CITATION: R. v. Bernier, 2026 ONSC 3213

COURT FILE NO.: CR-21-00030103-00AP/CR-21-00005048-00AP

DATE: 2026/08/05

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

– and –

Christopher Mark Bernier

Appellant

Mark Fernandes, for the Crown

Self-Represented

HEARD: May 20, 2026, at Ottawa

Decision on Motion for Leave for Extension of time to Appeal

DOYLE J.

[1] The Appellant, Christopher Bernier, seeks an extension of time to appeal his convictions arising from guilty pleas and sentence imposed on October 6, 2022. The application was brought more than three years after the expiry of the prescribed appeal period.

[2] The Appellant is also requesting a stay pending an appeal.

[3] The Appellant submits that, had he known the collateral consequences of his convictions, he would not have plead guilty to the charges. The central issue is whether the Appellant has satisfied his burden of the criteria set out in r. 40.03 of the Criminal Proceedings Rules for the Superior Court of Justice (Ontario).

[4] For the reasons that follow, the application is dismissed.

Background

The Charges

[5] On September 28, 2022, the Appellant plead guilty to six counts, and the remaining 20 counts were withdrawn.

[6] The charges stemmed from an investigation arising from false and deceptive tax returns filed by the Appellant on behalf of his two corporations: American Domain Names LLC (“ADN") and Maple Names Inc (“MNI”).

[7] Information 21-30103, sworn April 1, 2021, and amended on September 17, 2021 (the “first information”), charged the Appellant with eight offences contrary to the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.), and eight offences contrary to the Excise Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15. The alleged offences are to have occurred between April 1, 2013 and July 30, 2015. The Crown elected to proceed by way of summary conviction and hence, the charges would be tried in the Ontario Court of Justice.

[8] It was alleged that the Appellant used his personal computer to forge invoices, falsify business records and then filed false and deceptive tax returns in 2013, 2014 and 2015 on behalf of ADN and MNI which resulted in the Appellant receiving $159,872.67 in illegitimate GST/HST refunds, and $214,778 in illegitimate Federal Income Tax Credits.

[9] Information 21-5048, sworn on May 14, 2021 (the “second information”), charged the Appellant with eight offences contrary to the Taxation Act, 2007, S.O. 2007, c. 11, Sched. A.

[10] The Taxation Act is governed by the Provincial Offences Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33, and the offences were alleged to have occurred between July 1, 2013, and June 30, 2015. They can either be tried before a Justice of the Peace or in the Ontario Court of Justice.

[11] It was alleged that the Appellant used forged invoices and falsified business records in support of false tax filings for the years 2013, 2014 and 2015 on behalf of ADN and MNI and illegitimately received $115,984.38 in Ontario Innovation Tax Credit refunds.

[12] Further, an indictment charged the Appellant with two offences under ss. 367 and 368(1) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. Count one alleged that between March 22 and October 1, 2018, the Appellant knowingly made a false document, including meeting minutes, used incorrect names in a corporate document, and made a fraudulent notice, with intent that it be acted upon as genuine. Count two alleged that the Appellant knowingly used such a forged document as if it were genuine.

[13] In summary, the Appellant was charged with attempting to mislead Corporations Canada over the course of an investigation into his business practices.

[14] The details supporting these allegations are as follows: on March 21, 2018, a search warrant obtained by Canada Revenue Agency (“CRA”) investigator, Michael Barski, was executed at the Appellant’s residence by CRA investigators (which included Trevor McCurry). It yielded documentary and electronic evidence linking the Appellant to ADN, MNI and the false and deceptive tax returns.

[15] The next day, March 22, 2018, the Appellant filed a Change Regarding Directors for MNI, adding the CRA investigators, Messrs. Barski and McCurry, as Directors of MNI, and signed the form using the name Harry Linn (who is a real person).

[16] In a letter dated August 1, 2018, Corporations Canada told the Appellant to remove the names of Messrs. Barski and McCurry from the online registry for MNI as they were not legitimate. On August 15, 2018, the Appellant sent a letter to Corporations Canada under the name “Harry Linn”, indicating that they were indeed directors and attached what purported to be minutes of a meeting which indicated that they were elected as directors of MNI. On October 1, 2018, the Appellant filed a Form 2 Annual Return on MNI’s online corporate registry and signed the name “Michael Barski”.

Procedural History

[17] The Crown applied to have both informations tried in the Ontario Court of Justice. Regional Senior Justice Clifford ruled that the second information would be tried in the Ontario Court of Justice; however, whether those charges would be tried with the other information or indictment would be dealt with by a separate Crown application.

[18] The Appellant filed an application for judicial review by way of certiorari challenging Clifford J.’s ruling. On March 21, 2022, London-Weinstein J. dismissed the certiorari application as she found no error in law.

[19] On April 12, 2022, the Appellant filed a notice of appeal of London-Weinstein J.’s decision to the Court of Appeal. The proceedings in the Ontario Court of Justice continued in light of her ruling.

[20] On February 18, 2026, the Court of Appeal found the Appellant’s appeal to be moot, as he had plead guilty on September 28, 2022. The appeal was dismissed: R. v. Bernier, 2026 ONCA 122.

[21] The Court stated, at para. 6 “[i]f the appellant is successful with his late-breaking appeal in the Superior Court of Justice, it will be open to him to bring an application to re-open this appeal.”

[22] On April 13, 2022, the Crown served a joinder application of the two informations, and despite the Appellant’s objection on the basis of his pending appeal, Legault J. granted the Crown’s joinder application.

[23] On June 20, 2022, the Appellant served a notice of motion for prohibition, requesting an order prohibiting Legault J. from proceeding with the second information until the appeal in the Court of Appeal was determined.

[24] On August 12, 2022, Ryan Bell J. of the Superior Court of Justice dismissed the Appellant’s prohibition application, finding there was no merit to his arguments and remitted the matter back to the Ontario Court of Justice.

[25] On September 28, 2022, with the assistance of counsel, the Appellant plead guilty to counts 1, 3 and 6 on the first and second informations and all of the remaining charges were withdrawn.

[26] The court conducted a plea inquiry pursuant to s. 606(1.1) of the Criminal Code.

[27] The agreed statement of facts (“ASF”), which had been initialed on each page by the Appellant, set out the facts for the basis of the convictions on all six counts.

[28] The Crown requested an 18-month conditional sentence order on the first information, a probation order on the second information and a fine in the amount of $190,100. The defence requested a fine and that the Appellant be given eight years to pay, but with a four year fine-repayment-sunset-deadline. The Appellant was a permanent resident and did not wish the sentence to affect his ability to obtain Canadian citizenship.

[29] The Appellant addressed the court before the sentence was passed, stating “I will not do anything like this again. I did not mean to harm or hurt anyone”.

[30] On October 6, 2022, Perkins-McVey J. found that the Appellant’s conduct could attract a jail sentence.

[31] The court considered the mitigating factors: that he had pleaded guilty, accepted an ASF, shown remorse and saved court time in both the Ontario Court of Justice and the Superior Court of Justice. Justice Perkins-McVey sentenced him to 12-month conditional sentence, imposed a fine of $190,100, and a 12-month probation order. He was given eight years to pay the fine of $190,100, and enforcement would not take place for four years (i.e. until October 6, 2026).

[32] All the remaining charges on the two informations and on the indictment were withdrawn.

[33] Pursuant to r. 40.05(a) of the Criminal Proceedings Rules, any notice of appeal was required to be filed within 30 days, namely by November 7, 2022.

[34] On October 19, 2022, within the appeal period, the Appellant became aware of a CRA publication referencing his guilty pleas, the admitted facts, and his sentence.

[35] The Appellant states he was not aware of the collateral consequences, being that his name would be on the CRA publication. He states that he was aware of the collateral consequences of immigration status as he was a permanent resident.

[36] He contacted Amy Felix, a Director of the CRA, who told the Appellant that he would need a court order for them to remove the publication. He then applied to the Ontario Court of Justice to obtain an order that CRA take down the information from canada.ca and a publication ban. The matter came before the Ontario Court of Justice in October 2023.

[37] There were proceedings dealing with the motion to quash the subpoena directed to Ms. Felix.

[38] In February 2024, Hoffman J. dismissed the Appellant’s application, finding that he did not have jurisdiction to make such an order.

[39] The Appellant appealed to the Superior Court of Justice. On July 17, 2024, the matter came before Williams J., and she heard the testimony of Kristen Lewis who testified, among other things, that the CRA publishes all tax convictions for a period of five years.

[40] The matter was adjourned to a judicial pre-trial scheduled for October 17, 2024.

[41] The CRA turned over additional disclosure.

[42] The matter was scheduled for January 9, 2025, but was postponed as Williams J. was ill. Justice Williams ultimately consented to another justice hearing the matter.

[43] The application was heard by Sirivar J. on July 24, 2025, with an ASF summarizing the evidence of Ms. Lewis and additional affidavit evidence to fill in the missing details.

[44] The mater was adjourned to September 2025 assignment court to set a date for the decision, and was adjourned again and ultimately, at the November 2025 assignment court, the date of November 21, 2025, was set for the decision. On that date, the Appellant stated that an individual named “Mr. Zsigo” – without revealing this individual’s role in the proceeding – failed to appear. Thus, the matter was adjourned to December 5, 2026, at which point Sirivar J. rendered her decision, but was not able to read her reasons due a late start as a result of technical issues.

[45] On Friday, December 12, 2025, Sirivar J. delivered her reasons and dismissed the appeal.

[46] The following Monday, December 15, 2025, the Appellant filed his notice of appeal seeking, among other things, to extend the time to file his appeal, to set aside his guilty pleas, and to vacate the fine.

[47] In his notice of appeal dated January 5, 2026, the Appellant argues that the “plea was uninformed because the appellant was unaware of the legally collateral consequence of state-imposed publicity on canada.ca because it is not authorized by the Taxation Act or any other statute, and the appellant would not have plead guilty if he had known.”

Issues

[48] An extension may be granted where the justice of the case requires it: R. v. Menear (2002), 2002 CanLII 7570 (ON CA), 162 C.C.C. (3d) 233 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 20-21. In determining whether to grant an extension, the court has considered the following factors:

i. Did the Appellant demonstrate a bona fide intention to appeal within the appeal period?

ii. Has the Appellant reasonably explained the delay?

iii. Is there merit to the proposed appeal?

iv. Do the interests of justice favour granting the extension?

Applicable Law

[49] Section 813(a) of the Criminal Code permits an appeal from conviction or sentence in summary conviction matters.

[50] Rule 40.05(a) of the Criminal Proceedings Rules requires the notice of appeal be served and filed within 30 days after the day on which the sentence is imposed.

[51] Rule 40.03(2) of the Criminal Proceedings Rules provides factors that the appeal court may consider:

• whether the applicant has shown a bona fide intention to appeal within the appeal period;

• whether the applicant has accounted for or explained the delay;

• whether there is merit to the proposed appeal; and/or

• any other relevant factors the appeal court considers relevant.

See also R. v. Ansari, 2015 ONCA 891, 128 O.R. (3d) 511, at paras. 22-23.

[52] In Menear, the Court of Appeal held that no single factor is determinative, and the overarching consideration is whether justice requires the extension: at paras. 20-21.

[53] The court will usually consider the factors set out in r. 40.03(2) and factors such as whether the Appellant has taken the benefit of the judgment, whether consequences of the conviction are out of proportion to the penalty imposed, and whether the Crown will be prejudiced in granting the application: Menear, at para. 21; Ansari, at para. 23.

[54] As Wagner J. (as he then was) stated in R. v. Wong, 2018 SCC 25, [2018] 1 S.C.R. 696, at para. 65 (in dissent but not on this point), “[t]he integrity of the plea bargaining process and the certainty and order which are essential to the criminal process depend on the finality of guilty pleas.” Accordingly, there is strong public interest in preserving the finality of guilty pleas.

[55] The majority of the Supreme Court in Wong, at paras. 25-30, directed courts to focus on the accused:

25Our framework is premised upon the view that judicial scrutiny must be directed to how the accused, and no one else, would have proceeded. The question to be answered is whether the accused would have acted differently, had he or she been armed with the knowledge of the legally relevant consequence.

26That the analysis focusses on the accused’s subjective choice does not mean that a court must automatically accept an accused’s claim. Like all credibility determinations, the accused’s claim about what his or her subjective and fully informed choice would have been is measured against objective circumstances. Courts should therefore carefully scrutinize the accused’s assertion, looking to objective, circumstantial evidence to test its veracity against a standard of reasonable possibility. Such factors may include the strength of the Crown’s case, any concessions or statements from the Crown regarding its case (including a willingness to pursue a joint submission or reduce the charge to a lesser included offence) and any relevant defence the accused may have. The court may also assess the strength of connection between the guilty plea and the collateral consequence, that is, whether the trigger for the collateral consequence is the finding of guilt as distinct from a particular length of sentence. More particularly, where the collateral consequence depends on the length of the sentence — keeping in mind that a guilty plea typically mitigates a sentence — the court may have reason to doubt the veracity of the accused’s claim.

27While our colleague refers to similar factors (at para. 105), he would consider them in assessing whether a reasonable person in the accused’s circumstances would have been influenced in their decision to plead guilty by the information. Again, we see the analysis differently. To reiterate, it properly operates from the standpoint of the accused, and what the accused would or would not have done, knowing of the legally relevant consequence.

28Of course, the basis for judicial scrutiny of the accused’s claim is not limited to objective circumstances contemporaneous with the original plea, since the accused’s idiosyncratic preferences may not always be reflected in those circumstances. A reviewing court must therefore also test the veracity of the accused’s assertions in their own right. A court may properly find an accused’s expressed preferences to be credible, and to establish a reasonable possibility of prejudice, based solely on the contents of the accused’s affidavit and on his or her withstanding of cross-examination.

29Throughout the process of testing the accused’s claim, however, the focus must remain upon what this accused — and only this accused — would have done. The basis for that subjective inquiry is found in the subjective nature of the initial decision to plea. Because the original guilty plea is an exercise of the accused’s own subjective judgment, it logically follows that the test for withdrawing that plea should also be directed to the accused’s subjective judgment. This approach properly balances society’s interest in the finality of guilty pleas and fairness to the accused by striking the accused’s plea only where he or she would have proceeded differently.

30We note parenthetically that adopting a subjective framework, which requires the accused to swear an affidavit in support, will not create a “procedural bar” to striking a plea (Wagner J.’s reasons, at para. 93). First, our colleague’s modified objective approach itself will require an accused to depose to his or her “particular circumstances” (para. 87) and to not having been informed of a legally relevant consequence. Second, any concern about an accused person who seeks to have their plea struck but who is unrepresented and unaware of the necessity of deposing that they would have proceeded differently if properly informed can be accounted for by the trial judge who should take steps to ensure that the accused obtains representation or, at the very least, is assisted by duty counsel (where available). And third, the accused need not speculate on how other participants in the justice system would have proceeded (ibid.). Our approach simply requires an accused to state how he or she would have acted differently. Though a condition sought may turn on another party’s response — e.g. the Crown’s willingness to agree to a joint submission on sentencing — the accused need only state that he or she would have insisted upon such a condition to plead guilty, or else would have proceeded to trial.

Analysis

i. Was there a bona fide intention to appeal?

Appellant’s Position

[56] The Appellant submits that first, he intended to challenge the collateral consequences of his convictions rather than the convictions themselves. In his view, it was premature. He stated he wanted to avoid the use of more judicial resources and was seeking the most efficient remedy, which was to deal with the collateral consequence of his guilty pleas directly.

[57] Although he did not file a notice of appeal within the prescribed period, the Appellant submits that he demonstrated a bona fide intention to challenge the consequences of his conviction by pursuing other legal remedies immediately after discovering the collateral consequences.

[58] The Appellant argued that his pursuit of proceedings in the Ontario Court of Justice shows an intention to address the injustice arising from the uniformed guilty plea. He took other measures to remove his name from the CRA publication by instead attending the Ontario Court of Justice to ask the court to order the CRA to remove the publication. In February 2024, Hoffman J. dismissed his application citing lack of jurisdiction and an appeal to the Superior Court of Justice was dismissed on December 12, 2025.

[59] The Appellant states he was aware of the collateral consequence of his immigration status and in the plea bargain, it was agreed that the Crown would not be asking for a jail term as it would affect his status. He did not expect that the CRA would be allowed to post private information on their website.

[60] There are other collateral consequences that are commonly known, for example, criminal records under the Criminal Records Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-47, DNA orders and victim surcharges under the Criminal Code and the sexual offender registry under the Sex Offender Information Registration Act, S.C. 2004, c. 10.

Discussion

[61] The Appellant did not file an appeal within a timely manner and there is no evidence until 2025 that he showed any intention of appealing. He filed the appeal three years and two months after the sentence.

[62] He was well aware of the timelines having previously challenged other rulings.

[63] As a self-represented individual, he appealed according to the timelines the orders Clifford J., London-Weinstein J. and Hoffman J. He also brought a prohibition application and initiated numerous proceedings.

[64] The issue is whether an intention to challenge collateral consequences is equivalent to an intention to appeal. The fact that the Appellant genuinely intended to challenge the collateral consequence does not automatically amount to a bona fide intention to appeal the conviction or sentence.

[65] The court must ask what the Appellant actually intended to challenge.

• Was the Appellant only challenging the collateral consequence, not the conviction?

• Did he subjectively know the collateral consequence when he plead guilty?

• Was he avoiding the consequence or was his goal to challenge the conviction itself?

[66] Here, the Appellant made no efforts to appeal the conviction by seeking counsel, preparing a notice of appeal, researching the ground of appeal, seeking transcripts or making inquiries directed towards overturning the conviction.

[67] However, as stated in Wong, at paras. 6, 25, the court must consider whether there was a reasonable possibility that the Appellant, had he known the true consequences, would have acted differently.

[68] In R. v. Baig, 2022 ONCA 129, at para. 21, the Court of Appeal held that an extension of time may be granted in cases involving uninformed guilty pleas, particularly when there were unexpected collateral consequences.

[69] The Appellant knew about the collateral consequence within the 30-day appeal period. He became aware of the CRA publication on October 19, 2022 – 13 days after his sentencing on October 6, 2022. At that time, he could have formed the intention to appeal and acted accordingly.

[70] Instead, he did not pursue an appeal until more than three years later.

[71] In addition, when he was before Sirivar J., the Appellant was also challenging the fines, and she refused to deal with them. If his only concern was the publication on canada.ca, then why was he raising the issue of fines and asking the court for a stay? One can infer that the impact of the enforcement of the fine as the four-year mark was approaching is also a concern for him.

[72] I find that the Appellant has not demonstrated a bona fide intention to appeal within the appeal period.

ii. Has the Appellant reasonably explained the delay?

Appellant’s Position

[73] The Appellant attributes the delay to ongoing related litigation and a desire to respect judicial economy. He explained that he reasonably pursued other remedies before seeking to appeal the underlying conviction. He was addressing the specific harm without necessarily challenging the conviction itself, being conscious of judicial resources and the finality of proceedings.

[74] The Appellant argued the alternate remedies came to an end with Sirivar J.’s decision in December 2025, which led the Appellant to immediately launch an appeal.

Discussion

[75] The Appellant chose to pursue alternative remedies rather than file a timely appeal. The availability of other proceedings does not justify a delay in this magnitude.

[76] Further, the Appellant’s positions in other proceedings – particularly, seeking to nullify the underlying convictions – are inconsistent with his claim that he did not intend to challenge the convictions.

[77] The matter ultimately came before Hoffman J. in February 2024, which is 13 months after the sentence. The Appellant speaks of some issues regarding a subpoena directed to Ms. Felix but does not provide any more details as to why it took him 13 months to obtain a court date to challenge the publication on canada.ca.

[78] The Appellant has the onus to account for the time and explain the delay. There is no transcript before the court of proceedings before Hoffman J., and no evidence supports his submission that he was told to return in a year.

[79] I also find it is disingenuous that he claims to be concerned with conserving judicial resources, when the record reflects numerous appeals and applications arising from decisions with which he disagrees, and all filed in a timely manner. Certainly, he is entitled to pursue appeals and judicial reviews; however, the volume of legal challenges does not suggest a genuine interest in minimizing the use of judicial resources in his case.

[80] The Appellant is no stranger to filing judicial reviews and appeals. He could have asked for leave for an extension when he was before Hoffman J. or when there were delays due to the illness of Williams J.

[81] The Court in Wong directs courts to look at the objective, contemporaneous evidence to assess the veracity of a claim (see para. 6). Here, the court must determine the credibility of the Appellant and whether he is using the publication issue as a ruse for the appeal.

[82] The Appellant brought an unsuccessful Charter application to have the evidence seized from the search warrant excluded. His trial was scheduled for three weeks in November 2022. However, the Appellant plead guilty to the six counts on September 28, 2022.

[83] At the plea, he admitted to the facts set out in the ASF and initialed each page. He had the benefit of counsel, and a full plea inquiry was completed.

[84] Neither the Appellant, nor his counsel, raised any objection, and there is a presumption that counsel fulfilled their duties: see R. v. Eizenga, 2011 ONCA 113, 270 C.C.C. (3d) 168, at para. 4.

[85] It is also relevant that the end of the four year stay of enforcement is imminent.

[86] Considering all of the above, I find the delay is neither adequately explained nor consistent with a timely intention to appeal.

iii. Is there merit to the proposed appeal?

Appellant’s Position

[87] The Appellant argues that his guilty pleas were uninformed because he was unaware of certain collateral consequences, specifically the CRA publication and its alleged impacts.

[88] He says he only plead guilty to avoid the immigration collateral consequences with a plea bargain. However, no one ever disclosed to him that his name would be published on canada.ca.

[89] In addition, the Appellant submits that the Crown had seven years to charge him and hence it would not be unfair for him to appeal after only three and a half years. In accordance with R. v. Haevischer, 2023 SCC 11, [2023] 1 S.C.R. 416, at para. 66-73, an appeal has merit if it is not “manifestly frivolous”.

Discussion

[90] In his factum, the Appellant pleads that he is factually innocent. However, at the sentencing hearing before Perkins-McVey J., he took responsibility and indicated that he would not do it again.

[91] His words of remorse and contrition at the sentencing hearing are inconsistent with his affidavit in support of this motion, where he alleges that the facts supporting the convictions “were fictitious”.

[92] The evidence filed, including the ASF, in support of the convictions is substantial.

[93] The Appellant has failed to satisfy his burden to show that his appeal has merit.

iv. Do the interests of justice favour granting the extension?

The guilty plea was voluntary, unequivocal, and informed

[94] The Court of Appeal for Ontario in R. v. Closs (1998), 1998 CanLII 1921 (ON CA), 105 O.A.C. 392 (C.A.), at para. 8, held that it is only in exceptional circumstances that a guilty plea should be reopened where there is a real concern that an injustice may have occurred.

There are many negative consequences of having a criminal conviction and it cannot be expected that these will all be explained to an accused prior to a plea; nor should the convicted person expect the judicial system to provide a fresh start when a surprising consequence of the conviction is encountered. We must have finality except where the demands of justice dictate otherwise.

[95] A valid guilty plea must be voluntary, unequivocal, and informed. Not all collateral consequences must be explained; only those that are legally relevant and sufficiently serious: Wong, at paras. 3-4.

[96] A legally relevant collateral consequence is one which bears on the sufficiently serious legal interests of the Appellant. There are numerous negative consequences with a criminal conviction, and it is not the usual procedure that all consequences are explained to an accused on a guilty plea.

[97] As discussed above, to assess the veracity of the Appellant’s position that he would not have plead guilty, the court must look to the objective and contemporaneous evidence. The inquiry is subjective.

[98] The Appellant claims he was unaware that pleading guilty would affect other proceedings. However:

a. The trial judge expressly explained that the admissions would apply broadly.

b. The Appellant acknowledged those facts after consultation with counsel.

c. He knew of the outstanding proceedings at the time of the plea.

[99] During an exchange with Perkins-McVey J. at his guilty plea proceedings, the Appellant stated that he was guilty “for the purposes this proceeding.” After discussion with his counsel, the Appellant confirmed that he was prepared to accept the facts without any qualification or condition.

[100] At sentencing, the court referred to the fact that the Appellant understood the seriousness of the charges, that he will take steps so it does not happen again, and that he had expressed remorse.

[101] As such, the record demonstrates the plea was voluntary, unequivocal, and informed.

The Appellant has taken the benefit of judgment

[102] There is no evidence that the publication has impacted the Appellant. He was not working at the time of the sentencing and continues to be receiving Ontario Disability Support Program (“ODSP”) benefits. He does not indicate that the publication affected his employment. However, a criminal record could certainly impact on job prospects.

[103] The Appellant was successful in having 20 charges withdrawn. He avoided a jail sentence and consequently did not face deportation. He is now a Canadian citizen. The withdrawal of the numerous counts was a significant benefit to the Appellant. Justice Perkins-McVey remarked that a jail sentence was justified.

[104] Overall, he benefited from a substantially reduced sentence on a significant fraud to CRA.

The publication of the Appellant’s case

[105] As previously discussed, the Appellant says he would not have pleaded guilty had he known there was going to be a publication on CRA’s website.

[106] The Appellant is not alleging that the publication on the canada.ca website is misleading or inaccurate. The CRA publication does not constitute publicity intended to be offensive, demeaning or discriminatory.

[107] The CRA has a right, as a victim of this fraud, to publish and report on the offender’s conduct, as do the media and legal reporting platforms. Decisions get published, and his conviction appears in an open forum. The courts operate openly, and absent a publication ban, cases are reported and covered by the media. The posting of his name and information on canada.ca does not amount to a legally consequential collateral consequence that would entitle him to bring an appeal years after sentencing.

[108] In Sirivar J.’s decision of December 5, 2025, she dismissed his application to review the Ontario Court of Justice order dismissing the application for a publication ban. It was a written endorsement, and her oral reasons were given in court via teleconference on December 12, 2025.

[109] In Bernier, at para. 9, the Court of Appeal refused to grant the Appellant’s request that he only be referred to by his initials, in applying the principles set out in Sherman Estate v. Donovan, 2021 SCC 25, [2021] 2 S.C.R. 75. The Court noted that his name is already in the public domain as the rulings, including the certiorari judgment, are online.

[110] If the Appellant took issue with the publication of his name and case, he should have appealed at the time he learned about it – just after sentencing and within the 30-day appeal period.

The Appellant’s disability

[111] The Appellant argues that there is unfairness to him as a person with a disability. He states that he has autism spectrum disorder, which is a life-long disability, and hence has been on ODSP. He was unemployed at the time of the convictions and has only been able to obtain minimal sporadic employment.

[112] The sentencing decision outlines that he has certain “physical handicaps as a result of a hip fracture from the car accident” and he had to undergo two surgeries. It was further noted that this would make incarceration difficult.

[113] The Appellant has failed to satisfy this court that this conviction, and the resulting publication, violate his privacy and dignity as a human being on ODSP, or that this decision discriminates against him on the basis of his disability and its impact.

Public interest in the finality of guilty pleas

[114] The Crown’s brief is replete with documentary evidence linking the Appellant to the two corporations and the deceptive and false tax returns and the resulting tax refunds.

[115] The strong public interest in the finality of guilty pleas militates against relief, as stated by the Supreme Court in Wong. Here, granting leave would compromise the public’s interest in finality: see R. v. J.H., 2025 ONCA 837, at para. 3.

[116] In J.H., the appellant sought to appeal his convictions more than three years after his conviction and sentence. The appellant argued he did not understand the impact of the conviction when he found it hard to find work and that he was unaware of his right to appeal the conviction. However, Paciocco J.A. found allowing the appeal “to go forward at this late date would cause prejudice by compromising the public interest in finality”: at para. 5.

[117] In this case, if the appeal proceeds and is granted, there would be a real and substantial prejudice to the interests of justice. The Appellant would re-litigate the pre-trial motions concerning the Charter challenges, resulting in further delay before the trial could proceed. The offences were committed 16 years ago; witnesses may have moved or be unavailable, memories may have faded, and the resulting prejudice is both real and substantial.

Conclusion

[118] The Appellant has not met his burden of justifying an extension of time. Accordingly, the application for an extension of time to appeal is dismissed.

Justice Doyle

Released: August 5, 2026

CITATION: R. v. Bernier, 2026 ONSC 3213