ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
CITATION: Turner v. Ross 2026 ONSC 3592
BETWEEN:
KEVIN TURNER
Applicant
– and –
ROBIN ROSS
Respondent
Anthony Colizza, for the Applicant
Jessi MacLennan, for the Respondent
Christopher Unruch, for the Ontario Children’s Lawyer
HEARD: May 26, 2026
REASONS FOR JUDGEMENT JUSTICE C. PETERSEN
INTRODUCTION
1The parties were married on August 30, 2008 and separated on January 1, 2022. They are the parents of a 14-year-old boy named Xander. Xander lives primarily with his mother and has regular parenting time with his father.
2To their credit, the parties executed a series of settlement agreements, resolving all the issues in this application except for one. The only outstanding issue relates to ownership and possession of a beloved cat named Harrold.
BACKGROUND FACTS
3When the parties separated, they both continued living in their matrimonial home on a jointly owned farm in Harriston, Ontario. Eventually, Ms. Ross left the home with Xander on November 14, 2022. Mr. Turner remained in the home until he relocated to his current residence in Oakville in or about January 2023. Harrold initially stayed in the matrimonial home under Mr. Turner’s care, then moved with Mr. Turner to his Oakville residence. Harrold has continuously lived with Mr. Turner, his partner Davina, and Davina’s children since that time.
4After the parties physically separated, Xander was able to interact with Harrold during the time he spent at his father’s residence, up until December 30, 2024. On that day, as Xander was leaving to return to his mother’s residence, he attempted to remove Harrold from his father’s house without permission. An altercation ensued between him and his father. Xander subsequently reported to his mother and then to the police that his father physically hurt him. The police attended Mr. Turner’s residence, investigated the incident, and decided not to charge him. Mr. Turner denies harming Xander.
5After that incident, Xander took a break from seeing his father for several weeks. Mr. Turner agreed to this. When the visits resumed, Mr. Turner decided to spend time with Xander at Mr. Turner’s mother’s house in Waterloo instead of at his Oakville residence. He has consistently exercised his parenting time at his mother’s residence since then. Consequently, Xander has had no contact with Harrold, except for one brief visit (at his paternal grandmother’s house) approximately one month prior to the commencement of trial. On that occasion, Mr. Turner brought Harrold to his mother’s house so that Xander could spend an hour with him.
6Todd Perreault, the Clinical Assist for the Ontario Children’s Lawyer (“OCL”), filed an affidavit and testified at the trial. He advised the court that Xander enjoyed seeing Harrold when he used to go for parenting time at his father’s house in Oakville. He stated that Xander could not understand why he was no longer allowed to see the cat.
7Mr. Perreault further testified that Xander wants to return to Kevin's residence in Oakville for his parenting time with his father. In addition to wanting to see Harrold, Xander
misses his room at Kevin's residence and liked spending time with Kevin's girlfriend, Davina, and her son.
8The parties agreed to have Kevin’s preferences put before the court through Mr. Perreault. Mr. Perreault’s evidence about Xander’s wishes is not contested.
ISSUES AND PARTIES’ POSITIONS
9Mr. Turner takes the position that Harrold belongs to him and should remain in his possession. Ms. Ross’s primary position is that Harrold belongs to Xander. She asks the court to order Mr. Turner to deliver the cat to Xander. Alternatively, she seeks a declaration that Harrold belongs to her, and an order that he be returned to her.
10If the court determines that Mr. Turner is Harrold’s owner, then Ms. Ross seeks an order that his parenting time with Xander be exercised at his Oakville residence, with Harrold present, so that Xander can interact with Harrold. Mr. Turner takes the position that this Court has no jurisdiction to make such an order in this trial because all parenting issues were resolved by final Minutes of Settlement (“MOS”), the terms of which have been incorporated into a final court order.
JURISDICTION TO MAKE A PARENTING ORDER
11This jurisdictional issue only arises if I find that Harrold belongs to Mr. Turner. However, it is an important issue that I want to address at the outset of my reasons for judgment because it implicates the fundamental principle of finality of settlements in family law.
12The parties executed three final settlement agreements. First, they signed MOS dated July 11, 2025 dealing with property and support issues. Those MOS stipulate, “All parenting issues (decision making/parenting time) remain outstanding, and the issue regarding ownership of Harrold the cat.” On July 15 and 17, 2025, they signed supplemental MOS dealing with parental decision-making issues. Then, on April 15, 2026, they signed final MOS dealing with parenting time.
13The 2026 MOS are long and detailed. The terms of settlement encompass numerous issues, including regular parenting time, holiday parenting time, summer parenting time, Xander’s attendance at weddings, funerals and celebrations of life, a process for requests to change the parenting schedule, communications protocols with Xander and with each other, a process for relocation including notice requirements, and other terms pertaining to travel with Xander, Xander’s belongings, Xander’s documentation, and Xander’s RESP’s. The 2026 MOS include a dispute resolution clause that stipulates, “in the event of any disagreement the parties shall proceed to arbitration.” The penultimate paragraph of the 2026 MOS specifies, “The issue of Harrold the cat remains outstanding.”
14The OCL signed both MOS dealing with parenting issues. The terms of all three settlements were incorporated into a comprehensive final court order dated May 22, 2026 (“the Final Order”).
15Mr. Turner submits that Ms. Ross is improperly attempting to convert a narrow property trial into a parenting time variation. He argues that, if Ms. Ross wants to vary the Final Order to add a disputed location-specific requirement for his parenting time, then she must use the arbitration process set out in the 2026 MOS and Final Order to achieve that.
16If the court rules that resort to the arbitration clause is not mandatory, then Mr. Turner argues that Ms. Ross should be required to file a Motion to Change. He submits that all parenting issues were resolved on a final basis in the last two MOS, which now form part of the Final Order. He argues that a restriction on his parenting time (such as a requirement that it be exercised in a specific location in the presence of a specific pet) consequently cannot be imposed by the court without a Motion to Change.
17Ms. Ross submits that the court has the inherent power to make an order about where and how Mr. Turner’s parenting time must be exercised to promote Xander’s best interests. She further submits that a Motion to Change is unnecessary. She argues that the 2026 MOS and Final Order are silent on the issue of where Mr. Turner’s parenting time will be exercised, so no variation of the Final Order is required. Finally, she notes
that the 2026 MOS carved out “the issue of Harrold the cat.” She submits that, because ownership of the cat is being determined in this trial, the court has authority to make ancillary parenting orders connected to that issue (i.e., orders that will enable the child, who is attached to the cat, to have access to the cat during the time he spends with his father).
18For the reasons that follow, I find that this court does not have jurisdiction to make the parenting order requested by Ms. Ross in the context of this trial.
19The 2026 MOS do not specify where Mr. Turner must exercise his parenting time with Xander. However, they are not completely silent on the subject of location of parenting time. The MOS contain relocation provisions, including notice requirements, that are triggered by “a relocation with or without Xander that will impact the other party’s relationship with Xander or Xander’s school and daily life.” Implicit in this contractual provision is a right of either party to change their residence without giving notice to the other party, provided that the relocation does not impact the other party’s relationship with Xander, or Xander’s school and daily life. Given that Mr. Turner has the contractual right to change his residence, he also implicitly has the right to change the location where he exercises his parenting time with Xander (provided that any relocation does not impact Ms. Ross’s relationship with Xander or Xander’s school or daily life.) That contractual right is enforceable as part of the court’s Final Order. The ancillary parenting order requested by Ms. Ross would impede that right.
20Moreover, the 2026 MOS and the Final Order specify that either party or Xander “may request a change to the time, date, or location of any parenting time” (emphasis added) by communicating the request through the Our Family Wizard online platform. The 2026 MOS and Final Order specify that, if the parties agree to the request in writing, it becomes binding. However, if they do not agree, the dispute “shall proceed to arbitration.”
21The parties executed MOS that encompass a broad spectrum of parenting terms. They consented to the terms being incorporated into a Final Order. Their clear shared
intention was to resolve, on a final basis, all the parenting issues between them, and to refer any future disputes about parenting issues to arbitration.
22By the date when the parties executed the 2026 MOS, Mr. Turner had been exercising his parenting time at his mother’s residence for several weeks. Ms. Ross was aware that Xander had been spending time with his father at his paternal grandmother’s house. She signed the 2026 MOS with that knowledge. In doing so, she agreed that, if she wanted to request a change in the location of Mr. Turner’s parenting time, she must follow the process negotiated by the parties, which includes mandatory arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism.
23In the 2026 MOS, the parties left open only “the issue of Harrold the cat” to be determined at trial. It would be contrary to the parties’ shared intention to interpret those words in the overly broad manner suggested by Ms. Ross. The evidence does not support a finding that the parties intended “the issue of Harrold the cat” to encompass disputes with respect to where and how Mr. Turner exercises his parenting time.
24Thus, even if the dispute resolution process set out in the MOS was not mandatory, I would not have jurisdiction to make the requested parenting order as part of this trial. The order sought by Ms. Ross would amount to a variation of parenting terms in the Final Order. Such a variation requires a Motion to Change. Ms. Ross cannot avoid the exigencies of a Motion to Change by unilaterally expanding the scope of the issues to be tried.
CREDIBILITY ASSESSMENTS
25Five witnesses gave evidence in this trial. Each of them swore an affidavit, which was supplemented by oral testimony, including cross-examination. I found some of the affidavit evidence to be inadmissible based on rules against hearsay, speculation, and opinion evidence.
26I received conflicting evidence about material facts in dispute. Consequently, in order to decide the pet ownership issue in this case, I need to assess the witnesses’ credibility and reliability. The following is a summary of my assessments.
Todd Perreault
27As I mentioned previously, Todd Perreault relayed statements made to him by Xander. He deposed that he reviewed the content of his affidavit with Xander and that Xander confirmed its accuracy. The parties consented to Xander’s views being shared with the court in this hearsay fashion.
28Mr. Perreault is a very experienced clinical investigator. He did not appear to have any personal investment in the outcome of this trial. He was objective, careful and candid in providing his evidence. He was not challenged by either party. I have no concerns about either his credibility or his reliability.
Robin Ross
29For the reasons that follow, I have serious concerns about Ms. Ross’s credibility. At best, she was careless in giving some of her evidence. At worst, she demonstrated a tendency to make deliberately misleading statements.
30For example, with respect to the farm property that has been in her family for four generations, Ms. Ross deposed, “[w]hen Kevin and I married, I added his name to title for the property.” That statement implies that she owned the property prior to their marriage, which is not true. Her father owned the farm up until Mr. Turner and Ms. Ross jointly purchased it from him. The documentary record shows that their names were registered on title to the property at the same time.
31When Ms. Ross was cross-examined on this topic, she initially stated that she did not understand the questions she was being asked. The questions were straightforward. I believe that she was feigning confusion to avoid answering hard questions that challenged her credibility. Eventually, after obfuscating for some time, she stated, “the agreement with my dad was I would own the property; that agreement with my dad changed when I married Kevin”. She asserted that was what she meant when she deposed that she added Mr. Turner’s name to title when they got married. Her testimony on this point is implausible and not credible. It was an answer she came up with only after evading questions and stalling for some time.
32I accept that Ms. Ross had a plan to purchase the farm from her father before she met Mr. Turner, but there is no evidence to support the existence of an agreement between her and her father to that effect. Her father testified that, if Ms. Ross had remained single, “she may have bought [the farm] from me.”
33Moreover, Ms. Ross did not depose that she “changed her plan” to purchase the farm alone when she married Mr. Turner. Rather, she swore that she “added his name to title for the property.” This was an unequivocal misrepresentation designed to mislead the court into believing that she owned the property before she married him. I find it likely that this misrepresentation was made to bolster her argument that she owned Harrold because Harrold was born of a barn cat on the farm property.
34This was not the only misleading statement made by Ms. Ross. She also deposed in her affidavit, “I …paid the vet bills for [Harrold].” However, at trial, she acknowledged that although she paid the vet bills using her credit card, the balance on the card was paid from a joint account co-owned by her and Mr. Turner. In other words, the vet bills were paid by her and Mr. Turner.
35Ms. Ross tried to downplay the seriousness of the latter misrepresentation by stating that she earned a higher income than Mr. Turner, so she contributed more to their joint bank account, and consequently paid a greater share of the vet bills. However, she did not depose that she paid a greater share of the bills. Rather she swore that she paid the bills. Moreover, since the funds used to the pay the bills came from a joint account, the money was as much Mr. Turner’s money as hers, regardless of how much they each contributed to the account.
36Ms. Ross was questioned about what happened when she picked up Xander for a parenting exchange on December 30, 2024. That was the day of the altercation at Mr. Turner’s home after Xander tried to leave with Harrold concealed under his coat. The parenting exchanges were taking place at a police station at that time. Ms. Ross initially testified that Xander “said his dad had physically hurt him, and he wanted to tell a police officer.” When she was challenged during her cross-examination about the wisdom of
reporting the incident to the police, she added, “Xander asked me to take him inside to tell the police what his dad did. He said he wanted to go. I said it was his choice.”
37Her evidence on this point is contradicted by what Xander told Mr. Perreault about the aftermath of the December 30, 2024 incident. Mr. Perreault deposed that Xander stated, “when Robin saw how upset Xander was at the parenting time exchange, which at that time was occurring at a police station, she suggested to him that he speak to the police” (emphasis added). Given Ms. Ross’s tendency to misstate facts to bolster her position in this litigation, I accept Mr. Perreault’s evidence and Xander’s account of what happened that day. I reject Ms. Ross’s self-serving account as false. It is probable that Ms. Ross decided to involve the police, then misrepresented to the court that it was Xander’s decision.
38Due to my concerns about Ms. Ross’s credibility, I do not accept her evidence on disputed issues unless it is corroborated by independent evidence.
Kevin Turner
39Mr. Turner’s evidence is also problematic, albeit not to the same extent. I do not doubt his honesty, but the reliability of his evidence is undermined by notable internal inconsistencies.
40For example, in his affidavit, he made vague statements insinuating that Xander had mistreated animals, including Harrold. He said, “I have concerns about Xander being left unsupervised with Harrold, particularly when Xander is upset.” He explained, “when Xander perceived Harrold as bothering him or wanting attention when Xander did not want to give it, Xander would become frustrated.” He added that, “given what occurred on December 30, 2024 and the prior concerns about Xander’s handling of animals, I believe any future contact between Xander and Harrold must be structured and supervised.” Finally, he stated that he would like to attend counselling with Xander to discuss visits with Harrold, including discussion of “proper care and handling of animals” and “how to ensure that time between Xander and Harrold is positive and safe.” He gave no particulars of any incidents of Xander mishandling an animal, except for the day that Xander tried to leave with Harrold concealed under his winter coat. Mr. Turner deposed
that Harrold was struggling to get free, and that he may not have been able to safely recover the cat if he had escaped Xander’s arms.
41In contrast, during his examination-in-chief at trial, Mr. Turner did not express any concerns about Xander’s past handling of animals, or about Harrold’s safety in Xander’s presence. On the contrary, he stated that Xander “cares for Harrold” and “treats animals very very well.”
42Then later, during his cross-examination, he contradicted his earlier testimony and asserted that Xander had tried to harm animals in the past and that he was concerned about that. These inconsistencies in his evidence leave me unsure as to what to believe.
43Mr. Turner similarly demonstrated inconsistency regarding what needs to occur before he will agree that Xander can resume regular visits with Harrold at his Oakville residence. In his affidavit, he proposed joint counselling so that he and Xander could discuss the issue “in a calm and non-confrontational way.” Xander told Mr. Perreault that his father made the same proposal to him. According to Mr. Perreault’s affidavit, “Xander stated that Kevin told him that he could not return to Oakville or see Harrold because Kevin did not trust him and thought that Xander was trying to get him arrested.” Xander also stated “that Kevin told him he cannot bring Xander back to Oakville to see Harrold until he can trust Xander again.” At trial, Mr. Turner did not deny making those statements to Xander. He clarified that therapy was just a suggestion, and not a requirement.
44However, Mr. Turner’s explanation for why Xander’s visits had not resumed in Oakville shifted. At trial, he testified that his trust issues are with Ms. Ross, not with Xander. He stated that he would like to have Xander spend time with him in Oakville, but he has trust issues with Ms. Ross that need to be resolved first. He said Ms. Ross frequently resorts to contacting the police or Family and Children’s Services to resolve disputes between them. He expressed the view that she has made unfounded allegations against him on more than one occasion. He added that it was very traumatic for his family when the police came to their residence in December 2024 and he wants to avoid a recurrence of such an incident. He stated, “I can’t feel like any time I bring Xander to Oakville there are going to be police called and allegations made.”
45The shift in Mr. Turner’s evidence left me completely unclear as to what needs to happen before he will resume parenting time at his Oakville residence.
Davina Boulton
46Mr. Turner’s partner, Davina Boulton, testified during the trial. Her alignment with Mr. Turner’s position was so strong that she refused to make simple admissions, such as acknowledging the fact that Xander considers Harrold to be his cat, and the fact that it is difficult for Xander to be separated from Harrold. It is obvious, based on both parties’ testimonies and Mr. Perreault’s evidence, that Xander misses Harrold deeply and believes that Harrold is his cat. Ms. Boulton’s inability (or refusal) to concede these undeniable facts mars her overall credibility.
47Notably, Ms. Boulton made misleading statements in her affidavit. For example, with respect to an event on November 19, 2022 when Ms. Ross attended the farm accompanied by police officers to collect her belongings, Ms. Boulton deposed: “I was present at the home when this occurred and let the police officers into the residence. Kevin remained in his area of the home while the police were present. To the best of my recollection the cats were roaming throughout all areas of the house at this time.” However, during her cross-examination at trial, Ms. Boulton admitted that after she let the officers into the house that day, she joined Kevin in a separate locked part of the residence and did not observe what happened while Ms. Ross was collecting her belongings. From Ms. Ross’s vantage point, she could not have seen or known whether the cats were roaming throughout all areas of the house. However, she did not make that clear in her affidavit. She created the impression that she was present and observing the events, when in fact she was segregated with Mr. Turner in another part of the house.
Donald Ross
48Ms. Ross’s father, Donald Ross, was a candid witness who gave his evidence in a straightforward and consistent manner, without exaggeration. I have discounted some of the statements in his affidavit because of their speculative nature. However, I have no concerns about his credibility or reliability.
ANALYSIS OF PET OWNERSHIP ISSUE
Relevant Factors
49The court has authority to determine who owns and who has the right to possess disputed property upon the breakdown of a marriage: Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, s.10(1). This includes disputes over possession and ownership of family pets.
50Harrold is adored by both parties and by Xander. He is considered a family member by all. However, the law treats animals as personal property. The dispute over him must therefore be resolved in accordance with principles of property ownership, not in accordance with what is in his best interest: Franco v. Franco, 2024 ONSC 6436, at para.
- Consequently, my task is not to determine which party would be the most caring and responsible pet owner. Nor is it my task to decide who wants Harrold the most or who has the most affection for him: King v. Mann, 2020 ONSC 108 at para. 70; Enei v. Enei, 2024 ONSC 6323, at para. 89. Rather, my task is to determine who, in law, owns him.
51People often develop deep emotional attachments to their pets. Pets can also provide important psychological support to their owners. There is evidence in this case that Harrold is a source of support for Xander. Based on both parties’ evidence, as well as the independent testimony of the OCL clinician, it is undeniable that Xander is emotionally attached to Harrold. However, Xander’s best interests are not relevant to the issue of who owns the cat.
52In any case involving a dispute over a pet, conventional indicia of property ownership, like a bill of sale, will be relevant. Documentary proof that one party paid to purchase the animal or executed an adoption agreement with a breeder or shelter to acquire the animal, will be strong probative evidence of ownership.
53No such evidence is available in this case, because Harrold came into this family’s life organically. He was born in a litter birthed by a barn cat on the property. He was not purchased or adopted, nor was he received from a third party as a gift. I must therefore look for other indicia of ownership.
54Because pets are living beings, they are a special category of personal property, and there are therefore unique factors that must be taken into consideration. The following helpful list of factors was set out by Adjudicator Richardson in MacDonald v. Pearl, 2017 NSSM 5, at para. 25:
(i) Whether the animal was owned or possessed by one of the people before their relationship began;
(ii) Any express or implied agreement as to ownership, made either at the time the animal was acquired or after;
(iii) The nature of the relationship between the people contesting ownership at the time the animal was first acquired;
(iv) Who purchased and/or raised the animal;
(v) Who exercised care and control of the animal;
(vi) Who bore the burden of the care and comfort of the animal;
(vii) Who paid for the expenses related to the animal’s upkeep;
(viii) Whether at any point the animal was gifted by the original owner to the other person;
(ix) What happened to the animal after the relationship between the litigants changed; and
(x) Any other indicia of ownership, or evidence of agreements, relevant to who has or should have ownership of the animal.
55The above list of factors has been adopted by this court in many subsequent cases, including Coates v. Dickson, 2021 ONSC 992, at para. 8: Duboff v. Simpson, 2021 ONSC 4970, at para. 15; Carvalho v. Verma, 2024 ONSC 1183, at para. 24; and Franco, at paras. 20, 28-29. Not all the factors are applicable in every case, and additional factors may be relevant depending on the circumstances of each case.
Application of Factors
56In this case, none of the factors points to Xander being Harrold’s owner.
57Xander told Mr. Perreault “that Harrold was his cat. Not his mother’s cat. Not his father’s cat. His cat. Xander stated this repeatedly.” However, Xander’s subjective belief that Harrold is his cat is not determinative of the issue of ownership.
58Xander’s belief likely arises from his emotional attachment to Harrold. It is not grounded in any recognized principles of property ownership. Xander did not, for example, have authority to decide whether any medical treatment would be provided to Harrold while he was living with his parents on the farm. Xander did not bear the financial burden of caring for Harrold. He did not purchase the cat’s food, litter box, litter or other supplies, and did not attend to Harrold’s health, take Harrold to the vet, or pay Harrold’s vet bills.
59By all accounts, Xander assisted with Harrold’s care by feeding him and occasionally changing his litter. However, I accept Mr. Turner’s evidence that Xander was encouraged to assist with pet care as a way of teaching him responsibility. There was no transfer of ownership as a result. Moreover, Xander was not exclusively (nor even principally) responsible for Harrold’s comfort and care.
60There is no evidence that Harrold was formally gifted to Xander by either of his parents at any time. The only objective indicium that would support a finding that Xander owns Harrold is that he named the cat. However, the mere fact that his parents let him name Harrold (and one of Harrold’s litter mates) as a kitten is not sufficient to establish ownership of the animal.
61For all the above reasons, I find that Harrold does not belong to Xander.
62The next issue for me to decide is whether Ms. Ross or Mr. Turner is Harrold’s sole owner. If they co-own him, then the issue becomes who should be permitted to possess him, since he is not divisible property.
63For the reasons set out below, I have concluded that Harrold is Ms. Ross’s cat.
64Harrold was born during the parties’ marriage, so he was not owned by either of them before their relationship began. Ms. Ross submits that she owned his mother Nosey, who was a barn cat on the property, and therefore owns Harrold as Nosey’s progeny. The evidence does not support that submission. Nosey was a barn cat that the parties acquired jointly as co-owners of the property.
65Neither Mr. Turner nor Ms. Ross purchased or adopted Harrold from a third party. He was one of three kittens in a litter born to Nosey in their barn. However, from birth, Ms. Ross principally attended to his needs. She gave him CPR when he was born. One of his littermates was stillborn. Harrold also could have perished if Ms. Ross did not give him chest compressions. She supplementally bottle-fed him as a kitten. Throughout the parties’ marriage, she took him to all his vet appointments, including to obtain vaccinations and to get him neutered. She was listed as his owner in the veterinarian’s records. The parties jointly covered his expenses, including food and vet bills, but Ms. Ross exercised significantly greater care and control of him.
66Although there was no express agreement between the parties as to who owned Harrold, the documentary record shows the existence of an implied agreement that he and other animals belonged to Ms. Ross. I make this finding based on the following evidence.
67During the marriage, and after the parties separated but where still residing under the same roof, there were not only several house cats in the matrimonial home, but also multiple barn cats, several dogs, a pig, and numerous goats on the property. The animals’ needs were extensive and satisfying their needs was time consuming. Mr. Turner participated in animal care, but Ms. Ross was more experienced and was primarily responsible for the animals.
68In September 2022, one of the dogs on the property had 8 puppies. Some of the goats had babies around that time, which also required a lot of attention and care. Ms. Ross was increasingly asking Mr. Turner (via email) for assistance in caring for the animals. By October 2022, she was no longer sleeping at the matrimonial home. She was staying at friends’ houses and at her new partner Carrie’s residence, or sleeping in
her car. She and Carrie were looking for a home to share, but in the interim, Ms. Ross had no fixed residence. She was unwell and off work, dealing with severe symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (from her prior employment as a paramedic). She was feeling overwhelmed and was finding the animal care responsibilities on the farm to be onerous, in conjunction with shared parenting of Xander. She asked Mr. Turner for help.
69On October 4, 2022, Ms. Ross wrote a lengthy email to Mr. Turner, outlining her psychological struggles, including PTSD and major depression. The subject line of the message was “Need help.” She described the nature of the care that the cats, dogs and puppies required and wrote: “I need you to tell me if you will help with cats and dogs for a little while (until I have a new home for them) or I will need you to help me euthanize all of them.” Mr. Turner responded, “I will help you with the dogs and cats in the short term.” Ms. Ross replied, “I can talk about details of feeding and schedules with you if you want or I can write them out and you reply that way.”
70The fact that Ms. Ross knew the animal feeding schedules and needed to share that information with Mr. Turner underscores her principal responsibility for the animals’ care.
71At trial, much was made of Ms. Ross’s threat to euthanize the cats and dogs, and whether it was genuine or simply manipulative. I make no finding on that issue because the threat is irrelevant to the ownership issue that I must decide.
72The October 4, 2022 email exchange clearly reflects that both parties understood the cats and dogs were Ms. Ross’s property and responsibility, and that she intended to take them with her to a new home once she and Carrie secured a residence. Mr. Turner explicitly agreed to care for the cats and dogs only “in the short term” and he did so explicitly to help her, not because he owned or co-owned the animals.
73During his cross-examination, Mr. Turner suggested that when he wrote, “I will help you with the dogs and cats in the short term,” he was only referring to the barn cats, and not the house cats. He then contradicted himself and testified, “I was going to object to euthanizing the cats because they belonged to me as well as her, but she was in a fragile
mental state, so I kept my response short.” I reject this evidence as a convenient after- the-fact rationalization to try to explain why he did not assert ownership of Harrold or the other house cats at the time.
74Mr. Turner argues that, in any event, Ms. Ross subsequently abandoned the cats, including Harrold, when she permanently left the property without them on November 14, 2022. He submits that even if the house cats belonged to her, or were co-owned by them, she relinquished her ownership interest that day.
75I am not persuaded by that argument because of the circumstances surrounding Ms. Ross’s departure from the matrimonial home. The evidence in the record shows that, when she left the home with Xander, she took few of her belongings with her. She claimed that she was leaving for safety reasons. She had consulted the Ontario Provincial Police (“OPP”) and Women in Crisis (“WIC”) for support in making the move. She had not yet secured a new place to live. She was headed for transitory housing.
76I am not making a finding that Mr. Turner posed a threat to her safety. I am simply noting that Ms. Ross left the property without the means or ability to take pets with her. That same day, she wrote an email message entitled “Alternative Housing for Safety”. She addressed and sent it to an OPP officer, a WIC social worker, two of Xander’s school administrators, and Mr. Turner. In it, she announced that she “gathered some of Xander’s and my belongings” and went to alternative housing. It is clear from the message that she left behind items that she considered to be her belongings. She asserted, “I am choosing to increase my safety by temporarily removing myself from the farm house for as long as Mr. Turner is living there.” She said she felt threatened by Mr. Turner and requested that he not contact her.
77In her email message, Mr. Ross also stated that she would attend the property during Mr. Turner’s work hours to care for farm animals that week and the next week. She concluded the message by writing, “The animals in the house will be his to care for or not. I hope that he does take care of them. His son loves them but with the urgency needed to get to safety I was not able to arrange a way to take them with me today.”
78Ms. Ross was questioned about the first sentence in the concluding paragraph of her email message. She testified that her intent in writing that sentence was not to abandon the cats or give them to Mr. Turner. Mr. Turner testified that he interpreted the sentence to mean that Ms. Turner was leaving the house cats (including Harrold) to his sole ownership, if he wanted them. Taken in isolation, that is not an unreasonable interpretation of the sentence. However, considered in the context of the entire message and the prevailing circumstances at that time, I do not believe that is what Ms. Ross intended.
79Notably, Ms. Ross wrote, “I was not able to arrange a way to take [the animals] with me today” (emphasis added). That implies that she still intended to take them at a later date.
80She was moving to temporary housing. The cats belonged to her, but she could not take them with her that day. She felt she had no choice but to leave them in Mr. Turner’s care until she could retrieve and rehouse them, but she knew that he had only agreed (on October 4, 2022) to help her with caring for the cats and dogs in the short term. Their relationship had significantly deteriorated since then. She did not know whether he would be willing to continue to care for the animals. She was not in a position to insist on it, so she left it to his discretion. When she wrote that the animals “will be his to care for or not”, she did not mean they would literally become “his” permanent property, but rather that it would be up to him whether he cared for them or not in the interim.
81Although Ms. Ross did not say so explicitly in her November 14, 2022 email message, it was still her intention to retrieve the cats as soon as she could make arrangements to house them at another location. I am confident of that inference because her subsequent actions were consistent with that intention. Two days after she left the farm property, on November 16, 2022, she communicated with an OPP officer to seek information and advice. Among other things, she noted that Mr. Turner had changed the locks on the house so she could no longer access her belongings, and she noted that Xander was upset that they could not retrieve the cats. This email shows that she was still contemplating retrieving the cats along with her other belongings.
82The OPP officer facilitated an opportunity for Ms. Ross and Xander to attend the property, accompanied by police, for the purpose of collecting some of their belongings. The visit was scheduled for November 19, 2022 at 7:00 PM. That morning, Ms. Ross corresponded with the officer by email and said Xander “will only care about his cat tonight.” That contemporaneous statement corroborates Ms. Ross’s testimony at trial to the effect that her intention was to retrieve Harrold that evening. Her testimony on that point is further corroborated by her father’s evidence. He attended the property with them and the police that evening. He recalls Xander being disappointed and upset that he was unable to take Harrold home with him.
83It is unclear why Ms. Ross and Xander could not locate Harrold (or the other cats) that night. Ms. Ross testified that they searched the house for the cats. I accept her evidence on this point because it is consistent with the contemporaneous record that confirms the goal of removing Harrold, along with other belongings. Both Mr. Turner and Ms. Boulton testified that they did not hide the cats inside the separate area of the home where they were waiting while Ms. Ross collected her personal property. I need not determine whether they were being truthful because the reason for the cat’s disappearance is not relevant. The point is that Ms. Ross and Xander were there to get Harrold (and other cats). Clearly, Ms. Ross had not relinquished ownership of Harrold to Mr. Turner five days earlier.
84Read in context, the November 14, 2022 email correspondence is therefore not evidence of Ms. Ross’s abandonment of the cat.
85Ms. Ross attended the property thereafter (when Mr. Turner was absent) to do chores and care for farm animals. On one occasion in January 2023, she broke into the house because water was leaking and the only way to shut it off was from a valve in the basement. She testified that Xander was with her that day. She said he sat inside the house and hugged Harrold while she went to the basement to turn the water off.
86Mr. Turner argues that this was an opportunity for Ms. Ross to remove Harrold without his intervention, if she truly believed that Harrold belonged to her. He submits that her failure to take Harrold that day is inconsistent with her claim of ownership.
87Ms. Ross explained that Xander wanted to bring Harrold home that day and she wanted to take her cats, but she had been advised by the police and by her lawyer “not to do anything that could be viewed as taking joint property.” Mr. Turner submits that this is evidence that Ms. Ross viewed Harrold as joint property. I disagree. She did not acknowledge that he was joint property. Rather, she stated that she was being cautious because he “could be viewed as” joint property. She was correct in that regard. Mr. Turner confirmed, during his cross-examination, that if she had taken Harrold that day, the conflict between them would have escalated.
88Ms. Ross’s conduct on that day in January 2023 is not consistent with abdicating ownership of the cats. She was simply being prudent not to engage in self-help while family law proceedings ran their course.
89Mr. Turner relies heavily on the final factor from MacDonald v. Pearl, namely what happened to the animal after the relationship between the parties ended. He notes that Harrold’s post-separation care overwhelmingly favours leaving the cat in his possession. He cites the decision in Knight v. Knight-Kerr, 2021 ONSC 55, where this court found that a jointly owned pet dog should remain in the possession of the party who had cared for him since separation. That case is distinguishable because Harrold is not jointly owned property, but rather is Ms. Ross’s cat. The care that Mr. Turner has provided to Harrold since November 2022 does not alter the fact that he belongs to Ms. Ross.
90For all the above reasons, I declare that Harrold is Ms. Ross’s property. I order Mr. Turner to deliver the cat to Ms. Ross at the next parenting exchange (unless the parties mutually agree to different timing). Mr. Turner has no compensable property interest in the cat. Ms. Ross is not required to compensate him monetarily for Harrold.
COSTS
91This is a clear case of divided success, in which I would ordinarily make no order for costs. However, there may have been Offers to Settle that impact entitlement to costs. If either party wishes to make a claim for costs, they must deliver written costs submissions to the opposing party, file the submissions with the court, upload the submissions to Case Centre, and send a courtesy copy via email to my judicial assistant
at SCJ.JudicialAssistant.Guelph@ontario.ca. The submissions shall not exceed two pages and shall be accompanied by a Bill of Costs and any Offers to Settle. If no submissions are filed by June 29, 2026, I will assume that neither party is claiming their costs and no order as to costs will be made.
Justice C. Petersen
Released: June 18, 2026
CITATION: Turner v. Ross 2026 ONSC 3592
COURT FILE NO.: FS-23-00000035-0000
DATE: June 18, 2026
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
KEVIN TURNER
– and –
ROBIN ROSS
Applicant
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Petersen J.
Released: June 18, 2026

