Rebello v. Toronto Police Services Board, 2026 ONSC 36

Court File and Parties

CITATION: Rebello v. Toronto Police Services Board, 2026 ONSC 36

COURT FILE NO.: CV-20-654082

MOTION HEARD: 20251211

REASONS RELEASED: 20260104

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO

TANYA REBELLO Plaintiff

-and-

TORONTO POLICE SERVICES BOARD, TORONTO POLICE SUPERINTENDENT PAUL MACINTYRE, TORONTO POLICE CONSTABLE TREVOR PERRY, TORONTO POLICE CONSTABLE McGRATH, TORONTO POLICE CONSTABLE TIFFANY LAM, TORONTO POLICE CONSTABLE LUIGI TROVATO, TORONTO POLICE CONSTABLE MATTHEW CARLES, TORONTO POLICE CONSTABLE RYAN MARTIN, TORONTO POLICE CONSTABLE KAYLA GERRITS, and TORONTO POLICE STAFF SARGEANT JAMES GICZI Defendants

BEFORE: ASSOCIATE JUSTICE McGRAW

COUNSEL: T. Rebello Email: trebello100@outlook.com

• Plaintiff, Self-Represented

C. Davies Email: cara.davies@toronto.ca

• for the Defendants

REASONS RELEASED: January 4, 2026

Reasons For Endorsement

I. Background

1This is a motion by the Plaintiff to compel the Defendants to produce a further and better affidavit of documents. Specifically, the Plaintiff seeks unredacted copies of all records of the Toronto Police Service (“TPS”) in which she is named from May 16, 2019 to the present including those which have already been produced and those which have been created after the commencement of this action which have not been produced. In the alternative, the Plaintiff requests an order striking paragraphs 15-38 of the Defendants’ Statement of Defence dated January 12, 2021 for the Defendants’ failure to attend examinations for discovery. The Plaintiff also requests costs thrown away related to the examinations for discovery.

2This action is 1 of 4 proceedings commenced by the Plaintiff against various TPS parties between June 2018 and January 2025. The Plaintiff commenced this action by Statement of Claim issued on December 31, 2020 claiming $75,000,000 in damages for, among other things, misfeasance in public office, conspiracy to injure by unlawful means, negligence and/or negligent supervision and/or negligent training, Charter breaches, intentional infliction of mental suffering and punitive damages. The Plaintiff’s primary allegation is that the Defendants filed false police reports about her related to numerous interactions with the TPS between 2018 and 2020. The Plaintiff also alleges that the Defendants conspired with other government and private entities and that evidence was planted at her property. There are no allegations that the Plaintiff was detained, arrested, prosecuted or that any force was used against her.

3In her Statement of Claim, the Plaintiff identifies 11 Toronto Police General Occurrence Reports dated from May 16, 2019 to August 2020 (the “Existing GORs”) related to the Plaintiff based on information or complaints from numerous individuals. The Defendants served their sworn Affidavit of Documents on April 29, 2021 listing 20 documents including the Existing GORs and related notes and videos. In the Existing GORs and related memobook notes produced to the Plaintiff, all information about the persons who complained or provided information to the TPS has been redacted. The parties have also identified 4 Toronto Police General Occurrence Reports dated from April 19, 2021 to February 7, 2025 (the “New GORs”) related to complaints made by the Plaintiff with the TPS against other persons after this action was commenced which have not been produced.

4By Endorsement dated October 3, 2025, Callaghan J. granted the Defendants’ motion striking the Plaintiff’s Fresh As Amended Statement of Claim as an abuse of process and, with the exception of 3 paragraphs, dismissed the Plaintiff’s cross-motion for leave to amend. The Plaintiff has appealed this decision. Callaghan J. also adjourned the Defendants’ summary judgment motion in this action and a related action to May 13-15, 2026.

5The Plaintiff attempted to amend her Statement of Claim again and the parties appeared before Papageorgiou J. on October 14, 2025. Papageorgiou J. directed that the Plaintiff could bring a cross-motion for leave to amend her Statement of Claim at the same time as the summary judgment motion. The Plaintiff was required to serve her Motion Record by November 30, 2025. Therefore, this production motion was brought and scheduled on an urgent basis. The deadline for the Plaintiff to serve her motion materials has subsequently been extended by Papageorgiou J. on consent to December 15, 2025, December 22, 2025 and January 9, 2026, the same date that the Plaintiff is required to file responding materials for the summary judgment motion.

II. The Law and Analysis

Further and Better Affidavit of Documents Generally

6Pursuant to Rule 30.06(1), where the court is satisfied by any evidence that a relevant document in a party’s possession, control or power may have been omitted from the party’s affidavit of documents, the court may, among things, order service of a further and better affidavit of documents. Under Rule 30.04(5), the court may order the production for inspection of any documents in a party’s possession, power or control which are not privileged.

7In order to succeed on a motion seeking a further and better affidavit of documents there must be evidence that specific, relevant documents exist which meet the proportionality requirements of Rule 29.2.03 have not been produced (Gamble v. Black & MacDonald, 2020 ONSC 811 at paras. 3-4). Evidence that simply amounts to intuition, speculation and guesswork is insufficient (Gamble at para. 3). Relevance is defined by the pleadings such that relevant documents and information must have probative value and adequately contribute to the determination of the truth or falsity of a material fact in the litigation (Ontario v. Rothmans Inc., 2011 ONSC 2504 at para. 129; Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Deloitte & Touche, 2013 ONSC 917 at paras. 67-68).

8The Plaintiff asserts that the Defendants have failed to produce all relevant documents in their possession or control including audio recordings, videos and signed written statements of the complainants who provided information to the TPS in the Existing GORs. The Defendants advise that they have no further relevant records or documents in their possession or control which have not been produced. There is no evidence in the record before me that any relevant documents exist which have not been produced by the Defendants. Therefore, I conclude that the Defendants have complied with their production obligations and I decline to order the delivery of a fiurther and better affidavit of documents.

The Existing GORs and the New GORs

9The focus of substantially all of the parties’ submissions was on the redactions to the Existing GORs. The Plaintiff advises that the primary information she requires is the names of the persons in the Existing GORs who made complaints or provided information to the TPS. She has confirmed that she does not require their addresses and contact information. The Plaintiff submits that she requires their names in order to properly respond to the Defendants’ summary judgment motion and for her latest pleadings amendment motion.

10The parties were unable to refer me to any case law where the court considered an opposed motion to compel the production of unredacted versions of redacted police records and/or the disclosure of the names of persons who made complaints or provided information to police. I was also not referred to any other relevant authority. Defendants’ counsel advised that as a matter of practice, the TPS makes redactions to police reports on a case-by-case basis.

11The Defendants rely on Beiko v. Stone, 2018 ONSC 1703 in which Ellies J. summarized the two-part conjunctive test a party seeking to avoid disclosure of redacted information must meet. The moving party must establish that the information it seeks to withhold is clearly irrelevant and that there is good reason not to disclose it which must rise to the level of causing significant harm to the producing party or infringe public interests deserving of protection (Beiko at para. 33). I am satisfied that this is the applicable test in the circumstances.

12One of the challenges in considering these motions is that the Plaintiff’s cross-motion for leave to amend the Statement of Claim is proceeding at the same time as the Defendants’ summary judgment motion. This raises the possibility that the Statement of Claim may be amended which may in turn affect what documents and information are relevant as defined by the pleadings. This is further complicated by the fact that the Plaintiff has appealed the previous pleadings motion. In my view, this Court must proceed on the basis of the current Statement of Claim and the record before me regardless of what amendments may be permitted or other issues which may arise on the summary judgment and pleadings motions. There may be issues which impact the disclosure of the information at issue on the motions before me, however, these are more appropriately left to the presiding Judge.

13Having considered the record before me and the parties’ submissions, I am satisfied that the Defendants have met the test to avoid disclosure of the redacted information in the Existing GORs. Based on the Statement of Claim and the record, I conclude that the redacted information sought by the Plaintiff, namely, the names of persons who complained or provided information to the TPS in the Existing GORs, is clearly irrelevant. The claims set out in the Statement of Claim are grounded solely on the conduct of the Defendants primarily for filing false reports against the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff has not made any suggestion that she is considering adding the unnamed persons as Defendants on her pleadings motion and there are no John Doe or Jane Doe placeholder Defendants. There is also no allegation or suggestion that their conduct is otherwise at issue in this action. The Plaintiff’s claims regarding the Defendants’ lack of policies with respect to the taking and filing of reports and their obligations to do so are also unrelated to identity of the persons who filed the complaints. The Plaintiff’s request for the names of these individuals appears to be based mostly on her position that she has a right to know who made complaints against her. There is no authority before me in support of this assertion.

14I also conclude that the Defendants have demonstrated that the disclosure of the names of the persons in the Existing GORs would infringe public interests deserving of protection. The Defendants state that they redacted portions of the GORs and related memobook notes including the names and contact information of persons who spoke to the TPS in order to protect them from potential retaliation by the Plaintiff. The Defendants further advise that some of the Existing GORs relate to incidents where it is alleged that the Plaintiff was acting in retaliation against individuals for complaining or speaking to police about her and that she knows the names of at least some of the individuals in any event. The Plaintiff claims that all of the complaints and allegations against her in the Existing GORs are completely false and fabricated, that the incidents never happened, that she does not know any of the individuals who spoke to the TPS, that she has a right to know who did and has alleged that the Defendants are hiding the names of persons who filed reports against her.

15In my view, preventing retaliation against individuals who provide information to the police is a public interest deserving of protection. The police have a duty and responsibility to serve and protect the public. This includes taking complaints, investigating matters, filing reports and if necessary, protecting those who make complaints and provide information. In my view, the public interest is served by protecting the identities of individuals who have provided information where the police have identified a reasonable risk of retaliation. Among other things, it functions to encourage individuals to speak to the police. It is not necessary for this Court to determine whether the allegations in the Existing GORs are true. This is an interlocutory production motion and in my view, it is sufficient that there is a reasonable basis in the record, including some of the Existing GORs, for the Defendants to have made the redactions. The police reports in the present case are distinguishable from Beiko, where the court noted that it would be an unusual case where bank records of the kind at issue in that case could rise to the level of infringing public interests.

16The Plaintiff relies on Taylor v. Metrolinx, 2022 ONSC 4774 where Healey J. granted a Norwich Order for the production of an email from a non-party who had made a complaint about alleged fraud by the applicants. Healey J. held that the benefit gained from getting at the truth and correctly disposing of the proposed litigation by disclosing the identity of the complainant far outweighed the benefit to the interests served by protecting their identity from disclosure (Taylor at para. 51). Taylor is distinguishable in numerous material respects. In Taylor, the applicants sought the identity of the complainant in order to commence litigation against them. In addition, Healey J. concluded that the applicants had a basis for any or all of their proposed causes of action against the complainant. As set out above, the Plaintiff has not stated any intention to commence litigation against the complainants, there are no submissions before me with respect to whether there would be a basis for any such claims and I have concluded that the names are clearly irrelevant to this action. Even applying the balancing test from Taylor as the Plaintiff requests, I conclude that the public interest served and benefit to be gained by protecting the names of these individuals who spoke to the TPS outweighs the benefit of disclosure where doing so will not assist in getting at the truth in this civil action.

17The Plaintiff also urges the court to follow Aboagye v. Peel (Regional Municipality) Police Services Board, 2022 ONSC 4373. In that case, an unredacted police incident report was produced on consent and no ruling was made. Therefore, it is of no assistance. The Plaintiff also refers to Curtis v. Toronto Police Services Board (Court File No. CV-22-686230) in which the TPS produced police reports without redacting the names of individuals who made complaints. The Plaintiff advises that the police reports were produced unredacted even though the plaintiff in that case was arrested. Therefore, she argues that since she was not arrested and is not a safety threat, the Existing GORs should be unredacted. However, the TPS produced the reports voluntarily in that case and there are no reasons or facts before me for it to assist with the current motions.

18I also deny the Plaintiff’s request for the production of the New GORs. The New GORs are distinguishable from the Existing GORs in 3 material respects: they are based on complaints made by the Plaintiff about others; they were made after this action was commenced and therefore, are not referenced in the Statement of Claim; and there are no concerns regarding information about third parties. The relief that the Plaintiff is seeking in this action does not relate to the New GORs which are complaints she filed about others after the litigation was commenced. Therefore, I cannot find any basis to conclude that they are relevant and should be produced.

19The Defendants advised that the New GORs would be available to the Plaintiff if she made a request under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (Ontario)(“MFIPPA”). It is unclear why the Plaintiff has not previously made a request under MFIPPA. The Defendants submit that it would undermine the MFIPPA process if the Plaintiff were permitted to obtain the New GORs by court order without first requesting them under MFIPPA particularly where the documents are not relevant to the current action. I expressed concern that if the Plaintiff is required to request the documents under MFIPPA that they may not be available in time for use on the May motions. However, given my conclusion that they are not relevant to this action and are available through another process, I decline to order production. As the Defendants concede, the New GORs may form the basis for a separate action and would not be subject to the deemed undertaking rule.

Request to Strike Paragraphs of Defence

20The Plaintiff requests that the court strike paragraphs 15-38 of the Defendants’ Defence for their failure to attend examinations for discovery on 3 occasions. Rule 34.15(1)(b) provides that where a party fails to attend at the time and place fixed for an examination for discovery in the notice of examination the court may strike out the party’s defence. An order to dismiss an action or strike a pleading under Rule 34.15(1)(b) is a draconian remedy which is rarely made and reserved for severe misconduct where the party’s non-compliance is deliberate and repeated and where actual prejudice can be demonstrated (Adams v. Body Plus Nutritional Products Inc., 2024 ONSC 7382 at paras. 56-63; CCPS Land Development Ltd. v. Capital Sewer Services Inc., 2024 ONSC 6099 at para. 62). Typically, parties who do not attend discovery are given a further opportunity to comply with their obligations (Adams at para. 57).

21On May 14, 2021, the Plaintiff brought a motion before me seeking to have this action tried together with 2 related actions, to compel the Defendants to serve their affidavit of documents and to set a deadline for examinations for discovery. The Defendants consented to trying the actions together and had already delivered their affidavit of documents. With respect to examinations for discovery, my Endorsement dated May 14, 2021 states the following:

“The Defendants advise that they have been attempting to schedule an attendance at Civil Practice Court (“CPC”) to schedule a summary judgment motion. Given that the Defendants intend to bring a summary judgment motion, I cannot set a deadline for the completion of examinations for discovery. This may be spoken to as part of the timetable for the summary judgment motion which may include cross-examinations or examinations for discovery.”

22The Defendants advise that they attempted to schedule a summary judgment motion over the following 4 years. At a case conference on May 16, 2025, Glustein J. scheduled the summary judgment motion for March 10-12, 2026. These dates were adjourned by Callaghan J. to May 13-15, 2026. Glustein J. ordered a timetable for summary judgment motions by both the Plaintiff and the Defendants (the Plaintiff subsequently withdrew her summary judgment motion) which included cross-examinations but not examinations for discovery.

23The Plaintiff served Notices of Examination for Myron Demkiw, Chief of Police, and Shelley Carroll, Toronto Police Services Board Chair, to attend examinations for discovery on March 13, 2023; June 20, 2025; and October 24, 2025. Defendants’ counsel advised the Plaintiff that the Defendants would not be producing any witnesses for discovery given the Defendants’ intention to schedule a summary judgment motion and, for the last 2 Notices, the fact that the motion had been scheduled with a deadline for cross-examinations. The Plaintiff obtained and filed Certificates of Non-Attendance.

24Based on the record before me, there is no basis to strike any paragraphs of the Defendants’ Statement of Defence. Given the pending and actual scheduling of the summary judgment motion and the absence of any direction from the court there was no obligation for the Defendants to attend examinations for discovery. The Plaintiff was aware that there was no timetable for discoveries and that the Defendants would not attend. After the attendance before Glustein J., the Plaintiff was aware that the motion had been scheduled with a deadline for cross-examinations but not examinations for discovery. The Plaintiff’s decision to serve the Notices of Examination anyway did not create an obligation for the Defendants to attend.

25Accordingly, the Plaintiff is unable to demonstrate that the Defendants did not comply with the Rules or that there was any misconduct of the Defendants at all, let alone the severe and repeated misconduct required to dismiss any of their Defence. I also cannot conclude that the Plaintiff has suffered any prejudice. For the same reasons, I conclude that the Plaintiff is not entitled to any costs thrown away related to the Notices of Examination and Certificates of Non-Attendance.

III. Disposition and Costs

26Order to go dismissing the Plaintiff’s motions.

27As the relief sought by the Plaintiff on these motions largely relates to the summary judgment motion and the pleadings motion, the costs of these motions are reserved to the Judge hearing the summary judgment and pleadings motions. However, I remain available to consider written costs submissions for these motions at the discretion of the presiding Judge.