Mileuska v. Najdovski, 2026 ONSC 299

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

CITATION: Mileuska v. Najdovski, 2026 ONSC 299 COURT FILE NO.: FS-25-50337 DATE: 2026-01-15

BETWEEN:

Vesna Mileuska Applicant

– and –

Boris Najdovski Respondent

COUNSEL:

Gary Peires, for the Applicant Self-Represented

HEARD: January 8, 2026

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

M. Kraft, J.

Overview

1The respondent, Boris Najdovski (“Boris”), appeals the June 17, 2025, order of Justice Kapurura, which stayed his Motion to Change the child support order dated August 4, 2006 (2006 child support order), until he pays $10,000 in security for costs, $2,000 to satisfy costs arrears from April 4, 2006, and $2,000 for the motion's costs (“Security Order”). Boris’s Motion to Change seeks to “cancel” the 2006 child support order and/or to rescind all arrears accumulated under that order back to 2006, which is an order he did not appeal at the time.

2Boris argues that the motions judge erred in making the Security Order because he exercised his jurisdiction improperly, erroneously found that Boris had engaged in blameworthy conduct, and in making the order, extinguished Boris’s ability to advance his claims in his Motion to Change. Boris claims that he cannot post the security for costs as ordered because he is impecunious. He also asserts that the Security Order is not child-focussed because it ignores the fact that Boris has a 15-year-old daughter in North Macedonia, who is not a child of the parties, for whom he has a financial obligation to support.

3I carefully listened to Boris and his arguments which were well-organized. But none provided a basis for appeal. I am satisfied that there is no error in the decision of the motion judge. Whether to grant or refuse security for costs is a discretionary decision entitled to deference absent an error or law or principle: Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corporation, 2017 ONCA 827, 183 O.R. (3d) 1, at para. 20.

Brief Background

4Married in 1993 and separated in 1997, the parties have two independent adult children, ages 32 and 28. The applicant, Vesna Mileuska (“Vesna”), age 64, earns $66,600 annually as a pension administrator. Boris, age 65, is a trained engineer in poor health, who has been living in North Macedonia since 2008 and has a 15-year-old daughter there.

5In an uncontested order dated April 4, 2006, Boris was ordered to pay $1,098 monthly in child support for the parties’ 2 children, based on a $75,000 income which he was earning at that time, plus $2,000 in motion costs (“2006 child support order”).

6In August 2008, Boris moved to North Macedonia and ceased making child support payments to Vesna. While he previously made some voluntary payments of child support between 2006 and 2008, his arrears totalled $20,884 by September 1, 2008. The child support arrears have grown to $118,747. Child support accruals ended in 2014 and 2019 as the children became ineligible.

7Vesna supported their children without Boris's help; he made no payments after moving to Macedonia and never communicated any financial changes he had experienced. She only learned of his request to rescind all arrears when served with his Motion to Change in 2024.

8In 2024, after the Family Responsibility Office began garnishing his CPP benefits, Boris’s sole income of $670, he filed a Motion to Change to rescind all arrears that had accumulated under the 2006 child support order. His position is that he does not have the means to comply with the order. He claims systemic barriers and non-residency prevented him from seeking a variation sooner. His financial statement lists no assets in Ontario.

9August 2024 was the first and only request Boris made to vary the 2006 child support order since it was made 18 years earlier. Boris claims he cannot support his family in Macedonia, where monthly expenses are $1,400; his sole income is a $670 CPP pension, half of which is currently garnished.

10During a March 2025 case conference, Vesna was directed to seek security for costs. By way of a 14B motion, Boris then received leave to bring a motion to rescind the arears and/or move for a stay of enforcement. However, the court inadvertently neglected to send Vesna that 14B endorsement. Both motions were to be returnable on June 17, 2025.

11On June 17, 2025, Justice Kapurura heard the security for costs motion first, deferring Boris’s rescission motion as its progress depended on the outcome of Vesna’s motion. The resulting "Security Order" stayed Boris’s Motion to Change until he: (a) paid the outstanding $2,000 costs order from 2006 immediately; (b) paid $10,000 into trust as security for costs by August 29, 2025; and (c) paid $2,000 for the motion's costs by July 31, 2025.

12This appeal is not a rehearing. Rather, the purpose of this hearing is to determine if the motion judge committed palpable and overriding errors of fact, or errors of law or mixed fact and law.

13Having found no such errors, I dismiss Boris’s appeal.

Boris’s Position on the Appeal

14Boris argues that the motions judge erred as follows:

a. Ordering security for costs as a procedural safeguard that, in practice, extinguishes Boris’s claims and violates proportionality and access to justice.

b. Failing to exercise his judicial discretion properly in applying r.24(20) to the facts of this case.

c. Improperly finding "blameworthy conduct" in Boris’s 18-year delay, ignoring evidence that systemic barriers as a non-resident prevented earlier filings.

d. Failing to conduct a holistic review or exercise proper discretion, specifically by basing the security for costs analysis on the incorrect assumption of blameworthy conduct.

e. Failing to consider Boris’s impecuniosity and the needs of his 15-year-old daughter.

Vesna’s Position on the Appeal

15Vesna maintains that the motions judge committed no reviewable errors, noting that Boris may still proceed with his Motion to Change upon complying with the Security Order. She argues that the order correctly applied Rule 24(20), as Boris is a non-resident with no Ontario assets, has $2,000 in outstanding historical costs, and his legal claim has little merit.

16Furthermore, Vesna asserts that Boris has repeatedly breached the Security Order given that he brought an urgent motion in this court, which resulted in the parties being directed to attend TBST court, which caused Vesna to incur further legal fees; and he brought two 14B motions in the OCJ, both of which were ultimately dismissed but also required Vesna to incur legal fees to defend.

Standard of Review

17The standard of review in this appeal is not in dispute. On questions of fact, the standard of review is one of “overriding and palpable error”. On questions of law, the standard of review is correctness. See the case of Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65; and Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235.

18The motion judge’s determinations with respect to questions of fact and mixed fact and law are entitled to deference and cannot be interfered with absent a palpable and overriding error of fact or in mixed fact and law or an extricable question of law that would be reviewed for correctness. The question is whether the motions judge erred with respect to identifying the correct legal test (an error of law), or correctly identified the legal test but erred in applying the test to the facts (an error of mixed fact and law).

19The need to give deference to motions/trial judges in family matters was emphasized by the Supreme Court of Canada in Hickey v. Hickey, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 518.

Analysis

Did the motions judge err in (a) failing to exercise his judicial discretion properly in applying r.24(20) to the facts of this case and/or (b) ordering security for costs as a procedural safeguard that, in practice, extinguishes Boris’s claims and violates proportionality and access to justice and/or (c) failing to conduct a holistic review or exercise proper discretion, specifically in his security for costs analysis?

20Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules provides as follows:

Order for security for costs

24(20) A judge may, on motion, make an order for security for costs that is just, based on one or more of the following factors:

1. A party habitually resides outside Ontario.

2. A party has an order against the other party for costs that remains unpaid, in the same case or another case.

3. A party is a corporation and there is good reason to believe it does not have enough assets in Ontario to pay costs.

4. There is good reason to believe that the case is a waste of time, a nuisance or an abuse of the court process, and that the party does not have enough assets in Ontario to pay costs.

5. A statute entitles the party to security for costs. O. Reg. 10/25, s. 4.

Amount and form of security

(21) The judge shall determine the amount of the security, its form and the method of giving it. O. Reg. 10/25, s. 4.

Effect of order for security

(22) Until the security has been given, a party against whom there is an order for security for costs may not take any step in the case, except to appeal from the order, unless the judge orders otherwise. O. Reg. 10/25, s. 4.

Failure to give security

(23) If the party does not give the security as ordered and, as a result, the judge makes an order dismissing the party’s case or striking out the party’s answer or any other document filed by the party, subrule (22) no longer applies. O. Reg. 10/25, s. 4.

Security may be changed

(24) The amount of the security, its form and the method of giving it may be changed by order at any time. O. Reg. 10/25, s. 4.

Payment to carry on case

(25) The court may make an order that a party pay an amount of money to another party to cover part or all of the expenses of carrying on the case, including a lawyer’s fees. O. Reg. 10/25, s. 4.

21I find that the motions judge properly applied the correct legal principles in determining whether to make an order for security for costs for the following reasons:

a. He identified that the purpose of an order for security for costs is to protect a party from nuisance or irresponsible litigation, conducted without regard to the merits of the case or the costs likely to be incurred, as set out in Izyuk v. Bilousoc, 2015 ONSC 3684, Blackwood v. Nichols, 2022 ONCH 313, para. 36.

i. In this case, the motions judge considered both the merits of Boris’s claim to rescind all of the child support arrears that began accruing 18 years ago under the 2006 child support order, and the need to protect Vesna from the costs likely to be incurred in defending the claim to rescind the child support arrears.

b. He correctly analyzed and placed the onus on Vesna, a party seeking the security for costs, to show that Boris fell within one of the enumerated grounds in subrules 24(13) to (17).

i. In this case, the motions judge’s reasons, at paragraph 24, state that Boris fell into three of the enumerated grounds set out in subrule 24(20) as follows:

    1. He habitually resides outside of Ontario. He resides in North Macedonia;

    2. He owes the mother $2,000 in unpaid costs from the original child support motion; and

    3. There is good reason to believe that the case is a waste of time, a nuisance or an abuse of the court process, and that the party does not have enough assets in Ontario to pay costs. Boris has no assets in the Province of Ontario, which was confirmed by his sworn evidence in his Form 13 financial statement.

c. Having found that Vesna met the onus of showing that Boris fell into three of the enumerated categories of r. 24(20), the motions judge correctly analyzed that the Court retains wide discretion as to the quantum and means of payment of the order, as set out in Clark v. Clark, 2014 ONCA 175. Further, in exercising this discretion, the motions judge was alert to the fact that the order must be “just” and based on one or more of the factors listed in subrule 24(20). In other words, the motions judge was mindful that satisfying the criteria of Rule 24(20) was not sufficient to merit an order for security for costs but that, it also must be just for that order to be made. See paragraph 23 of the motions judge’s reasons.

d. In determining whether to make a security for costs order would be just, the motions judge considered the merits of the claim being made by Boris to retroactively rescind the child support arrears that have accumulated over the past 18 years. Toward that end, the motions judge referred to Colucci v. Colucci, 2021 SCC 24 in the following fashion:

i. The motions judge corrected stated that Boris has the onus to meet the threshold of establishing a past material change in his circumstances, such as a material decrease in income that has some degree of continuity, that is real and not one of choice;

    1. In this regard the motions judge found that Boris’ arguments regarding the material change in his financial circumstances have challenges. In recognizing that the evidence was not yet tested, Kapurura, J. noted that the existence of a 14-year-old daughter (now 15) in Macedonia does not constitute a material change in Boris’ circumstances connected to the need to reduce his child support obligations to the 2 children from this marriage arising from the 2006 child support order. 

    2. In considering Boris’ argument that he has medical issues that amount to a material change in his circumstances justifying a complete recission of child support arrears, the motions judge noted that Boris had not made medical disclosure. The motions judge referred to the fact that if a payor wishes the court to consider medical reasons why someone was not able to earn an income, Davidson v. Patten, [2021 ONCJ 437](https://www.minicounsel.ca/ocj/2021/437) sets out guidance as to what information the court would require which include:

        a. Diagnosis;

        b. Prognosis;

        c. Treatment plan;

        d. Compliance with the treatment plan

        e. Specific and detailed information connecting the medical condition to the ability to work (e.g, this person cannot work at the pre-injury job; this person cannot work for three months; this person cannot work at physical labour; this person cannot return to work ever).

    3. Boris argued during the appeal that it was not appropriate for the motions judge to have expected him to produce a medical report from Macedonia that would be up to same standards as a medical report from Canada. There is no basis for that submission. He also argued that at the appeal that it was not his responsibility to translate any such medical reports. That is simply incorrect. The courts in Canada operate in English and French. A litigant from a foreign country has the obligation to translate any documents it wishes this Court to consider as evidence. Further, a medical report that sets out a payor’s medical condition, prognosis, treatment and how the condition impacts someone’s ability to earn income is a basic requirement where a payor asks the court to consider the fact that he cannot work because he is in poor health.

ii. The motions judge correctly noted that there was nothing on the record before him that identified the past material change in circumstances Boris faced that would meet the threshold of a material change in circumstances. Notwithstanding that, the motions judge proceeded to consider the next step in the analysis.

e. The motion judge correctly analyzed that once a material change is established, which he concluded would be a challenge for Boris, a presumption arises to retroactively decrease child support to the date the payor gave effective notice, up to three years before formal notice of the application to vary. The motion judge correctly stated in paragraph 23 of the reasons, that in the decrease context, effective notice requires clear communication of the change in circumstances accompanied by the disclosure of any available documentation necessary to substantiate the change and allow the recipient parent to meaningfully assess the situation: Jonas v. Akwiwu, 2021 ONCA 641.

f. The motion judge set out in paragraph 23 of the reasons that in circumstances where no effective notice is given by the payor parent, child support should generally be varied back to the date of formal notice, or a later date where the payor had delayed making complete disclosure in the course of the proceedings.

i. In this case, having found no effective notice, the motions judge moved to the fact that child support should be varied back to the date of formal notice given to Vesna, which in this case, was when Boris served Vesna with his Motion to Change in August 2024. Even if the Court agrees with Boris’ assertion that he tried to bring a Motion to Change in 2008, for which there was no evidence presented, the motions judge correctly stated that Colucci requires that the date of effective notice not go back more than 3 years from the date of formal notice. The motions judge found therefore, that at most, Boris would be able to argue to rescind the child supports 3 years from when he gave formal notice which is August of 2021. See paragraph 24 of the reasons.

g. The motions judge correctly stated that notwithstanding Colucci, he retained discretion to depart from the presumptive date of retroactivity where the result would otherwise be unfair. The D.B.S. factors, adapted to the decrease context, guided the exercise of the motions judge’s discretion. Those factors were listed in paragraph 23 of his reasons as: (i) whether the payor had an understandable reason for the delay in seeking a decrease; (ii) the payor’s conduct; (iii) the child’s circumstances; and (iv) hardship to the payor if support is not decreased (viewed in context of hardship to the child and recipient if support is decreased). The payor’s efforts to pay what they can and to communicate and disclose income information on an ongoing basis will often be a key consideration under the factor of payor conduct.

22The motions judge noted that Boris was adding to Vesna’s costs through his Motion to Change and that Vesna runs the risk of accumulating significant costs, without any guarantee that an award of costs in her favour will be paid. The motions judge arrived at this conclusion noting that there was no available mechanism for Vesna to enforce any further costs orders against Boris, in the same manner that FRO was not able to enforce the 2006 child support order once he move to Macedonia and is outside of Ontario.

23I do not find that the motions judge made a palpable or overriding error in mixed law and fact in making the order for security for costs as a procedural safeguard. I do not agree with Boris that this Security Order extinguishes his claims. Rather, Boris is entitled to proceed with his Motion to Change once he complies with the Security Order.

24I do not find that the motion judges made a palpable or overriding error in mixed law and fact or that he failed to exercise his judicial discretion in properly applying r. 24(20) to the facts of this case. Rather, I find that he applied his discretion fairly and judiciously as set out above.

Did the motions judge err in improperly finding "blameworthy conduct" on Boris’s part (a) because Boris failed to pay a prior costs order arising from the 2006 child support order and/or (b) because there was an 18-year delay by Boris in pursuing a motion to vary the 2006 child support order ?

25In considering whether Boris engaged in “blameworthy conduct”, which was done to look at the underlying merits of Boris’s claim to cancel all of the arrears under the 2006 child support order, the motion judge looked to the case of D.B.S. v. S.R.G., L.J.W. v. T.A.R., Henry v. Henry, Heimstra v. Heimstra 2006 Carswell SCC 37. In D.B.S., Bastarache J. provided considerable guidance in elucidating what the Court means by “blameworthy conduct,” stating at para. 36:

a. …courts should take an expansive view of what constitutes blameworthy conduct in this context. I would characterize as blameworthy conduct anything that privileges the payor parent’s own interests over his/her children’s right to an appropriate amount of support.(D.B.S., at 36.) [emphasis added]

b. No level of blameworthy behaviour by payor parents should be encouraged. Even where a payor parent does nothing active to avoid his/her obligations, (s)he might still be acting in a blameworthy manner if (s)he consciously chooses to ignore them. Put simply, a payor parent who knowingly avoids or diminishes his/her support obligation to his/her children should not be allowed to profit from such conduct…(D.B.S., at 36.) [emphasis added]

c. Examples of blameworthy conduct are: a payor hiding income increases from the recipient parent, intimidating a recipient parent to dissuade that parent from bringing an application for support, or misleading a recipient parent into believing that the support obligations being met when (s)he knows that they are not.(D.B.S., at 36.)

d. The finding of blameworthy conduct, or its absence, is not definitive in any one case. Bastarache J. quite clearly states that no one factor is decisive and that the court should exercise its discretion in determining the question based on a “holistic” view of each case. Bastarache J. noted expressly that retroactive support could be ordered even in the absence of any blameworthy conduct by the payor parent.(D.B.S., at para. 34.) [emphasis added]

26In making the finding that Boris engaged in blameworthy conduct, the motions judge relied on the following facts:

a. Boris relocated to Macedonia 2 years after the granting of the 2006 child support order, which raises the suspicion that he was trying to evade support. (para. 24(ii) of the reasons);

b. Boris returned to Macedonia in 2008 due to his mother’s illness. He made a conscious decision to remain in Macedonia, fully knowing that he had a child support obligation in Canada (para. 24(iii) of the reasons).

c. Boris has no assets in Ontario to pay costs (para. 24(iv) of the reasons).

d. Boris is seeking to rescind all of the arears in excess of $118,000, which is an indirect attempt on his part to terminate an order that he never appealed. (para. 24(v) of the reasons).

e. The original child support order was made in his absence because Boris chose not to participate. By this Motion to Change, Boris is seeking to retroactive cancel an order that he could have participated in but did not (para. 24(vi) of the reasons).

f. His evidence is that he tried to initiate a Motion to Change in 2008. He did not take steps beyond 2008 to have his Motion to change heard by the court.

g. He made no payments under the 2006 child support order once he moved to North Macedonia. Any FRO payments Vesna received came from diversions.

h. He waited 18 years to seek variation. During this time the children were impacted by his conduct. Vesna struggled to the support the children financially on her own.

i. He ignored the costs ordered by the court at the time the 2006 child support order was made to pay Vesna $2,000. His evidence is that he didn’t understand he had to pay this amount; this amount was a small amount as compared with what he earned; if he knew he had to pay it, he would have. If that is the case, then why did Boris not take steps to do so.

27The motions judge also considered the case law that has found not paying costs orders cannot be condoned. He cited Carmichael v. Carmichael, 2019 ONSC 7224 where it was stated, among other things, that

Parties to litigation must understand that court proceedings are expensive, time-consuming and stressful for all concerned. They are not designed to give individual litigants a forum for carrying on in whatever manner they may choose, oblivious to the impact of that conduct on the other side and, perhaps most importantly for the purposes of this case, oblivious to the mounting costs of the litigation: Lawrence v. Lawrence, 2017 ONCJ 431, at para. 54.

28The motions judge’s reasons also stated at paragraph 26 that:

a. Parties cannot expect to be immune from an order of costs based on their limited financial resources. If this were the case, parties would be free to conduct litigation as they wished without fear of reprisal in the form of adverse costs orders and this would be contrary to the philosophy and requirements of the Rules. See: Culp v. Culp, 2019 ONSC 7051 (Ont. S.C.J.); Mark v. Bhangari, 2010 ONSC 4638 (Ont. S.C.J.).

b. Ability to pay alone cannot, nor should it, over-ride the other factors in Rule 24(12). See: Peers v. Poupore, 2008 ONCJ 615 (Ont. C.J.); Lawrence v. Lawrence, 2017 ONCJ 431, 2017 CarswellOnt 9843 (Ont. C.J.).

c. Those who can least afford litigation should be the most motivated to seriously pursue settlement and avoid unnecessary proceedings. See: Mohr v. Sweeney, 2016 ONSC 3238 (Ont. S.C.J.); T.L. v. D.S., 2020 ONCJ 9 (Ont. C.J.); Balsmeier v. Balsmeier, 2016 ONSC 3485 (Ont. S.C.J.).

d. Family law litigants are responsible for and accountable for the positions they take in the litigation. See: Heuss v. Surkos, 2004 ONCJ 141 (Ont. C.J.).

e. Impecuniosity does not grant a litigant the right to unrestricted access to the courts. Such access has to be exercised responsibly and reasonably. See: G.W.S. v. C.S., 2018 ONCJ 378.

29Further in paragraph 27 of the reasons, the motions judge stated, “[s]elf-representation cannot be used to shield or insulate a litigant from a costs award, otherwise it would create a two-tier system. Any such consideration is outweighed by the need to ensure that the objective of sanctioning/discouraging inappropriate behaviour is met. At a time when our family court system is seeing ever-increasing numbers of self-represented parties, it is important to reaffirm that costs sanctions apply equally whether parties have counsel or not. No one should get a “free pass.” See: M.A.L. v. R.H.M., 2018 ONSC 2542 (par. 100); Barran v. Schanck, 2019 ONCJ 218

30Accordingly, I do not find that the motions judge made any errors in finding blameworthy conduct on Boris’s part. Further, he did not look at the blameworthy conduct as “the determining factor.” Rather, he balanced Boris’s hardship against the fact that he participated in blameworthy conduct. The motions judge stated in paragraph 24(d),

“If there is the potential for hardship to the payor, but there is also blameworthy conduct which precipitated or exacerbated the delay, it may be open to the courts to disregard the presence of hardship. In all cases, hardship may be addressed by the form of payment. See: Michel v. Graydon, 2020 SCC 24, para 124.”

31The motions judge correctly stated that Boris’s motion to change seeks to “cancel the 2006 support order.” In considering Boris’s position that he does not have the means to comply with the Security Order, the motions judge noted that Boris had failed to produce financial information in the initial proceedings. Having engaged in that conduct, the 2006 child support order was made in his absence. The underlying child support order is in line with Boris’s reported income at the time the order was made. In any case, Boris chose not to participate in the proceeding and an uncontested order was made.

32I do not find that the motions judge failed to conduct a holistic review or exercise proper discretion, specifically by basing the security for costs analysis on the incorrect assumption of blameworthy conduct, nor do I find that the motions judge made a palpable or overriding error by not considering Boris’s impecuniosity or his 15-year-old daughter’s needs in Macedonia.

33In fact, it was a result of Boris’ financial means being limited and the concerns he raised about be able to provide for his 15-year-old daughter that the motions judge only ordered him to pay security costs in the sum of $10,000 and not $20,000 as sought by Vesna. Further, Boris was given until August 29, 2025, to pay the security order which was essentially two full months.

Disposition

34I do not find that Kapurura, J. made any errors in law or a palpable or overriding error of fact or mixed fact and law. Accordingly, Boris’ appeal is hereby dismissed.

35Vesna is entitled to costs of this appeal. If the parties cannot agree on costs, Vesna shall serve and file written costs submissions of no more than 3 pages in writing, not including a Bill of Costs or Offers to Settle within 7 days of the release of this Endorsement. Boris shall serve and file responding costs submissions of no more than 3 pages in writing, not including a Bill of Costs or Offers to Settle within 5 days of being served with Vesna’s costs submissions.

M. Kraft, J.

Released: January 15, 2026

CITATION: Mileuska v. Najdovski, 2026 ONSC 299 COURT FILE NO.: FS-25-50337 DATE: 2026-01-15

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

Vesna Mileuska Applicant

– and –

Boris Najdovski Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

M. Kraft, J.