CITATION: Vallelunga v. Vallee, 2026 ONSC 2900

COURT FILE NO.: FS-21-000225-00

DATE: 2026-05-19

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

B E T W E E N:

Brunella Vallelunga

P. Gouda, for the Applicant

Applicant

• and -

Mario Lorne Vallee

No one appearing, for the Respondent Mario Vallee

Respondent

HEARD: April 30, 2026 by Zoom at Thunder Bay, Ontario

Mr. Justice F. B. Fitzpatrick

Reasons For Judgment on Uncontested Trial

Background

1Ms. Vallelunga claims she and Mr. Vallee were in a common law relationship from April 7, 2007 until September 9, 2020. There were no children of this relationship.

2Ms. Vallelunga commenced her application in November 2021. Various heads of relief were claimed. Ultimately only a claim for damages arising from a claim of unjust enrichment and repayment of an amount owing under a promissory note were pursued before me on this uncontested trial.

3Ms. Vallelunga’s application had 19 specific paragraphs setting out the relief claimed including claims for spousal support, freezing of assets, a certificate of pending litigation on an unspecified property, the claim for unjust enrichment and a restraining order.

4Mr. Vallee filed an answer prepared by counsel in January 2022. In addition to a wholesale denial of Ms. Vallelunga’s various claims, Mr. Vallee alleged the parties separated in 2015 and thereafter only lived as “roommates”.

5Both parties appeared with counsel on a case conference on April 22, 2022. A lengthy disclosure order was made on that date.

6From a review of the endorsements in the file in Case Centre, the file then lay dormant for almost three years. In fact, the case was administratively dismissed on December 11, 2024. Ms. Vallelunga moved immediately to set it aside. It was so ordered by Wojciechowski J. on January 30, 2025. Wojciechowski J. commented in his endorsement that the matter should not be allowed to drag on and to that end, ordered Mr. Vallee to show up at the next attendance which was to be a settlement conference. Mr. Vallee did not attend the scheduled settlement conference on May 15, 2025. At that date RSJ Newton ordered the matter proceed as an uncontested trial. Mr. Vallee’s counsel got off the record on July 17, 2025.

7A first uncontested trial was scheduled before Nieckarz J. on January 9, 2026. The trial did not proceed because Ms. Vallelunga did not file a factum or draft order as was required by the Newton RSJ Order of May 15, 2025. Counsel for Ms. Vallelunga also indicated an amendment to her application might be required. Ultimately. I could find no record of that proposed amendment being put before the Court.

8The matter came before me on February 10, 2026. The matter did not proceed that day because the trial materials were not organized in a satisfactory way. 300 pages of material were filed without hyperlinks making it difficult for the Court to deal with the matter in an efficient fashion.

9The matter was again scheduled before me on April 30, 2026 and it proceeded on that date. The draft order filed asked for:

1. Judgment is granted in favour of the Applicant Brunella Vallelunga against the Respondent Mario Lorne Vallee in the amount of $[amount], inclusive of:

a. unjust enrichment damages; and

b. the sum of $90,000 owing pursuant to the promissory note.

2. The amounts owing shall bear pre-judgment and post-judgment interest in accordance with the Courts of Justice Act. 3. The Applicant is entitled to her costs of this motion, fixed in the amount of $[amount], payable within 30 days.

10The factum filed by Ms. Vallelunga was more particular in the “Order Requested” section seeking;

a. A declaration that Mario holds a portion of the proceeds of sale of the Duvernay Property in trust for the Applicant;

b. A monetary award to the Applicant by way of unjust enrichment and/or quantum meruit, reflecting her direct financial contributions and the benefit conferred upon Mario; and

c. Such further and other equitable relief as this Honourable Court deems just.

11I repeat the history of the matter because it is material to some preliminary observations that bear on how I have determined to adjudicate the claim as presented based on the affidavit evidence filed and the submissions of counsel. There was no trial record before the court on this attendance. It appears to have been deleted. Also there was no record in the endorsements or orders in the court file and in the material filed at this uncontested trial of Ms. Vallelunga’s spousal support claim or claims for a restraining order or claims for the freezing of assets having been adjudicated. They were not before me. It is unclear if these claims have been abandoned.

12In considering the material before me, it seems the claims as presented fall into two broad categories. First, a claim under a promissory note. Second, a claim for damages arising from a claim of unjust enrichment.

13Despite the fact the matter was proceeding on an uncontested basis, judgment can only be granted if the evidence presented support such a conclusion on a balance of probabilities. Mr. Vallee did file an answer in this matter. He is not in default of responding to Ms. Vallelunga’s claim. However, it has been determined that this trial should proceed in his absence. In a civil context, even where no defence has been filed a party must prove its case if the deemed admissions do not entitle a party to judgment. In this matter, by analogy to the civil rules, as the result of Mr. Vallee filing an answer, I find there are no deemed admissions contained in the pleadings, material to the claims put forward by Ms. Vallelunga at this uncontested trial.

Preliminary Finding of Fact

14I find on the materials filed that Brunella Vallelunga and Mario Lorne Vallee cohabited within the meaning of section (1) of the Family Law Act R.S.O. 1990 c. F-3 as amended (FLA) in that they lived together in a conjugal relationship outside of marriage. Further they were spouses within the meaning of section 29 of the FLA as they were not married to each other but cohabited for a period of not less than three years.

The claim under the Promissory Note

15Ms. Vallelunga filed two affidavits on this trial. An affidavit dated October 14, 2025, makes no mention of the promissory note or any circumstances surrounding it.

16The affidavit of January 14, 2025 says the following;

In November 2013, Mario signed a promissory note whereby he agreed that he owed me $100,000 representing the amounts he borrowed from me from 2006 to 2014. In February 2016, Mario paid me $10,000 and acknowledged that he still owed me $90,000. I attach as Exhibit A to this affidavit a copy of the promissory note dated February 20, 2016 signed by myself and Mario indicating that further to the 2013 promissory note, Mario owes me $100,000 and has only paid $10,000 towards that debt.

17The “promissory note” was a document entitled “Payment Against Promissory Note”. It was dated February 20, 2016 and contained the following text:

Further to the Promissory Note signed in November 2013 whereby the borrower, Mario L. Vallee, promised to pay back Brunella Vallelunga the full amount borrowed between 2006 and 2014 in the amount of $100,000, let it be known that Mario Vallee paid a portion in the amount of $10,000 to Brunella Vallelunga. The principle amount borrowed is now reduced to $90,000.

18There was no evidence produced on this trial in respect of the terms of the November 2013 promissory note.

19The failure to produce the original promissory note presents some difficulties from the Court. However, I find the exhibited document contains words that allow me to draw a reasonable inference that the document is an acknowledgement of debt by Mr. Vallee in the amount of $90,000.00. I note that the part payment occurred more than two years from the date of the original note in November 2013. From that fact, I draw an inference and find that the original note was not governed by an express payment date, or that the usual two-year limitation period contained a section 4 of the Limitations Act 2002 S.O. c. 24 as amended would apply to this instrument. Rather, I find on the evidence the instrument was a demand note, for which the limitation was governed by section 5(1) of the Limitations Act. I find the parties contemplated that the principal amount could be paid off in installments of less than the full amount over time as and when demanded by Ms. Vallelunga.

20The affidavit discloses no further evidence of an express demand for payment under the note before the application was issued. I find the obligation for Mr. Vallee to pay Ms. Vallelunga was still outstanding as of the date the application was issued in this matter in 2021. I find there is no evidence that Mr. Vallee satisfied this obligation with any further payments made before or after separation.

21I therefore find on the evidence presented at this uncontested trial that Mr. Vallee owes Ms. Vallelunga the sum of $90,000.00 in respect of monies borrowed by Mr. Vallee from Ms. Vallelunga for the period 2006 to 2014.

22Further, I find on the evidence that upon payment of the sum of $90,000.00 plus interest further to judgment granted herein, Mr. Vallee will have satisfied any and all claims Ms. Vallelunga had against him for any monies advanced or contributions to property made for the period 2066 to 2014. I find this based on the language of the document dated February 20, 2016.

23Brunella Vallelunga shall have judgment against Mario Lorne Vallee in the amount of $90,000.00 plus interest calculated at the post judgment rate as of the first quarter of 2021 at 2% to date of this judgment and post judgment interest on the accumulated amount at the post judgment rate for the first quarter of 2026 as that was the first date the uncontested trial could have proceeded.

The claim for unjust enrichment

24Counsel for Ms. Vallelunga relied on the leading decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Kerr v. Baranow, 2011 SCC 10 in submitting that this Court should declare that Mr. Vallee has been unjustly enriched at Ms. Vallelunga’s expense for no juristic reason. At paragraph 81 of Kerr, Cromwell J., writing for the unanimous court, stated that a claim for unjust enrichment arises “when the parties have engaged in a joint family venture and there is a clear link between the contributions to the joint venture and the accumulation of wealth”. The jurisprudence following Kerr requires a party seeking to prove a claim for unjust enrichment to demonstrate that the opposite party has been enriched for which the claimant has suffered a corresponding deprivation and that there was no “juristic reason” for the enrichment.

25In my view, the evidence presented at this uncontested trial was not sufficient to prove Ms. Vallelunga’s claim for unjust enrichment. I say so for the following reasons.

26On this trial, from the affidavit materials filed including the factum, Ms. Vallelunga was ultimately seeking to prove a claim of unjust enrichment in order to secure an order to share in the proceeds of sale of a house located at 475 Duvernay Drive Orleans Ontario (“Duvernay”). From a GeoWarehouse document provided in the affidavit material by Ms. Vallelunga, Duvernay was purchased solely by Mr. Vallee on July 30, 2009, for $250,000.00. It was transferred to Ayesha Malette and Shawn Malette for $595,000.00 on September 10, 2020. Despite the affidavit of Ms. Vallelunga referencing a mortgage on Duvernay, no such documentary evidence was provided to the court that went beyond December 31, 2010. At that time the principal amount of the mortgage was $180,793.38 on a property that had been purchased for $250,000.00 about 18 months before. At best, printouts of a line of credit in Mr. Vallee’s name were provided but the latest date was August 13, 2017. There were two statements on that date. One statement for a personal line of credit and one statement for a Homeowner Readiline Account. While both statements showed a zero balance, the amount of total credit available showed $120,000.00 for the personal line and $340,000.00 for the Homeowner Line.

27While Ms. Vallelunga deposes at various places she contributed to renovations to Duvernay, I could find no other independent evidence such as receipts for payments made for particular renovations in the material before me. It is not sufficient to make bald statements about contributions in the context of a claim for an unjust enrichment. There was clear evidence about the purchase of household items. But these do not attach to land and do not particularly enhance the value of land as they can be moved when the property is sold.

28While Mr. Vallee had an obligation to provide financial disclosure in this matter, which he did not do, the Court is left in a difficult position concerning the amount, and even a “ballpark amount” that Mr. Vallee can be said to have been enriched by the sale of Duvernay, if he was even enriched at all.

29Ms. Vallelunga’s affidavits go on at length about Mr. Vallee’s inability to handle money and his personal financial difficulties that she observed during their relationship. Ms. Vallelunga also deposes that

-“throughout our relationship Mario demonstrated consistent irresponsibility in managing his business and personal finances” (para 34 aff Jan 2025)

-“from the outset Mario treated the Duvernay property as a source of credit to address his personal debts. Over time he refinanced the property multiple times borrowing far more than the original mortgage amount. The funds from these refinances were not used for household renovations or improvements but were instead used by Mario to pay off personal debts, credit cards and loans unrelated to the property”

30This evidence leads me to draw the inference that Mr. Vallee’s entire financial picture was not good, despite all the things Ms. Vallelunga claims she was doing for him. At the same time, she was living in the property and presumably enjoying the benefits of the things, like household items, that she deposes she alone purchased. This is not evidence of enrichment on Mr. Vallee’s part or corresponding deprivation to Ms. Vallelunga. What it is, at best, is evidence of a failing family venture. In my view, the equitable principles enunciated in Kerr does not guarantee either participant in an alleged family venture to participate in same and then to get back everything they have put in, if at the end, there is nothing there to distribute.

31In my view, what is missing in all of the evidence is proof of enrichment on the part of Mr. Vallee from the sale of Duvernay. There is a sale price, but no evidence about any debt that had to be paid off on closing. This is considered in the face of the other evidence given by Ms. Vallelunga that Mr. Vallee was constantly in debt and allegations that he maximized the equity of Duvernay by encumbering it to fund other debts and his alleged multiple failed ventures. Counsel in submissions urged me to simply award half of the sale price of Duvernay to Ms. Vallelunga on the basis of a constructive trust arising from proof of a claim of an unjust enrichment. I am not persuaded to do so based on the evidence I have before me.

32I am persuaded that there was no enrichment by Mr. Vallee because of the evidence Ms. Vallelunga gave that Mr. Vallee gave her $20,000.00 on September 11, 2020. How he had the money to do this and why it doesn’t represent complete compensation to Ms. Vallelunga for monies she did contribute to the alleged joint family venture was not addressed in the materials provided to the court. However, it is evidence that if Mr. Vallee was enriched, he did return funds to Ms. Vallelunga. However it is not proof on a balance of probabilities that Ms. Vallelunga is entitled to a judgment on this particular aspect of her claim. Her bald statements were not sufficient to persuade me that Mr. Vallee was enriched in any amount beyond the $20,000.00 he paid Ms. Vallelunga shortly after closing the Duvernay property.

33I am also not persuaded that a circumstance of a joint family venture has been made out in this case. Ms. Vallelunga made Mr. Vallee sign a promissory note to repay $100,000.00 to her about 5 years into their relationship. This is not persuasive evidence of a joint family venture but rather of two people who may have financial ties but were not pulling together towards common goals. Otherwise, there would be no need for a promissory note as sharing in the fruits of the venture would be envisioned by both parties.

34The evidence of the promissory note in 2013 leads me to conclude that there was financial separation in this relationship rather than a combined effort which would be characteristic of a joint family venture. Ms. Vallelunga sought to enforce a debt through a promissory note for a period of time which she was cohabiting with Mr. Vallee. She received part payment in 2016 and continued to cohabit with him for another five years. She has now been successful in pursuing and proving that claim. In my view, pursuing that claim tends to disprove the existence of a joint family venture.

35Also Ms. Vallelunga deposed that monies she provided Mr. Vallee on an ongoing basis were characterized as “rent”. This evidence militates against a finding of a joint family venture as it connotes a degree of financial separation which is inconsistent with cohabiting spouses. Friends rent from each other. Typically, spouses do not.

36I find on the evidence that the circumstances of this common law relationship were not indicative of a joint family venture sufficient to found a claim for unjust enrichment.

37Further, in my view Ms. Vallelunga has not proved that she has suffered an economic deprivation which corresponds to an enrichment which also has not been proven on a balance of probabilities. I rely on the amounts that Mr. Vallee paid Ms. Vallelunga on September 11, 2020, to conclude that he in fact was not enriched by the sale of Duvernay beyond the amounts he paid to Ms. Vallelunga and that there was no corresponding deprivation suffered by Ms. Vallelunga.

38The other evidence about Ms. Vallelunga’s various contributions to personal items allegedly owned by Mr. Vallee such as the household items and various “toys” which Mr. Vallee purchased during the course of the relationship also do not persuade me that there was any enrichment to Mr. Vallee that corresponded to the Duvernay property. Personal items like furniture used in a house are generally depreciating assets which are used and enjoyed by all parties who live in a property where these are situate. What happened to these items was not made clear on the evidence. I could not conclude on the evidence that Ms. Vallelunga did not enjoy the benefit of these assets and therefore suffered no deprivation.

39Also Ms. Vallelunga deposes she was able to remove from Duvernay larger items that she says were worth roughly $7,000.00 after the sale closed. This is not an insubstantial amount. Her ability not to continue to enjoy these items arises from her decision post separation to return to Thunder Bay and not anything for which I can find is rationally connected to what Mr. Vallee did post separation. In my view, this also militates against a finding that Ms. Vallelunga has suffered a corresponding deprivation from the alleged enrichment.

40In my view, it is not sufficient for a party in a common law relationship upon a breakdown in that relationship to simply assert and seek to selectively prove that they “paid for stuff” and then seek to have the full value or indeed any value returned to them simply because of bald assertions about how they paid it. There has to be at least some minimal evidentiary connection of the expenditures at issue to an asset against which a party seeks judgment. The provincial legislature made a policy decision to not afford common law spouses with the ability to share in a division of net family property upon the breakdown of their relationships. The common law has sought to deal with this by the creation of the claim for unjust enrichment. However, the proof of such claims requires specific and persuasive evidence connecting the enrichment to the deprivation. In this case, I find that there was no joint family venture and further it has not been proven that Mr. Vallee has been enriched and that Ms. Vallelunga suffered a corresponding deprivation. Having failed to get over these hurdles there is no necessity to discuss the concept of “no juristic reason” for something that has not been proven.

41The affidavit evidence provided by Ms. Vallelunga does go into some detail about the financial aspects of the relationship between the parties. However, I find it to be more focused on proof of a dependency that would support a claim for compensatory spousal support rather than a basis to find there has been proved a claim for unjust enrichment. Many of the paragraphs in the affidavit appeared under the title “support”. While headings are not definitive, they nonetheless differentiate portions of the evidence and do correspond to the content of the paragraphs. For example, in the most recent affidavit of October 2025, paragraphs 28 through 38 appear under the heading of “support” and outline Ms. Vallelunga’s efforts to support Mr. Vallee’s apparent failed career. In my view this evidence is useful for a claim for compensatory spousal support rather than a basis for a claim for unjust enrichment.

42It was not clear why the various other claims in the application were not pursued on this uncontested trial. Practically, the claim for spousal support remains alive and is not constrained by any limitation period. It can be asserted at any time. A restraining order is also something that can be obtained at any time in future if supported by the appropriate evidence. The claim for a freezing of assets was not pursued before me.

43This matter was commenced in 2021. It has not been diligently pursued. Mr. Vallee chose not to participate in these proceedings since 2024 and likely earlier than that. No children are involved in this case. In my view this uncontested trial should be the end of the proceedings at least as they are presently constituted. Claims that have no limitation period can be pursued in a fresh application.

44For all the above reasons I am dismissing all the claims made in the application and by Mr. Vallee in his answer, and for clarity, all of Ms. Vallelunga’s claims for damages for unjust enrichment and claims against property owned by Mr. Vallee save and except the claim by Ms. Vallelunga in respect of the promissory note for which she will have judgment for $90,000.00 plus pre and post judgment interest as set out above.

45The dismissal of the claim for spousal support and the restraining order are made without prejudice to Ms. Vallelunga’s right to reassert these claims in a fresh proceeding at a later date.

46Costs of this action fixed in the amount of $5,000.00 inclusive of disbursements are awarded to Brunelle Vallelunga payable forthwith by Mario Lorne Vallee.

47Counsel for Ms. Vallelunga may prepare a final order for my signature reflecting these reasons and provide same to my judicial assistant for my signature. Approval as to form and content of this final order by Mario Lorne Vallee is hereby dispensed with.

The Hon. Mr. Justice F.B. Fitzpatrick