CITATION: Sandhu v. Dhillon, 2026 ONSC 3371

COURT FILE NO.: FS-21-00000003-0000

DATE: 2026 06 08

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

B E T W E E N:

AKSHPREET KAUR SANDHU

Supriya Joshi, for the Applicant

Applicant

and -

MANINDERPAL SINGH DHILLON

Ritika Narang, for the Respondent

Respondent

SUPPLEMENTARY TRIAL REASONS

Stewart J.

These are supplementary trial reasons to be read in conjunction with the court’s trial reasons released February 2, 2026.

Issue Requiring Supplementary Trial Reasons

The issue requiring supplementary trial reasons is whether 22 Cogswell was the matrimonial home at the time of separation. This factual finding governs whether Mr. Dhillon is entitled to a date of marriage deduction on the equalization calculations.
At trial, Ms. Sandhu admitted that 22 Cogswell was not the matrimonial home, and Mr. Dhillon was therefore entitled to a date of marriage deduction.
The trial reasons refer to 22 Cogswell as the matrimonial home at paragraph 5(e) and paragraph 71.
The parties requested a further attendance to clarify whether the court intended to make a factual finding that 22 Cogswell was the matrimonial home.
The parties were permitted to make additional written submissions.

Positions of the Parties

The parties agree that this issue was not contested at trial. The applicant, Ms. Sandhu, conceded, for the purposes of trial, that 22 Cogswell was not the matrimonial home.
Applicant: Ms. Sandhu argues that her concession that 22 Cogswell was not the matrimonial home at the date of separation was a legal, not factual, concession. Further, she argues that legal concessions can be disregarded by the court, and the facts support a finding that 22 Cogswell was the matrimonial home at the time of separation.
The respondent, Mr. Dhillon, argues that Ms. Sandhu admitted at trial that he should receive the deduction for the house as a pre-marital asset. Further, he argues that there is no evidence which would support a finding that 22 Cogswell was the matrimonial home at the time of separation.

Inadmissible Evidence Disregarded in Supplementary Submissions from Parties

At the request of the court, the parties made supplementary written submissions.
In those supplementary written submissions, both parties referred to information which was not put into evidence at trial. The court disregarded all such information in deciding the supplementary trial issue.

Analysis

For the following reasons, the court finds that 22 Cogswell was not the matrimonial home, and Mr. Dhillon is entitled to a date of marriage deduction.

a. The lack of clarity in the trial reasons language does not change the underlying trial findings.

The trial reasons contain unclear language on the issue of the matrimonial home in two paragraphs.

a. First, in paragraph 5(e), one of the trial issues is framed as: “should the court attribute $132,000 to Mr. Dhillon which are funds he received as a result of refinancing the matrimonial home?” (emphasis added).

b. Second, in paragraph 71, the second sentence states: “Mr. Dhillon bought out his sister so that he and Ms. Sandhu could occupy the matrimonial home without the family tensions described above” (emphasis added).

At no point in the trial reasons is there a finding that 22 Cogswell was the matrimonial home. The court accepts that the wording noted above is unclear and the lack of clarity caused understandable confusion for the parties, but there is no factual finding that 22 Cogswell was the matrimonial home.

b. The applicant’s admission at trial continues to be binding.

During trial, Ms. Sandhu admitted that 22 Cogswell was not the matrimonial home and conceded that Mr. Dhillon was entitled to a date of marriage deduction on his net family property statement.
Mr. Dhillon argues that this admission was binding.
Ms. Sandhu argues that a concession on a question of law does not bind the court.
With respect, Ms. Sandhu’s cases on this point are entirely distinguishable and come from the criminal context.
Ms. Sandhu’s admission that 22 Cogswell was not the matrimonial home was a factual admission. There is no basis to disturb that admission.

c. Even without the applicant’s admission, the court would find against 22 Cogswell being the matrimonial home at the time of separation, based upon all the trial evidence.

The facts demonstrate that 22 Cogswell was not the matrimonial home at the time of separation.
A summary of the facts found at trial are set out below. For clarity, subparagraphs (a) to (g) are for context. The actual factual findings are in the trial reasons.

a. Prior to marriage, Mr. Dhillon co-owned a home with his sister (Ms. Kaur) at 22 Cogswell Avenue in Brampton. (An uncle was also on title for 1% but it is agreed that this was for mortgage purposes, and the uncle did not contribute to the house, nor did he receive any money when he was removed from title).

b. After the parties married in India, they returned to Brampton and Ms. Sandhu moved into the Coswell property. Ms. Kaur, her husband and their child also resided at the property.

c. Ms. Sandhu only learned after moving into 22 Cogswell that Mr. Dhillon and his sister co-owned the house.

d. As a result of alleged violence by Ms. Kaur towards Ms. Sandhu, Ms. Sandhu moved in with a cousin. This occurred in early July 2020. A few days later, she reunited with Mr. Dhillon in their own basement apartment, where they resided until separation on December 19, 2020.

e. 22 Cogswell was listed for sale. An offer was accepted but later fell through. Mr. Dhillon and Ms. Kaur decided that Mr. Dhillon would buy out his sister. The siblings agreed that Ms. Kaur’s equity in the home was $208,000.

f. Ms. Kaur and the uncle came off title in November 2020. Mr. Dhillon remortgaged the house and paid Ms. Kaur $208,000 on or about December 9, 2020.

g. Mr. Dhillon bought out his sister so he and Ms. Sandhu could occupy 22 Cogswell without the family tensions described in the trial reasons.

Despite the trial finding that Mr. Dhillon refinanced the house and purchase his sister’s interest so that the parties could live at 22 Cogswell, there was no evidence given at trial about:

a. Any concrete plan to move from the basement apartment, such as a date when the parties would move from the apartment to 22 Cogswell.

b. The vacancy status of 22 Cogswell: There was no evidence that 22 Cogswell was actually vacant in December 2020. There was no evidence about when (or if) Ms. Kaur and her family had moved out of 22 Cogswell. There was no evidence that the parties had started to move any items back into 22 Cogswell. Indeed, there was no evidence that either party had set foot in 22 Cogswell from early July 2020 to the date of separation.

c. The status of the basement apartment: the parties gave no evidence about when the apartment lease ended and whether the parties had given notice on the lease.

Section 18 of the Family Law Act requires four conditions to be met for a property to qualify as a matrimonial home:

a. One of the spouses must have an interest in the property;

b. The property was ordinarily occupied by both spouses;

c. The joint occupation existed at the time of separation; and

d. The property was occupied as a family residence¹.

Section 18 contemplates that spouses can have more than one matrimonial home at the same time².
Deciding whether a property qualifies as a matrimonial home within the definition of section 18 of the Family Law Act is a fact-specific analysis³.
The court must engage in a flexible and contextual analysis of ordinary occupation⁴. Ordinary occupation does not require constant or continual occupancy, nor does it require occupancy of every square metre⁵.
Where usage is minimal or sporadic, the courts have focussed on the intent of the parties⁶. However, future intent does not factor into the analysis. Section 18(1) requires a determination of ordinary occupation at the time of separation; usage and intention post-separation is irrelevant⁷.
The intention to occupy a home does not make a home a matrimonial home within the meaning of the Family Law Act⁸.
Applying this law to the four factors in section 18 of the Family Law Act:

a. Interest in the property: the first factor, interest in the property, is met. There is no dispute that Mr. Dhillon was a 49% owner of 22 Cogswell until November 2020, when he became a 100% owner.

b. Ordinary occupation: the second factor, ordinary occupation, is not met. The parties were not living at 22 Cogswell on the date of separation. There was no evidence that either party had set foot in the 22 Cogswell property between early July 2020 and the date of separation. Although the court found that Mr. Dhillon had purchased his sister’s interest so that the parties could live at 22 Cogswell without the sister’s family, there was no evidence of any plan to move back to 22 Cogswell. Indeed, there was no evidence if (or when) 22 Cogswell would be vacant. As noted above, intention alone does not make a property a matrimonial home.

c. Joint occupation: the third factor, joint occupation, is not met at the time of separation. Neither party had lived at 22 Cogswell since early July 2020. There is no evidence that the parties lived anywhere except their basement apartment between early July 2020 and the date of separation.

d. Occupation as a family residence: the fourth factor, occupation as a family residence, cannot be met because there was not any occupation of 22 Cogswell by either party.

There are cases in which families own more than one home. Some of these second home scenarios involve families moving between properties and not always living together or occupying a specific property at the same time. This case is entirely distinguishable from those scenarios. Mr. Dhillon and Ms. Sandhu lived in one place between early July and the date of separation: their basement apartment. Other than a generalized intent to go back to 22 Cogswell, there was no plan and no action towards moving back. As noted above, that intent alone does not make 22 Cogswell the matrimonial home.
The court therefore finds that, from July 2020 to the date of separation, the sole matrimonial home was the basement apartment. 22 Cogswell was not, at the date of separation, the matrimonial home.
Therefore, Mr. Dhillon is entitled to the date of marriage deduction.

Calculation of Equalization

The parties advised the court that there is no need for the court to calculate equalization. The parties were agreed on the calculations and simply needed a ruling as to whether 22 Cogswell was the matrimonial home.

Costs

The original trial reasons provided deadlines for costs submissions. These deadlines must be extended to permit the parties to consider these supplementary trial reasons.
The parties are urged to agree on costs. If they will not, written costs submissions will be served, filed and uploaded to Case Centre on the following schedule:

a. Applicant: by June 30, 2026, at 4pm;

b. Respondent: by July 21, 2026, at 4pm.

There is no reply.
These deadlines cannot be varied unless by court order. If submissions are not received by these deadlines, the court will proceed on the basis that costs are not being sought. If costs are settled, the parties are asked to inform the court.
Submissions will be double spaced, in 12-point font, and five pages, maximum (exclusive of offers, authorities and bills of costs).
The submissions and bills of costs will identify any step in the proceeding (including trial) which requires costs to be assessed. The submissions and bills of costs will exclude any step for which costs have already been awarded.

L.B. Stewart J.

Released: June 8, 2026