Court File and Parties

CITATION: Chuang v. Fogler Rubinoff LLP, 2026 ONSC 3071

COURT FILE NO.: CV-19-617034

MOTION HEARD: 20260128

REASONS RELEASED: 20260526

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO

BETWEEN:

DR. SYLVESTER CHUANG, HSC HOLDINGS INC., TRANSORIENTAL FINE CARS LTD., 1405768 ONTARIO LIMITED and ONTASIAN ENTERPRISES INC.

Plaintiffs

• and-

FOGLER RUBINOFF LLP, NINA PERFETTO, IAN KATCHIN, DAVID LEVANGIE, FRED TAYAR & ASSOCIATES PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION, FRED TAYAR and COLBY LINTHWAITE

Defendants

BEFORE: ASSOCIATE JUSTICE McGRAW

COUNSEL: T. Danson and M. Delavar E-mail: danson@drlitigators.com -for the Plaintiffs

S. Cavanagh E-mail: scavanagh@cavanagh.ca -for the Defendants Fred Tayar & Associates Professional Corporation, Fred Tayar and Colby Linthwaite (the “Tayar Defendants”)

A. Hershtal Email: michael@kestenberglitigation.com -for the Defendants Fogler Rubinoff LLP, Nina Perfetto, Ian Katchin and David Levangie (the “Fogler Defendants”)

REASONS RELEASED: May 26, 2026

Reasons For Endorsement

I. Background

[1] This is a motion by the Plaintiffs for leave to amend their Amended Statement of Claim to particularize and increase their claim for damages and make other amendments. This action is a solicitor’s negligence claim against two law firms and five lawyers, the Tayar Defendants and the Fogler Defendants (together, the “Defendants”).

[1] The Plaintiff, Dr. Sylvester Chuang (“Dr. Chuang”) is the President, CEO and majority shareholder of the Plaintiffs HSC Holdings Inc. (“HSC”), Transoriental Fine Cars Ltd. (“TFC”), 1405768 Ontario Limited (“145”) and Ontasian Enterprises Inc.(“OEI”). HSC operates under the trade name Auto World Imports Network (“AWIN”), the parent company which operates the AWIN Group of Dealerships consisting of 28 franchises incorporated through 23 companies, including TFC. TFC was incorporated for the purpose of holding the assets for what was to be a Lexus dealership in downtown Toronto (the “Dealership”) which is the subject of this action. 140 owns the land for what was to be the Dealership. OEI owns all the shares of 72 companies which, among other things, own the land for the AWIN Group of Dealerships and the GAIN-VI Group of Dealerships, an automobile dealership group (GAIN-VI) that operates in Western Canada for which Dr. Chuang is the majority shareholder.

[2] This action arises from an underlying action related to the termination of a Letter of Commitment dated April 15, 2003 (“LOC”) by Toyota Canada Inc. (“Toyota”) for the construction and operation of the Dealership. The Plaintiffs commenced an action against Toyota on May 18, 2005 seeking injunctive relief, a declaration that the LOC was valid and binding, specific performance and in the alternative, damages of $28,000,000 (the “Toyota Action”). After terminating their retainer with their original counsel, the Plaintiffs retained the Fogler Defendants in May 2009 to represent them in the Toyota Action. The Toyota Action was bifurcated and a trial with respect to liability proceeded before Spence J. The Fogler Defendants terminated their retainer on November 4, 2013, 6 days into trial, and the Plaintiffs retained the Tayar Defendants. By Reasons for Decision dated February 10, 2015, Spence J. dismissed the Plaintiffs’ claim (Chuang v. Toyota Canada Inc., 2015 ONSC 885). The issue of damages was not adjudicated. An appeal was dismissed (2016 ONCA 584) and leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was refused (2017 16823(SCC)). The Defendants did not act on the appeals.

[3] The Plaintiffs commenced this action by Statement of Claim issued on March 28, 2019, with an Amended Statement of Claim served on February 19, 2020 (the “Current Claim”). The Defendants delivered Statements of Defence and Crossclaim on February 24, 2020 and March 20, 2020. The Defendants brought a summary judgment motion which was heard by Pollak J. on March 30, 2021. By Reasons dated September 13, 2021, Pollak J. dismissed the summary judgment motion (2021 ONSC 5942). An appeal was dismissed on June 6, 2022 (2022 ONCA 440).

[4] After the parties exchanged Affidavits of Documents, the Defendants requested that the Plaintiffs deliver an expert report on damages in advance of examinations for discovery. On July 7, 2025, the Plaintiffs served the Defendants with the 294-page Expert Report by Neil de Gray of KSV Soriano Inc. dated July 3, 2025 (the “Report”).

[5] The parties first attended before me at a telephone case conference on August 12, 2025 to speak to the Plaintiffs’ forthcoming amendments to the Current Claim based on the Report. Another case conference was scheduled for October 22, 2025 to provide the parties with an opportunity to determine if they could agree on the amendments. Counsel advised that the Plaintiffs delivered numerous drafts of their proposed Amended Amended Statement of Claim dated August 27, 2025 (the “Amended Claim”), however the parties were unable to agree and this motion was scheduled.

II. The Law and Analysis

[6] For the reasons that follow, the Plaintiffs’ motion is granted with the exception of the proposed amendments which are adjourned.

[7] Rules 26.01 and 26.02 state:

“26.01 On motion at any stage of an action the court shall grant leave to amend a pleading on such terms as are just, unless prejudice would result that could not be compensated for by costs or an adjournment.

26.02 A party may amend the party’s pleading,

(a) without leave, before the close of pleadings, if the amendment does not include or necessitate the addition, deletion or substitution of a party to the action;

(b) on filing the consent of all parties and, where a person is to be added or substituted as a party, the person’s consent; or

(c) with leave of the court.”

[8] Rule 26.01 is framed in mandatory terms: the court must allow the amendment, unless the responding party would suffer non-compensable prejudice, the proposed pleading is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, or the proposed pleading fails to disclose a reasonable cause of action: 158844 Ontario Ltd v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 2017 ONCA 42, 135 O.R. (3d) 681, at para. 25; Iroquois Falls Power Corp. v. Jacobs Canada Inc., 2009 ONCA 517, 264 O.A.C. 220, at paras. 15-16; Klassen v. Beausoleil, 2019 ONCA 407 at para. 25).

[9] The Court of Appeal summarized the general principles on motions for leave to amend pleadings in State Farm:

“[25] The law regarding leave to amend motions is well developed and the general principles may be summarized as follows:

The rule requires the court to grant leave to amend unless the responding party would suffer non-compensable prejudice; the amended pleadings are scandalous, frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of the court's process; or the pleading discloses no reasonable cause of action: Iroquois Falls Power Corp. v. Jacob Canada Inc., [2009] O.J. No. 2642, 2009 ONCA 517, 75 C.C.L.I. (4th) 1, at paras. 15-16, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [2009] S.C.C.A. No. 367, 2010 CarswellOnt 425; and Andersen Consulting Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2001 8587 (ON CA), [2001] O.J. No. 3576, 150 O.A.C. 177 (C.A.), at para. 37. [page688]

The amendment may be permitted at any stage of the action: Whiten v. Pilot Insurance Co. (1996), 1996 8109 (ON CTGD), 27 O.R. (3d) 479, [1996] O.J. No. 227 (Gen. Div.), revd (1999), 1999 3051 (ON CA), 42 O.R. (3d) 641, [1999] O.J. No. 237 (C.A.), revd [2002] 1 S.C.R. 595, [2002] S.C.J. No. 19, 2002 SCC 18.

There must be a causal connection between the non-compensable prejudice and the amendment. In other words, the prejudice must flow from the amendments and not from some other source: Iroquois, at paras. 20-21; and Mazzuca v. Silvercreek Pharmacy Ltd. (2001), 2001 8620 (ON CA), 56 O.R. (3d) 768, [2001] O.J. No. 4567 (C.A.), at para. 65.

The non-compensable prejudice may be actual prejudice, i.e., evidence that the responding party has lost an opportunity in the litigation that cannot be compensated as a consequence of the amendment. Where such prejudice is alleged, specific details must be provided: King's Gate Developments Inc. v. Drake (1994), 1994 416 (ON CA), 17 O.R. (3d) 841, [1994] O.J. No. 633 (C.A.), at paras. 5-7; and Transamerica Life Insurance Co. of Canada v. Canada Life Assurance Co. (1995), 1995 7105 (ON CTGD), 25 O.R. (3d) 106, [1995] O.J. No. 2220 (Gen. Div.), at para. 9.

Non-compensable prejudice does not include prejudice resulting from the potential success of the plea or the fact that the amended plea may increase the length or complexity of the trial: Hanlan v. Sernesky, 1996 1762 (ON CA), [1996] O.J. No. 4049, 95 O.A.C. 297 (C.A.), at para. 2; and Andersen Consulting, at paras. 36-37.

At some point, the delay in seeking an amendment will be so lengthy, and the justification so inadequate, that prejudice to the responding party will be presumed: Family Delicatessen Ltd. v. London (City), [2006] O.J. No. 669, 2006 5135 (C.A.), at para. 6.

The onus to prove actual prejudice lies with the responding party: Haikola v. Arasenau (1996), 1996 36 (ON CA), 27 O.R. (3d) 576, [1996] O.J. No. 231 (C.A.), at paras. 3-4; and Plante v. Industrial Alliance Life Insurance Co. (2003), 2003 64295 (ON SC), 66 O.R. (3d) 74, [2003] O.J. No. 3034 (Master), at para. 21.

The onus to rebut presumed prejudice lies with the moving party: Family Delicatessen, at para. 6.” (State Farm at para. 25).

[10] Flynn J. summarized the contemporary approach to pleadings in Sleep Clinic London Inc. v. Merchea, 2012 ONSC 3004, [2012] O.J. No. 2471:

“22 Long gone are the days when pleadings motions could be approached in an overly technical manner. Generally speaking, a party should be at liberty to craft a pleading in the manner it chooses, providing that the Rules of pleadings are not violently offended and there is no prejudice to the other side.”

[11] In considering pleadings and amendments, the court should consider the purpose of pleadings and pleadings rules:

i.) to define clearly and precisely the questions in controversy between the litigants;

ii.) to give fair notice of the precise case which is required to be met and the precise remedy sought; and

iii.) to assist the court in its investigations of the truth of the allegations made. (See National Trust Co. v. Furbacher, [1994] O.J. No. 2385 at paras. 9 and 10)(Ontario Consumers Home Services v. Enercare Inc., 2014 ONSC 4154; Balanyk v. University of Toronto, 1999 14918 (ON SC), at para. 27).

[12] On a pleadings motion, the plaintiff is only required to demonstrate that the proposed amendments disclose a reasonable cause of action by showing that the proposed amendments are legally tenable (Plante at paras. 21). It is not necessary for the plaintiffs to tender evidence to support the amendments nor is it necessary for the court to consider whether the plaintiff can prove the amendments (Plante at paras. 21). The court must assume that the facts as pleaded in the amendments (unless patently ridiculous or incapable of proof) are true, and the amendments are to be granted unless the claim is clearly impossible of success read generously with allowances for drafting deficiencies (Plante at para. 21)

[13] In Farmers Oil and Gas Inc. v. Ontario (Natural Resources), 2016 ONSC 6359 (Div. Ct.), the Divisional Court summarized the approach on a pleadings motion:

“In the end result, the requirement to read a pleading generously, and the concomitant requirement to allow amendments unless they will inflict non-compensable prejudice, means that the presumption is that any amendment, that can reasonably be seen as falling within the four corners of the existing claim, ought to be permitted….”(Farmers Oil at para. 31).

[14] A pleading cannot be “scandalous” if it is relevant and where allegations are relevant and material, the court should exercise considerable caution in striking them out (Quizno’s Canada Restaurant Corporation v. Kileel Developments Ltd., 2008 ONCA 644 at paras. 14-15). It is not for the court to prune a case at the pleadings stage and parties are entitled to plead whatever material facts they choose provided that the allegations are relevant and of at least marginal probative value which is not outweighed by their prejudicial effect (Quizno’s at para. 23).

[15] The Defendants raised a preliminary issue with respect to the Report. The Report is an exhibit to the supplementary affidavit of Marjan Delavar, one of the Plaintiffs’ counsel, sworn January 21, 2026 (the “Supplementary Affidavit”). The Defendants submit that a sworn affidavit from the expert is required to enter the Report in evidence, that the Supplementary Affidavit from counsel is insufficient, and that at most, the Report should be given little weight. The Defendants did not cross-examine Mr. Delavar nor did they file any evidence on this motion. I reject the Defendants’ submissions. The Defendants rely on Danos v. BMW Group Financial Services Canada, 2014 ONSC 2060; aff’d 2014 ONCA 887, in which the court held that a forgery expert’s report was inadmissible hearsay on a summary judgment motion because a sworn affidavit from the expert was not filed in support of the report. Unlike Danos where the plaintiff was relying on the expert report to prove its fraud claim and for the truth of its contents, this is a pleadings motion where the Report is being filed in support of proposed amendments to a pleading. This Court is not making any findings of fact or credibility based on the Report or drawing any conclusions with respect to the merits of the Plaintiffs’ claims. The Report is filed in support of the legal tenability of certain amendments, a low threshold. Defendants’ counsel was unable to refer me to any cases where an affidavit from an expert was required to rely on an expert report on a pleadings motion. Even giving the Report little weight, it would not change my conclusions on this motion.

[16] At paragraphs 2-6 of the Amended Claim, the Plaintiffs propose numerous amendments with respect to the coroporate status and description of each Plaintiff. The purpose of these amendments is to support the Plaintiffs’ related amendemnts at paragraph 40 regarding the apportionment of damages. The Defendants submit that these amendments are not relevant though it was unclear if the Defendants ultimately opposed them. In any event, I am satisfied that these are relevant biographical and historical amendments which are non-contentious, do not offend any rules of pleadings and would cause no prejudice to the Defendants if permitted.

[17] The Defendants consent to the amendments at paragraphs 25 and 28 of the Amended Claim regarding the Plaintiffs’ reliance on the Defendants, which Plaintiffs’ counsel confirmed were part of the Current Claim in any event. Defendants’ counsel further advised that they do not take issue with the amendments related to appellate counsel at paragraph 28 of the Amended Claim as long as the Plaintiffs are only claiming the costs of the appeals, which the Plaintiffs have confirmed.

[18] Most of the proposed amendments relate to the quantum of damages (the “Quantum Amendments”) and the apportionment of damages as between the Plaintiffs (the “Apportionment Amendments”), both of which the Defendants oppose.

[19] The Quantum Amendments, based on the Report, are set out at paragraphs 37-39 and 41-42 of the Amended Claim:

“37. As a direct and foreseeable result of the aforesaid negligence and breach of contract, the plaintiffs suffered injuries, losses and damages. Specifically, the plaintiffs lost the benefit of adding a lucrative Lexus car dealership, at a prime location in downtown Toronto, to the AWIN Group of Dealerships. The plaintiffs claim damages for the loss of the Lexus dealership.

38. The plaintiffs plead that there are four possible scenarios for the assessment of these damages, the particulars of which have been provided to the defendants. These damages are dependent upon factual and legal findings that will be determined at trial, namely:

Scenario #1: Loss Period End Date: February 10, 2015 – Date the trial judge, The Honourable Justice Spence dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim against Toyota.

Low range with pre-judgment interest: $22,152,700.00.

High range with pre-judgment interest: $23,225,100.00.

Scenario #2: Loss Period End Date: July 21, 2016 – Date appeal from Spence J. dismissed by the Ontario Court of Appeal.

Low range with pre-judgment interest: $34,125,500.00.

High range with pre-judgment interest: $37,159,200.00.

Scenario #3: Loss Period End Date: March 30, 2017 – Date plaintiffs’ Application for Leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was dismissed.

Low range with pre-judgment interest: $35,502,800.00.

High range with pre-judgment interest: $40,375,300.00.

Scenario #4: Loss Period End Date: Current (to be adjusted to date of trial judgment).

Low range with pre-judgment interest $113,181,500.00.

High range with pre-judgment interest: $115,317,600.00.

39. Additionally, as pleaded (in part) in paragraphs 19-21, 24, 27 and 31 above, the plaintiffs also claim $3,856,578.00 for reimbursement of all legal and expert fees paid associated with the Toyota litigation, the particulars of which are as follows:…

40. The plaintiffs state that but for the negligence and breach of contract of the defendants, the plaintiffs would continue to own and operate the Lexus Downtown dealership, making Scenario #4 above the correct basis for assessing the plaintiffs’ loss, namely, $115,317,600.00 as adjusted to the date of the trial judgment.

41. In the alternative, the plaintiffs claim one set of damages for the loss of the Lexus Downtown dealership calculated on the basis of Scenario #3, namely, $40,375,300.00 or in the further alternative Scenario #2, namely, $37,159,200.00 or in the further alternative Scenario #1, namely, $23,225,100.00 adjusted to the date of the trial judgement.”

[20] Having considered the relevant factors and circumstances and giving the Amended Claim a generous, liberal, contextual reading with allowances for drafting efficiencies, I am satisfied that the Quantum Amendments should be permitted. In particular, the Quantum Amendments meet the threshold of legal tenability such that they reveal a reasonable cause of action and the Defendants would not suffer any prejudice if they are permitted. In my view, none of the arguments raised by the Defendants provide a basis to deny the Quantum Amendments.

[21] In the Current Claim, the Plaintiffs claim total damages of $18,000,000, comprised of $15,000,000 for breach of contract and neglgience plus $3,000,000 for legal and expert fees. As set out above, the Plaintiffs wish to increase their claim to $115,317,600.00 based on Scenario #4, the highest of the four scenarios set out in the Report, plus $4,000,000 for legal and expert fees. The Defendants submit that since the Plaintiffs claimed $18,000,000 in the Current Claim, they must allege additional facts regarding counsel’s conduct with respect to the Toyota Action if they wish to increase their damage claim by such a significant sum which amounts to $102,000,000 (667%) and is greater than the $28,000,000 claimed in the Toyota Action. The Defendants assert that the Plaintiffs cannot claim more than they did in the Toyota Action and that to do so means that the Quantum Amendments are frivolous, vexatious and scandalous (Seabrook et al. v. Murison et al, 2019 ONSC 4232 at para. 16).

[22] I reject the Defendants’ submissions for numerous reasons. The Defendants have not provided any basis for limiting the amounts claimed in the manner they propose. Sufficient material facts are pleaded in both the Current Claim and the Amended Claim to support the Quantum Amednments and no new cause of action is being added. In particular, the Plaintiffs have pleaded that they suffered damages as a result of the loss of the Dealership which flow from the Defendants’ breach of contract and negligence related to the Toyota Action which is set out at paragraph 36 of the Amended Claim. In my view, the Quantum Amendments are not incapable of proof and fall within the existing factual matrix of the Current Claim which includes the loss of the Dealership and the Plaintiffs’ reliance on the expertise of the Defendants in advancing the Toyota Action. I also cannot conclude that the proposed increase in damages is frivolous, vexatious or scandalous. Namely, there is no basis to conclude that the Quantum Amendments are irrelevant, argumentative, have been inserted for colour, or are bare unsupported allegations or other similar characterization in order to make such a finding.

[23] The pleading of damages in the Toyota Action provides further support for the Quantum Amendments. The Plaintiffs’ claim for $28,000,000 in the Toyota Action was pleaded as alternative relief. It was also pleaded in the Statement of Claim that the Plaintiffs would suffer significant future loss of profits based on operating the Dealership for an indefinite number of years and that full particulars of the Plaintiffs’ losses would be provided prior to trial. In addition, the Toyota Action was bifurcated and the trial proceeded only on the issue of liability. Damages were not adjudicated. Therefore, I am satisfied that the Toyota Action provides no basis to limit the Plaintiffs’ claim as proposed. Even accepting the Defendants’ submissions, Scenario #1, one of the Plaintiffs’ alternative claims for damages, is for approximately $22,000,000, which is less than the amount claimed in the Toyota Action.

[24] The Defendants also argue that there may be a trial within the trial in this action with respect to what damages might have been awarded in the Toyota Action had it proceeded to the damages phase. Therefore, the Quantum Amendments cannot be permitted without additional particulars regarding the Defendants’ conduct in the Toyota Action. In my view, how this action might proceed at trial is not relevant to a pleadings motion. The Defendants have not provided me with any authority in this regard. I also note that the Plaintiffs proposed that this action also be bifurcated, however, the Defendants declined. The Plaintiffs have pleaded sufficient material facts to support the Quantum Amendments which are legally tenable, within the four corners of the Current Claim and no non-compensable prejudice would result. This includes sufficient particulars regarding the Defendants’ alleged negligence and breach of contract.

[25] Overall, it is not the court’s role and it would not be appropriate to limit the Plaintiffs’ claim for damages as requested by the Defendants in these circumstances on a pleadings motion. The Defendants have notice of the damages sought, they even have the Report much sooner than required under the Rules and prior to examinations for discovery. While the Defendants may take issue with the Plaintiffs’ theory of damages or what is contained in the Report, a pleadings motion is not the appropriate forum to determine these issues. The content and early delivery of the Report does not change this. What is material is that the Quantum Amednments are relevant, legally tenable, within the existing factual matrix and would cause no prejudice. They should be permitted so that this action can proceed to examinations for discovery where the case can be further particularized and the issues identified and narrowed for trial and/or potential settlement.

[26] There is no evidence before me that the Defendants would suffer any non-compensable prejudice if the Quantum Amendments are permitted. As set out above, the Defendants did not file any evidence. In light of my conclusions below, I am also satisfied that the Quantum Amendments can be granted independent of the Apportionment Amendments. In all of this, as a result of the Quantum Amendments and through the Amended Claim generally, the Plaintiffs have provided the Defendants with fair notice of the case they must meet and the remedies which the Plaintiffs are seeking.

[27] The Apportionment Amendments are set out at paragraph 40 of the Amended Claim:

40. In apportioning damages amongst the various plaintiffs, the plaintiffs plead as follows:

(a) As interrelated private entities, the plaintiffs’ claim one set of damages for the loss of the Lexus Downtown dealership to be apportioned as directed by the plaintiffs’ accountants;

(b) Consistent with industry standards and practices, each automobile franchise has an individual dealer principal. The dealer principal carries on business through various corporate entities such as operating and land holding companies;

(c) As pleaded in paragraphs 2, 3 and 6 above, it was understood that consistent with industry standards and practices AWIN and GAIN consisted of multiple motor vehicle franchises and dealerships. It was this corporate operating structure that was essential to building the necessary trust and confidence required for the manufacturer (Toyota/Lexus) to grant a franchise to a designated dealer principal, namely, Dr. Chuang.

(d) In granting the plaintiffs the Lexus franchise, Toyota, in addition to requiring Dr. Chuang to be the dealer principal, required him to enter into a Lexus Dealer Agreement with a company to be incorporated by him, HSC, Ontasian or 1405768 as decided by the said plaintiffs, to operate the Lexus downtown Toronto dealership.”

[28] The Defendants submit that the Apportionment Amendments, specifically the Plaintiffs’ claim for one set of damages as a “single economic enitity”, are contrary to Rule 25.06(9) which requires a pleading to state the amount claimed for each claimint in respect of each claim. The Defendants also rely on Meditrust Healthcare Inc. v. Shoppers Drug Mart, 2001 28371 (ON SC), 15 B.L.R. (3d) 221; aff’d 2002 41710 (ON CA), 61 O.R. (3d) 786 (C.A.) in which the Court of Appeal held that even if a parent company owns all the shares of its subsidiaries and exercises complete control, it does not have the right to damages which it did not suffer directly or are derivative of the subsidaries’ damages. The Defendants concede that while all five Plaintiffs may have a valid cause of action it is more likely that most do not except possibly Dr. Chuang who signed the LOC on behalf of a company to be incorporated by him (which appears to be TFC). The Defendants also argue that Dr. Chuang does not, as a shareholder, have a cause of action.

[29] The Plaintiffs submit that Meditrust is distinguishable as it was a summary judgment motion and that they are permitted to plead appportionment in this manner with the issue determined by the trial Judge, not on a pleadings motion. The Plaintiffs further submit that while they could attempt to allocate damages amongst the Plaintiffs, it would not be a worthwhile excercise at this stage of the proceedings. The Plaintiffs also note that the Defendants did not raise this issue when all 5 Plaintiffs advanced claims in the Toyota Action.

[30] During submissions, I discussed with counsel a potential agreement to reduce the number of Plaintiffs. The parties were unable to agree, in part because counsel did not have instructions. In my view, it is reasonable to provide the parties with a full opportunity for further discussions to determine if they can resolve the Apportionment Amendments barring which I will decide the issue.

III. Disposition and Costs

[31] Order to go granting the Plaintiffs leave to amend the Current Claim substantially in the form of the Amended Claim with the exception of the Apportionment Amendments which are adjourned pending further discussions between the parties. If the parties are unable to resolve the Apportionment Amendments they may advise me in writing and I will render a decision or counsel may schedule a telephone case conference.

[32] If the parties are able to resolve the Apportionment Amendments, they should attempt to resolve the issue of costs. This should include consideration of deferring costs until trial or other future steps, including the Defendants’ request for documents or any other motions or issues which may come before me from examinations for discovery. If the parties are unable to agree on costs, they may file written costs submissions not to exceed 4 pages (excluding Costs Outlines) with me on a timetable to be agreed upon by counsel. If the parties cannot agree on a timetable or there are any other issues they may schedule a telephone case conference with me.

[33] The Defendants’ request for documents and any other outstanding issues including a timetable for this action may be spoken to at a telephone case conference before me.

Released: May 26, 2026

Associate Justice McGraw