Court File and Parties
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO
RE: R. v. JUANITA CHAKASIM
R. V. ANDREW LEE JOHNSTON
BEFORE: S.F. Dunphy J.
COUNSEL: Tania Monteiro, for the Appellant Crown
Jonathan Rudin, Maxwell Hill for the Defendants/Respondents on appeal
HEARD at Toronto: January 14, 2026
REASONS FOR DECISION – SCA SENTENCING
1I heard the Crown’s appeal on sentence in the above two cases which raised essentially identical issues on January 14, 2026. At the conclusion of the hearing, I granted the Crown’s appeal on both cases and substituted the parties’ joint sentencing submission for the sentence imposed by the Justice B. Jones for reasons to follow. These are those reasons.
The decisions appealed from
2Ms. Chakasim appeared before Justice Jones in Gladue Court in Toronto on March 28, 2025 on two charges of assault. At the commencement of the hearing, Ms. Chakasim’s counsel indicated her client’s intention to plead guilty and asked for time to consult further. The matter was adjourned to permit her to do so. After consulting with counsel, the court was advised that she intended to enter a guilty plea on her own to two counts of assault and that counsel would assist on sentencing. Following a plea inquiry, a guilty verdict was entered. Crown and defence both addressed the court on their agreed sentence proposal outlining the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Following this, Jones J. delivered oral reasons. After finding “I do not have any difficulty with the joint submission”, he nevertheless indicated “I intend to lessen it” and proceeded to give reasons for doing so without seeking or receiving any submissions from either counsel on the legal test for doing so or the grounds he intended to rely upon. In the result, the amount of pre-sentence custody applied to the charges was reduced, the length of probation was shortened and the terms of probation were altered. On March 31, 2025, Jones J. delivered supplemental reasons in writing explaining why he did not accept the joint submission of the parties: R. v. Chakasim, 2025 ONCJ 171.
3The following day (April 1, 2025) the matter of R. v. Andrew Johnston came before Jones J. on six charges (not including charges agreed to be withdrawn following the guilty plea). The charges included trespass, break and enter, failure to comply probation, fraudulent use of a credit card, theft and assault. Once again, a plea inquiry was taken before the guilty plea was entered. Once again submissions by Crown and defence were received in relation to the joint submission on sentence. Mr. Johnston addressed the court directly as well.
4Jones J. did not inform either party that he proposed to depart from the jointly recommended sentence which his reasons described as “completely reasonable”. Instead, he said “in fact, in my assessment you have been in jail probably far too long for this; I know the conditions at the South are very difficult”. No evidence regarding such conditions or their impact upon this detainee had been provided. He attributed only a portion of the pre-sentence custody to the charges before him based on the “conditions there” where time served “really … is worth even more”.
5Both offenders had lengthy criminal records, including for similar offences, which were before the court. Ms. Chakasim had 32 prior convictions on her record, 12 of which were for various forms of assault, 4 of which involved uttering threats and 7 of which were failure to comply with court orders. Mr. Johnston’s record contained more than thirty prior convictions as well. Both offenders had other charges before the court that were withdrawn by the Crown in addition to the charges for which a plea and joint sentencing submission were made.
Analysis and discussion of legal errors and consequences
6While it is trite law that the decisions of a sentencing judge are entitled to appellate deference (R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64), no such deference is due where, as here, legal error has been identified which clearly had a material impact upon the sentencing decision.
7There is an unbroken line of cases which underscores the considerable value placed upon the plea bargaining process. This plays a key role in enabling a criminal justice system that is seemingly in a permanent state of crisis nevertheless to meet its constitutional obligation of affording to each person charged the right to trial within a reasonable time.
8In R. v. Anthony-Cook, 2016 SCC 43, Moldaver J., writing for the Court, noted that “resolution discussions between Crown and defence counsel are not only commonplace in the criminal justice system, they are also essential” (at para. 1). Anthony-Cook involved a subset of resolution discussions being joint submissions on sentence in exchange for the accused entering a plea of guilty. The Court found that while a trial judge may depart from joint submissions, the trial judge in that case erred in applying a “fitness of sentence” test instead of considering the test of whether the proposed sentence “would bring the administration of justice into disrepute” (at para. 3-5).
9The defence urged me to find that Anthony-Cook is simply of no application to the facts of either case before me. It was suggested that in the present cases, the joint submissions did not reflect a “real” quid pro quo since both offenders were in a time served situation and were agreeing only to get released quickly.
10Hindsight reasoning is always a slippery slope because the lure of finding that what did in fact happen was always inevitable is hard to resist. The jointly negotiated agreement on sentence preceded the actual entry of a guilty plea in both cases before me even if the likely fact of resolution was announced in advance (as it was in Chakasim at least).
11There is no guilty plea until the plea is received and accepted in the manner stipulated by the Criminal Code. Crown and defence had negotiated and agreed to a joint submission on sentence before any plea was entered in both cases. The sentencing arrangements in both cases involved the Crown withdrawing charges. The fact that the Crown agreed in both cases to a suspended sentence with time served does not imply that there was some objective standard of “time served” that could be determined with precision and was known to all in advance. The Crown accepting a “time served” sentence in both cases was necessarily a “package deal” that included an assessment of the fitness of the entire proposed sentence including probation both as to terms and duration and the full allocation of pre-sentence custody to sentence in the case of two offenders with lengthy records of prior offences that may well require assessment in future cases should that arise.
12I was pointed to the case of R. v. Wesley, 2025 ONCA 51, where the Court of Appeal found that the “high threshold” for departing from a joint submission established in Anthony-Cook does not apply in the case of joint sentencing submissions made following a conviction at trial. This case is not analogous because of course the guilty pleas taken in both of the cases before me were taken only after the agreement on a joint sentencing submission was reached. Anthony-Cook is on all fours with the present appeals and the policy considerations there apply with equal force here. Furthermore, the Court of Appeal in Wesley found that that protection afforded negotiated arrangements by Anthony-Cook did not apply post-conviction the “requirements to notify counsel of any concerns, afford counsel the opportunity to address those concerns, and, if not satisfied, provide clear and cogent reasons for departing from the joint recommendation” provide adequate protection. None of those procedural justice pre-conditions were satisfied in the two cases before me either.
13While making no reference to Anthony-Cook at the time either sentence was handed down, Jones J. did refer to Anthony-Cook in the written reasons delivered on March 31 in the Chakasim matter. However, he attempted to distinguish Anthony-Cook not on the ground of lack of quid pro quo (as the respondents urged upon me here) but on the basis of a non-existent license in Anthony-Cook to undercut a joint sentence recommendation freely, restricting the case to instances where the sentencing judge seeks to exceed the sentence agreed upon. The distinction sought to be introduced (i.e. restricting Anthony-Cook to instances of “jumping”) is as corrosive of the underlying public interest in promoting resolution agreements on sentencing as it is entirely without foundation in the jurisprudence.
14Anthony-Cook is dispositive of both appeals. Jones J. found that the joint sentencing recommendations were reasonable in both cases. Reasonable arrangements cannot at the same time also be so unreasonable as to bring the administration of justice into disrepute were they to be implemented.
15The failure of the Justice to have informed counsel of his intention to depart from the joint sentencing submission in both cases as required by Anthony-Cook and Wesley was a clear failure to provide minimum standards of procedural fairness and amounts to material reversible error.
16I find no need to enumerate at length the findings of fact made by the Justice in the reasons given in both cases for which there was no direct evidence before him or about which counsel were not invited to make submissions. This included such matters as the impact of conditions at Toronto South upon Mr. Johnston and the relationship between fetal alcohol syndrome or the Gladue factors discussed upon the incidents giving rise the Ms. Chakasim’s charges, the alleged “colonialist” nature of the bail system or the treatment of the offender in jail. This too was a failure to adhere to the minimum standards of natural justice and is reversible error.
Disposition
17Accordingly, I allowed the Crown’s sentence appeal in both Chaksaim and Johnston and imposed the following sentences in each case in substitution of the sentences imposed by Justice Jones on March 28, 2025 and April 1, 2025 respectively:
18In Chakasim:
a. For both counts, a concurrently served sentence of time served calculated as 43 days of actual pre-sentence custody with enhanced Summers credit of 65 days applicable concurrently to both charges; plus
b. Three years probation with the following terms (in addition to statutory terms):
i. Report as directed by your probation officer;
ii. Take Counseling as directed by your probation officer;
iii. Sign Consents and Releases in favour of your probation officer;
iv. No contact with Tarun Bedi or Ahmad Ahmed;
v. Not to attend 291 George Street, Toronto;
vi. Not to attend the LCBO at 777 Bay Street; and
vii. No weapons as defined by the Criminal Code.
c. The following ancillary orders:
i. S. 109 weapons prohibition for 10 years; and
ii. DNA order (secondary designated offence); and
d. Victim surcharge waived.
19In Johnston:
a. Global sentence of time served calculated as 135 days of pre-trial custody with enhanced Summers credit of 203 days;
b. One year of probation with the following terms (in addition to statutory terms):
i. Take Counseling as Directed by Probation Officer;
ii. Sign Consents and Releases in favour of Probation Officer;
iii. Not to attend the Paris Baguette at 110 Bloor St W, Toronto;
iv. Not to attend 70 St. Joseph St, Toronto (University of Toronto residence building);
v. Not to attend 66 Isabella Street, Toronto;
vi. Not to attend ME Law Firm at 1000-180 Bloor Street West, Toronto;
vii. Not to attend the Roots Store at 1485 Yonge Street in the City of Toronto.
viii. No contact with Clara Montero Dominguez
ix. Not be within 25 meters of anywhere you know Clara Montero Dominguez\ to be; and
c. Victim surcharge waived.
20In both cases, these are GLOBAL sentences applicable to all affected counts for which a guilty plea was entered in each case. Arrangements will be made with defence counsel to have the defendants sign the necessary amending documents prior to Friday January 23, 2026 at the courthouse (361 University Avenue).
21Orders accordingly.
___________________________
S.F. Dunphy J.
Date: January 16, 2026