CITATION: Romeiro v. Caiado, 2026 ONSC 277

COURT FILE NO.: FC-22-521-00

DATE: 20260114

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

LUIS PAULO de MENDONCA ROMEIRO

Applicant

– and –

Self-Represented

SOFIA MADEIRA CAIADO

Respondent

Farrah Hudani and Julianna Galifi, Counsel

for the Respondent

HEARD: June 2,6, 16–27; November 18–

24, 2025

G. KAY, J.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

I. Introduction and Procedural History

1The Applicant, Luis Paulo de Mendonca Romeiro (“Mr. Romeiro” or “the Applicant”), and the Respondent, Sofia Madeira Caiado (“Ms. Caiado” or “the Respondent”), were common- law spouses who cohabited for approximately 15 years.

2They have two children: Felix Leander Romeiro, born July 13, 2010 (age 15 at the time of trial), and Moira Louise Romeiro, born April 4, 2018 (age 7 at the time of trial).

3The proceedings were initiated by Mr. Romeiro on March 21, 2022, seeking parenting orders, child and spousal support, and a division of assets under a joint family venture claim. Ms. Caiado, in her Answer, sought primary residence of the children, sole decision-making authority, retroactive and ongoing child and spousal support, and a declaration that all businesses and properties accumulated during the relationship formed part of a joint family venture.

4The litigation has been protracted and high-conflict, with over 146 documents filed in the continuing record in the three months leading up to trial, 13 motions brought by Mr. Romeiro in that period, and two civil claims commenced by Mr. Romeiro against Ms. Caiado in violation of prior court directions. Mr. Romeiro’s conduct, including derogatory social media posts targeting the judiciary and Ms. Caiado (which he denied; however, I find that he made the posts, based on his testimony under cross-examination), was a significant issue in the proceedings.

5The parties jointly own or control five businesses (“the businesses”):

a. Full Service Maintenance (“FSM”);

b. FSM Landscaping Inc. (“FSM Landscaping”);

c. 2432540 Ontario Inc. (“FSM Group”); and

d. Supreme General Services Inc. (“Supreme”), and 1875325 Ontario Limited (“187”).

6They also own or control four properties:

a. 14 Oldfield Court, Ajax (“Oldfield”);

b. 118 Petra Way, Unit 3, Whitby (“Petra”);

c. 5006 Old Brock Road, Pickering (“Old Brock”); and

d. 1688 Central Street, Pickering (“Central Street”).

7The parties also share a 2015 Jayco motorhome (“the RV”).

8A joint expert valuation and income report was prepared by Mr. Jason Kwiatkowski of Valuation Support Partners Ltd. (“VSP”), pursuant to a consent order dated June 27, 2022. An updated report from the Office of the Children’s Lawyer (“OCL”) was prepared by Linda Bleau in October 2025. Following the release of the OCL’s report, the parties resolved all parenting issues on consent.

9Evidence was heard from the parties, Mr. Kwiatkowski, and collateral witnesses including Mr. Derek Wellwood (a former employee of the businesses) and Ms. Leslie Pasieka (Felix’s former educational assistant). Affidavits, financial records, photographs, and social media evidence were tendered.

10Following the resolution on the parenting issues on consent, the issues left for determination are:

a. the date of cohabitation;

b. whether the businesses and properties constitute a joint family venture and how assets should be divided;

c. the parties’ incomes for support purposes;

d. retroactive and ongoing child and spousal support, including special or extraordinary expenses;

e. Mr. Romeiro’s civil claims;

f. post-separation accounting;

g. prejudgment interest; and

h. costs.

II. Credibility Findings

11Credibility and reliability are central to this decision, given the parties’ conflicting accounts on cohabitation, contributions to the businesses, income, and post-separation transactions.

12Credibility is assessed holistically, considering consistency, corroboration, demeanor, motive to deceive, and harmony with the preponderance of probabilities: R. v. G.(M.) (1994), 93 C.C.C. (3d) 347 (Ont. C.A.), at pp. 8–9; Faryna v. Chorny, [1952] 2 D.L.R. 354

(B.C.C.A.), at p. 356; and M.A.B. v. M.G.C., 2022 ONSC 7207, at paras. 48–49). Reliability concerns accuracy and is distinct from credibility, which centres on honesty (Lawson v. Hartt, 2022 BCSC 2087, 80 R.F.L. (8th) 404, at para. 9).

13Mr. Romeiro’s evidence was inconsistent, evasive, and undermined by documentary contradictions. For example, he advanced three different cohabitation dates without satisfactory explanation. Further, Mr. Romeiro’s trial affidavit claimed he was a “successful entrepreneur” bringing “significant equity” into the relationship (Exhibits H311, H313), but under cross-examination, when confronted with his 2007 pleadings and 2008 questioning transcripts from his prior divorce (Exhibits H810, H815–H816), he admitted the businesses were experiencing severe financial difficulties and operating at a loss.

14His claims of incapacity due to a 2015 injury were contradicted by photographs showing him performing physical labour and playing soccer in 2025 (Exhibit H353).

15He also failed to disclose and establish his income from 2023–2025, despite court orders requiring him to do so. As such, I am entitled to make adverse inferences (Colucci v. Colucci, 2021 SCC 24, [2021] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para. 52). His social media posts disparaging the judiciary and Ms. Caiado reflect bad faith (Ms. Caiado’s Affidavit, at para. 29).

16I do not accept his testimony where it conflicts with Ms. Caiado’s.

17Ms. Caiado’s evidence was consistent, candid, and corroborated by documents (e.g., work journals, Exhibits H233–H267; contracts she signed as office manager, Exhibits H217– H232; and Wellwood’s testimony, Ms. Caiado’s Amended Trial Record, B2024). Minor inconsistencies do not detract from her overall reliability. I prefer her evidence on most of the disputed issues with the exception of her alleged temporary cohabitation with Mr. Derek

Bryans and the cohabitation’s impact on her spousal support claim, which I will address later in these reasons.

18Mr. Kwiatkowski’s testimony was credible, impartial, and was of assistance to the court in providing opinion evidence on the value of Mr. Romeiro’s businesses.

19Chosen by Mr. Romeiro, Mr. Kwiatkowski addressed concerns fairly, adjusting valuations where warranted (e.g., reducing the appraisal value of Old Brock by $20,000–$30,000). His methodology was not effectively challenged, and the credibility and reliability of his evidence was not diminished in any way by cross-examination. If anything, the fact that the valuation did not include any cash income or any income splitting may have resulted in an underestimation of Mr. Romeiro’s income and was therefore likely favourable to Mr. Romeiro.

III. Issue 1 – Date of Cohabitation and Separation

20The date of separation is undisputed: October 18, 2021.

21Mr. Romeiro put forward three dates for cohabitation: December 1, 2006 (original application), January 1, 2007 (amended application), and June 5, 2007 (fresh as amended application).

22Under cross-examination, he claimed that the first proposed cohabitation date was a “mistake” and the second proposed date to be a “draft,” despite the amended application being signed and served. His definition of cohabitation—requiring joint property or having a shared address on the parties’ driver’s licenses—is not the legal test, which focuses on intent and living arrangements (Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, s. 29; Molodowich v. Penttinen (1980), 17 R.F.L. (2d) 376 (Ont. Dist. Ct.)). Ironically, even his June 5, 2007 date, which is when Mr. Romeiro purchased the property at 7 Slater Circle in Brampton, fails his own test as Ms. Caiado was not on the title for that property.

23Ms. Caiado’s evidence was unwavering: the parties met in October 2006, dated, and cohabited in November 2006 at Mr. Romeiro’s residence. She candidly admitted the relationship moved quickly but explained it practically—she was staying frequently with him while living with her mother in Toronto, and cohabitation made sense as their relationship progressed. Photographs from late November 2006 show her books, jewelry, clothes, and a framed photo of her niece in the home (Exhibit H710), sent to her mother for reassurance that both the residence and Mr. Romeiro were appropriate. Under cross- examination, Mr. Romeiro admitted these items were present, but he downplayed their significance.

24Ms. Caiado’s evidence is coherent, consistent across her affidavit, examination-in-chief, and cross-examination, and corroborated by the photos. I accept it.

25I therefore find that the date of cohabitation is November 30, 2006.

IV. Issue 2 – Joint Family Venture and Division of Property

26The parties’ claims center on whether their businesses and properties form a joint family venture, entitling Ms. Caiado to a monetary award for unjust enrichment. Mr. Romeiro seeks a joint family venture only for Supreme, 187 (at 33%), Oldfield, Petra, and the RV, and he wishes to exclude the other businesses. Ms. Caiado seeks the inclusion of all assets.

27The law on unjust enrichment and joint family ventures is set forth in Kerr v. Baranow, 2011 SCC 10, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 269 and Mullin v. Sherlock, 2025 ONCA 510, 16 R.F.L. (9th) 253.

28Unjust enrichment requires: (1) enrichment of the defendant, (2) corresponding deprivation of the plaintiff, and (3) no juristic reason for the defendant’s enrichment (Kerr, at para. 32). For common-law spouses, where domestic services or contributions to asset accumulation are at issue, a joint family venture may be found if there is mutual effort, economic integration, actual intent, and priority of the family (Kerr, at paras. 90–99).

29As a result, the remedy for unjust enrichment is not restricted to a monetary award using a fee-for-service approach (Kerr, at para. 100). Instead, the remedy for unjust enrichment in joint family ventures cases “should be calculated according to the share of the accumulated wealth proportionate to the claimant’s contributions” (Kerr, at para. 87) and the equal division of assets may be appropriate in long-term relationships where the parties’ lives are deeply intertwined (Mullin, at paras. 39–43).

30In Mullin, the Court of Appeal for Ontario upheld a $3 million award (50% of growth) in a 17-year common-law relationship where the wife contributed to the husband’s business, sacrificed her career, and was the manager of the parties’ household, despite the husband’s refusal to provide adequate financial disclosure (Mullin, at paras. 34–38). It should also be noted that adverse inferences were drawn by the trial judge in Mullin against the non- disclosing husband and those inferences were upheld on appeal (Mullin, at paras. 42–43).

31For the reasons set out below, and applying the principles above to the facts of this case, I find that Ms. Caiado and Mr. Romeiro were engaged in a joint family venture during their relationship. Mr. Romeiro was enriched by Ms. Caiado, Ms. Caiado was correspondingly deprived (career sacrifice, minimal pay, primary caregiving), and there was no juristic reason for the enrichment. The parties pooled their efforts and resources for their family’s benefit. I will now explain my findings.

32Kerr sets out a number of broad categories to be used as guidelines for determining whether a joint family venture exists. These categories are: (a) mutual effort; (b) economic integration; (c) actual intent; and (d) priority of the family. These categories do not form a checklist, but rather, they are a framework to evaluate whether a joint family venture existed between the parties. I will now analyze the facts of this case with respect to each category.

(a) Mutual Effort

33Ms. Caiado’s contributions were substantive. She worked full-time from 2007 to 2018 (50– 70 hours/week), snowplowing, performing janitorial cleaning services, facilitating office management, conducting supplier negotiations, developing protocols, branding, leading

staff training, and securing contracts (Exhibits H217–H232, H233–H267). Mr. Wellwood corroborated her administrative work.

34Ms. Caiado was also the primary caregiver of the parties’ children, handling Felix’s medical needs (SickKids appointments) and Moira’s care, freeing Mr. Romeiro to develop and grow the businesses.

35Ms. Caiado began working in the businesses from the commencement of cohabitation— starting with snowplowing overnight beside Mr. Romeiro under the banner of the newly- incorporated FSM Landscaping, performing janitorial cleaning on weekends, and taking on office management duties.

36In June 2007, at Mr. Romeiro’s request, she quit her studies at George Brown College to devote herself full-time to building the family’s businesses. From 2007 to 2018 she routinely worked 50 to 70-hour weeks: driving snowplows, cleaning commercial sites, managing payroll and invoicing, negotiating with suppliers (using her own good credit when Mr. Romeiro had none, which included opening credit accounts with United Salt and Petro- Canada), developing health and safety protocols, designing logos, creating advertising campaigns, recruiting and training staff, and securing new contracts. She continued this work while pregnant and even continued to snowplow despite suffering from morning sickness triggered by the inhalation of fuel fumes.

37These efforts were instrumental in transforming the businesses that were, by Mr. Romeiro’s own admission, barely surviving, into enterprises worth over $3 million by the date of separation.

(b) Economic Integration

38There was significant economic integration between the parties. The parties did not live separate lives, with separate bank accounts, and separate economic interests. Rather, the parties clearly acted as a functioning unit. There was substantial evidence confirming economic integration.

39To cite some specific examples, the parties

a. shared inter-company loans;

b. possessed shared signing authority; and

c. experienced contract shifts (Mr. Romeiro admitted that redirecting Supreme’s contracts post-separation affected his businesses).

40Moreover, assets were acquired with joint resources: Oldfield (2008, $78,400 gift from Respondent’s mother, Exhibit H1688), Petra (2013), Old Brock (2018), Central Street (2019), and 1895 Clements Road in Pickering (a business property owned by 187 that was sold at the time of separation).

(c) Actual Intent

41The parties treated their assets as shared for the family’s benefit. Ms. Caiado’s evidence was that the parties acted in a manner that reflected their shared goal of building a home and family together, along with a thriving business. Mr. Romeiro managed the corporate and financial sides of the businesses while Ms. Caiado maintained the home and cared for the children (in addition to her contributions to the businesses), which allowed Mr. Romeiro to grow the businesses for the family’s benefit. In other words, the parties treated the family and the businesses holistically and both were inextricably intertwined.

(d) Priority of the Family

42Ms. Caiado subordinated her career/education to supporting the family/businesses and caregiving for the parties’ children. She prioritized the family over the businesses by reducing her working hours after Moira’s birth in 2018 to focus on childcare, managing Felix’s autism and ADHD needs (including weekly medical appointments at SickKids), therapies, Individualized Education Plan meetings with teachers, and daily care, while still contributing to the office from home.

43Ms. Caiado’s efforts allowed Mr. Romeiro to focus on expanding the parties’ businesses without the burden of primary parenting responsibilities. Ms. Caiado’s choices consistently placed the family’s well-being first, sacrificing her own professional development and personal time to ensure the children were cared for and the household ran smoothly, even as the businesses expanded.

CONCLUSION ON THE JOINT FAMILY VENTURE ISSUE

44The businesses grew from negligible value (Applicant’s admissions: financed trucks, minimal supplies, bad credit, Exhibit H338) to $3+ million (VSP report, B3052). Ms. Caiado’s contributions are directly linked to this growth, as her operational systems, supplier relationships, and staff management built the foundation for future growth, while her domestic labour freed Mr. Romeiro to pursue the businesses’ growth opportunities.

45Having reviewed and carefully considered all the evidence adduced at trial, including the testimony of the parties, the documentary exhibits, the valuation reports, the appraisals, and the submissions of counsel, I find that the parties were engaged in a joint family venture throughout their approximately 15-year common-law relationship. Their personal and corporate financial affairs were deeply intertwined, their efforts were mutual and complementary, and the accumulation of wealth in the various corporate and personal assets was the direct result of their joint contributions to the family enterprise.

46I am aware that a remedy for unjust enrichment based on a joint family venture, unlike an equalization calculation, does not automatically result in an equal division of the value received. Nonetheless, the closer the joint family venture mirrors a formal marriage, and the greater the contributions of the claimant, a court may provide a monetary or proprietary remedy that is equal to half the value of the accumulated property. This case warrants such an outcome. As I have found that all the businesses were part of a joint family venture, and that the Kerr categories all point to the significant roles and contributions of Ms. Caiado to

the joint family venture, I find it just that the value of the businesses shall be divided equally between the parties.

Calculation of the Joint Family Venture Claim

47Having reviewed and considered all the evidence adduced at trial, I make the following findings with respect to the valuation and division of assets:

(a) Valuation of the Businesses and Related Assets

48The value of FSM, including Old Brock, is $802,000 (mid-point, no contingent income taxes), as set out in the VSP expert report.

49The value of FSM Landscaping is $457,000 less contingent income taxes of $125,000, which results in a net value of $332,000.

50The value of FSM Group is $2,047,000 less contingent income taxes of $364,000, which results in a net value of $1,683,000.

51The value of Supreme is fixed at Scenario 1 in the VSP report: $296,000 less contingent income taxes of $31,000, for a net value of $265,000. I accept Scenario 1 in the VSP report because it properly accounts for the shareholder loan of $100,342 owing to Ms. Caiado as of May 31, 2020 (confirmed in the financial statements and the 2021 corporate tax return prepared by Tax Audit Solutions), Mr. Romeiro’s post-separation withdrawals of $41,300, and Ms. Caiado’s sale of the two Supreme trucks for $3,000 in their documented poor condition. Mr. Romeiro led no credible evidence to contradict these adjustments.

52The value of 1875325 Ontario Limited is $599,000 less contingent income taxes of $7,000, which results in a net value of $592,000.

53The shareholder loans at the valuation date are taken from Scenario 1 of the VSP report:

$165,982 payable to Mr. Romeiro and $343,773 receivable from Ms. Caiado.

(b) Real Property and Personal Property

54The value of Oldfield is $1,200,000 less costs of disposition of $69,495 (as per the Apex Appraisal dated October 30, 2024), for a net value of $1,130,505.

55The value of Petra (jointly owned) is $575,000 less costs of disposition of $34,182.50 and less capital gains tax on 50% of $185,000 ($92,500), for a net value of $448,317.50.

56The RV is valued at $65,500 as per Mr. Romeiro’s appraisal.

(c) Other Assets and Liabilities

57Personal income taxes owing at separation are shared equally: Mr. Romeiro’s verified 2021 liability of $17,848.83 and Ms. Caiado’s audited liability (after reversal of penalties and interest) of $98,729.63.

58The funds loaned to Mr. Romeiro’s parents originated from FSM Group, passed through the parties jointly, and are property of the joint family venture. The remaining trust funds of

$38,736.95 represent Ms. Caiado’s one-half share in these funds and shall be released to her (with credit to Mr. Romeiro for prior consensual payments).

59The travel savings of 20,000 BRL held by Ms. Caiado’s aunt (equivalent to $4,950 CAD) are to be divided equally.

(d) Cash in Mr. Romeiro’s Home

60Having reviewed and considered all the evidence adduced at trial, I do not accept Ms. Caiado’s position that Mr. Romeiro is in possession of $100,000 in cash in his home. In the absence of any additional or corroborative evidence, I am unable to conclude, on a balance of probabilities, that Mr. Romeiro is in possession of this cash. Accordingly, no amount for this cash is included in the equalization calculation.

(e) Post-Separation Adjustments

61The net post-separation adjustments, after full consideration of the evidence, result in Mr. Romeiro owing Ms. Caiado $115,447.53 (detailed calculations are set out in Ms. Caiado’s submissions and tracing documents, which I accept).

(f) Final Calculation (All Businesses Included in the Joint Family Venture)

62After applying an equal division of the net value of all business and personal assets accumulated through the joint family venture, and after accounting for the post-separation adjustments and the other findings set out above, the total amount required to achieve an equal division of the joint family venture’s property is $879,438.88, payable by Mr. Romeiro to Ms. Caiado.

V. Issue 3 – Income for Support Purposes

63VSP was engaged to provide an opinion with respect to the income of both parties. The opinion of any expert needs to be consistent with the legal principles regarding the determination of income. The court cannot simply defer its judgment to an expert. The court must consider the evidence of the expert, but it is ultimately the court’s responsibility to determine income (see Child Support Guidelines, O. Reg. 391/97, s. 15(1); Sherrill v. Fahrni, 2004 BCSC 1835, at para. 21).

64Mr. Romeiro’s $220,000 self-chart (B2077) ignores his retained earnings/pre-tax income. Furthermore, Mr. Romeiro’s health claims are contradicted by photos (H353). Given Mr. Romeiro’s non-disclosure with respect to his 2023–2025 financial situation, adverse inferences are warranted (Mullin, at paras. 42–43). I do not accept Mr. Romeiro’s position regarding his income. His closing submissions do not address specific and concrete issues with the valuations. He refers to vague principles about “credible medical constraints”, but none of the submissions undermine, in substance, the opinion of the valuator. I do not accept Mr. Romeiro’s version of his income because his self-generated chart ignores pre-tax corporate income and is inconsistent with the asset accumulation,

65I accept the VSP calculation of Mr. Romeiro’s income because it is based on a comprehensive review of financial statements, tax returns, and business records, using a conservative methodology that excluded unverifiable cash income and income splitting, which likely underestimate Mr. Romeiro’s true earnings. In the end, however, Mr. Romeiro’s position does not accord with the relevant principles for determining income.

66For the above reasons, I find that the parties’ incomes for support purposes are to be determined as per the VSP reports:

• Mr. Romeiro

o $694,000 (2021); and

o $689,000 (2022/ongoing).

• Ms. Caiado

o $77,000 (2021); and

o $66,000 (2022/ongoing).

67The 2021 income levels will be used to calculate the 2021 retroactive support payments. The 2022 income levels will determine the support payments for 2022 and later.

VI. Issues 4 & 5 – Retroactive and Prospective Spousal Support

(a) Governing Principles

68The purposes of spousal support for unmarried spouses are enumerated in the Family Law Act. As per s. 33(8) of the Family Law Act:

(8) An order for the support of a spouse should,

(a) recognize the spouse’s contribution to the relationship and the economic consequences of the relationship for the spouse;

(b) share the economic burden of child support equitably;

(c) make fair provision to assist the spouse to become able to contribute to his or her own support; and

(d) relieve financial hardship, if this has not been done by orders under Parts I (Family Property) and II (Matrimonial Home).

69Furthermore, when determining the amount and duration of spousal support to be awarded,

s. 33(9) of the Family Law Act provides guidance for the amount and duration of support.

70Before spousal support can be awarded, grounds for entitlement to the support must first be established. Spousal support can be compensatory (career sacrifice for family/business),

non-compensatory (needs/disparity) and/or contractual (Moge v. Moge, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 813; Bracklow v. Bracklow, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 420, at para. 15). These grounds for support often intersect, reflecting the multifaceted economic interdependence created by marriage or long- term cohabitation.

71Given that there is not a contractual basis for entitlement at issue in this case, it will not be discussed further.

(i) Compensatory Claims

72Compensatory spousal support seeks to equitably distribute the economic consequences of the marriage and its breakdown, recognizing both the advantages accrued and disadvantages incurred by one spouse due to marital roles. Pursuant to s. 33(8)(a) of the Family Law Act, a purpose of spousal support is to “recognize the spouse’s contribution to the relationship and the economic consequences of the relationship for the spouse”. This purpose includes acknowledging economic advantages arising from the marriage or cohabitation such as one spouse’s enhanced earning capacity, career advancement, or accumulated wealth facilitated by the other’s contributions (e.g., home management, child-care, or direct support like relocating for job opportunities), as well as disadvantages, such as lost career opportunities, interrupted education, skill erosion, or reduced pension entitlements.

(ii) Non-Compensatory Claims

73Non-compensatory support addresses need and hardship arising from the breakdown of the spouses’ relationship, independent of specific contributions or sacrifices. It honors the mutual obligation of support inherent in marriage, or long-term cohabitation, particularly where economic lives have merged over time, leading to interdependence and a shared standard of living. Sections 33(8)(c) and (d) of the Family Law Act underpin this purpose, recognizing the advantages gained from the marital partnership (e.g., an elevated lifestyle) while acknowledging the financial hardship from the relationship’s dissolution, such as a precipitous drop in living standards.

(iii) Determining the Quantum and Duration of Support

74Once a basis for entitlement is established, the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (“SSAG”) are generally applied to determine the quantum and duration of the support.

75The SSAG use the separated parties’ incomes and the length of their cohabitation to establish low-, mid-, and high-range values of spousal support. These ranges are the presumptive starting point for spousal support awards (Politis v. Politis, 2021 ONCA 541, 158 O.R. (3d) 230 (“Politis ONCA”), at para. 28; McKinnon v. McKinnon, 2018 ONCA 596, at para. 24;

and Slongo v. Slongo, 2017 ONCA 272, 137 O.R. (3d) 654, at paras. 105–06).

76While the SSAG are not binding, they should not be departed from lightly (Politis ONCA, at para. 28; Slongo, at para. 105). When the SSAG ranges are not relied upon, an adequate explanation must be provided (Politis ONCA, at para. 28; McKinnon, at para. 24; and Slongo, at paras. 105–06).

77Further, the mid-range of the SSAG should not be treated as the default (Carol Rogerson & Rollie Thompson, Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines: The Revised User’s Guide (Ottawa: Department of Justice Canada, 2016), at p. 45; Mason v. Mason, 2016 ONCA 725, 132 O.R. (3d) 641, at para. 199). Placement within the SSAG ranges—low, mid, or high— is informed by an analysis using the non-exhaustive factors in Chapter 9 of the SSAG, and

s. 33(9) of the Family Law Act, applied contextually.

78The non-exhaustive list of factors outlined in Chapter 9 of the SSAG for determining the location within the spousal support ranges are:

• Strength of any compensatory claim;

• The recipient’s needs;

• Age, number, needs and standard of living of the children (if any);

• Needs and ability to pay of payor;

• Work incentives for payor;

• Property division and debts; and

• Self-sufficiency incentives.

79Additionally, Chapter 9 of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines: The Revised User’s Guide notes that other factors, including whether a spouse remarries or re-partners, may have an impact on the amount of spousal support awarded.

(b) Application of the Governing Principles

(i) Grounds of Support Entitlement

80I find that Ms. Caiado has both compensatory and non-compensatory claims to spousal support.

81With respect to the compensatory grounds: Ms. Caiado quit school (culinary management) in 2007 at Mr. Romeiro’s request, worked for minimal pay while Mr. Romeiro benefited, and was the family’s primary caregiver. Ms. Caiado’s sacrifices were substantial and significant. By quitting the pursuit of her higher education and career path at Mr. Romeiro’s urging, Ms. Caiado gave up opportunities in culinary management that could have led to independent financial security. Instead, she poured her energy into the family businesses, often for minimal compensation that did not reflect her contributions, while Mr. Romeiro accrued the bulk of the economic benefits. As the family’s primary caregiver, Ms. Caiado bore the daily responsibilities of child-rearing, including managing Felix’s special needs and Moira’s early years, which allowed Mr. Romeiro to focus on the businesses’ expansion without distraction. This created a clear compensatory claim.

82With respect to non-compensatory grounds, the economic disparity post-separation between the parties is stark: Ms. Caiado, now in her early forties, faces limited earning potential due to years out of her original field of work and currently earns $66,000/year. Comparatively, Mr. Romeiro enjoys a high income ($689,000/year) and benefits from the ventures that Ms. Caiado helped build. The toll of this litigation, including financial strain from inconsistent support payments, further exacerbates her needs.

83In her examination-in-chief and during cross-examination, Ms. Caiado claimed that Mr. Derek Bryans had moved in with her and the children in April of 2023. She insisted throughout her evidence that he was only living with her temporarily because his rental unit was under repair. She gave evidence that he was having parenting time with his child in their home. This cohabitation arrangement continued for over 2.5 years and went on until the weekend before the last day of the trial. I do not accept Ms. Caiado’s evidence that she was cohabitating temporarily with Mr. Bryans from April 2023 to the weekend just prior to the last day of trial. The OCL’s report outlines that the length and timing of the cohabitation until Ms. Caiado’s breakup with Mr. Bryans support the conclusion that the cohabitation was not temporary. Ms. Caiado’s insistence that her cohabitation with Mr. Bryans was temporary resulted in her providing insufficient financial information to fully assess her needs-based entitlement.

(ii) Quantum and Duration of Spousal Support

84While I acknowledge that the mid-range of the SSAG is not the default, I find that Ms. Caiado is deserving of spousal support in the mid-range of the SSAG after considering the following factors:

Strength of Compensatory Claim: Strong evidence of career sacrifice or enabled advantages favours the high-end of the range (Moge, at pp. 862–63). Weak compensatory elements, particularly in short marriages, will tilt towards the low-end of the range. Moderate claims often settle in the mid-range (see Cameron v. Cameron, 2024 ONSC 5783). The parties were involved in a long-term relationship. They cohabitated for some 15 years and had two children together. Ms. Caiado left school to join Mr. Romeiro in building the landscaping, cleaning and snow removal businesses.

Ms. Caiado was the primary caregiver of their two children, caring for the parties’ children full time after the birth of their second child. The accumulated value of the companies that comprise the joint family venture and the disparity between the parties’ income that resulted from their relationship support a strong compensatory claim by Ms. Caiado and points to a higher SSAG range amount.

Recipient’s Needs: Profound hardship or disparity in standards of living suggests the use of the high-end range to alleviate need. Minimal hardship and/or needs favour the low-end range (Bracklow, at p. 866). The income disparity between the parties is stark. Mr. Romeiro earns $689,000 annually compared to Ms. Caiado’s annual income of

$66,000.

Age, Number, Needs, and Standard of Living of Children (if any): Significant child- related burdens in the recipient’s household warrant upper-range placement. However, the new parenting arrangement was agreed to towards the end of the trial and there was insufficient evidence before me to assess this factor’s impact on the relative range of spousal support on an ongoing basis.

Payor’s Needs and Ability to Pay: A constrained ability to pay will justify a support award on the low-end of the SSAG range. A robust ability to pay will allow for awards on the higher end of the range. A payor spouse’s ability to pay support must always be considered (Boston v. Boston, 2001 SCC 43, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 413, at para. 62; Family Law Act, s. 33(9)(d)). There was little, if any, evidence before me at trial that would suggest that Mr. Romeiro’s ability to pay spousal support was anything less than robust.

Work Incentives for the Payor: Variable income sources favour support orders on the low-end of the SSAG range to preserve the payor’s motivation. The evidence at trial did not indicate that Mr. Romeiro’s income variability was a factor impacting his motivation to maintain or increase his income. In fact, the evidence at trial was that Mr. Romeiro is a highly motivated and hardworking individual who requires little external incentive to maximize his earning capacity.

Property Division and Debts: Substantial property awarded to the recipient (e.g., matrimonial home) provides security and favours awards on the low-end of the SSAG range. Minimal assets or high debts of the support recipient will suggest support on the higher end of the range (Rasaei v. Bahman, 2025 ONSC 2074, at para. 25(g)).

In scenarios involving a finding of a joint family venture—where the court recognizes the spouses’ pooled efforts and mutual contributions to wealth accumulation, leading to an order awarding the recipient spouse a significant share, such as half of the family assets valued at approximately $2 million—this equitable division enhances the recipient’s long-term financial stability and capital base. Such an award, often grounded in unjust enrichment principles (see Kerr, at para. 87), addresses compensatory aspects of marital roles by redistributing accumulated advantages, thereby justifying placement at the low-end of the SSAG range to prevent double recovery or disproportionate ongoing support (Mason, at para. 202). Recent jurisprudence reinforces this interplay: in Mullin, property division following a joint family venture claim in a long cohabitation influenced spousal support quantum, pulling toward the lower range as the asset award mitigated post-separation needs. In this case, I have found that the parties were engaged in a joint family venture and that Ms. Caiado is entitled to half of the accumulated value of the assets of the joint family venture as at the date of separation. As noted earlier, this division of assets amounts to a substantial property award for Ms. Caiado and would favour placing the quantum of spousal support in the lower SSAG range.

Self-Sufficiency Incentives: Depending on the circumstances of the case, it is possible that long-term compensatory support will be required, regardless of the level of self- sufficiency achieved by the recipient spouse. This is particularly true in cases where a former spouse continues to suffer economic disadvantages following the breakdown of their relationship while the other spouse continues to reap the economic benefits of the

former spouse’s contributions (Allaire v. Allaire, 35 R.F.L. (5th) 256 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 22; Moge, at p. 383). In reviewing the evidence in this case, it is unclear to what degree the property award resulting from my joint family venture finding will impact Ms. Caiado’s self-sufficiency in the immediate to long term. As a result, at this time, I am unable to consider this factor’s impact on the range of the spousal support amount according to the SSAG.

Re-partnering or Second Family: This factor carries significant weight, reflecting any changed circumstances that may alter needs, means, and interdependence. While re- partnering does not always completely compensate for the financial difficulties experienced by a spouse following a relationship breakdown, if the recipient spouse re- partners or remarries, that decision may reduce or terminate that spouse’s support entitlement. This is because support of the recipient spouse, upon re-partnering or remarriage, shifts from the former spouse to the new spouse (Politis v. Politis, 2020 ONSC 1306 (“Politis ONSC”), at para. 112, aff’d Politis ONCA). The new relationship may restore economic stability or shared living standards—consistent with promoting self-sufficiency and recognizing that support is not indefinite, absent ongoing disadvantage. However, courts should exercise caution when considering re-partnering and require clear evidence of financial integration rather than mere cohabitation as casual or short-term relationships have a minimal impact on the recipient spouse’s actual needs. Conversely, the payor’s re-partnering or new familial obligations (e.g., subsequent children) typically favours adoption of the low-end of the SSAG ranges, acknowledging competing claims on the payor’s income without inflicting undue hardship.

These considerations balance fairness for all dependents and the jurisprudence illustrates this nuance: in Miglin v. Miglin, 2003 SCC 24, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 303, remarriage was a material change warranting support variation.

More recently, Ontario decisions like Politis ONCA demonstrate that a fact-driven analysis must be undertaken when a court is asked to determine the impact of re- partnering or remarriage on a recipient spouse’s support entitlement. Where a recipient spouse’s new partner can help meet the recipient spouse’s needs, the recipient spouse may have their support award reduced or terminated; however, support must continue until the recipient spouse has been compensated for the economic disadvantages suffered from the breakdown of their previous relationship (Politis ONCA, at paras. 34–39).

The SSAG underscore discretion: re-partnering does not automatically end support, but it may shift the range downward proportionally to the change. As I noted earlier, contrary to Ms. Caiado’s evidence, I find that she was cohabitating with Mr. Bryans and that this cohabitation was not temporary in nature. While this factor does not necessarily point to a lower range for spousal support, I find that Ms. Caiado’s lack of credible evidence on the family’s shared income and expenses impeded my ability to consider her re- partnering as a factor in assessing the range of the spousal support award. As a result, while it does not automatically point to a lower range, Ms. Caiado’s re-partnering and non-temporary cohabitation with Mr. Bryans are inconsistent with a spousal support award using the high SSAG range.

85After weighing and balancing the above factors using a fact-specific analysis, I find that it is appropriate to use the mid-range SSAG values in calculating the quantum of retroactive and prospective spousal support.

86Using the SSAG mid-range amount and applying those amounts to Mr. Romeiro’s income for the period starting from the date of separation, and based on the Respondent’s calculations using DivorceMate, which I found reliable and accurate, I make the following finding with respect to retroactive spousal support (mid-range): $464,034.01 support +

$26,432.91 s.7 (70% of $37,761.30, receipts to September 2024) – $12,441.15 credit =

$478,025.77. Credits: $3,886.51 credit card; $2,850 2022 payments; Rowsell Order payments.

87Using the SSAG mid-range amount and applying those amounts to Mr. Romeiro’s income, I make the following findings regarding lump sum prospective spousal support: Lump sum

$567,000 (7 years mid-range, Schedule B). Terminates upon payment. The advantages of lump sum payments (finality and reducing non-payment risks) outweigh the disadvantages (Davis v. Crawford, 2011 ONCA 294, 106 O.R. (3d) 221; Blatherwick v. Blatherwick, 2015

ONSC 2606, 2015 ONSC 2606, 8 E.T.R. (4th) 30).

VII. Issue 6 – Prospective Child Support

88Based on the current parenting time arrangement, my earlier findings regarding the parties’ incomes, and applying s. 3(1) of the Child Support Guidelines, I make the following finding with respect to prospective child support: Set-off of each party’s respective child support amount will result in payments of $4,814.40/month (see DivorceMate calculations, Schedule B) paid by Mr. Romeiro to Ms. Caiado, commencing December 1, 2025.

89Any special or extraordinary expenses under s. 7 of the Child Support Guidelines are to be divided as follows: 90% of the expenses are to be paid by Mr. Romeiro and the remaining 10% will be paid by Ms. Caiado.

VIII. Issue 7 – Mr. Romeiro’s Civil Claims

90Mr. Romeiro’s two civil claims against Ms. Caiado (for misappropriation in the amounts of $146,639.30 and $140,617) are dismissed. The evidence adduced at trial, including that Mr. Romeiro controlled the parties’ finances and authorized the 2015 withdrawals for the Oldfield mortgage (which benefited the family), that the CRA audit revealed a hidden CIBC account with altered statements (Exhibits H1959, H1964), and that there was no evidence of incapacity (medical notes, Exhibit H847), has been fully considered.

91However, these claims are addressed and subsumed within the comprehensive finding of a joint family venture, which encompasses all the funds and transactions at issue. This dismissal aligns with the directions of Hughes J. in her endorsement dated May 16, 2023 (Exhibit B1868), which prohibited further steps in the civil matters pending resolution of the family proceeding, as well as the compliance review endorsement dated November 24, 2023 (Exhibit B1868), which found Mr. Romeiro’s commencement of the civil claims to be in bad faith.

IX. Issue 8 – Payment Structure and Security

92Mr. Romeiro’s conduct throughout the proceedings, including but not limited to: Hughes J.’s finding that he acted in bad faith, his unilateral actions with respect to the movement and withdrawal of assets after separation, his arrears of support and non-payment of outstanding cost orders warrant the need for security and assurance that the amounts ordered paid in this order will indeed be paid (Levy v. Williams, 2023 ONSC 4164, 92

R.F.L. (8th) 353).

93Therefore, the funds previously ordered preserved by me shall be transferred to Ms. Caiado in partial satisfaction of the amounts owing to her.

X. Issue 9 – Prejudgment Interest

94I award prejudgment interest at the prescribed rate from the Answer date: $37,482.56 ($1,982,447.21 x 0.5% / 365 x 1,306 days). Mr. Romeiro’s delays prejudiced Ms. Caiado (Djekic v. Zai, 2015 ONCA 25, 54 R.F.L. (7th) 1).

SUMMARY OF AMOUNTS AWARDED

[95] The following is the summary of the amounts I am awarding:

Joint Family Venture (including post- separation adjustments)

$879,438.88

Retroactive child support & s.7 payments

$478,025.77

Prospective spousal support (lump sum)

$567,000.00

Outstanding costs

$20,500.00

Prejudgment interest

$37,482.56

TOTAL

$1,982,447.21

Orders

96The following are my Orders:

1. Mr. Romeiro shall pay Ms. Caiado $1,982,447.21 as follows:

a. $500,000 by February 28, 2026; and

b. the balance shall be paid in 12 equal monthly installments of $119,537.27 commencing March 1, 2026.

2. There shall be a charge against the property located at 118 Petra Way, Unit 3, Whitby, Ontario, as security for the monetary payment owing under this judgment. The parties may file a 14B motion on consent to remove the charge once the payment in para. 96(1) above is satisfied in full.

3. All funds ordered to be preserved by my Order dated, June 2, 2025, shall be transferred to Ms. Caiado in partial satisfaction of the judgment in para. 96(1) above.

4. Commencing December 1, 2025, and on the first of each month thereafter, Mr. Romeiro shall pay $5,423.40 per month in child support to Ms. Caiado, for the child, Moira Louise Romeiro, born April 4, 2018, based on income of $689,000 and the Child Support Guidelines.

5. Commencing December 1, 2025, and on the first of each month thereafter, Ms. Caiado shall pay $609.00 per month in child support to Mr. Romeiro, for the child, Felix Leander Romeiro, born July 13, 2010, based on income of $66,000 and the Child Support Guidelines.

6. Based on the above, the set-off amount for child support shall be that Mr. Romeiro shall pay Ms. Caiado child support in the sum of $4,814.40. This shall commence December 1, 2025 and be payable on the first of each month thereafter.

7. In the event expenses under s.7 of the Child Support Guidelines arise, or are claimed on an ongoing basis, they shall be shared proportionate to income with Mr. Romeiro responsible for 90% and Ms. Caiado responsible for 10%. However, before incurring an expense that it is not a medical or health related expense, the party claiming the expense must seek the other side’s consent for the expense, but such consent shall not be unreasonably withheld.

8. Mr. Romeiro’s two civil actions are dismissed.

COSTS

9. Costs of the proceeding, including the dismissed civil claims, shall be determined according to the following protocol. If parties cannot agree on costs, Ms. Caiado shall file submissions (maximum 3 pages, not including bill of costs and offers to settle) within 30 days; Mr. Romeiro shall respond within 20 days thereafter and he shall have 3 pages, also exclusive of any Bill of Costs and offers to settle; there shall be no reply.

The Honourable Justice G. Kay

Released: January 14, 2026

CITATION: Romeiro v. Caiado, 2026 ONSC 277

COURT FILE NO.: FC-22-521-00

DATE: 20260114

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

LUIS PAULO de MENDONCA ROMEIRO

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