CITATION: R. v. Koritar, 2026 ONSC 2879

COURT FILE NO.: CR-22-90000564-0000

DATE: 20260519

BETWEEN:

STEPHEN WILLIAM KORITAR

Applicant

– and –

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

Respondent

Dragi Zekavica and Elina Marinosyan, for the Applicant

Venus Sayed, for the Crown

HEARD: September 19, 2025

pinto j.

Defence Entrapment Application

1The applicant, Mr. Koritar, brings an entrapment application seeking a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Charter. He alleges that the police engaged in improper conduct that amounted to the commission of criminal acts facilitated by the police. Following the hearing of the application, I summarily dismissed it for written reasons to follow. These are those reasons.

Procedural History

2I have laid out the procedural history of this criminal proceeding in my decision concerning the defence application to re-open this matter: R. v. Koritar, 2026 ONSC 2860.

Prior Ruling that the CS was not an agent

3Importantly, prior to hearing the entrapment application, I heard and dismissed the defence application for an order declaring the confidential source (CS) to be a police agent. In oral reasons, I found that:

(a) The defence argument that the CS was a police agent was based on pure speculation and did not meet the evidentiary standard required for an argument that the CS is or could be an agent.

(b) The affiant of the ITO, PC Acer Hwang, deposed that the person who provided information to him was, in fact, a CS, and that acting as an agent or witness would have put the CS’s safety in jeopardy.

(c) There was no evidence that the person identified as a CS went “into the field” and investigated at the behest of the police, or that the person was directed by the police to attend a particular location or speak with an individual or engage in a particular way with someone. Nor was there any evidence of any type of agreement between the police and the source to support the argument that the source was, or had been turned into, a police agent.

Discussion

4I find that the applicant’s entrapment application is essentially a re-packaging of his various previous applications (Garofoli, CS as agent) and should be summarily dismissed: R. v. Haevisher, 2023 SCC 11, at paras. 66-69.

5The facts are accurately stated at paragraphs 7 through 26 of the respondent Crown’s factum.

6The application should be dismissed because it relies on: facts that are not based on the actual record that was before the court; mischaracterization of the interaction between the CS and the source handler / affiant; and the repeated speculation and assertion that the source was a police agent, even though I have expressly ruled against the applicant on that issue.

7In particular, I find the applicant bootstraps his entrapment application by asserting that he knows who the CS is, and then using that supposed fact to advance his application, but no such evidence was in the record. Argument not based on the evidence cannot be relied upon in this application.

8The instances of the applicant misstating or mischaracterizing evidence are accurately summarized at paras. 31 to 55 of the respondent Crown’s factum.

9To succeed with a claim of entrapment, an accused must prove one of the following:

The police provided him with the opportunity to commit an offence without acting on reasonable suspicion.
Although having such a reasonable suspicion, the police went beyond providing an opportunity and induced the commission of the offence.

10See R. v. Mack, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 903, 1988 24 (SCC), at p. 959. The required standard of proof is a balance of probabilities: Mack, at p. 975.

11Here, I find that the police had more than adequate reasonable suspicion. As explained in my Garofoli ruling, the CS provided police with considerable information. The police investigation was bona fide.

12On the second branch of the test, beyond mere speculation, the applicant has provided no evidence that the police went beyond providing an opportunity and induced the commission of an offence. The applicant testified that he was already a drug dealer and that on the night in question he retrieved a supply of drugs from his locker and then sold those drugs. There was no evidence that police induced this behaviour or that whoever bought the drugs from the applicant was an agent of, or acting on behalf of, the police.

13A stay of proceeding is the most drastic remedy that should only be granted in the clearest of cases: R. v. Babos, 2014 SCC 16, at paras. 31-32. The circumstances of this case far fall short of warranting a stay. There is no state misconduct to speak of and I have already rejected the applicant’s theory that a private CS was, in effect, acting as a police agent

Conclusion

14The entrapment application is dismissed.

Pinto J.

Released: May 19, 2026