now realizes he could have made a better bargain does not make the bargain unconscionable or improvident.

(g) The Respondent failed to provide proof of his tax liability despite multiple requests from the Applicant. The court is therefore entitled not to take into account any alleged financial hardship on the basis of the tax liability, particularly where there are questions as to whether the tax liability exists at all given his non-residence in Canada for many years.

55As a result of the foregoing, I do not find that enforcing the lump sum spousal support agreement would be manifestly unfair or unconscionable in these circumstances.

Costs

56The Applicant was the more successful party on this motion. However, the Respondent did act reasonably in that he at least conceded that if there was a binding agreement, the equalization payment should be paid. In these circumstances, a cost award of $5,000 payable by the Respondent to the Applicant is reasonable and fair.

Order

57The court makes the following final orders:

The terms of the January 19, 2026 minutes of settlement are binding and enforceable.
The Respondent shall pay the Applicant an equalization payment in the sum of $2,150,000 CAD in full and final satisfaction of the Applicant's claim for an equalization of the parties' net family property.
The Respondent shall pay the Applicant lump sum spousal support in the sum of $925,000 CAD in full and final satisfaction of the Applicant's claim for spousal support, both retroactive and prospective.
The Respondent’s total payment obligation to the Applicant, in the amount of $3,075,000 CAD (the “Total Payment”), shall be satisfied as follows:

(a) The sum of $980,000 CAD shall be satisfied by the Respondent transferring title to the matrimonial home municipally known as 15 Water Walk Drive, Unit 2105, Unionville, Ontario L6G 0G2 (the “Matrimonial Home”) to the Applicant, free and clear of all encumbrances, within forty-five (45) days. The Applicant may retain the contents of the home.

(b) The sum of $405,254.10 CAD shall be paid by the real estate lawyer, Yang Wang, of Yang Wang Law Professional Corporation, to the Applicant’s family lawyer, Daniel Walker of Bobila Walker Law LLP, in trust, within seven (7) days, from the net sale proceeds of the property municipally known as 55 Cooper Street, Unit 3202, Toronto, Ontario M5E 0G1, presently held in trust by Yang Wang.

(c) The Respondent shall not withdraw, encumber, or transfer any funds held in the Guaranteed Investment Certificate with the Royal Bank of Canada (“RBC”), bearing account number 00120224259 (the “RBC GIC”), except in accordance with these Minutes. Within forty-five (45) days, the Respondent shall:

i. convert the funds in the RBC GIC into Canadian Dollars using the spot exchange rate offered by RBC at the time of conversion; and

ii. transfer the entire balance of the RBC GIC to Daniel Walker of Bobila Walker Law LLP, in trust.

(d) The Respondent shall pay the remaining balance of the Total Payment, being $3,075,000 CAD less the amounts set out in paragraphs 4(a), 4(b), and 4(c), to Daniel Walker of Bobila Walker Law LLP, in trust, within forty-five (45) days.

(e) The Respondent shall retain Yang Wang as the real estate lawyer to complete the transfer of title of the Matrimonial Home to the Applicant. Both parties shall cooperate fully and execute all documents reasonably required to complete the transfer. If the Applicant has registered a matrimonial home designation against the title to the Matrimonial Home, she shall remove such designation or consent to its removal for the purposes of completing the transfer. The parties shall share the costs associated with the preparation and registration of the transfer equally, including any costs incurred to remove the matrimonial home designation.

(f) Upon the completion of the title transfer of the Matrimonial Home to the Applicant, the Applicant shall be solely responsible for all costs of the Matrimonial Home.

(g) In the event the Canada Revenue Agency challenges the characterization of the lump sum spousal support payment such that the Applicant is required to include the payment as part of her income, the Respondent shall be responsible for the resulting tax liability and/or penalty.

The Respondent shall pay to the Applicant $5,000 in costs for this motion within 30 days.

Justice T. Law

Released: June 19, 2026

SCHEDULE A

Text of Revised Minutes of Settlement

The Applicant, Jenny Hoi Yin Cho (the "Applicant"), and the Respondent, John Ping Kwun Hui (the "Respondent"), hereby agree to settle the issues of equalization and spousal support on a final basis as follows:

Equalization and Spousal Support

The Respondent shall pay the Applicant an equalization payment in the sum of Two Million One Hundred and Fifty Thousand Dollars ($2,150,000 CAD) in full and final satisfaction of the Applicant's claim for an equalization of the parties' net family property.
The Respondent shall pay the Applicant lump sum spousal support in the sum of Nine Hundred and Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars ($925,000 CAD) in full and final satisfaction of the Applicant's claim for spousal support, retroactive and prospective.
The Respondent’s total payment obligation to the Applicant, in the amount of Three Million Seventy- Five Thousand Dollars ($3,075,000 CAD) (the “Total Payment”), shall be satisfied as follows:

(a) The sum of $980,000 CAD shall be satisfied by the Respondent transferring title to the matrimonial home municipally known as 15 Water Walk Drive, Unit 2105, Unionville, Ontario L6G 0G2 (the “Matrimonial Home”) to the Applicant, free and clear of all encumbrances, within forty-five (45) days of both parties signing these Minutes. The Applicant may retain the contents of the home.

(b) The sum of $405,254.10 CAD shall be paid by the real estate lawyer, Yang Wang, of Yang Wang Law Professional Corporation, to the Applicant’s family lawyer, Daniel Walker of Bobila Walker Law LLP, in trust, within seven (7) days of both parties signing these Minutes, from the net sale proceeds of the property municipally known as 55 Cooper Street, Unit 3202, Toronto, Ontario M5E 0G1, presently held in trust by Yang Wang.

i. convert the funds in the RBC GIC into Canadian Dollars using the spot exchange rate offered by RBC at the time of conversion; and

ii. transfer the entire balance of the RBC GIC to Daniel Walker of Bobila Walker Law LLP, in trust.

(d) The Respondent shall pay the remaining balance of the Total Payment, being $3,075,000 CAD less the amounts set out in paragraphs 3(a), 3(b), and 3(c), to Daniel Walker of Bobila Walker Law LLP, in trust, within forty-five (45) days of both parties signing these Minutes.

The Respondent shall retain Yang Wang as the real estate lawyer to complete the transfer of title of the Matrimonial Home to the Applicant. Both parties shall cooperate fully and execute all documents reasonably required to complete the transfer. If the Applicant has registered a matrimonial home designation against the title to the Matrimonial Home, she shall remove such designation or consent to its removal for the purposes of completing the transfer. The parties shall share equally the costs associated with the preparation and registration of the transfer, including any costs incurred to remove the matrimonial home designation.
Upon the completion of the title transfer of the Matrimonial Home to the Applicant, the Applicant shall be solely responsible for all costs of the Matrimonial Home.
In the event the Canada Revenue Agency challenges the characterization of the lump sum spousal support payment such that the Applicant is required to include the payment as part of her income, the Applicant shall be responsible for the resulting tax liability and/or penalty.

Spousal Support Release

As a result of the terms of these Minutes, the Applicant and the Respondent are financially independent of each other and release each of their respective rights to spousal support from the other, now and forever, including any further payment for spousal support under the Divorce Act, the Family Law Act, in common law or equity, or as a dependant from the other's estate under the Succession Law Reform Act.
Neither party will pay spousal support to the other now or in the future notwithstanding any material change in either party's circumstances.
The Applicant and the Respondent intend this spousal support release to be forever final and non- variable.
For greater certainty, the parties acknowledge that:

(a) they have negotiated these Minutes in an unimpeachable fashion and that the terms of these Minutes fully represent their intentions and expectations;

(b) they have had independent legal advice and all the disclosure they have requested and require to understand the nature and consequences of these Minutes, and to come to the conclusion, as they do, that the terms of these Minutes, including the release of all spousal support rights reflects an equitable sharing of the economic consequences of their relationship and its breakdown;

(d) this release of spousal support reflects each of their own respective particular objectives and concerns, and are intended to be a final and certain settling of all spousal support issues between them. They are relying on this spousal release to base their future lives.

The Applicant and the Respondent specifically wish to be able to pursue their separate and independent lives, no matter what changes may occur. The Applicant and the Respondent specifically anticipate that one or both of them may lose their jobs, become ill and be unable to work, have child care responsibilities that will interfere with their ability to work, find their financial resources diminished or exhausted whether through their own fault or not, or be affected by general economic and family conditions changing over time. Changes in their circumstances may be catastrophic, unanticipated or beyond their imagination. Nevertheless, no change, no matter how extreme or consequential for either or both of them, will alter this agreement and their view that the terms of this Agreement reflect their intention to always be separate financially. The Applicant and the Respondent fully accept that no change whatsoever in either or both of their circumstances will entitle either of them to spousal support from the other, now and forever.
In short, the parties expect the courts to enforce fully this spousal support release no matter what occurs in the future.

Property and Estate Release

Except as otherwise stated in these Minutes, the Applicant and the Respondent release each other from all claims either may have against the other now or in the future under the terms of any statute or the common law or in equity, including all claims under the Family Law Act and the Succession Law Reform Act, for:

i. possession of property,

ii. ownership of property,

iii. division of property,

iv. compensation for contributions to property, and

v. an equalization payment;

(b) will be entitled to retain their respective property free from any claim by the other party, and will be free to deal with or dispose of their respective property as they deem fit;

(d) in the case of RRSPs, RRIFs, registered or unregistered private or employment pensions, life insurance and any such similar property, disclaim any and all rights a rising from and benefits payable to them from the other party's plans, including any survivor benefits and other rights or benefits which may arise on the death of the other, or any designations to the contrary that predate this Agreement.

Except as otherwise provided in these Minutes, the Applicant and the Respondent each renounce any entitlement either may have in the other's will made before the date of this Agreement or to share in the estate of the other upon the other dying intestate.
Except as otherwise provided in these Minutes and except as related to the issue of child support including section 7 expenses, the Applicant and the Respondent release each other from all claims either may have against the other now or in the future under the terms of any statute or the common law, including claims for:

(a) a share in the other's estate;

(b) a payment as a dependant from the other's estate under the Succession Law Reform Act;

(d) an appointment as an attorney or guardian of the other's personal care or property under the Substitute Decisions Act; and

(e) participation in decisions about the other's medical care or treatment under the Health Care Consent Act.

General

Paragraphs 1 to 6 of these Minutes shall be incorporated into a Final Order.
The interpretation of these Minutes is governed by the laws of Ontario.
There are no representations, collateral agreements, warranties or conditions affecting these Minutes. These Minutes will replace all previous oral or written agreement made between the parties.
The parties shall sign such documents necessary to give effect to these Minutes.
The invalidity or unenforceability of any term of these Minutes do not affect the validity or enforceability of any other term. Any invalid term will be treated as severed from the remaining terms.
The effective date of these Minutes is the date on which the latter party signs it.
The Applicant and the Respondent hereby irrevocably agree to the following:

(a) These Minutes constitute as a binding agreement;

(b) The Applicant has received independent legal advice from Daniel Walker, Barrister and Solicitor, before signing this document;

(c) The Respondent has received independent legal advice from Wen Chin (Celia) Hu, Barrister and Solicitor, before signing this document;

(d) The Applicant and the Respondent have fully read and understood these Minutes; and

(e) The Applicant and the Respondent have signed these Minutes on his or her own free will, without threats, coercion, or duress.

These Minutes of Settlement may be executed and delivered by electronic means.

CITATION:Cho v. Hui, 2026 ONSC 3614

NEWMARKET COURT FILE NO.: FC-23-00000962-0000

DATE: 20260619

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

Jenny Hoi Yin Cho

Applicant

– and –

John Ping Kwun Hui

Respondent

REASONS FOR DECISION

Law, J

Released: June 19, 2026

Cho v. Hui, 2026 ONSC 3614

Case Summary

REASONS FOR DECISION

Background Facts

Law and Analysis

Formal Requirements of a Domestic Contract

Was a Binding Settlement Reached?

Should the Court Exercise its Discretion Not to Enforce the Settlement?

Costs

Order

SCHEDULE A

Text of Revised Minutes of Settlement

Equalization and Spousal Support

Spousal Support Release

Property and Estate Release

General

CITATION:Cho v. Hui, 2026 ONSC 3614

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

REASONS FOR DECISION

Cho v. Hui, 2026 ONSC 3614

Case Summary

REASONS FOR DECISION

Background Facts

Law and Analysis

Formal Requirements of a Domestic Contract

Was a Binding Settlement Reached?

Should the Court Exercise its Discretion Not to Enforce the Settlement?

Costs

Order

SCHEDULE A

Text of Revised Minutes of Settlement

Equalization and Spousal Support

Spousal Support Release

Property and Estate Release

General

CITATION:Cho v. Hui, 2026 ONSC 3614

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

REASONS FOR DECISION