Visic v. Elia Associates Professional Corp. et. al., 2026 ONSC 2895

Court File and Parties

CITATION: Visic v. Elia Associates Professional Corp. et. al., 2026 ONSC 2895

COURT FILE NO.: CV-25-00743659-0000

DATE: 2026-05-19

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

RE: Anica Visic, Plaintiff

-and-

Elia Associates Professional Corporation et al., Defendant

BEFORE: Mathen, J.

COUNSEL: Anice Visic, for the Plaintiff Megan Molloy, for the Defendant

READ: May 13, 2026

ENDORSEMENT

1The registrar’s office referred this motion to me pursuant to rule 2.1.01(7) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, following receipt of a written request from lawyers for the Defendant, Elia Associates Professional Corporation (Elia) et al, under rule 2.1.01(6).

2On April 24, 2026, I directed the registrar to give notice to the Plaintiff, Anica Visic, that the court is considering making an order under Rule 2.1.01 dismissing the action.

3The Plaintiff filed submissions which I have reviewed.

4For the following reasons, I order the Plaintiff’s claim dismissed under Rule 2.1.01.

5I have benefited from the discussion of this case and related cases in many prior decisions of the Court, other courts, and tribunals.

6The Plaintiff is a lawyer called to the bar of Ontario. For five months in 2007, she was the Defendant’s articling student.

7The parties have been engaged in litigation dating back to 2008, before the Law Society, the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, the Superior Court of Justice, the Divisional Court, the Court of Appeal for Ontario, and the Supreme Court of Canada.

8Those prior proceedings include:

a. Visic v. Elia Associates Professional Corporation, 2011 HRTO 1230;

b. Visic v. Elia Associates Professional Corporation, 2011 HRTO 1933;

c. Anica Visic v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2013 ONLSHP 71;

d. Visic v HRTO and Elia Associates Professional Corporation, 2015 ONSC 7163

e. Anica Visic v. Ontario Human Rights Tribunal, et al., 2016 74988 (SCC)

f. Visic v. Elia Associates Professional Corporation, 2017 HRTO 744;

g. Visic v. Elia Associates Professional Corporation, 2019 ONSC 7238;

h. Visic v. Elia Associates Professional Corporation, 2020 ONCA 690;

i. Visic v. Elia Associates Professional Corporation, 2020 ONCA 779;

j. Anica Visic v. Elia Associates Professional Corporation, et al., 2021 CarswellOnt 4332 (SCC);

k. Visic v. Elia Associates, 2022 ONSC 3030;

l. Visic v. Elia Associates Professional Corporation, 2022 ONCA 841; and

m. Anica Visic v. Elia Associates Professional Corporation, et al., 2023 CarswellOnt 7721 (SCC).

9The root of the Plaintiff’s many legal claims is that, while she was a law student at the University of Windsor, her official transcript showed that she did not complete her first year. The Plaintiff says that the reason is that she had a physical disability. Therefore, in her view, it is discriminatory that her official transcript reflects the uncompleted year.

10In 2005, the Plaintiff commenced a civil action against the University and three individual defendants associated with it.

11From July 2007 to December 2007, the Plaintiff articled with Elia Associates. Patricia Elia (“PE”) was her principal. The Plaintiff did not disclose her official law school transcripts to the firm – only an unofficial one. The Plaintiff believed that producing the official transcript would reveal that she had had a physical disability, violate her privacy and amount to discrimination.

12By way of written notice, the Defendant law firm terminated the Plaintiff’s employment as an articling student on a without cause basis effective December 14, 2007. The notice of termination provided Ms. Elia with two options: she could depart immediately and be paid two weeks’ severance, or she could continue to work for the two-week notice period, which would give her the opportunity to complete the Law Society’s 10-month articling requirement.

13The Plaintiff absented herself from the Defendant’s workplace from November 30 to December 4, 2007. She did not notify the Defendant about, or explain to them, this absence.

14On December 5, 2007, the Plaintiff returned to work and sent correspondence to the Defendant disputing the bona fides of the notice period. The Plaintiff continued to work for the firm from December 5 to December 14, 2007. On December 18, 2007, the firm provided the Plaintiff with a Record of Employment, which stated that the reason for termination of employment was “not suitable for position”.

15As the Plaintiff’s articling principal, PE filed a Certificate with the Law Society of Upper Canada (now the Law Society of Ontario) recommending that the Plaintiff complete an additional six months of articles.

16In 2008, the Plaintiff brought a human rights application against the University before the HRTO, based on the same factual circumstances as her 2005 civil claim.

17During the HRTO hearing, PE testified that the Plaintiff, by hiding the fact that she did not successfully complete her first year, misrepresented her law school career to the Defendant firm.

18The Plaintiff tried but failed to get the HRTO to issue a partial publication ban and anonymization order. The Plaintiff argued that publicizing the dispute over the transcripts would affect her future employment prospects and harm her legal career.

19The HRTO dismissed the Plaintiff’s claims on the merits (Visic v. Elia Associates Professional Corporation, 2011 HRTO 1230). The HRTO also denied the partial publication ban and anonymization order.

20The Plaintiff unsuccessfully appealed the HRTO’s decision to the Divisional Court (Visic v Ontario (Human Tights Tribunal), 2015 ONSC 7163, 343 O.A.C. 318 (Div. Ct.). Leave to appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada were each denied.

21In 2012, in response to the Plaintiff’s application for a licence to practice law in Ontario, and concerns raised by her former principal PE, the Law Society initiated a “good character” hearing before the Law Society Hearing Panel (“LSHP”).

22During the course of the hearing, PE again testified that, in her view, the Plaintiff had misrepresented her academic standing by failing to provide her official transcripts. PE suggested that the misrepresentation called into question the Plaintiff’s character and suitability as a future lawyer.

23The LSHP ultimately found that the Plaintiff had not engaged in intentional dishonesty or misconduct about the transcripts. The panel did find that the Plaintiff had engaged in “sharp practice” in relation to her dispute with the University. The panel also noted that the Human Rights Tribunal declared the Plaintiff to be a vexatious litigant: Visic v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2012 HRTO 1642. In that decision, the HRTO found that “the applicant’s repeated attempts to pursue the same allegations against the University about her official transcript have reached the point of abuse of process”: para. 13.

24The Plaintiff was granted her licence to practice law in Ontario (Visic v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2013 ONLSHP 71).

25On December 21, 2018, the Plaintiff commenced an action in this Court against Elia and the University of Windsor.

26The 2018 action sought damages for “invasion of privacy, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of confidence, breach of contract, negligence, defamation and infringement of the Ontario Human Rights Code.” Among other things, the Plaintiff claimed that:

a. The Defendant Elia falsely alleged to the Law Society and others that the Plaintiff had been dishonest; denigrated the Plaintiff’s academic accomplishments; and falsely contended to the Law Society and others that the Plaintiff had behaved unprofessionally.

b. The Defendant Elia’s misconduct had caused the Plaintiff considerable emotional distress, as well as loss of income and future earning potential.

27In Visic v. Elia Associates Professional Corporation, 2019 ONSC 7238, at para. 18, Nishikawa J. invoked Rule 2.1.01 to dismiss the claim against the University as frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process. The judge found that the claim “was yet another attempt to relitigate the same issues raised in … previous action in this court, namely, Visic v. University of Windsor, 2013 ONSC 2063, and before the HRTO.”

28However, Nishikawa J. dismissed Elia’s claim for the same order. Nishikawa J. concluded that the 2018 claim against Elia was distinct from the Plaintiff’s prior complaint to the HRTO. Nishikawa J. noted that there was no prior civil action against Elia.

29On May 20, 2022, Vella J. granted Elia’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the 2018 action: 2022 ONSC 3030. Vella J. found that the Plaintiff knew of the allegedly defamatory and injurious statements made by Elia Associates (and PE in particular) by 2012 at the latest. Therefore, the Plaintiff had started her action beyond the basic two-year limitation period set out in s.4 of the Limitations Act, 2002.

30Vella J. found, further, that all of the Plaintiff’s causes of action as pleaded were based on the statements allegedly made by Elia Associates to prospective employers, which are the same statements as were the subject of the HRTO hearing and the subsequent LSHP hearing: supra, at para. 71.

31Vella J. considered and rejected the Plaintiff’s request to amend her Statement of Claim and Reply to plead the doctrine of fraudulent concealment: supra, at para. 40.

CURRENT ACTION

32On May 22, 2025, the Plaintiff commenced yet another action against the Defendant for, among other things, damages in the amount of $2,956,112 for:

i. Breach of an employment agreement

ii. Breach of the duty of care

iii. Breach of privacy

iv. Breach of fiduciary duty

v. Doctrine of fraudulent concealment

vi. Breaches of several provisions of the Ontario Human Rights Code

33Save for (v), the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, the 2025 action raises the same legal claims as the 2018 action.

34It appears to be undisputed that, as the Defendants puts it: “The Plaintiff has failed to pay a single costs award issued in favour of the Defendants in respect of the above-referenced proceedings, and as of [December 10, 2025], owes the Defendants $37,884.00, plus post-judgment interest, for unpaid costs awards arising from her unsuccessful motions, applications, and appeals.”

ISSUE

35The only issue is whether this Claim should be dismissed under Rule 2.1.01 because it frivolous, vexatious, and/or an abuse of process on its face.

ANALYSIS

36My findings are contained in the following analysis.

The Law

37Under Rule 2.1.01(1), the court “may, on its own initiative, stay or dismiss a proceeding if the proceeding appears on its face to be frivolous or vexatious or otherwise an abuse of the process of the court.”

38The Rule is not meant for “close calls” but, at the same time, must be “robustly interpreted and applied”: Gao v. Ontario WSIB and Ontario Ombudsman, 2014 ONSC 6100, 37 C.L.R. (4th) 1, at para. 9.

39A frivolous proceeding lacks a legal basis or legal merit or is brought without reasonable grounds. It is readily recognizable as devoid of merit and will necessarily or inevitably fail. See Gill v. MacIver, 2023 ONCA 776, at para. 3; Lavallee v. Isak, 2022 ONCA 290, at para. 19; Annotation to rule 2.1 in Ontario Superior Court Practice, the Hons. Todd Archibald, Stephen Firestone and Tamara Sugunasiri; Van Sluytman v. Orillia Soldiers' Memorial Hospital, 2017 ONSC 692, at para. 11; R. v. Haevischer, 2023 SCC 11, at para. 67; Pickard v. London Police Services Board, 2010 ONCA 643, 268 O.A.C. 153, at para. 19.

40Vexatious actions include those brought for an improper purpose other than the assertion of legitimate rights, such as the harassment and oppression of other parties: Re Lang Michener and Fabian, 1987 172 (ON SC). Common hallmarks of such litigation are curious formatting, “many, many pages”, odd attachments, and “rambling discourse characterized by repetition and a pedantic failure to clarify”: Khan v. Krylov & Company LLP, 2017 ONCA 625 citing Gao v. Ontario WSIB, 2014 ONSC 6497, at para. 15.

41In Gao #2, Myers J. cautioned that “even a vexatious litigation can have a legitimate complaint”: 2014 ONSC 6497 at para.18. The Court may not throw out cases simply because a party is difficult.

42Abuse of process exists when “the abusive nature of the proceeding is apparent on the face of the pleading and there is a basis in the pleadings to support the resort to the attenuated process”: Scaduto v. The Law Society of Upper Canada, 2015 ONCA 733 at para. 8.

Application

43I agree with the Defendant that the 2025 action is part of “a long-standing pattern of meritless, repetitive and abusive litigation”.

44The Plaintiff argues that “[w]hile there is some overlap between the facts,” the new causes of action, events and remedies are different. She points to “new context and fresh evidence.”

45Upon review of both her Statement of Claim and her submissions on this motion, I found no new context and no fresh evidence.

46Turning first to the Plaintiff’s 2025 Statement of Claim, it alleges “fresh causes of action that accrued two (2) years before the proceeding was commenced”, namely, that the Defendant (a) failed to comply with their “periodic obligation to make payments under the fixed term contract” and (b) failed to comply with their “continuing obligation to maintain confidentiality of the plaintiff’s personal information.”

47However, the vast majority of the Statement of Claim regurgitates facts and allegations from the Plaintiff’s many prior proceedings. For example:

a. Paras. 8-25 discuss the Defendant’s hiring of the Plaintiff into an articling position in or around July, 2007. The Plaintiff discusses her submission of unofficial transcripts and the fact that it was not until October of 2007 that the Defendant asked her for official ones. The Plaintiff alleges that, as a result of obtaining her official transcript, the Defendant became aware of the Plaintiff’s re-admission into law school on the basis of past physical disability.

b. Paras. 25-32 discuss the Defendant’s termination of the Plaintiff’s employment without cause, and the Defendant’s communication with the Law Society in or around December 2007.

c. Paras. 33-41 discuss the Defendant’s alleged “gratuitous correspondence” with the Law Society, the Defendant’s “different shocking groundless allegations against the plaintiff”, and the Defendant’s alleged comments about the Plaintiff in a published article.

d. All of the above information is essentially the same as the Plaintiff’s 2018 Statement of Claim and her February 1, 2021, Statement of Defence for the summary judgement motion.

e. Para. 45 claims that the Defendant “failed to comply with its periodic obligation to make payments under the fixed term contract” [emphasis in original]. No particulars are provided.

f. Para. 46 claims that the Defendant “failed to comply with their ongoing obligation to maintain confidentiality of the plaintiff’s personal information” [emphasis in original]. No particulars are provided.

g. The Statement of Claim refers to event and actions between 2007 and 2012. It refers to no specific events relating to the Defendant after 2012.

h. At paras. 65-73, the Plaintiff discusses the doctrine of fraudulent concealment. The Plaintiff states that “the issue [is] whether the defendant terminated the Plaintiff’s employment without cause in order to conceal the existence of causes of action.” The Plaintiff says the answer to that issue is within the Defendant’s knowledge, which requires discovery. The Plaintiff notes that fraudulent concealment tolls any limitation period. The Plaintiff does not describe what other causes of action the Defendant was trying to conceal when they terminated her employment in December 2017.

i. At para. 74, the Plaintiff argues that “the current proceeding pleads issues, causes of action, and a series of acts or omission which had not been dealt with in the past.” The Plaintiff argues that the current proceeding “includes issues that were unknown, have arisen, or have been learned since the commencement of past proceedings.” The Plaintiff does not explain what those issues are.

j. Paras. 75-76 stress that the past application to the HRTO in 2008, and the LHSP hearing in 2012, “were not alternative forums in which to seek the remedy for the causes of action, issues, and a series of acts or omissions pled in this proceeding.” The Plaintiff states that “at the time of the filing of the 2008 HRTO application, the plaintiff was not yet aware of the defendants’ series of acts of omissions from 2007 to 2012, at least, including the defendants’ allegations and disclosures.”

k. Para. 77 of the Statement of Claim states that it “is in the interest of justice to take into account the new context”, citing “significant differences in the scope and nature of the proceedings” and that “the issues, causes of action, a series of incidents, and remedies are different.” The Plaintiff does not describe the “new context” and “significant differences”.

l. The Statement of Claim then essentially reproduces the LSHP’s decision, upon which the Plaintiff “pleads and relies.” Paras. 80 – 106 describe, in detail, the Hearing Panel’s decision, its summary and findings about the Plaintiff’s articles of clerkship with different firms, and the transcript dispute with Elia.

m. Para. 108 claims that, while the Divisional Court rejected the Plaintiff’s judicial review of the HRTO’s decision, the Court “stated it did not make a ruling on fresh issues and evidence from the LSHP decision.” The Plaintiff cites numerous paragraphs from the Divisional Court decision – but not paragraph 48, which says:

Ms. Visic seems to miss the point that the Law Society’s conclusion as to her character does not, and could not, say anything about the conduct of Elia Associates and the basis for their comments about her lack of honesty. The findings by the Law Society are irrelevant to any issue before the Human Rights Tribunal or this Court.

n. Para. 109 cites “new issues” that arose “in connection with the plaintiff’s employment situation and job search” that prompted her to commence an action in 2018 naming, among others, the Defendant.

o. Paras. 112-114 allege numerous difficulties the Plaintiff faced in responding to the Defendant’s request for a motion for summary judgment in respect of the 2018 claim (the Vella J. decision). The Plaintiff notes, among other things, that she was “seeking new counsel”, “did not have the necessary experience to self-represent” and had to “meet a very tight timetable”. The paragraphs imply that the summary judgment motion was procedurally unfair. The Plaintiff does not mention that she has exhausted all avenues of appeal for that decision.

p. Paras. 119-131 claim that the Defendant breached the duty of care by “a series of acts of omissions from 2007 to 2012” that “have caused damages to the plaintiff’s long term career in the legal profession.” The Plaintiff states that the Defendant “exercised power over the plaintiff’s career and [was] required to take the necessary care to get their facts straight before taking actions in relation to the plaintiff.” The paragraphs reiterate the Plaintiff’s complaint about the Defendant seeking her official transcript and, thereby, forcing her to disclose a past disability. The paragraphs do not reference any specific actions by the Defendant after 2012, save for a vague allusion to their failure “to consider the serious ramifications of their series of acts of omissions on the plaintiff’s long term career in the legal profession.”

q. Paras. 132-134 purport to discuss breach of fiduciary duty. The paragraphs repeat the gist of the complaint in previous paragraphs: the Defendant had the balance of power; the Plaintiff was a vulnerable articling student; the Defendant failed to recognize that expecting the Plaintiff to disclose information relating to a past disability was not reasonable; and the Defendant “failed to protect the confidentiality of the Plaintiff’s personal information.”

r. Paras. 135-140 cite the Defendant for a breach of privacy, including by disclosing the Plaintiff’s “highly confidential personal information” resulting in “multiple publications on the Internet”; and by giving character evidence against the Plaintiff at the LSHP hearing.

s. Paras. 141-169 of the Statement of Claim outline the Plaintiff’s general damages.

t. Paras. 170-186 outline the Plaintiff’s arguments that her claim is not subject to any limitations period.

u. Paras. 187-191 outline the Plaintiff’s claim for aggravated damages and set out the total damages claimed.

48Turning to the Plaintiff’s submissions for this motion, dated May 10, 2026:

a. The Plaintiff argues that “it would not be in the interests of justice to dismiss the proceedings’; “[t]here is no clear evidence of frivolous or vexatious litigation”; and “the rule 2.1 request is premature”.

b. The Plaintiff says that the current action does not include a defamation claim. As discussed below, one of the Plaintiff’s primary defences is that the 2022 summary judgment motion dealt only with her defamation claim.

c. The Plaintiff argues: “While there is some overlap between the facts, the issues, causes of action, events and remedies are different. There is new context and fresh evidence. The defendants have other rules available to address deficiencies in the pleading. The proceeding has different issues and causes of action, including breach of privacy and the duty of care, which have not been dealt with on the merits.”

d. In paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 21, the Plaintiff again relies heavily on the 2013 Law Society Hearing Panel decision.

e. The Plaintiff cites and relies on the Divisional Court decision discussed at paragraph 47(m) of these reasons, above, but omits to mention the Court’s statement that the LSHP’s findings are not binding on it.

f. The Plaintiff cites that fact that, in 2019, Nishikawa J. declined to dismiss her 2018 claim against the Defendant (under Rule 2.1).

g. The Plaintiff cites precedents on various points of law including that (a) a claim for defamation does not preclude a cause of action in negligence and (b) even proof of abuse of process does not “inevitably lead to the dismissal of the claim.”

h. The Plaintiff argues that her complaints against Elia have never been addressed “on the merits.”

i. Under the heading “New Evidence, Scope and Context”, the Plaintiff says that the 2025 claim is for “different causes of action…including (i) breach of contract (employment agreement), (ii) breach of the duty of care; (iii) breach of privacy; (iv) breach of fiduciary duty; and (v) the doctrine of fraudulent concealment.” It appears that the “new evidence” on which the Plaintiff seeks to rely is an Expert Report purporting to show her loss of income.

j. The Plaintiff then cites caselaw in support of her position that an order under Rule 2.1 would be unjust.

49For the following reasons, I am satisfied that the Plaintiff’s most recent statement of claim is both vexatious and an abuse of process:

a. The Plaintiff’s materials repeat and rely upon previously pleaded facts concerning: the Defendant’s October 2007 request for her official university transcript, the Defendant’s discriminatory treatment of the Plaintiff based on the prohibited ground of disability, the Defendant’s termination of her employment in 2007, and the Defendant’s allegedly wrongful statements about the Plaintiff in various hearings some of which were published on the Internet. All of those complaints have been fully and finally disposed of in prior proceedings. Indeed, the Plaintiff was denied leave to appeal some of them to the Supreme Court of Canada (including the Vella J. summary judgment). The abusive nature of the 2025 litigation is plain on the face of the pleadings. It would be both inappropriate and unjust to permit the litigation to take its course and require the Defendant to make a claim for abuse of process under a different rule.

b. The Plaintiff misstates the Vella J. decision on the summary judgment motion. The Plaintiff says that the decision concerned only the Plaintiff’s defamation claim. That is not true. Vella J. did not confine her ruling to defamation. She dismissed the 2018 Statement of Claim – which goes far beyond defamation – it its entirety.

c. Vella J. found that the “gravamen” of the 2018 claim was the Plaintiff’s allegations that, by expressing their opinion of her honesty and character in the HRTO and Law Society hearings, the Defendant harmed her employment prospects. I find that observation equally applicable to the 2025 claim.

d. The Plaintiff either ignores, or fails to appreciate that, Vella J.’s summary judgment motion is a decision on the merits. In her decision, Vella J. weighs evidence, draws inferences, and makes findings of fact: see paras. 77-101. Vella J. found there was no genuine issue for trial on any of the Plaintiff’s claims.

e. The Plaintiff does not mention that, but for the inclusion of the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, the heads of relief in the 2018 and 2025 claims are identical.

f. The Plaintiff ignores that Vella J.’s refusal to permit the Plaintiff to amend her 2018 claim to include fraudulent concealment relies in part on an assessment of whether the pleaded facts were sufficient to support that claim. Having reviewed the materials, I am satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the Plaintiff’s assertion of that claim, now, is simply an attempt to resurrect her pleadings which rely on the same facts she has asserted for years. The Plaintiff’s allegations in respect to fraudulent concealment are vague and/or speculative. The Plaintiff demands the opportunity to discover the Defendant to determine whether its without-cause termination of her employment was pretextual. However, the Plaintiff has no new facts on that point. I find the Plaintiff has added fraudulent concealment to get around Vella J.’s dismissal of her 2018 claim. The Plaintiff is not entitled to do that.

g. The Plaintiff does not explain how the Defendant “failed to make periodic payments to her”. That allegation appears to be an attempt to resurrect the Plaintiff’s 2018 claim for breach of contract. The Plaintiff’s claim that she would somehow have been owed additional payments is baseless and, again, satisfies me that she is simply trying to relitigate the same complaint she has had against Elia since 2007.

h. The Plaintiff points to no “new evidence”, “context”, or, for that matter, anything at all that Elia has done after 2012.

i. The Plaintiff fails to mention that one of the reasons Nishikawa J. declined Elia’s request for an order under Rule 2.1 is that there was no prior civil claim against the firm. There is now. Vella J. dismissed that claim in its entirety, and the Court of Appeal for Ontario upheld that decision: Visic v. Elia Associates Professional Corporation, 2022 ONCA 841.

Conclusion

50The Plaintiff has been trying to sue her former articling firm for years. Her repeated attempts to vindicate that grievance have produced many decisions requiring an extraordinary expenditure of judicial resources.

51In 2012, when it declared the Plaintiff a vexatious litigant, the HRTO stated that the Plaintiff’s conduct “is particularly vexing given her familiarity with the law and legal process and presumably her understanding of the principles of delay and res judicata.” Fourteen years on, the criticism is even more pertinent.

52The Plaintiff has ignored repeated, pointed signals from courts and tribunals that her legal crusade is at an end: see, for example, Visic v HRTO and Elia Associates Professional Corporation, 2015 ONSC 7163 at para. 53. I am satisfied that her continued legal pursuit of the Defendant is oppressive and, therefore, vexatious.

53There are now some thirty-six decisions stemming in some way from the Plaintiff’s official law school transcript. The Plaintiff’s core complaint against Elia has not changed. The Plaintiff’s dogged refusal to accept her repeated losses has crossed the line into a misuse of the courts.

54Therefore, I am satisfied that the Plaintiff’s 2025 claim is both vexatious and an abuse of process.

ORDER

55The Defendant’s request for an Order dismissing the Plaintiff Anica Visic’s action pursuant to Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure is granted.

Mathen, J.