Court File and Parties

CITATION: Fournier v. Giannousopoulos, 2026 ONSC 2813 COURT FILE NO.: FS-26-00001010-0000 DATE: 2026-05-13

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO

RE: Kelsy Janet Fournier, Applicant AND: Markos Giannousopoulos, Respondent

BEFORE: M. Kraft, J.

COUNSEL: Kristen Woods, for the Applicant Stacey Mintsopoulos, for the Respondent

HEARD: May 12, 2026

Endorsement

Nature of the Motion

[1] Kelsy Fournier (“Kelsy”) and Markos Giannousopoulos (“Markos”) are the parents of two children. They are not married. Kelsy brings this motion seeking an order for vacant possession and sole carriage of the sale of a property she solely owns located at 78 Squires Avenue, Toronto Ontario (“Squires Property”). Markos has been residing in the Squires Property since the parties separated on November 16, 2024. Prior to separation, the parties resided in the Squires Property together. Kelsy has tried to obtain Markos’s consent to list the Squires Property for sale for a year and he refuses to agree. Kelsy can no longer afford to maintain the property on her own. This is why she seeks an order that he vacate the property, and she have sole carriage of the sale of the property. She proposes that the net proceeds of sale be held in trust pending further court order or agreement.

[2] Markos opposes Kelsy’s motion and asks that it be dismissed with costs. He has asserted a constructive trust interest in the Squires Property and argues that his equitable claims cannot yet be determined. Further, he asserts that if the Squires Property is sold, his proprietary interests would be prejudiced. Finally, Markos claims that the motion is vindictive on Kelsy’s part and if the relief she seeks were granted, he would be homeless.

Issues to be determined

[3] The issues for me to decide are as follows:

a. Does Markos’s constructive trust/joint family venture (“JFV”) claims in the Squires Property prevent the property from being sold now?

b. If the answer to a. is no, when should Markos be ordered to vacate the property?

c. Should Kelsy be granted sole carriage of the sale of the Squires Property?

Brief background

[4] The parties began cohabiting on June 1, 2020. They separated on November 16, 2024.

[5] Markos asserts that the parties have been in a common law relationship for 15 years.

[6] The parties are not married. They are the parents of two twin daughters, age 3.

[7] The parties lived together in the Squires Property during their relationship.

[8] Kelsy solely owns the Squires Property and only her name is on title.

[9] Markos is a licenced realtor. He submits that when the twins were born, he stepped back from his career and took on the role of primary caregiver. Kelsy is employed full-time by BMO.

[10] In October 2024, an incident took place between the parties in the car in front of the children, which was reported to CAS by Kelsy’s therapist. Markos denies Kelsy’s version of events. In any case, as part of a safety plan developed with CAS, Kelsy left the Squires Property on an interim basis and went to live with her parents in Hamilton. Markos has remained in the Squires Property.

[11] On November 26, 2024, Kelsy directed counsel to send Markos a letter confirming their separation and a desire to resolve their outstanding issues. Markos did not respond to this letter.

[12] In the interim, the parties began to follow an ad hoc parenting schedule for the twins which remains in place today. The parties have an equal time-sharing arrangement with the children on a 2-2-3 schedule.

[13] Since separation, Kelsy has paid 100% of the expenses relating to the Squires Property without contribution from Markos, including mortgage, property insurance, property taxes and all operative expenses. She has also contributed to many basic expenses for Markos including food and supplies for the children.

[14] Kelsy submits that in May 2025, she began telling Markos that she needed to sell the Squires property and did not wish to renew the mortgage when it matured in 2025. Markos did not agree. Kelsy agreed to renew the mortgage for a one-year term in June 2025 to accommodate Markos and give him more time to make alternate arrangements. This decision was financially difficult for Kelsy.

[15] In November 2025, Kelsy tried to discuss the sale of the Squires property with Marko again. She offered for Markos to act as the listing agent for the sale, since he is a real estate agent. Markos ignored Kelsy’s requests and refused to vacate the property. Kelsy’s counsel sent a follow up letter to Markos asking him to engage in the process and vacate the property. Markos did not respond.

[16] In February 2026, Kelsy’s counsel sent a third follow up letter to Markos requesting that he vacate the property and advising him that she had received a notice from the Bank of Montreal that they will not renew the mortgage and the entire amount of the mortgage would be due and owing as of June 1, 2026.

[17] Markos takes issue with this “notice” from BMO and believes that since Kelsy has been an employee of BMO for many years, this is somehow being manipulated by her. There is no evidence on record about this.

[18] Given Markos’s refusal to engage with Kelsy and her counsel, she issued an Application to require Markos to vacate the property so it could be sold. Markos refuses to leave the property.

[19] The Squires Property has a roof issue which requires repair. The work has been arranged through the insurance company. According to Kelsy, Markos has been obstructing her efforts to have the renovation work completed to prepare it for sale. Recently, the contractors at the Squires Property told Kelsy they will not return to the home to complete the renovations unless Markos was not there due to his aggressive behaviour toward them which included berating, swearing and threatening them. Markos denies that he is being obstructionist and asserts that he has been helping with the repairs needed.

[20] Kelsy has tried to engage in discussions with Markos about where they will both relocate given that they have shared parenting of the twins. She submits that Markos becomes argumentative and aggressive, refusing to cooperate with her when she tries to discuss this with him. Kelsy has told Markos that she hopes to relocate to an area in Mississauga. Kelsey submits that she is willing to assist Markos financially with securing alternative accommodations for himself and the children.

[21] Given that the mortgage expires on June 1, 2026, Kelsy and Markos attended a To Be Spoken To conference on March 30, 2026. At this conference, Markos took the position that the letter from BMO that they refuse to renew the mortgage is false because Kelsy is employed at BMO.

[22] This allegation is completely denied by Kelsy. In early January 2026, Kelsy received three phone calls from a 1-800 number, which she later learned was the BMO Special Accounts Management Unit regarding her Homeowner line of credit.

[23] Due to changes in Kelsy’s credit score, BMO placed a hold on her Homeowner ReadiLine of Credit registered on title to the Squires Property and she learned that she would not be able to draw down any available funds. BMO advised that they would not be renewing the mortgage on the property, and the entire amount owing would be due on June 1, 2026. Kelsey then asked BMO to confirm this in writing which they did in March of 2026.

[24] Kelsy reached out to other mortgage brokers to request the renewal of the mortgage from a different source. Scotiabank rejected the mortgage on March 31, 2026. Mortgages.ca, a Mortgage broker rejected Kelsy’s mortgage request in May 2025. She also completed a mortgage application with CIBC which was rejected. Finally, Kelsy spoke with Monster Mortgages who advised her that she would not be approved by an A-lender, but through a B-lender she could obtain a mortgage at a rate of 5.59%, and the mortgage would need to consolidate her student loan. She would have to pay fees of $6,750 to obtain this mortgage with a significant penalty if the mortgage term was broken.

[25] Kelsy argues that she cannot afford a new mortgage with a B-Lender. Her financial circumstances have declined since the parties’ separated and certainly since she first obtained the mortgage in 2020. At that time, Kelsy’s credit score exceeded 800. Since then, her credit profile has been negatively impacted because she and Markos had a CIBC loan on a Toyota Sienna which went into default without her knowledge. Kelsy has since negotiated a collections settlement and paid the balance in full through Partners in Credit. While Kelsy can still meet the minimum payments for the mortgage, her credit is over-utilized. Currently, Kelsy’s credit score is 597 according to a recent Equifax Report.

Issue 1: Does Markos’s constructive trust/JFV claim in the Squires Property prevent the property from being sold now?

The Law

[26] In Ontario, there is no statutory protection for an unmarried spouse's interest in property held in the other's name, and a person not on title must rely on equitable remedies to assert a claim.

[27] In Sorensen v. Ellis[^1], and Norman v. Connors[^2], Ontario courts ruled that registered sole owners can obtain vacant possession and sell a property despite an occupying party’s unresolved constructive trust claim, often to mitigate financial hardship. To protect alleged interests, courts may order that a portion of the net sale proceeds be held in trust pending a trial determination of the claim.

[28] In Abdulaziz v El Zahabi[^3], the Applicant brought a motion for vacant possession and sale the matrimonial home that was solely owned by him. The Respondent opposed this motion, asserting a claim for unjust enrichment which would prevent the home from being sold prior to trial. In granting the Applicant’s motion, the Court found that the Respondent’s trust claim could be protected by an order to hold a portion of the proceeds of sale in trust pending trial.

[29] These cases confirm that courts will not allow an occupant to use possession as leverage while the owner bears the financial burden of a property.

Application of the law

[30] Kelsy has paid a total of $48,280 toward the mortgage and HELOC in the 17 months since separation. In addition, she has paid 100% of the gas, hydro, internet, utilities, property taxes, home insurance and car insurance over the past 17 months. Kelsy also pays for the cost of Marko’s cell phone. In total, she has paid $76,567 towards these expenses since the separation on a net, after-tax basis. She argues that she cannot continue to make these payments and, as a result, the property needs to be sold. Kelsy already renewed the mortgage after separation for an extra year to address Markos’s difficulty in dealing with having to move. I find that it is not reasonable to require her to have to obtain another mortgage with a B-lender in these circumstances.

[31] In terms of Markos’s trust claim, Kelsy argues that he has not provided sufficient evidence for his claims. One the record before me, the basis of Markos’s trust claim is as follows:

a. In 2018, Kelsy purchased a condominium located at 56 Annie Craig, Unit 3005. She resided there until 2020. This condominium was purchased for $565,000 and Kelsy had a mortgage from BMO in the amount of $405,000.

b. Markos submits that he equally contributed to the expenses associated with this condominium. Kelsy acknowledges that he did make some contributions. She calculates that in 2018, he contributed $5,500 toward the property, which was $785 a month, and less than half the expenses; and in 2019, he contributed to half the mortgage, condo fees, property taxes and utilities, which was $1,250 a month.

c. In 2020, Kelsy bought the Squires Property. She and Markos agreed that only her name would be on title to the property since Markos was unable to obtain a mortgage given his ongoing garnishments, inconsistent income and prior credit defaults.

d. The condominium sold for $686,000, which resulted in net sale proceeds of approximately $120,000. These proceeds were used toward the purchase of the Squires Property.

e. The Squires Property was purchased for $745,000. Kelsy obtained a mortgage through BMO of $575,000.

f. At the time of purchase of the Squires Property, Kelsy contributed $161,000 toward the downpayment. These funds were gifted to Kelsy by her mother. Markos takes the position that this gift was made to both he and Kelsy in lieu of a formal wedding. Kelsy disagrees.

g. Of the $161,000 gifted to Kelsy, her mother paid $113,000 directly to the brokerage, and a further $48,000 was transferred to Kelsy’s bank directly into her personal account.

h. Kelsy also contributed her own funds toward the downpayment in the sum of $5,285, which she withdrew from her RRSP pursuant to the First Time Home Buyer’s Plan.

i. The gifted funds to Kelsy came from a RESP and TFSA accounts her mother had set up for her benefit. Kelsy argues that the money was intended to be a gift to her alone and was not a joint gift to her and Markos.

j. Kelsy’s mother has apparently sworn an affidavit outlining the nature of the gift of her funds to her. This was not on the record before me.

k. Markos argues that he acted as the real estate agent for the purchase of the condominium, the sale of the condominium and the purchase of the Squires Property. He claims that he rebated his commissions to Kelsy. Kelsy disputes this and argues he only rebated commissions for one transaction to her.

l. Markos also submits that he completed a great deal of labour toward renovations toward the Squires Property, including demolition, framing, electrical, insulation, roofing, plumbing related work and other general construction. Kelsy maintains that she paid for the materials and contractors and Markos, and her father put some labour into the property.

[32] In addition to his trust claim, Markos takes the position that the parties were engaged in a joint family venture. Kelsy denies this arguing that their financial affairs were never integrated, and there was no intention for them to ever operate as a joint economic unit. She maintains that Markos’s contributions throughout their relationship were inconsistent and limited.

[33] I am not determining Marko’s trust claims in relation to the Squires Property at this time. I agree that Marko’s alleged ownership interest in the Squires Property, depends on the determination of his constructive trust/JFV claims, which are issues to be determined at trial. Even if he is ultimately successful, his remedy could be limited to a monetary award rather than a proprietary interest in the Squires Property.

[34] Kelsy argues that Marko’s trust/JFV claims are not prejudiced if the property is sold since the net proceeds of sale will be held in trust. I agree.

[35] On the record before me, I find that Kelsy has attempted to negotiate with Markos regarding the sale of the Squires Property and his need to vacate the property so it can be sold. Markos has demonstrated that he is not interested in cooperating in this regard. Kelsy has maintained the financial burden of carrying all expenses for the home. She now finds herself in a financial crisis and cannot afford to keep the Squires Property.

[36] During Markos’s counsel’s submissions, she acknowledged that ultimately the Squires Property has to be sold. Given that the mortgage expires on June 1, 2026, it makes sense that the property should be listed for sale as soon as practicably possible. I am not persuaded that the sale of the Squires Property will prejudice Markos’s trust claims because the net proceeds of sale will be held in trust pending a determination of these claims at trial.

Issue 2: When should Markos be ordered to vacate the property?

[37] Unmarried spouses do not have possessory rights to a “matrimonial home” under the Family Law Act since the expanded definition of “spouse” to include common law spouses is only in relation to spousal support claims and not property claims.

[38] In terms of vacant possession, Kelsy asks that Markos vacate the Squires Property in 14 days. Markos argues that this demand is unjust and vindictive. I do find that 14 days is not enough time for Markos to figure out his next plan in terms of accommodation. I find that it is more appropriate that he had 45 days to vacate the Squires Property. In the meantime, Markos will need to find alternative accommodation. Kelsy deposed in her reply affidavit that she is willing to financially assist him in securing alternative accommodation. Further, Kelsy acknowledges she owes Markos child support in accordance with the Child Support Guidelines on a set-off basis, given their shared parenting arrangement.[^4]

[39] Part of the issue in determining Kelsy’s child support obligation on an interim basis is the issue of Markos’s income since the parties have shared parenting. In Markos’s motion materials he attached child and spousal support calculations imputing an income of $20,000 to himself. Whether or not that is the correct income figure for support purposes is not before me. However, I believe that child support arrangements ought to be put in place prior to when Markos vacates the Squires Property, so he understands his means to secure new accommodation. Accordingly, I order Markos to bring an interim child support and/or spousal support motion returnable before the court in the next four to five weeks.

Issue 3: Should Kelsy be granted sole carriage of the sale of the Squires Property?

[40] Markos’s counsel made submissions that there is no reason Kelsy should have sole carriage of the sale of the Squires Property. Markos asserts that he wants to participate in the sale. I do not agree. Markos’s conduct with the contractors that were in the house to complete the roof repairs in the past few weeks was clearly aggressive and erratic. There is no reason Jaime Parra, of ServiceMaster, would have written to Kelsy on April 24, 2026, complaining of Marko’s aggressive and erratic conduct toward him and his crew. He describes Marko verbally insulting the crew and shouting at them.

[41] Given how long Kelsy has tried to get Markos to engage with her on the need for the Squires Property to be listed for sale, and his consistent refusal to deal with this, it is appropriate that Kaley have carriage of the sale and decide who the listing agent will be, particularly given that she is the sole titled owner.

ORDER

[42] This court makes the following order:

a. Within 45 days, the respondent shall vacate the property, municipally known as 78 Squires Avenue, Toronto, ON and deliver all keys to the applicant and not re-enter the property.

b. The applicant shall have sole carriage and control of the repairs to the property and sale of the property, including authority to sign the listing agreement, follow the agent’s advice regarding listing price, staging, showings and price adjustments. The applicant shall have sole ability to execute all agreements or purchase and sale and closing documents without the respondent’s consent.

c. During the respondent’s period of residence over the next 45 days, the respondent shall cooperate with all showings, repair work and any work needed to ready the property for sale. The respondent shall not interfere with any repairs needed to the property and shall ensure the property is kept in clean condition for showings.

d. The net sale proceeds from the sale of the property shall be held in trust pending further agreement or court order.

e. The respondent shall bring a motion for interim child/spousal support, returnable within the next 4-5 weeks.

f. The applicant is entitled to her costs of this motion. If the parties cannot agree on costs of the motion, they shall serve and file written costs submissions of no more than 3 pages, not including a Bill of Costs or Offers to Settle within 15 days of the release of this Endorsement.

M. Kraft, J.

Released: May 13, 2026

[^1]: Sorenson v. Ellis, 2017 ONSC 2459, at paras. 1-4, 17 and 20. [^2]: Norman v. Connors, 2019 ONSC 1975, at paras. 8, 20, 45, 45-48, 55, 59. [^3]: Abdulaziz v El Zahabi, 2022 ONSC 2591, at para. 21. [^4]: Section 9 of the Ontario Child Support Guidelines, O. Reg. 391/97.