CITATION: WADIE NAROUZ c. FISGARD CAPITAL CORPORATION also known as FISGARD ASSET MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, 2026 ONSC 3060
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO
RE: WADIE NAROUZ , Plaintiff/Defendant by Counterclaim
AND:
FISGARD CAPITAL CORPORATION also known as FISGARD ASSET
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, Defendant/Plaintiff by Counterclaim
BEFORE: Associate Justice Fortier
COUNSEL: Christopher Shorey, for the Defendant/Plaintiff by Counterclaim, moving party Wadie Nairouz, self-represented Plaintiff/Defendant by Counterclaim
HEARD: March 26^th^, 2026
ENDORSEMENT
FRENCH TRANSLATION TO FOLLOW
- This is a motion by the defendant/plaintiff by counterclaim, Fiscard Capital Corporation (“Fiscard”) for leave to issue a writ of possession with respect to the property municipally described as 73 Rita Avenue, Ottawa, Ontario (the “Property”).
Background
This action relates to the enforcement of a $495,000 mortgage registered in favour of Fiscard which matured on November 15, 2023.
Mr. Narouz first defaulted on the interest payments and then failed to repay the loan on its maturity date. After Fiscard issued a formal demand for payment and a notice of sale, Mr. Narouz commenced this action to forestall Fiscard from proceeding with enforcement.
Fiscard brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of Mr. Narouz’ claims, judgment for the debt owing, and an order for possession, including a writ of possession.
The motion for summary judgment was heard by Justice Jensen over two days in January 2025.
At the hearing before Justice Jensen, Mr. Narouz advised that another individual was occupying the mortgaged property on a part-time basis.
On March 13, 2025, Justice Jensen released her decision, granting summary judgment for the amount owing and ordering Mr. Narouz to deliver vacant possession of the Property. Fiscard’s request for leave to have a writ of possession issued was adjourned as Fiscard had not yet complied with the notice of requirements under rule 60.10(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Justice Jensen also directed that her decision be translated into French. Once the French translation has been provided to Mr. Narouz, counsel for Fiscard was to provide Justice Jensen with a revised draft order for her review and signature.
Mr. Narouz served a notice of appeal of Justice Jensen’s decision and requested a stay of the order for possession of the mortgaged property. In a motion heard on August 27, 2025, the Court of Appeal held that the order for possession would not be stayed pending appeal, as there was no arguable merit in any grounds that might call into question the validity of the mortgage and no prospect that the appeal would permit Mr. Narouz to remain in possession of the property.
Mr. Narouz remains in possession of the Property and hence, Fiscard brings this motion for leave to issue a writ of possession.
Fiscard’s motion was originally scheduled for September 25, 2025, but was adjourned to November 13, 2025. In his responding factum for the September 25, 2025 hearing, Mr. Narouz submitted that the motion should be dismissed on the basis that: (a) a person who had been staying at the property from time to time had not been identified by Fiscard; and (b) Justice Jensen’s formal signed order for possession had not yet been received.
Mr. Narouz was cross-examined on October 22, 2025. During the cross-examination, he advised that the individual who sometimes stays at the property lives in Gatineau and is named Habib Reda. Mr. Narouz stated that Mr. Reda stays with him on weekends and sometimes on weekdays. He further confirmed that no one else stays at
the property, that there is no written agreement with Mr. Reda, and that they have no formal or informal agreement of any kind. Mr. Reda does not pay rent; the parties share the kitchen and washroom; and Mr. Reda does not keep furniture at the property. Mr.
Reda is, in effect, a regular houseguest. Mr. Narouz confirmed that no one else resides at the property.
Mr. Reda was served with the motion materials and provided with the videoconference link for the November 13, 2025 hearing. Mr. Reda has been advised of all subsequent court appearance dates with respect to Fiscard’s motion for leave to issue a writ of possession.
On November 12, 2025, the court released the French translation of Justice Jensen’s decision granting summary judgment.
On November 13, 2025, the parties appeared before Justice Roger for the hearing of this motion; Mr. Reda did not attend. Justice Roger adjourned the hearing to allow Mr. Narouz sufficient time to review the translated decision and respond to the motion, as he had only recently received it. The motion was rescheduled for December 18, 2025 and ultimately heard on March 11, 2026.
On November 20, 2025, the court issued the signed judgment on the summary judgment motion.
On December 3, 2025, Mr. Narouz delivered a notice of constitutional question alleging violations of his Charter rights and seeking, among other relief, a stay of proceedings and $800,000 in damages against Fiscard pursuant to section 24 of the Charter.
Issues
a) Has the notice requirement of Rule 60.10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O.1990, Reg. 194 been satisfied?
b) Application of the Charter
The Law and Discussion
i. Leave to issue writ of possession
Rule 60.10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires that, before granting leave to issue a writ of possession, all persons in actual possession of the property receive sufficient notice of the proceeding to enable them to apply to the court for relief.
I am satisfied, based on the record, that all persons in possession of the Property have received actual notice of this proceeding pursuant to Rule 60.10. The evidence establishes that Mr. Reda, who resides in Gatineau, is a regular houseguest of Mr. Narouz, is not a tenant and has received notice of these proceedings. Mr. Narouz has confirmed that no one else resides at the property.
ii. Charter arguments
- Mr. Narouz now claims relief under s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the “Charter”) as follows:
a stay of proceedings because of the delay in receiving the translated reasons for decision of Justice Jensen on the summary judgment motion; and
a stay of proceedings and damages of $800,000 for an alleged violation of his s. 7
Charter rights related to “constant surveillance” and “intrusion” by Fiscard.
Mr. Narouz argues that the eight-month delay by the court in providing him with a French version of Justice Jensen’s decision dated March 13, 2025, violated his constitutional rights under s. 24(1) of the Charter, as a francophone resident of Ontario. He further alleges that he has been under constant surveillance by Fiscard for several months and subjected to unlawful investigations of his Property, causing stress and severe psychological distress.
I do not propose to engage in an extensive Charter analysis. Rather, I will outline briefly why, in my view, the Charter does not govern the present situation. In particular, this litigation involves private parties. As held by the Supreme Court of Canada in RWDSU v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., 1986 5 at paras. 33 to 41, the Charter does not apply to private litigation. Rather, it applies to government legislation and action, not to private entities. As held by the court, at para 34: “… s. 32 of the Charter specifies the actors to whom the Charter will apply. They are the legislative, executive and administrative branches of the government.”
It is not clear from Mr. Narouz’s submissions how Fiscard is in any way responsible for the timing of the delivery of the French translation of Justice Jensen’s decision. It is possible that he is contending that the court’s delay in providing the French translation of the decision infringes his Charter rights. However, Mr. Narouz’s entitlement to a
French translation of the decision arises from provincial legislation, namely the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, cC.43 and not from the Charter. Section 126(4)7 of the Courts of Justice Act provides:
7.The reasons for a decision may be written in English or French, but the court shall provide a translation into the other language on the request of a party.
In my view, the appropriate remedy for the delay in delivering the French translation of Justice Jensen’s decision has already been provided by Justice Roger, who adjourned this motion to allow Mr. Narouz sufficient time to review the translated decision and to respond, which he has done.
Mr. Narouz alleges that he and his neighbours observed two vehicles parked near his residence in positions that appeared intended to monitor his home. He attached photographs of some of these vehicles to his affidavit. On this basis, he concludes that Fiscard is responsible for surveilling his property.
Fiscard denies these allegations and has provided affidavit evidence from Alison Kilback, a mortgage investment specialist with Fiscard, stating that Fiscard has not retained anyone to monitor Mr. Narouz or his residence and has no knowledge of the vehicles to which he refers.
With respect to the alleged unlawful intrusions into the home, Fiscard explains that it retained Appledale Property Management to conduct an occupancy check. Representatives attended the property on two occasions. On each visit, they knocked on the door, received no response, and left a call-back notice.
Mr. Narouz’s claims of constant surveillance and improper investigative activity by Fiscard are not supported by the evidence. More importantly, even if accepted, these allegations concern conduct by a private party. They do not involve government action or legislation. Accordingly, the Charter does not apply.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Fiscard’s motion for an order granting leave to issue a writ of possession is granted. In particular, Fiscard is granted leave to have a writ of possession issued with respect to the Property if Mr. Narouz fails to deliver vacant possession of the Property to Fiscard within 30 days of the release of the French translation of this endorsement along with the signed Order.
Mr. Narouz’s motion is dismissed, including his claims for relief pursuant to s.24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
Fiscard uploaded a draft Order to Case Center, which I have reviewed, amended to correspond with this endorsement, and signed.
This decision, along with the Order, shall be translated into French on an urgent basis and provided to the parties as soon as possible.
Costs
Fiscard has been entirely successful on this motion and is therefore, in my view, entitled to costs. Fiscard has provided a Bill of Costs for the motion, and Mr. Narouz has submitted written submissions on costs.
Fiscard seeks partial indemnity costs, inclusive of HST and disbursements, in the amount of $32,955.11. In support of this request, Fiscard submits that the issues are very important to both parties, as they relate to approximately $600,000 in mortgage debt and possession of the mortgaged property. Fiscard further argues that although the motion is not overly complex, Mr. Narouz raised a number of issues that required detailed responses. These included serving a notice of constitutional question for the first time 15 days before a prior return date of December 18, 2025, which Fiscard maintains was improper. In addition, Mr. Narouz failed to provide the name or contact information of the individual staying at his residence until he was cross-examined on the issue. Fiscard also submits that Mr. Narouz should have complied with Justice Jensen’s order for possession without requiring Fiscard to bring a motion for a writ of possession.
Mr. Narouz argues that he should not be ordered to pay costs, or, in the alternative, that Fiscard’s costs should be significantly reduced due to his advanced age, significant health issues, and very limited financial means. He submits that his financial circumstances and inability to pay should be taken into account.
Section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act, provides that costs are in the discretion of the Court. The case law further establishes that a successful party is presumed to be entitled to costs in an amount that is reasonable, having regard to the factors set out in Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court must be mindful, in exercising its discretion, that the fixing of costs is not simply a mechanical exercise; the objective is to set an amount that is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances (Boucher v. Public Accountants Council (Ontario) (2004), 2004 14579 (ON CA), 71 O.R. (3d) 291 (C.A.), at para. 26). In
determining what is fair, reasonable, and proportionate, due consideration must be given to the reasonable expectations of the parties (Neubuerger v. York, 2016 ONCA 303, at para. 17.)
- In exercising my discretion with respect to costs, I find that costs to Fiscard in the amount of $15,000, inclusive of disbursements and HST, are fair, reasonable, and proportionate in the circumstances. Accordingly, Mr. Narouz shall pay to Fiscard its costs of this motion, fixed in the amount of $15,000.
Associate Justice Fortier(MF)
Date: 2025-05-25