CITATION: D.V. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2026 ONSC 3316

COURT FILE NO.: CV-25-0051

DATE: 2026-06-17

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

D.V., by his litigation guardian C.L.

Appellant

– and –

Canada (Attorney General)

Respondent

J. Herbert and C. Valiquette, for the Appellant

R. McNamara and C. Tsang, for the Respondent

HEARD at Parry Sound: February 10, 2026

REASONS FOR DECISION ON APPEAL

A.D. KURKE J.

Overview

1D.V. (“D.V.” or the “appellant”) appeals the decision of the Indian Registrar (the “Registrar”) that denied him registration as a Status Indian with Wiikwemkoong Unceded Territory. The appellant had applied pursuant to Bill S-3¹ on the basis that he was not on a Band List before 1951 and his family was omitted from the Band List as a result of sex-based discrimination in law, which began in 1869. The historical basis and legal context of this area of law dictate the usage of words and names that are recognized as offensive and that have now generally been superseded by more appropriate terminology. It is for those reasons that such regrettable terms as “Indian” and “half-breed” shall be employed in this decision, reflecting their continued use in legislation and also by counsel and decision-makers in this arena.

2Legislative definitions of who were “Indians” existed since 1868. In 1869, legislation was enacted that deprived women of Indian status if they “married out” that is, married non-Indian men. In more recent times, legislation has been passed that has attempted to reverse such sex-based discrimination and has permitted re-instatement of descendants of such women on application to the Registrar The appellant’s application was filed on the basis of sub-para. 6(1)(a.3)(i) of the Indian Act (the “Act”), that he is a direct descendant of a person who is, was or would have been entitled to be registered under paragraph 6(1)(a.1) and he was born before April 17, 1985.

3Paragraph 6(1)(a.1) provides entitlement to registration for women who lost status on marriage to a non-Indian man before 1951, and who were accordingly omitted or deleted from the Indian Register, or from a Band List, before September 4, 1951. Sections 6(3) and 11(3) of the Act provide entitlement to registration to children of individuals who would have been entitled to registration if they had not died. By subsection 11(3.1), a person is entitled to have their name entered in a Band List that is maintained in the department for a band if they are entitled to be registered under paragraph 6(1)(a.3) and one of their parents, grandparents or other ancestors was not entitled to be a member of that band immediately before April 17, 1985.

4On the appellant’s application, the Registrar indicated to him by letter dated August 24, 2023 that “the Federal government adopted laws governing who is entitled to registration and band membership only since the year 1868. Consequently, it is impossible for me to confirm that your ancestors who were born and died before 1868 were recognized as Indians.”

5On October 24, 2023, the appellant filed a notice of protest pursuant to s. 14.2 of the Indian Act. The ground of protest was “seeking to add a person or persons names to the Indian Register and/or departmentally maintained Band List, who were omitted due to gender discrimination”. By Final Protest Decision dated May 27, 2025, the Indian Registrar concluded, “I must now advise that, the arguments and points which you raise in your claim are not sufficient to reverse the Registrar’s decision of August 24, 2023. In light of the foregoing, my decision is to not uphold your protest.”

6The appellant asserts in this appeal of that decision palpable and overriding errors of fact and/or mixed fact and law. The appellant argues that the Registrar erroneously assessed the available facts individually and with a disregard for the historical context and its effect on the burden of proof. The appellant further submits that the Registrar erred in applying legislative provisions to the facts of the case.

7For the following reasons, the appeal is allowed.

Facts

Agreed facts

8The parties prepared an agreed statement of facts for this appeal. The applicant has also provided additional facts and there were additional materials referred to by the Registrar. The agreed facts also contain areas of law on which it appears the parties agree.

9D.V. was born in 1944 and applied for registration under the Act on January 11, 2022, claiming to be affected by a now-corrected category of sex-discrimination under the Act. He claimed connection to the Wikwemikong First Nation. Wikwemikong (now Wiikwemkoong; both spellings will be used in these Reasons) is the site of the Holy Cross Mission church, the oldest Catholic church in northern Ontario.

10D.V. traced his descent back to his great-grandmother, Emily Lowe, who was born March 16, 1871, to parents John Lowe and Mary Anne Lowe, née McKeon. Mary Anne McKeon (also referred to in these Reasons simply as “Mary Anne”) was born November 23, 1851, and was baptized the following day in Wiikwemkoong. Mary Anne McKeon’s mother was Marianne Bill.

11Marianne Bill (“Bill”) also had a son, “Francois Bill”, who was baptized on June 6, 1858 in Wiikwemkoong and noted to be “illegitimate.” Francois Bill died January 30, 1859, in Wiikwemkoong. Bill subsequently had a relationship with Jean Baptiste Vasseur, with whom she had at least two children, Adeline and Pauline Vasseur. Bill and Jean Baptiste Vasseur were married at some point before Pauline was born.

12Adeline Roy, née Vasseur, was born in 1867 or 1868, and died January 31, 1944. She married Augustus Osawabine on December 7, 1885. By 1911 Osawabine had died; Adeline was described in the 1911 Algoma census as a “widow.” The same census described Adeline’s “language commonly spoken” as “Indian.” On her death record, Adeline was originally described as “Indian”, which was struck out, and “French” written in its place. Adeline was buried at Wiikwemkoong.

13Pauline Vasseur was born June 16, 1871, and baptized August 20, 1871, at Spanish River Mill.

14Mary Anne McKeon had five known children with John Lowe: Albert, Emily, Charles, Hannah, and William. The Ontario government record of William Lowe’s death indicated that Mary Anne was born in Wiikwemkoong. Albert Lowe, Mary Anne’s oldest son, is described in the 1899 Report on Payments of Robinson Treaty Annuity, Manitowaning Superintendency, as “half-breed, not paid”. Albert Lowe married Genevieve Roque in 1893.

15Wiikwemkoong is the site of the Holy Cross Mission church, the oldest Catholic church in Northern Ontario. The Holy Cross Mission was established in Wiikwemkoong by the Jesuits in or around 1838 and administered to Wiikwemkoong and surrounding Catholic parishes.

16Section 15 of the 1868 An Act providing for the organisation of the Department of the Secretary of State of Canada, and for the management of Indian and Ordnance Lands (the “1868 Act”) set out a definition of “Indian” for the purpose of determining entitlement to hold, use, or enjoy lands and other immoveable property belonging to or appropriated for the use of “various tribes, bands or bodies of Indians in Canada”, as follows:

a. Firstly, All persons of Indian blood, reputed to belong to the particular tribe, band or body of Indians interested in such lands or immoveable property, and their descendants;

b. Secondly, All persons residing among such Indians, whose parents were or are, or either of them was or is, descended on either side from Indians or an Indian reputed to belong to the particular tribe, band or body of Indians interested in such lands or immoveable property, and the descendants of all such persons; And

c. Thirdly, All women lawfully married to any of the persons included in the several classes hereinbefore designated; the children issue of such marriages, and their descendants.

17The 1868 Act permitted a male to confer entitlement to registration on his wife through marriage, while a woman could not do so for her husband.

18On June 22, 1869, An Act for the gradual enfranchisement of Indians, the better management of Indian affairs, and to end the provisions of the Act (the “1869 Act”) received royal assent. The 1869 Act removed an Indian woman’s entitlement to registration if she married a non-Indian man, and it barred their children and future descendants from entitlement to registration.

19In 1951, the Indian Act was amended to establish a centralized Indian Register and created the position of the Indian Registrar, to determine who was entitled to registration pursuant to the definition of “Indian” in the legislation. The Act was reformed in 1985, after passage of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

20Bill C-31 was a first attempt to address sex-based inequities in the Act. Indian women who married non-Indian men no longer lost their entitlement to registration and Indian women who had previously lost entitlement through marriage became eligible to apply for reinstatement, as did their children. Bill C-31 also created separate regimes for control of band membership, and the concepts of registration as an “Indian” and for “band membership” became distinct.

21Decisions of the courts in McIvor v. Canada, 2009 BCCA 153, and Descheneaux c Canada (procureur General), 2015 QCCS 3555 led to further legislative change. Bill S-3 had as a purpose that: “[t]he provisions of the Indian Act that are amended by this Act are to be liberally construed and interpreted so as to remedy any disadvantage to a woman, or her descendants, born before April 17, 1985, with respect to registration under the Indian Act as it read on April 17, 1985, and to enhance the equal treatment of women and men and their descendants under the Indian Act.”

22Section 6(1) of the Act now provides reinstatement to individuals whose names were omitted or deleted from the Indian Register or a Band List due to previous versions of the legislation. So, a person is entitled to be registered if (s. 6(1)(a.1)):

the name of that person was omitted or deleted from the Indian Register, or from a band list before September 4, 1951, under subparagraph 12(1)(a)(iv), paragraph 12(1)(b) or subsection 12(2) or under subparagraph 12(1)(a)(iii)pursuant to an order made under subsection 109(2), as each provision read immediately before April 17, 1985, or under any former provision of this Act relating to the same subject matter as any of those provisions.

23Subsection 6(1)(a.3) provides entitlement to registration for an individual born before 1985 who is a direct descendant of a woman whose name was omitted or deleted from the Indian Register or from a Band List before 1951 due to a marriage that occurred before 1985.

Further facts offered by the appellant

24In the affidavit that accompanied the appellant’s application, he offered further evidence. It is apparent that some at least of that evidence came from the oral tradition in his family. He wrote: “In the years that I knew my father and grandfather, they spoke of our Anishinaabe heritage through Wikwemikong Unceded Territory where we have numerous relations.”

25The appellant traced his family back to Emily Lowe, Mary Anne’s daughter. By her marriage to William Dryburgh, Marion Dryburgh was born, the appellant’s grandmother (1899-1967).

26Mary Anne’s mother, Bill, was born around 1836. Although there were “Bills” living in Wiikwemkoong and in southern Ontario around that time, the evidence was inconclusive as to whether Bill was related to the Wiikwemkoong Bills or the ones identified as “Indian” in southern Ontario. But Bill lived in Wiikwemkoong as a child, and she is recorded as giving birth to Mary Anne when she was 15 years old in Wiikwemkoong on November 23, 1851.

27Mary Anne’s father was listed on the birth record by a single name that was something like “Mkions” and was not indicated as Bill’s spouse.

28Emily Lowe had lost entitlement because her mother Mary Anne McKeon, who had two parents from Wiikwemkoong, had married a white man. “The government referred to Mary Anne McKeon’s children as ‘half breeds’ but without status to pass on.” So, in the 1899 Indian agent Report on payments of Robinson Huron Treaty annuity, Albert Lowe, Mary Anne’s oldest child, is described as a “half-breed”, married to Genevieve Rocque, who was “not paid” an annuity.

29The appellant described Mary Anne as “part of the Wikwemikong Band.” In her baptismal record, Mary Anne’s godfather’s name was recorded as Paul Ominakwat, and her godmother’s as Agathe Kawita Kajigokwe. The appellant believed that Mary Anne’s father’s name was “Mikwans or some similar spelling”, and that the name was anglicized to McKeon by a Jesuit priest at her birth. The name on the record appears to be something like the single name Mkions. He was not indicated as Bill’s spouse. Mary Anne was baptized at Holy Cross church and remained a Roman Catholic. The McKeon surname adopted by Mary Anne may relate to the otherwise unknown name of her father. The appellant noted that there were numerous variations of Mary Anne McKeon’s last name throughout her life on various documents, perhaps reflecting both that it was not actually her father’s name and her own illiteracy.

30An 1861 census document has 9-year-old Mary Anne, Catholic, living in Killarney/Shebahoaning with Charles and Susan Hammond, an area that the applicant believed was now recognized as being part of Wiikwemkoong territory. In 1871, when she was 20, Mary Anne was living in Killarney with husband John Lowe and their 2-year-old child Albert. For the 1881 census, Mary Anne was 30 years old, widowed, and still living at Killarney with her five children: Albert (12), Emily (9), Charles (7), Hannah (5), and William (1).

31The appellant believed that Mary Anne married John Lowe in 1869. She therefore lost entitlement by the 1869 Act and “ceased to be an Indian.” The appellant noted later misattributions of her race or origin as “Scotch” and “French” in records, though she had no Scotch or French heritage.

32Wiikwemkoong was and remains a First Nations reserve located on the eastern portion of Manitoulin Island. It is now known as Wiikwemkoong Unceded Territory, and made up of people of Odawa, Ojibwa and Potawatomi heritage. Before 1862, the local population residing at the Indian village of Wiikwemkoong, other than the Jesuit priests and missionaries, were described as “Indians.”

33When Mary Anne was born, Wiikwemkoong was part of the greater reserve lands which were Manitoulin Island as a whole. This was brought about by the Bond Head Treaty of 1836, described below. At the time, there was no colonial settlement at Wiikwemkoong, nor was land available to settlers on Manitoulin, as the entire island was a reserve. Once the reserve was created, Jesuit missionaries went to Manitoulin to try to proselytize the Ojibwa population, attempting to convert them to Catholicism.

34The Jesuits kept detailed records from about 1838 about the life events, such as birth, baptism, marriage, death, and burials, of First Nations people living in Wiikwemkoong; these records still survive. The Indian Agency did not keep detailed records. Band membership lists were occasionally kept for some bands before 1951, but not systematically until at least 1893, when band information began to become available because of treaty annuity pay lists. However, because Wiikwemkoong was unceded, there were no pay lists in relation to it.

35Census lists for Wiikwemkoong were non-existent before 1869 for Wiikwemkoong. When census records began to be kept after confederation, they were sparse and incomplete.

Concerning Manitoulin treaties

36The Registrar included in materials consulted reference to a “Treaty Research Report: Manitoulin Island Treaties” by Robert J. Surtees (1986). This Report describes that during the period from 1836 to the early 1860s, there were two treaties relating to Manitoulin: the Bond Head treaty of 1836 and the Manitoulin Island Treaty of 1862. The Bond Head treaty set aside the entire island for Indigenous occupation, with the goal of first separating them from “the whites,” and eventually negotiating land cessions for future settlement. The treaty of 1862 provided for land cession and setting aside of five reserves. Wiikwemkoong remains unceded.

37Overall, this research report notes the increasing occupation of Wiikwemkoong by Indigenous bands around 1839 and into the early 1860s when those bands strongly resisted attempts by the government to establish land cessions there. Movement of settlers onto Manitoulin during the early period appears to have been quite limited. From 1836, the Jesuits had begun to establish a presence on Manitoulin, and in 1838, Father J.B. Proulx took up a permanent residence at Wiikwemkoong and performed many baptisms. It seems that there was a different demographic in Wiikwemkoong than at the government settlement of Manitowaning, where the Anglican religion was to be taught by English persons to the First Nations peoples.

The course of the Application and the protest

38D.V. sent his application to the Registrar in January 2022, based on, among other things, his genealogical connection to Emily Lowe, to her mother, Mary Anne McKeon, to Mary Anne’s mother Marianne Bill, and to Mary Anne’s father “Mkions”, all of whom lived at Wiikwemkoong. That lineage does not appear to be challenged. On August 24, 2023, the Registrar wrote to D.V. to advise that his application had been unsuccessful. Specifically, that letter indicated, “the Federal government adopted laws governing who is entitled to registration and band membership only since the year 1868. Consequently, it is impossible for me to confirm that your ancestors who were born and died before 1868 were recognized as Indians.”

39On October 25, 2023, C.V. filed a protest with the Registrar on behalf of her father D.V., pursuant to s. 14.2 of the Act. The ground for protest was “seeking to add a person or persons names to the Indian Register and/or departmentally maintained Band List, who were omitted due to gender discrimination.”

40In December 2023, D.V.’s same-generation cousin K.H. made application for Indian Status to the Registrar, based on a genealogical link to Albert Lowe, a son of Mary Anne McKeon and the brother of Emily Lowe. On January 13, 2025, the Registrar wrote, confirming that K.H. had been granted Indian Status with Wiikwemkoong First Nation. C.V. followed up with a letter arguing that K.H.’s success was further evidence justifying D.V.’s application, given the shared lineage.

41On April 28, 2025, the Registrar wrote to advise C.V. that the Registrar proposed not to uphold D.V.’s protest and provided reasons therefor. This letter invited C.V. to offer any further evidence in support of D.V.’s protest. A final letter of May 27, 2025, formally indicated the Registrar’s decision not to uphold the protest, as “the arguments and points which you raise in your claim are not sufficient to reverse the Registrar’s decision of August 24, 2023.” It is against the protest decision of May 27, 2025 that the appellant appeals.

The reasons for not upholding the protest

42The first Registrar letter dated August 24, 2023, stated that:

a. The Registrar had “conducted an extensive search of the historical records of the department of registered Indians and members of Bands in Canada. I was unable to locate a record of your ancestors.”

b. The letter continued, “In the light of the foregoing and based on the facts presently known, I am unable to conclude that you are entitled to registration as an Indian under the provisions of the current Indian Act. I therefore cannot conclude, from the facts presently known, that you are entitled to registration as an Indian under the provisions of the Indian Act.

I would like also to clarify that the federal government adopted laws governing who is entitled to registration and band membership only since the year 1868. Consequently, it is impossible for me to confirm that your ancestors who were born and died before 1868 were recognized as Indians.”

43The appellant argues that this letter contains several errors with historical dimensions. As s. 6(1)(a.1) of the Act speaks to entitlement for reinstatement for an applicant whose ancestor was a woman whose name was omitted or deleted from the Indian Register or from a Band List before 1951 due to “marrying out”, it was an error in process for the Registrar to seek the names of the appellant’s ancestors in records from which the names had been omitted (as opposed to deleted). Further, the ancestors offered by the appellant had not “died before 1868,” so the Registrar’s claim of impossibility was based on a false premise. Moreover, to look for the name of Mary Anne McKeon on a Band List would in any event be futile, as there were no official Band Lists before the promulgation of the Act in 1951.

44C.V.’s protest on behalf of the appellant of October 24, 2023 was investigated, and a letter to C.V. followed, dated April 28, 2025. This letter was to advise of the results of the investigation and give notice of an upcoming final decision. The letter acknowledged that the protest was based on the desire to add the appellant to the Indian Register and Band List, because of omission due to gender discrimination. This discrimination caused the omission of Emily Lowe and Albert Lowe from the Indian Register because Mary Anne had married out before the creation of the 1951 Indian Registry. The original August 24, 2023 decision letter was referenced in the response of April 28, 2025.

45The decision letter of April 28, 2025 discussed various “points” in the affidavit of the appellant that had formed part of his application:

a. “point 11” involved the assertion that Emily Lowe lost entitlement because her mother, Mary Anne McKeon, who had two Indian parents from the Wikwemikong Band, married a white man. A marriage record indicated Emily Lowe’s parents as John and Mary Lowe;

“point 12” asserted that Albert Lowe was Emily’s older brother, as documented in census records. The Registrar noted that the 1871 census recorded John Lowe as of English origin, wife Marianne was of Scotch origin, and their son Albert of English origin. In the 1881 census, Mary Anne Low was “widowed”, her origin “French”, and children Albert and Emily of English origin;

“point 13” noted Albert Lowe was listed as “half-breed” in an 1899 report relating to payments of the Robinson Huron Treaty Annuity, and asserted that he was so called because his mother had “married out” after the 1869 Act. Because of his status, his wife Genevieve Rogue [sic] was therefore not eligible for treaty payment. A marriage record for Albert Lowe indicated Albert as the son of John Henry Lowe and Mary Ann McKeon, and his marriage to Genevieve Rogue [sic] daughter of Ferdinand Rogue [sic] and Marguerite Recollet on November 28, 1893;

The Registrar concluded this section, “No evidence was identified within our records to establish that Albert Lowe or his parents were Indians as defined by the Indian Act.”

b. “point 14” referred to the claim that Marie Anne McKeon was part of Wikwemikong Band, born of two parents of that band, Marianne Bill and “Mikwans (or some similar spelling)”;

“point 15” notes the claim that a Jesuit priest anglicized Mary Anne’s father’s name to McKeon, and references the baptismal record. The Registrar finds “I…do not concur that this baptismal record alone would be sufficient to determine that Mary McKeon’s name was anglicized from Mikwan.” Rather the Registrar’s view was that the parents’ names were McKion and Marie Anne Bill [emphasis added].

The Registrar went on to state, “I would point out that even if it was determined that Marie Anne McKeon’s father’s name was “Mikwan” his information would not be sufficient to establish that she was defined as an Indian under the provisions of the Indian Act” [emphasis added];

The Registrar’s search through historical and departmental records, census and treaty paylists did not turn up any records identifying a “Mikwan” or “McKeon”. Some family groupings were located under the surnames Migwans, Megwanse, and Wemigwans, but “life events” of these persons did not coincide with those of Marie Anne McKeon, “and we were unable to establish a correlation between them” [emphasis added];

c. The Registrar moved on to evidence of Mary Anne living with Charles and Susan Hammond in the Indian and Metis village of Shebahoaning Killarney. The Registrar corrected the name to Flammand, noting that the family appeared to be of Non-Indian origin. The Registrar indicated that an 1861 census indicated a 9-year-old girl “Mary Ann” living in the “Hammond” household. This girl’s place of birth was given as “Upper Canada” and her religion as “Roman Catholic.” Nothing in the census suggested Indian heritage for her.

d. The Registrar concluded, “Although Mary Anne McKeon was baptized at Holy Cross Mission, this evidence alone is not sufficient to establish that she was from the Wikwemikong Band or that she was defined as an Indian in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Act” [emphasis added];

e. The Registrar went on to consider Mary Anne’s half-sister, Adeline Vasseur. Her marriage to Augustus Osawabine of the Wikwemikong Band, her spoken language given as “Indian” in the 1911 census, her death and burial in Wikwemikong were all noted;

f. In a summary paragraph, the Registrar wrote: For your information, having descent from Indian ancestry does not, in itself, qualify an individual to be entitled to registration under the provisions of the Indian Act and having ancestors who were born or were buried in an Indian cemetery or lived on or near an Indian reserve also does not, in itself, qualify an individual to be eligible for registration under the provisions of the Indian Act. As entitlement to registration is based on direct descent, having a sibling who may have acquired Indian status through marriage, does not allow that individual to pass status to their siblings. According to the evidence provided, we have searched our records, and it was not possible to identify any of your father’s ancestors as persons who are or were recognized as Indians in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Act or entitled to registration [emphasis added].

46In the final letter of May 27, 2025, the Registrar addressed the appellant’s concern that his cousin K.H. had been granted status, relying on her relationship to the same Indian ancestor as had D.V., though D.V.’s application had not been successful. D.V. was descended from Emily Lowe, while K.H. was descended from Albert Lowe, two children of Mary Anne.

47The Registrar indicated that K.H.’s success was due to K.H.’s descent from Margaret Roque née Recollet, the mother-in-law of Albert Lowe. Margaret Roque was not therefore a blood ancestress of Emily Lowe or D.V., and K.H.’s registration was therefore not relevant to D.V.’s application.

48The Registrar then went on to reject the relevance of the designation of Albert Lowe as “half-breed, not paid,” and D.V.’s description of Albert as “non-treaty Indian,” a term of art in the Indian Act. The Indian Registrar referred to the definition of “half-breed” in the Indian Act, apparently spoken of in terms of those “half-breeds” living in Manitoba who were not entitled to be considered “Indian” because of having shared in the distribution of “half-breed lands.” According to the Indian Registrar, Albert was therefore excluded from being considered an Indian.

49The Registrar noted that the “the arguments and points which you raise in your claim are not sufficient to reverse the Registrar’s decision of August 24, 2023” and “my decision is not to uphold your protest.”

Standard of review

50This appeal is brought pursuant to s. 14.3 of the Indian Act. The administrative decision made by the Registrar is to be assessed on an appellate basis, involving palpable and overriding error regarding questions of fact, and correctness regarding questions of law, including statutory interpretation: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, at paras. 17 and 37; Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235.

51The obligation of the Registrar is to “get it right” in determining questions of entitlement to registration, and the Registrar’s decision is subject to appeal to this court. The power exercised by the Registrar is not a discretionary one, and no special expertise is exercised by the Registrar in determining entitlement. Accordingly, no deference is owed to the decisions of the Registrar: Gehl v. Canada (Attorney General), 2017 ONCA 319 (“Gehl”), at paras. 84-87.

Issues relating to the burden of proof

52The burden of proof is a balance of probabilities: Wilson v. Canada (Indian Registry, Registrar), 1999 CanLII 5333 (BC SC), [1999] B.C.J. No. 2510 (QL), at para. 26. However, this standard of proof applies to the ultimate issues in the case, and not to the determination of individual facts. The ultimate issues here were whether D.V.’s ancestors were entitled to be registered as Indians and on a Band List but were omitted from Indian Register or a Band List prior to September 4, 1951.

No allowance for gaps in the historical record

53The affidavit evidence provided by the appellant, if accepted, appears sufficient on its own to establish the appellant’s right to be registered. He points to Mary Anne McKeon as born of two Indian members of Wikwemikong Band and shows how she came to lose her status by marrying out to John Lowe. Being “reputed to belong to the particular tribe, band or body of Indians”, and of Indian descent are both described. On Mary Anne’s birth, she would have been entitled to registration by the definitions that applied before the 1869 Act.

54But the August 2023 response indicated that the Registrar was unable to locate records of the appellant’s ancestors and therefore could not conclude that the appellant was entitled to registration. Given that marrying out after the 1869 Act cost Indian women their status, Mary Anne McKeon’s omission from the Registrar’s records is hardly surprising. But that response also implies a complete disregard of the appellant’s evidence from his family’s oral history.

55It appears that the Registrar was unwilling to accept the evidence offered by the appellant, evidence of an oral history passed down by his father and grandmother, unless it was confirmed by evidence in the Registrar’s possession. The Registrar stated:

“According to the evidence provided, we have searched our records, and it was not possible to identify any of your father’s ancestors as persons who are or were recognized as Indians in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Act or entitled to registration.”

56In essence, this passage indicates a manner of proceeding that discounts family history unless the evidence is otherwise available in the Registrar’s records. Such a manner of proceeding runs counter to the expansive and purposive spirit of the legislation that seeks to make right past inequities inflicted on Indigenous women. An Act to amend the Indian Act in response to the Superior Court of Quebec decision in Descheneaux c. Canada (Procureur général), S.C. 2017, c. 25, s. 9, states:

The provisions of the Indian Act that are amended by this Act are to be liberally construed and interpreted so as to remedy any disadvantage to a woman, or her descendants, born before April 17, 1985, with respect to registration under the Indian Act as it read on April 17, 1985, and to enhance the equal treatment of women and men and their descendants under the Indian Act.

57No accommodation and no remediation are offered by the outright refusal of the Registrar to accord any weight to a family’s oral history about historical, excluded people. In Gehl, concerning the difficulty of proving historical facts, the Court of Appeal wrote, concerning the issue of paternity, but applicable to all assessments of historical evidence (at para. 52):

The imposition of a relatively strict burden of proving paternity may well be appropriate to circumstances arising after 1985, when the new regime came into force and after the iniquities of the prior regime had been eliminated. However, it is unreasonable to apply that same burden to Dr. Gehl’s circumstances in relation to a birth that occurred 50 years prior to the amendments and to individuals who had been unjustly deprived of status.

58As I will discuss below, this is also a case of unknown paternity, as was the Gehl decision. And how much more appropriately does the reasoning in that passage apply to events in this case, in which relevant events occurred some 130 years before the “new regime” arising after 1985? This case involves the assessment of facts that occurred starting around 1851, the year that Mary Anne was born. The appellant assembled various records to give bones to the flesh of the narrative told in his family, but how far can such facts go in circumstances of Mary Anne McKeon, the Indigenous ancestor about whom the applicant knew the most, but who, on his understanding, had been deprived of status by marrying out?

59In such circumstances, it is necessary to grant some allowance for the difficulty of establishing the Indian status of D.V.’s ancestors and their connection to Wiikwemkoong Band if the direction to accord liberal construction and interpretation is to be given teeth. It would be unreasonable to apply the strict burden of proof to events recorded more than 170 years in the past, when an applicant is seeking to claim a status that was lost to his ancestor “because of the iniquitous provisions of the pre-1985 Act:” Gehl, at para. 52.

60When there are few, if any, official records, the requirement to prove support from such records before granting the relief sought by an applicant, imposes what can amount to an impossible burden of proof on Indigenous persons, and those descendants of Indigenous persons who are seeking to vindicate their status by the examination of historical events. Assigning weight only to official records must consistently undervalue the oral traditions of the families of the descendants of those who suffered unfair treatment based on their gender. Those traditions may sometimes offer the only full narrative of the circumstances of an ancestor who has lost status: see, ee.g., Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1977), 1997 CanLII 302 (SCC), 153 D.L.R. (4^th) 193 (S.C.C.), at pp. 232, 236; Wilson, at paras. 27-30.

61The respondent argues that focus on the August 24, 2023 decision letter is misplaced, as it does not represent the final word of the Registrar. Respectfully, I cannot agree. At the conclusion of the Registrar’s literal final words on this subject, the decision letter of May 27, 2025 to C.V., the Registrar concludes:

As you have not submitted any additional evidence concerning the entitlement of your father’s ancestors, I must now advise that, the arguments and points which you raise in your claim are not sufficient to reverse the Registrar’s decision of August 24, 2023. In light of the foregoing, my decision is not to uphold your protest.

62The August 24, 2023 letter is incorporated by reference in the final decision. By its terms, it looked for evidence where little could be found or could even be expected to be found. Mary Anne McKeon had been arguably omitted from Band Lists, if any even existed at the time, as a result of marrying out. Nevertheless, the Registrar formed a preliminary conclusion based on her omission from the Registrar’s sources, and the Registrar confirmed that initial conclusion without due regard to the appellant’s evidence and the unsurprisingly sparse references to Mary Anne McKeon in surviving “official” sources.

63It is my view that the Registrar committed palpable and overriding error by not attributing any weight to the evidence provided by the appellant in his affidavit that accompanied his application, except insofar as it stemmed from independent documents attached to that affidavit that confirmed evidence already in the possession of the Registrar. Such a manner of proceeding will necessarily further perpetuate the injustice inflicted on the appellant’s female ancestors by imposing a burden on historical evidence about Indigenous people that such evidence cannot meet and runs counter to the spirit of s. 9 of An Act to amend the Indian Act in response to the Superior Court of Quebec decision in Descheneaux c. Canada (Procureur général), S.C. 2017, c. 25.

Error in applying the burden to individual facts

64Such a devaluation of the appellant’s evidence is only compounded by the Registrar’s treatment of individual facts that are substantiated in the documentation offered by the appellant in support of his claim. The facts are not permitted to express their collective force but are rather considered and dismissed individually by the Registrar. So, in the decision letter of April 28, 2025, the Registrar hives off individual points from the evidence provided by D.V. and explains that those individual points do not establish individual facts. Thus, for example, the Registrar explains that a baptismal record alone does not establish that Mary Anne’s name was anglicized from an Indigenous name by a Jesuit priest.

65Again and again, the decision letter of April 28, 2025 dismissed individual facts as not establishing the issues that required determination. So:

a. if Mary Anne’s father’s name was “Mikwan”, that would not “establish” that she was defined as an Indian under the Act;

b. Although there was evidence found of Indigenous families under the surnames Migwans, Megwanse, and Wemigwans, “life events” of these persons did not coincide with those of Mary Anne McKeon, “and we were unable to establish a correlation between them” [emphasis added];

c. “Although Mary Anne McKeon was baptized at Holy Cross Mission, this evidence alone is not sufficient to establish that she was from the Wikwemikong Band or that she was defined as an Indian in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Act” [emphasis added];

d. “For your information, having descent from Indian ancestry does not, in itself, qualify an individual to be entitled to registration under the provisions of the Indian Act and having ancestors who were born or were buried in an Indian cemetery or lived on or near an Indian reserve also does not, in itself, qualify an individual to be eligible for registration under the provisions of the Indian Act.

66But why should those facts be required to bear the ultimate burden of proof in and of themselves? What have to be established by D.V. in his application are not individual facts, but rather that he is descended from an ancestor of Indian blood who is reputed to belong to a particular band, and that ancestor was unfairly deprived of status for a reason based on gender discrimination, as set out in the Act. It is only the ultimate issues that need to be established on the balance of probabilities, and this should only be determined on the cumulative effect of all of the evidence in the case.

67In Etches v. Canada (Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (Registrar)) (2008), 2008 CanLII 8610 (ON SC), 89 O.R. (3d) 599 (Sup. Ct.), at para. 62, Forestell J., citing R. v. Morin, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 57, at para. 170, in a case involving an appeal from a decision of the Registrar refusing to restore Indian status to an applicant, held that it was “an error to apply the burden of proof to each individual item of evidence rather than to the whole of the evidence as it imposes a more onerous burden on the party.” In the Ontario Court of Appeal, the decision in Etches was overturned, but on a different issue: Etches v. Canada (Indian and Northern Affairs), 2009 ONCA 182, at paras. 16-17.

68A decision-maker’s duty to consider the facts in their totality rather than piecemeal in order to determine their collective force is familiar in the law. So, in R. v. Jacques, 1996 CanLII 174 (SCC), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 312, at paras. 25-26, Gonthier J. for the majority of the Supreme Court spoke of the need to assess an arresting officer’s reasonable cause to arrest by looking to a “constellation of objectively discernible facts” and “viewing the facts and circumstances as a whole, rather than isolating each in turn”, for the “whole is greater than the sum of the individual parts viewed individually.”

69The issue is stated with no less force in the immigration context. Some authorities discuss this principle as considering the evidence in individual silos, rather than collectively, thus depriving the evidence of the force of the whole picture that it offers altogether:

a. Thus, in Demirtas v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 302, at para. 27, the court found fault with the decision below in that “[t]he various pieces of evidence were considered in separate silos, and without consideration for how each piece fit into the overall narrative”;

b. In Warnakusooriy v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 830, at para. 1, the court observed: “To examine core evidence in a case, piecemeal, each part out of context, not as part of an entirety, is as if a decision-maker examined a forest by looking at each tree and omitted to see the forest as a whole, thus missing the big picture”;

c. In Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Karshe, 2024 FC 1743, at para. 23, the court considered it “unreasonable” for a tribunal to consider “key pieces of evidence in isolation and [fail] to consider the cumulative effect of circumstantial evidence”.

70In proceeding as they did, by assessing whether individual facts “established” a particular point, the Registrar erroneously isolated and then eliminated individual facts from the equation instead of considering their collective force. In so doing, the Registrar committed palpable and overriding error by placing an untenable burden on individual pieces of evidence and then dismissing them individually from consideration, rather than considering them collectively and determining whether their collective whole could satisfy the appellant’s burden: Etches (S.C.J.), at para. 65.

“Mkions” the unknown ancestor

71Section 5(6) of the Act states:

If a parent, grandparent or other ancestor of a person in respect of whom an application is made is unknown – or is unstated on a birth certificate that, if the parent, grandparent or other ancestor were named on it, would help to establish the person’s entitlement to be registered – the Registrar shall, without being required to establish the identity of the that parent, grandparent or other ancestor, determine, after considering all of the relevant evidence, whether that parent, grandparent or other ancestor is, was or would have been entitled to be registered. In making the determination, the Registrar shall rely on any credible evidence that is presented by the applicant in support of the application or that the Registrar otherwise has knowledge of and shall draw from it every reasonable inference in favour of the person in respect of whom the application is made.

72The appellant submits that Mary Anne McKeon is of uncertain or unknown paternity, and that therefore this provision applies in the circumstances of this case. The respondent points to the “Mkions” named on Mary Anne McKeon’s birth record and submits that s. 5(6) does not apply, as Mary Anne McKeon’s father is “known:” he has a name. The respondent further submits that this issue was not raised before the Registrar and should not be given traction on appeal.

73As a general rule, an appellate court will not consider entirely new issues on appeal: Peter B. Cozzi Professional Corporation v. Szot, 2020 ONCA 397, at para. 42. On a statutory appeal under s. 14.3 of the Indian Act, the court’s jurisdiction is to consider matters that were before the Registrar, and affirm, vary or reverse the Registrar’s decision or refer the matter back for reconsideration: Indian Act, s. 14.3(3) and (5); Tuplin v. Canada (Indian and Northern Affairs), 2001 PESCTD 89, at para. 24.

74The respondent argues that “Mary Anne McKeon’s parentage is both known and stated on her baptismal record.” D.V.’s application was premised, argues the respondent, on the basis of Mary Anne McKeon’s parents being known. In his affidavit, D.V. states that Mary Anne was born of two parents in the Wiikwemkoong Band, Marianne Bill and a man recorded as “Mikwans (or some similar spelling).”

75So, is this a case of known parentage, and is this issue to be disregarded as an entirely new issue raised for the first time on appeal?

76D.V. was entitled to present as ancestors for consideration as many persons as might fit the definition of “Indians” in the Indian Act both for consideration individually and for what they proved about other ancestors. He did so. Mary Anne McKeon’s parents were stated in D.V.’s affidavit to be Indians of the Wiikwemkoong Band. The name on the baptismal record has allowed for no identification of a living person, though we know he must have been one. It is to argue form over substance to assert that Mary Anne McKeon’s father is known because a nearly indecipherable name was written by someone on a birth record. Suppose what was written on that document was “Jones”, rather than “Mkions”, and nothing could be determined about “Jones”. Would this still be a matter for debate? It is readily apparent that Mkions is “unknown” to available history, even though a name is given on a birth record.

77But is this an entirely new issue on appeal? Far from it. Indeed, this Mkions was explicitly referred to in the supporting affidavit of the appellant in his application. D.V. suggested that this name was altered into an English name by a Jesuit priest, but that it may relate to such an Indigenous name as “Migwans”, a name known in the Wiikwemkoong area.

78Nor was the Registrar misled by any assertion that an unknown ancestor was not germane in the circumstances of the case. The Certified Record of the Registrar on this appeal, and in particular the “Protest Research Record” at Tab 7, demonstrate that Registrar investigators devoted substantial attention to attempting to track down a relevant Migwans or Megwance/Megwanse, only to come up empty-handed. Of the certified record of the Indian Registrar put before this court, at least Tabs 7.18, 7.19, 7.20, 7.21, 7.21A, 7.21B, 7.21C, 7.22, 7.23, 7.24, 7.28 relate to extensive searches among persons and families with these names by Registrar staff. The Protest Research Record describes extensive searches made to identify “Mikwans” at pages 115-117. The unknown ancestor was clearly already a live issue for the Registrar.

79On the finding that should have been made, that Mkions is an “unknown” ancestor in the assessment of whether he and his descendants are entitled to be registered, the Registrar is directed by the legislation to: “rely on any credible evidence that is presented by the applicant in support of the application or that the Registrar otherwise has knowledge of and shall draw from it every reasonable inference in favour of the person in respect of whom the application is made.” It is significant that the inferences spoken of in s. 5(6) relate to “any credible evidence that is presented by the applicant in support of the application or that the Registrar otherwise has knowledge of.” That is, the inferences do not only relate to evidence about the unknown ancestor.

80I have already discussed why I believe that the Registrar committed palpable and overriding error with respect to their manner of dealing with the evidence and the burden of proof on the appellant’s application. First, the Registrar failed to give independent weight to the oral family history evidence offered up by the appellant in the affidavit that accompanied his application. Second, the Registrar failed to make determinations based on the totality of the evidence, but instead considered the evidence piecemeal, and thereby deprived it of its collective force. In so doing, the Registrar applied too onerous a burden to individual pieces of evidence, essentially making it impossible for the appellant to prove his case on the proofs that he had assembled.

81In the Gehl decision, the concurring judges held (at paras. 73-75) that it was error to disregard what could be determined about an unknown ancestor, when that ancestor’s identity is unknowable by the passage of time and superfluous given s. 5(6). Circumstantial evidence was capable of supporting the necessary inference. A claimant need only provide “some evidence capable of giving rise to an inference” that an unknown ancestor may have had status, in the absence of evidence to the contrary: see Gehl, at para. 75. Importantly, s. 5(6) directs the Registrar, where multiple reasonable inferences are available, to draw out those in favour of an applicant.

82The Registrar did not proceed in this fashion. In failing to apply this principle as directed by the legislation to the facts at hand, the Registrar made a palpable and overriding error of mixed fact and law.

Assessment of facts and inferences

83For the appellant to succeed in his application, he needed to show: that Mary Anne McKeon was of Indian (Indigenous) blood; was reputed to belong to the Wiikwemkoong band, or that she resided among such Indians, and her parents were one or both Indians or descended on either side from Indians or an Indian reputed to belong to the Wiikwemkoong band; and, that she lost status by “marrying out,” and thereby deprived Emily Lowe and her descendants, including the appellant, of status and band enrollment.

84What facts should the Registrar have considered in their totality in making determinations in this case? In my view, those facts should include the following:

a. Of great importance but hardly noted by the Registrar was the historical fact that, other than the Jesuit missionaries, the population of Wiikwemkoong at the time of Mary Anne’s birth, by the Bond Head Treaty were largely Indigenous. The most reasonable inference in favour of the applicant from this is that the appellant’s named ancestors in Wiikwemkoong, Bill and Mkions, were Indigenous, as he claimed. In the words of Gehl, the appellant had provided evidence capable of giving rise to an inference that Mkions had status;

b. Bill was born and grew up at Wiikwemkoong, at least until the age of 15 when she gave birth to Mary Anne. It is reasonable to infer that Bill, Mary Anne’s mother, had status and was associated with Wiikwemkoong;

c. There is evidence of others with the surname “Bill” living in Wiikwemkoong at the time when Manitoulin was a reserve and some identified as “Indian” living in southern Ontario. A reasonable inference is that a female Bill living on Manitoulin at the time of the Bond Head Treaty would be of Indigenous blood;

d. Multiple ancestors had lived on reserve lands at Wiikwemkoong on Manitoulin;

e. The appellant’s direct ancestor, Mary Anne McKeon, and many others in that family, were born on reserve lands in the “Indian Village” of Wiikwemkoong;

f. Ancestors of D.V., including Bill, Mary Anne McKeon, Pauline and Adeline Vasseur, and Francois Bill, had lived for some period of time on the reserve in Wiikwemkoong after their birth and during their childhood;

g. Mary Anne was baptised at Wiikwemkoong. By their names, her godparents appear to have been Indigenous, and from Wiikwemkoong, given the unique Catholic status of Wiikwemkoong. It is reasonable to infer a strong connection between the Indigenous godparents and Bill and/or Mkions which allows a reasonable inference that Bill and Mkions had strong community ties to Wiikwemkoong;

h. In childhood, Mary Anne settled in Killarney/Shebahoaning, an area with historical ties to Wiikwemkoong, and remained there for much of her life;

i. Mary Anne’s sisters Adeline and Pauline Vasseur attended school in Wiikwemkoong. A reasonable inference in the appellant’s favour is that they were Indigenous, and receiving the training in a residential school for which such schools were notorious;

j. Mary Anne’s brother Francois Bill and her sister, Adeline Vasseur, were buried at Wiikwemkoong, at very different ages, in very different circumstances, and many decades apart. Mary Anne’s family association to Wiikwemkoong supports her own connection to that band. These facts demonstrate a multi-generational, decades-long connection by Mary Anne’s family to Wiikwemkoong, a community important to this family at birth, in life, and at death;

k. Adeline, Mary Anne’s sister, married Augustus Osawabine of Wiikwemkoong Band. This fact reasonably supports an inference that Bill’s and her daughter Mary Anne’s family were closely associated to Wiikwemkoong and lived among and were accepted by the Indigenous population there;

l. Adeline spoke “Indian”, a language she likely learned from her mother, “Bill”, who was also Mary Anne’s mother. That at least is an available reasonable inference in favour of the appellant;

m. Adeline Vasseur was indicated as “Indian” and speaking the “Indian” language on her death certificate. While one reasonable inference is that Adeline gained this status by marrying Augustus Osawabine, a more likely reasonable inference, in favour of the applicant, is that her death certificate recognized the reality of her mother Bill’s language, her own life and the language she spoke;

n. Albert Lowe, a child of Mary Anne and John Lowe, was indicated as a “half breeds” by government agents. A reasonable inference in the applicant’s favour is that this designation derives from Mary Anne marrying out, leading to the loss of status of her children. The Registrar’s suggestion that this somehow relates to “half-breeds” in Manitoba, the only use of the word in the Act, is not reasonable. Unfortunately, the word also carried an ugly popular connotation and did not only exist in the Act. Albert had no connection to Manitoba on evidence that was before the Registrar;

o. The possible identification of “Mkions” as Migwans, as suggested by the appellant, or as Megwanse/Megwance, is corroborated by the existence of other such family names at Wiikwemkoong, even if no known male of such a family could be identified as Mary Anne’s father. A reasonable inference is that “Mkions” represents a yet unknown member of one of these families, a child of Wiikwemkoong, and therefore of Indigenous blood;

p. There is no evidence offered by either party of non-Indian males with a name like McKeon in the same area who could be looked to as a non-Indigenous parent of Mary Anne.

85Bill and “Mkions” were the parents of Mary Anne McKeon, and were present in Wiikwemkoong when the population was mostly Indigenous or Jesuit. A Jesuit origin for either of them can be readily dismissed. Bill grew up there and gave birth there to Mary Anne McKeon. The family lived among Indigenous people there and closely associated with them. Bill and Mkions could find Indigenous godparents for Mary Anne in the Catholic church, a religion associated with Wiikwemkoong at the time. Bill had another child Francois who died young and was buried in Wiikwemkoong, and Bill’s other daughters went to school in Wiikwemkoong, showing that Mary Anne’s mother Bill was still associated to Wiikwemkoong. Mary Anne’s half-sister married an Indigenous man from Wiikwemkoong. That woman, Adeline Vasseur, spoke “Indian”, lived her life in Wiikwemkoong, and was considered on a death record to be “Indian.” It appears likely that she did not acquire those traits from Jean Baptiste Vasseur. Mary Anne spent some time in her childhood and adulthood in the Wiikwemkoong territory of Killarney/Shebahoaning, still identifying as Catholic, a religion acquired by having been born and spending time in Wiikwemkoong. Mary Anne’s son and daughter Albert and Emily were considered “half-breeds”, because their mother Mary Anne had given up her status by marrying out to John Lowe after the 1869 Act came into force.

86Although individual facts and people can be isolated and discounted, the totality of the circumstances of the family history of Bill, “Mkions”, Mary Anne, and Emily Lowe, with the facts that can be established in Jesuit or government records, must not be ignored. With the sparse records relating to a forgotten age and disestablished persons, examining and assessing the composite family connections to Indigeneity and Band status provides a more comprehensive picture and creates a context for the issue of “reputed to belong.” Mary Anne McKeon was part of a family with deep roots as Indigenous persons in an Indigenous enclave and associated to Wiikwemikong. Some leeway must be given for the historical nature of the exercise, and some respect for the oral tradition in D.V.’s family, as corroborated by the facts discoverable in government and Jesuit records. Section 5(6) of the Act requires that reasonable inferences be drawn from the evidence in favour of the appellant.

87The evidence from D.V., as confirmed and corroborated by the documents assembled and provided to the Registrar, is capable of proving, on the balance of probabilities, that Bill, Mkions, and Mary Anne McKeon (before she married out) were all “Indians”, and that they and their immediate families were closely associated to Wiikwemkoong Unceded Territory. That decades-long close association, in its historical context, generates an inference that Mary Anne and her family were “reputed to belong” to the Wiikwemkoong Band. Albert Lowe’s status as a “half-breed” offers support for the appellant’s argument that Mary Anne lost status for herself and her children by her marriage to John Lowe. That “half-breed” status would have been shared, for the same reason and with the same effect, by Emily Lowe, the appellant’s ancestor.

Conclusion

88By s. 14.3(4) of the Indian Act, this court has the authority to affirm, vary or reverse the decision of the Registrar, or refer it back for further consideration.

89This court owes no deference to the Registrar; in this matter, the court possesses the same jurisdiction as the Registrar. On the totality of these facts, including the facts provided by the appellant of his family’s oral history, as confirmed and given context by facts recorded in historical documents, and the reasonable inferences that these facts generate in favour of the appellant in the circumstances of Mary Anne McKeon’s unknown father, I can see no reason to send this matter back to the Registrar for determination.

90Marianne Bill, Mkions, and Mary Anne McKeon themselves were probably Indigenous and probably reputed to belong to the Wiikwemkoong Band. Given the age of the facts at issue, the court cannot expect to receive more or more solid facts than these to make out the appellant’s claim. Mary Anne McKeon probably lost her status by marrying out to John Lowe after the promulgation of the 1869 Act, as evidenced by Albert Lowe’s classification as “half-breed” by the government.

91By ss. 6(1)(a.3)(i), 6(3) and 11(3) of the Act, D.V.’s grandparents, parents and himself would be entitled to be registered as Indians and into the same Band Lists as Emily Lowe, Mary Anne’s daughter and D.V.’s ancestor, had she not been deprived of her status by Mary Anne McKeon, her mother, having married out.

92For the above reasons, this court orders that D.V. be registered as an “Indian” and added to the Band List for the Wiikwemkoong Unceded Territory.

The Honourable Justice A.D. Kurke

Released: June 17, 2026

CITATION: D.V. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2026 ONSC 3316

Footnotes

1. 1Bill S-3, An Act to amend the Indian Act in response to the Superior Court of Quebec decision in Descheneaux c. Canada (Procureur général), S.C. 2017, c.25.