CITATION

R. v. Solinski, 2026 ONSC 3497

COURT FILE NO.

CR-25-00006474-0000

DATE

June 15, 2026

DELIVERED ORALLY AND MADE AN EXHIBIT

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

– and –

JOHN JASON SOLINSKI

Zuzana Szasz, for the Crown

Shane Miles, for the Offender

HEARD: June 15, 2026

REASONS FOR SENTENCE

Howard, r.s.j.:

Overview

1We are here for the pronouncement of sentence on Mr. Solinski, following the sentencing hearing held February 20, 2026. Originally scheduled for May 20, 2026, the sentencing date was adjourned to today’s attendance due to the unavailability of the court on May 20th last.

2In Count No. 1 of the indictment dated April 3, 2025, Mr. Solinski was charged as follows:

THAT, the said John Jason Solinski, on or about the 15th day of May in the year 2024 at the City of Windsor in the Southwest Region did possess a substance included in Schedule I, namely fentanyl, for the purpose of trafficking, contrary to Section 5, subsection (2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

3At the attendance on November 28, 2025, Mr. Solinski pled guilty to possession of fentanyl for the purposes of trafficking, as charged in Count No. 1.¹

4In assessing an appropriate sentence for Mr. Solinski, I have considered, among other things:

a. the principles of sentencing set out in s. 718 of the Criminal Code,²

b. the circumstances of the offence,

c. the circumstances of the offender,

d. the presence of certain aggravating factors, and

e. the presence of certain mitigating factors.

Factual Background

Circumstances of the Offence

5In May of 2024, the Drugs and Guns Enforcement Unit of the Windsor Police Service initiated a drug investigation into Mr. Solinski. Information had been received from confidential informants that Mr. Solinski was trafficking illicit substances, namely, fentanyl, in the City of Windsor.

6A search warrant under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act³ was sought and granted for Mr. Solinski’s residence at 1176 Erie Street West.

7On May 15, 2024, Mr. Solinski was arrested by Windsor Police Service officers, who then searched his person and seized from him:

a. 3.3 grams of crystal methamphetamine,

b. 1.3 grams of crack cocaine,

c. 13.6 grams of fentanyl,

d. an empty knife sheath hanging from his belt,

e. an 8-inch hunting-style knife,

f. a cell phone,

g. a bundle of $1,201 Canadian currency in the pocket of his jeans, and

h. a set of keys hanging on his belt loop.

8At 1:27 p.m. that same afternoon, Windsor Police Service officers executed the CDSA warrant at Mr. Solinski’s residence. In the course of their search, officers located a briefcase-sized Sentry safe, which they were able to open using one of the keys from the key ring seized from Mr. Solinski’s belt loop.

9Inside that safe, officers found 1,021 grams of fentanyl and 202.4 grams of crystal methamphetamine.

10In the master bedroom, officers located a digital scale, a black CO2-powered pistol, and a Uscan-brand password-protected safe.

11Inside that safe, officers found:

a. $10,600 Canadian dollars,

b. $570 U.S. dollars,

c. a box of 12-gauge rounds,

d. a bag of rifle rounds, and

e. jewelry, collection coins, and correspondence in the name of Mr. Solinski.

12It was determined that the ammunition found would be seized for public safety, and no charges were laid in relation to that ammunition as no firearms were located that could fire the rounds.

13The total amount of fentanyl seized from Mr. Solinski’s person and residence was 1,034.6 grams.

Circumstances of the Offender

14A pre-sentence report was prepared on February 10, 2026, and marked as Exhibit No. 2 on the sentencing hearing. There was no objection to the facts asserted.

15Mr. Solinski was born on September 25, 1970, and is currently 55 years of age.

16A review of the pre-sentence report indicates that Mr. Solinski experienced a fairly traumatic and challenging upbringing. His parents had a toxic relationship, and his father was physically and emotionally abusive toward his mother. Mr. Solinski witnessed intimate partner violence on numerous occasions throughout his childhood and adolescence. He reported that his parents were both physically and emotionally abusive towards him and that physical punishment as a form of discipline was normal. His mother made several attempts to leave the relationship when he was ten years old but did not permanently separate from his father until he was fifteen.

17Following the separation, Mr. Solinski remained living with his father, while his mother left with his older half-brother. Mr. Solinski had hoped to leave with his mother, but she told him he reminded her too much of his father. Mr. Solinski made numerous efforts over the ten years following his parents’ separation to maintain a relationship with his mother, but she was not responsive, and they remain estranged to date.⁴

18During his school-age years, Mr. Solinski was diagnosed with dyslexia and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), for which he took medication. He received multiple suspensions from school for engaging in physical altercations with other students and eventually dropped out of school, never completing his high school education.⁵

19It appears from the pre-sentence report that Mr. Solinski is not currently engaged in a long-term intimate relationship, but he has three children from two previous such relationships.⁶

20Mr. Solinski presents as a hard worker with a long employment history including carnival work, farm labour, a scrap yard, and an iron worker for approximately fourteen years, operating equipment such as skyjacks, scissor lifts, forklifts, zoom booms, and swing stages. His last significant period of employment was as a utility arborist for seven years, during which he also began operating his own lawn maintenance and tree removal business.⁷

21Mr. Solinski reported that during one job when he was in his forties, he fell approximately fifty-five feet and sustained multiple serious injuries, including a broken hip and pelvis, three fractured vertebrae and ribs, and a shattered elbow. He was hospitalized for nearly one month. He now has a titanium elbow and experiences ongoing pain and arthritis.⁸

22Mr. Solinski reported that while he first experimented with drugs and alcohol when he was 15 years of age, he stopped drinking prior to his incarceration. He has been a habitual marijuana user for years. He first experimented with cocaine around the age of 18 years and following his move to Windsor, he became involved with the drug subculture and found himself using cocaine regularly and, specifically, multiple grams per day. He stated he does not use any other narcotic and specifically denied using fentanyl. Mr. Solinski has never participated in a drug treatment program or counselling service to address addiction.⁹

23The probation and parole officer who authored the pre-sentence report summarized her assessment as follows:

The Offender described his upbringing with mixed emotions because of his family dynamics. He became independent at a young age and though he did not complete his high school education, he was committed to working. Unfortunately, a serious workplace accident left the Offender unable to work, having to rely on the support of a disability program. The Offender explained his mental health suffered following the accident as he had always prided himself on being a hard worker. He reported he began to struggle financially approximately five years ago when he moved to Windsor in hopes of finding a lower cost of living. He reported he found himself associating with an antisocial group of individuals and back in front of the Courts after not having criminal justice involvement in over twenty years.¹⁰

24Mr. Solinski was admitted to the South West Detention Centre in May 2024. He is housed in the Direct Supervision Work Unit. In August 2024, he was approved to participate in the Institutional Work Program and is assigned to work in the kitchen department, where his duties include meal preparation, cleaning, and meal cart preparation. In September 2024, he was approved to complete additional kitchen duties, including duties performed outside on the loading dock. Individuals selected for this work must maintain satisfactory institutional behaviour with no evidence of misconduct, sanctions, or violence.¹¹

25While in custody, Mr. Solinski has participated in and completed numerous certificate programs, including

a. the Release from Custody program, offered through the Windsor-Essex Canadian Mental Health Association,

b. the Service Excellence Certificate program, offered by the Unemployed Help Centre,

c. the Worker Health & Safety Awareness in Four Steps program, offered through the Ministry of Labour,

d. Home Bible Studies, offered by the Gospel Echoes Team,

e. two five-day workshops known as Change Is A Choice – Substance Use and Change Is A Choice – Anger Management, and

f. at least 21 Core Programs devoted to a variety of different issues, including Anger Management, Substance Use, Supportive Relationships, Looking for Work, Maintaining Employment, Being an Effective Father, Managing Stress, Problem-Solving, Understanding Feelings, Setting Up a Budget, Changing Habits, Recognizing Healthy Relationships, and Planning for Discharge.

26As reflected in the pre-sentence report, Mr. Solinski would like the court to know that his goals moving forward are to find and maintain suitable employment, potentially working in a restaurant while also continuing to support himself with disability benefits. He stated he hopes to find a partner and settle down. He stated that he is open to counselling services and sees the benefit of having a counsellor for support. He stated he would like to reconnect with his children and five grandchildren and become a productive member of society again.¹²

27In his allocution statement to the court at the sentencing hearing, Mr. Solinski admitted that he “made huge mistakes in a bad way.” He stated that he did not “mean to be a burden to society.” He expressed that he takes responsibility for his actions.

28Mr. Solinski has a sporadic and dated criminal record, reflecting offences committed over an 11-year period from October 1989 to August 2000, most of which involve theft and property-related offences. However, there is a conviction in January 2002 for possession of a scheduled substance for the purpose of trafficking, contrary to s. 5(2) of the CDSA, for which Mr. Solinski was sentenced to 45 days in custody.

Legal Parameters

29At the time of the offence, the provisions of s. 5(3)(a) of the CDSA relevant to Count No. 1 in the indictment provide that everyone who commits the offence of possession of a Schedule I substance for the purpose of trafficking is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for life.

Positions of Crown and Defence

30I have carefully considered the submissions of counsel for both parties. Ms. Szasz submitted on behalf of the Crown that an appropriate global sentence in the circumstances of the instant case would be imprisonment for a term of 13 years, less credit for presentence custody.

31Mr. Miles submitted on behalf of Mr. Solinski that, given Mr. Solinski’s personal circumstances, this court should consider a global sentence of 10 years, less credit for presentence custody.

32I have considered the submissions of counsel for both the Crown and the offender, as well as the cases relied upon by counsel.

Analysis

Principles of Sentencing

33The Supreme Court of Canada has said that the sentencing of an offender is “one of the most delicate stages of the criminal justice process in Canada.”¹³ It requires “the exercise of a broad discretion by the courts in balancing all the relevant factors in order to meet the objectives being pursued in sentencing.”¹⁴

34The notion of proportionality is the fundamental principle in sentencing, and that important principle is enshrined in s. 718.1 of the Criminal Code, which provides that:

A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.

35In its seminal decision in R. v. Lacasse, the Supreme Court of Canada described proportionality as “the cardinal principle” that must guide sentencing courts in considering the fitness of a sentence imposed on an offender. As the Supreme Court explained, “[t]he more serious the crime and its consequences, or the greater the offender’s degree of responsibility, the heavier the sentence will be. In other words, the severity of a sentence depends not only on the seriousness of the crime’s consequences, but also on the moral blameworthiness of the offender.”¹⁵

36In Lacasse, the Supreme Court observed that determining “a proportionate sentence is a delicate task.”¹⁶ Indeed, the Court described how an unfit sentence can undermine public confidence in the administration of justice:

The credibility of the criminal justice system in the eyes of the public depends on the fitness of sentences imposed on offenders. A sentence that is unfit, whether because it is too harsh or too lenient, could cause the public to question the credibility of the system in light of its objectives.¹⁷

37The Supreme Court has also repeatedly recognized that sentencing is an “inherently individualized process.”¹⁸ In R. v. Nasogaluak, the Supreme Court described this individualized process in the following terms:

The determination of a “fit” sentence is, subject to some specific statutory rules, an individualized process that requires the judge to weigh the objectives of sentencing in a manner that best reflects the circumstances of the case.… No one sentencing objective trumps the others and it falls to the sentencing judge to determine which objective or objectives merit the greatest weight, given the particulars of the case. The relative importance of any mitigating or aggravating factors will then push the sentence up or down the scale of appropriate sentences for similar offences. The judge’s discretion to decide on the particular blend of sentencing goals and the relevant aggravating or mitigating factors ensures that each case is decided on its facts, subject to the overarching guidelines and principles in the Code and in the case law.¹⁹

38Section 718 of the Code sets out certain objectives of sentencing and provides that:

The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives:

(a) to denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community that is caused by unlawful conduct;

(b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences;

(c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary;

(d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders;

(e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and

(f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims or to the community.

39Both counsel before me agree that, in the circumstances of this case, the primary sentencing objectives must be denunciation and deterrence. While rehabilitation and reintegration cannot be forgotten in a sentencing analysis, denunciation and deterrence must be given paramount consideration when an offence involves, as here, possession of a dangerous drug for the purpose of trafficking.

40My task is to impose a sentence that is appropriate for Mr. Solinski “based on the particular facts of the offence and of the offender within the applicable principles of law.”²⁰

Mitigating Factors

41I consider the following mitigating factors.

Guilty plea

42Mr. Solinski has pled guilty to possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking. His guilty plea has obviated the need for a trial with the consequent saving of judicial resources, at a time when the Superior Court is continuing to address increasing workload demands with limited resources. Mr. Solinski’s guilty plea is a primary consideration.

Acceptance of responsibility

43Through his decisions, not only to plead guilty to the charge of possession for the purpose of trafficking, but also to make real positive steps to change his life direction, Mr. Solinski has accepted responsibility for his actions. As reflected in his allocution to the court at the sentencing hearing, Mr. Solinski has acknowledged that he made some very bad decisions that could have negatively affected members of society. As he said to the court, “I admit I made huge mistakes in a bad way.”

44But it is not just his acknowledgement of the very poor decisions he made and his acceptance of responsibility – it is not just mere words – one can also see in Mr. Solinski’s actions and his conduct while in custody that he has started to make positive changes. He has decided to pursue the path towards rehabilitation.

45As I reviewed earlier, he has availed himself of extensive programming from a variety of agencies, all designed at self-improvement. For almost two years now, he has been engaged in the Institutional Work Program, assigned to work in the kitchen department at South West Detention Centre, and has been given added responsibilities in his job duties. He has maintained satisfactory institutional behaviour with no evidence of misconduct, sanction, or violence.

46I accept the submission of Mr. Miles that Mr. Solinski did not pursue an interim release application, in part, because he wanted to avail himself of the courses and programs available to him while in custody.

47In my view, this is not a case of an offender promising to the court that he is going to turn his life around at some point in the future. This is a case where Mr. Solinski comes before the court having already taken some very positive and concrete steps towards self-improvement and better decision-making. And in that vein, I note the observation recorded in the Pre-Sentence Report that, shortly after coming to Windsor, Mr. Solinski found himself associating with “the wrong crowd,” that is, individuals with ties to the drug subculture,²¹ and that, upon release, Mr. Solinski is considering returning to Northumberland County in Ontario, “as he thinks removing himself from Windsor would be in his best interest.”²²

48In that same vein, I also accept the submission of Ms. Szasz that, through the positive steps he has taken while in custody, Mr. Solinski “has oriented himself toward rehabilitation,” and this is a mitigating factor for the court to consider.

Personal circumstances

49As I have reviewed above, the pre-sentence report indicates that Mr. Solinski experienced a fairly traumatic and challenging upbringing. Among other things he was a witness to repeated instances of domestic violence against his mother, his parents were both physically and emotionally abusive towards him, and his mother essentially abandoned him.

Aggravating Factors

50However, there are also certain aggravating factors present in this case, and I have considered the following.

Nature of the substance

51As I will review below, the courts have repeatedly commented on the inherently dangerous and deadly nature of fentanyl. As was said by McGivern J. of the Ontario Court of Justice just last month in another fentanyl trafficking case in Windsor:

Trafficking in fentanyl and other illicit substances are not victimless crimes. There is no doubt that the offence of possession for the purpose has a devastating impact on the community. Fentanyl kills.”²³

Amount of the substance

52The sheer amount of the fentanyl at issue here – 1,034.6 grams – is a significant aggravating factor. Ms. Szasz observed that, to her knowledge, that is the most significant quantity of fentanyl ever involved in a Windsor case.

Criminal record

53In considering an appropriate sentence for Mr. Solinski, I cannot ignore that he comes before this court with a criminal record already, and while it is certainly dated, and mostly for unrelated offences, and so, all in all, not a driving factor on the sentencing analysis, I note that his last conviction was for the same offence of possession for the purpose of trafficking as is in issue here.

Appropriate Sentence

54In her sentencing submissions on behalf of the Crown, Ms. Szasz provided me with a book of authorities and a detailed review of many of the leading cases dealing with sentences for fentanyl trafficking.²⁴ Mr. Miles did not provide me with own authorities because, as he said, the brief provided by the Crown was quite “complete.” And I agree with Mr. Miles on this point. I have reviewed and considered the Crown’s cases, but I am not going to review each case in detail here.

55While a sentencing judge must respect the parity principle embodied in s. 718.2(b) of the Code and acknowledge that similar cases decided by other courts are useful for certain purposes, one must also recognize that because of the inherently individualized process of sentencing, the decisions in other cases often turn on their own particular circumstances.

56In considering an appropriate sentence for Mr. Solinski, my starting point is the principle that sentences must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.²⁵ The principles of parity and individualization, while important, are secondary principles.²⁶

57In the circumstances of the case at bar, I find the moral blameworthiness of Mr. Solinski to be quite high. That consideration is inextricably linked to the gravity of the offence here, given the nature of the substance and the sheer quantity involved.

58While I note that Mr. Solinski has struggled with some substance abuse issues in his past, I agree with Ms. Szasz that he does not meet the definition of an addict trafficker as that term has come to be known in the jurisprudence.²⁷ Moreover, Mr. Solinski himself expressly disavowed any use of fentanyl. As recorded in the Pre-Sentence Report, Mr. Solinski stated that, “he does not agree with drugs such as fentanyl.”²⁸

59The nature of fentanyl and the danger it poses to the public must inform the court’s consideration of the gravity of the offences here. Our courts have repeatedly recognized and described the dangerous nature of fentanyl. Fentanyl has been recognized to be “one of the most highly addictive and dangerous drugs.”²⁹ “Fentanyl is 100 times stronger than morphine and 20 times stronger than heroin. It is also highly addictive.”³⁰ “Its widespread abuse … has quickly become entrenched in our country. Every day in our communities, fentanyl abuse claims the lives of Canadians.”³¹

60In its 2021 decision in R. v. Parranto, the Supreme Court of Canada noted that “trafficking in fentanyl is so deadly that various courts have described it as a national crisis.” ³²

61I note, in particular, the concluding observations of Moldaver J. in his concurring reasons in Parranto, which spoke to the appropriateness of “heavy penitentiary sentences” for “largescale trafficking in fentanyl,” as follows:

The time has thus come for our perception of the gravity of largescale trafficking in fentanyl to accord with the gravity of the crisis it has caused. Largescale trafficking in fentanyl is not a crime marked merely by the distribution and sale of an illicit substance; rather, it is a crime marked by greed and the pursuit of profit at the expense of violence, death, and the perpetuation of a public health crisis previously unseen in Canadian society. In many ways, "[t]rafficking in fentanyl is almost the equivalent of putting multiple bullets in the chambers of a revolver and playing Russian roulette. It is the most efficient killer of drug users on the market today" (R. v. Frazer, 2017 ABPC 116, 58 Alta. L.R. (6th) 185, at para. 11). Put simply, it is a crime that can be expected to not only destroy lives, but to undermine the very foundations of our society.

In my view, heavy penitentiary sentences will be appropriate where offenders have trafficked in large quantities of fentanyl and assumed leadership roles in the trafficking operation. Indeed, in the context of largescale fentanyl trafficking operations, substantial sentences should be neither unusual nor reserved for exceptional circumstances. …

Ultimately, largescale trafficking in fentanyl is a crime that preys disproportionally on the misery of others — the marginalized and those whose lives are marked by hopelessness and despair. It is a crime motivated by greed and by a callous disregard for the untold grief and suffering it leaves in its wake. Above all, it is a crime that kills — often and indiscriminately. It follows, in my view, that what matters most is that those individuals who choose to prey on the vulnerable and profit from the misery of the Canadian public for personal gain are sentenced in accordance with the severity of the harms they have caused. Fentanyl trafficking, and largescale trafficking in particular, are a source of unspeakable harm. Accordingly, while the range of sentences currently imposed for the directing minds of largescale fentanyl operations straddles the upper single digits and lower double digits, sentencing judges should feel justified, where circumstances warrant, in applying a higher range, consisting of mid-level double digit sentences and, in particularly aggravating circumstances, potential sentences of life imprisonment.³³

62In Parranto, at the time of Mr. Parranto’s arrest in March 2016, the police recovered 27.8 grams of fentanyl powder, and following his October 2016 arrest, they recovered 485.12 grams of fentanyl powder,³⁴ for a total of 512.92 grams of fentanyl in that case. That amount was described as “significant” by the majority of the Supreme Court.³⁵ And that amount is less than half of the amount of fentanyl seized from Mr. Solinski in the case at bar.

63The majority in Parranto held that, in respect of 512.92 grams of fentanyl, a “more accurate range based on a review of reported case law nationally would be in the region of 8 to 15 years.”³⁶ In the result in Parranto, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the Alberta Court of Appeal’s sentence of 14 years for Mr. Parranto.

64The remarks of Moldaver J. in his concurring judgment in Parranto make me think of Mr. Solinski and his original justification for his actions here. As reflected in the Pre-Sentence Report, at least initially, Mr. Solinski tried to justify his actions by saying that he engaged in street-level trafficking of “his” fentanyl, not to enable his customers, but to provide them with a “safer alternative.” As he explained, “he believed he was more responsible than others in positions like his. He stated he wanted to ensure people with addictions were getting a reliable, unaltered supply in doses he felt would not harm them, while also using those interactions to encourage them to consider treatment or other services in the community and eventually stop using drugs.”³⁷

65I give no weight to Mr. Solinski’s explanation. To my mind, it does not lessen his moral blameworthiness here. To return to the observations of Moldaver J. in Parranto, that trafficking “in fentanyl is almost the equivalent of putting multiple bullets in the chambers of a revolver and playing Russian roulette.”³⁸ In my view, it does not lessen Mr. Solinski’s moral blameworthiness to say that, in effect, he gave his addict users a loaded revolver and invited them to play Russin roulette instead of having them play with a live grenade. That said, I understand from the submissions of Mr. Miles on the sentencing hearing that Mr. Solinski understands now that his original thinking was deeply flawed.

66It has also been said that the dangers of fentanyl have become well known in Canadian society, “which puts traffickers on notice that their conduct will attract significant custodial penalties.”³⁹ In Loor, one of the first times the Court of Appeal for Ontario reviewed a sentence for trafficking in fentanyl, the court declined to set a sentencing range; however, it did pronounce that offenders should expect “significant penitentiary sentences”:

Few fentanyl trafficking cases have reached this court. It is thus perhaps too early in our jurisprudence to establish a range. But I think it fair to say that generally, offenders — even first offenders — who traffic significant amounts of fentanyl should expect to receive significant penitentiary sentences.⁴⁰

67Some three months after the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Parranto, our Court of Appeal in Lynch suggested an appropriate range for trafficking in fentanyl. In Lynch, the court held that the appropriate range for “mid-level traffickers” in cocaine is “five to eight years,” that fentanyl is “a more dangerous drug than is cocaine,” and that “long or longer” sentences should be imposed in fentanyl cases.⁴¹

68In Olvedi, the offender was convicted of importing 499.5 grams of fentanyl and possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, and after a trial, was sentenced to a global sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment and 12 years, concurrent, on the trafficking charge. The offender was 33 years of age, with a minor but unrelated criminal record, in respect of which the Court of Appeal held he “was entitled to be treated as a first offender,” was genuinely remorseful, and had excellent rehabilitative potential.⁴² In dismissing the appeal as to sentence, the Court of Appeal upheld the sentence imposed by the trial judge for the trafficking conviction, and while the court remarked that it was “not strictly necessary to address the appeal from the concurrent 12-year sentence for possession for the purpose of trafficking,” the court expressly noted that, “the same aggravating factors are also very much in play in this context, and justify the substantial penitentiary term that was imposed.”⁴³

69Again, I would note that the 499.5 grams in issue in Olvedi, in respect of which the Court of Appeal did not disturb the 12-year sentence imposed by the trial judge, is less than half the quantity of fentanyl at issue in the case before me.

70In R. v. Owusu, an accused in possession of 127 grams of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking was described as a “mid-level trafficker,” to whom a range of up to 10 years, for that offence alone, was held to be appropriate.⁴⁴ In the result in Owusu, Justice Code imposed a sentence of nine years.⁴⁵

71In the Court of Appeal’s 2024 decision in Hoang, police seized over 16 kg. of drugs from the accused’s car, including 5.1 kg. of heroin; 2.2 kg. of heroin and fentanyl; 994 grams of heroin, carfentanil, and fentanyl; 494 grams of carfentanil; 7.5 kg. of cocaine/crack cocaine; $118,000 in bundled Canadian currency; a shotgun, and ammunition for the shotgun.⁴⁶ The 38-years-old accused was found guilty after a trial. He had no criminal record. The trial judge imposed an 18-year sentence for the trafficking offences, which the Court of Appeal reduced to 15 years after considering the principle of restraint, particularly in the context of a first-time offender.⁴⁷

72Given the dangerous nature of fentanyl and the gravity of the offence involved in fentanyl trafficking cases, the courts have repeatedly held that the principles of general deterrence and denunciation must be prominent, if not paramount, factors in fentanyl trafficking cases.⁴⁸

73That said, even where deterrence and denunciation are the primary sentencing objectives, it is an error of law to fail to consider the rehabilitative potential of the offender.⁴⁹ While the principles of deterrence and denunciation are undoubtedly important in the instant case, in short, they should not be permitted to overwhelm the analysis.

74In the circumstances here, given the sheer amount of the 1,034.6 grams of fentanyl seized from Mr. Solinski, I find that Mr. Solinski was engaged in more than just so-called “mid-level” trafficking. The amount of fentanyl in this case eclipses almost every other case to which counsel directed my attention.

75At the same time, I am somewhat reticent to conclude that Mr. Solinski falls within the category of traffickers that Moldaver J. had in mind in Parranto, when the court spoke of “largescale trafficking,” where offenders have trafficked in large quantities of fentanyl and assumed leadership roles in the trafficking operation.⁵⁰

76To be clear, I have no hesitation in concluding that the 1,034.6 grams of fentanyl seized from Mr. Solinski in this case constitutes a very large quantity of fentanyl. Certainly, the sheer amount of the drug involved here would certainly fall within the parameters of “largescale trafficking” contemplated by Moldaver J. in Parranto. Again, in Parranto, the total amount of fentanyl involved was 512.92 grams of fentanyl in that case. And that amount is less than half of the amount of fentanyl seized from Mr. Solinski in the case at bar.

77That said, to the extent that the reference to “largescale trafficking” and “leadership roles in the trafficking operation” at hand may engage the notion of a significant leadership role in a sophisticated, high-level operation, I have no evidence before me that Mr. Solinski engaged in any such significant role within a sophisticated operation. Indeed, I have very little evidence before me as to the nature of Mr. Solinski’s operation or his role.

78Consequently, despite the able submissions of Mr. Miles on behalf of the offender, I have come to the conclusion that, in all of the circumstances of this case, a just, fit, and proportionate sentence for Mr. Solinski is a global term of imprisonment for 12-and-one-half years or 4,562.5 days, less credit for presentence custody.

Presentence Custody

79At the sentencing hearing on February 20, 2026, counsel were agreed that Mr. Solinski had served 646 real days in custody. I understand that counsel are now agreed that, as of today’s date, Mr. Solinski has served 761 real days of presentence custody.

80Counsel before me are agreed that Mr. Solinski is entitled to “Summers”⁵¹ credit at the rate of 1.5 days credit for every actual day served in presentence custody. Accordingly, Mr. Solinski is entitled to a Summers credit 1,141.5 days for presentence custody.

81Counsel are also agreed that Mr. Solinski is entitled to an additional 45 days of enhanced “Duncan”⁵² credit to reflect particularly harsh presentence incarceration conditions.

82Therefore, the total credit for presentence custody amounts to 1,186.5 days.

Final Disposition

83Mr. Solinski, I impose the following sentence on you.

84With respect to your conviction on Count No. 1 for committing the offence of possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, contrary to s. 5(2) of the CDSA, I sentence you to a global term of imprisonment of 4,562.5 days, reflecting 12-and-one-half years, less credit for presentence custody of 1,186.5 days, for a net sentence of 3,376 days.

85The Crown sought a number of ancillary orders, all of which are on consent of the offender. Accordingly, I make the following ancillary orders.

86As possession for the purpose of trafficking is a “secondary designated offence” under s. 487.04 of the Code for the purposes of DNA collection and storage, the making of such a DNA order is not mandatory; however, I find on the evidence before me that it is in the best interests of the administration of justice to make such an order. Accordingly, pursuant to s. 487.051(3)(b) of the Code, I make an order in Form 5.04 authorizing the taking of the number of samples of your bodily substances that is reasonably required for the purposes of forensic DNA analysis. I also make an order in Form 5.041 requiring you to attend forthwith to give such samples.

87Pursuant to s. 109(3) of the Code, you are hereby prohibited from possessing any firearm or codified weapon or device for life, as weapon prohibitions under s. 110 were previously made.

88Finally, I make a forfeiture order under s. 16 of the CDSA, on consent, in the form approved, that Mr. Solinski forfeit the money seized on execution of the CDSA warrant and other offence-related property.

Original signed by “R.S.J. J. Paul R. Howard”

J. Paul R. Howard

Regional Senior Justice

Delivered Orally: June 15, 2026

CITATION

R. v. Solinski, 2026 ONSC 3497

COURT FILE NO.

CR-25-00006474-0000

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

– and –

JOHN JASON SOLINSKI

REASONS FOR SENTENCE

Howard, R.S.J.

Delivered Orally: June 15, 2026

Footnotes

1. 1At the attendance on November 28, 2025, the accused also entered a plea of guilty to Count No. 2. However, at the sentencing hearing on February 20, 2026, on consent, that plea was struck.
2. 2Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 [Code].
3. 3Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19 [CDSA].
4. 4Pre-Sentence Report dated February 10, 2026, Exhibit No. 2, at p. 3 [Pre-Sentence Report].
5. 5Ibid., at p. 5.
6. 6Ibid., at p. 4.
7. 7Ibid., at p. 5.
8. 8Ibid.
9. 9Ibid., at p. 6.
10. 10Ibid., at p. 8.
11. 11Letter dated November 26, 2025, from Ministry of the Solicitor General, South West Detention Centre, Exhibit No. 3, p. 2.
12. 12Pre-Sentence Report, at p. 7.
13. 13R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089, 333 C.C.C. (3d) 450 [Lacasse], at para. 1.
14. 14Ibid.
15. 15Ibid., at para. 12.
16. 16Ibid.
17. 17Ibid., at paras. 3-4.
18. 18R. v. M. (C.A.), 1996 CanLII 230 (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500, at p. 567.
19. 19R. v. Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 206, 251 C.C.C. (3d) 293, at para. 43, citing R. v. L. (T.P.), 1987 CanLII 25 (SCC), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309; R. v. M. (C.A.); and R. v. Hamilton (2004), 2004 CanLII 5549 (ON CA), 72 O.R. (3d) 1 (C.A.).
20. 20R. v. Johnson, 2016 ONSC 6656 (S.C.J.), at para. 18. See also R. v. Shropshire, 1995 CanLII 47 (SCC), 1995 SCC 47, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 227, 102 C.C.C. (3d) 193, at p. 249 [cited to S.C.R.]; R. v. D.(D.) (2002), 2002 CanLII 44915 (ON CA), 58 O.R. (3d) 788, [2002] O.J. No. 1061, 163 C.C.C. (3d) 471 (C.A.), at para. 33; and R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, [2019] S.C.J. No. 100, 391 C.C.C. (3d) 309, 444 D.L.R. (4th) [Friesen], at para. 162.
21. 21Pre-Sentence Report, at p. 7.
22. 22Ibid., at p. 8.
23. 23R. v. St. Clair (14 May 2026), Windsor (O.C.J., McGivern J.), at para. 18 [unreported].
24. 24Those cases included R. v. Parranto, 2021 SCC 46, 411 C.C.C. (3d) 1, 463 D.L.R. (4th) 389 [Parranto]; R. v. Loor, 2017 ONCA 696, 2017 CarswellOnt 13875 [Loor]; R. v. Disher, 2020 ONCA 710, 153 O.R. (3d) 88, 396 C.C.C. (3d) 419 [Disher]; R. v. Olvedi, 2021 ONCA 518, 157 O.R. (3d) 583 [Olvedi OCA], leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused (10 March 2022), 2022 CarswellOnt 2946; R. v. Lynch, 2022 ONCA 109, 160 O.R. (3d) 241 [Lynch]; R. v. England, 2024 ONCA 360, 171 O.R. (3d) 401, 437 C.C.C. (3d) 350 [England]; R. v. Hoang, 2024 ONCA 361, 172 O.R. (3d) 97, 437 C.C.C. (3d) 328 [Hoang]; R. v. Sutherland, 2026 ONCA 12, 2026 CarswellOnt 361; R. v. Truong, 2023 ONSC 7518, 2023 CarswellOnt 21293 (S.C.J., Himel J.); R. v. Hamilton, 2024 ONSC 2167, 2024 CarswellOnt 5695 (S.C.J., Goodman J.); and R. v. Owusu, 2024 ONSC 671, 2024 CarswellOnt 2097 (S.C.J., Code J.)
25. 25Parranto, at para. 10, quoting Friesen, at para. 30.
26. 26Parranto, at para. 10.
27. 27Among other things, there is no evidence before me as to any causal connection between an addiction to fentanyl, which Mr. Solinski expressly disavows, and trafficking in fentanyl: see R. v. Cinelli, 2018 ONSC 4983, 2018 CarswellOnt 14427 (S.C.J.), at paras. 30-32.
28. 28Pre-Sentence Report, at p. 6.
29. 29R. v. Lu, 2016 ONCA 479, at para. 9 [Lu]. See generally, R. v. Schramek, 2021 ONSC 436 (S.C.J.), at paras. 71-75.
30. 30Olvedi OCA, at para. 40.
31. 31Loor, at para. 33
32. 32R. v. Parranto, 2021 SCC 46, 411 C.C.C. (3d) 1, 463 D.L.R. (4th) 389 [Parranto], at para. 96.
33. 33Ibid., at para. 98, 100, and 101.
34. 34Ibid., at para. 75.
35. 35Ibid., at para. 79.
36. 36Ibid., at para. 68, where the majority of the Supreme Court reviewed cases ranging from 1,834 pills to 3 kg. of fentanyl.
37. 37Pre-Sentence Report, at p.7.
38. 38Parranto, at para. 98.
39. 39R. v. Vezina, 2017 ONCJ 775 [Vezina], at para. 56. See also Schramek, at para. 72.
40. 40Loor, at para. 50. Loor was described as a “low-level member” of a “small” fentanyl trafficking ring who used a forged prescription to obtain 45 fentanyl patches. His sentence of six years (less credit for presentence custody) was affirmed on appeal. Ibid., at paras. 3-5.
41. 41Lynch, at paras. 14-15 and 24-26. See also England, at para. 99.
42. 42Olvedi OCA, at para. 37.
43. 43Ibid., at para. 60.
44. 44R. v. Owusu, 2024 ONSC 671 (S.C.J., Code J.) [Owusu], at paras. 37-38. See also England, at para. 101.
45. 45Owusu, at para. 42.
46. 46Hoang, at para. 16.
47. 47Ibid., at paras. 71-84.
48. 48See, for example, Olvedi OCA, at para. 57; Lu, at para. 9; Schramek, at paras. 42-44; and Vezina, at paras. 56 and 58.
49. 49Disher, at paras. 27.
50. 50Parranto, at paras. 98 and 100.
51. 51See R. v. Summers, 2014 SCC 26, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 575.
52. 52See R. v. Duncan, 2016 ONCA 754, 2016 CarswellOnt 15975, [2016] O.J. No. 5255, at paras. 5-7.