Court File and Parties

Citation: Moghimi v. Moodi, 2026 ONSC 2766

Court File No.: FC-18-FS000827-0001

Date: 2026/05/12

Superior Court of Justice - Ontario

Re: Nafiseh Moghimi, Applicant

-and-

Mojtaba Moodi, Respondent

Before: Gibson J.

Counsel: Applicant is Self-Represented Respondent is Self-Represented

Heard: September 15, 16, 17, 18, 2025 and March 16, 2026

Endorsement

Overview

[1] The parties have been engaged in high-conflict litigation for many years. Both the Applicant mother Nafiseh Moghimi (“the Applicant”) and Respondent father Mojtaba Moodi (“the Respondent”) came originally from Iran. They are now both dual Canadian and Iranian citizens, as are their children. They were married 7 November 2011 in Iran, and separated 2 March 2018.They have two children together, Daniel Moodi (born 16 December 2013) and Dina Moodi (born 15 August 2016) (collectively, “the children”).

[2] The parties had a trial before Valente J. which resulted in a final order dated 27 April 2023 which, among other things: gave sole decision-making responsibility for the two children of the marriage to the Applicant; specified that the primary residence of the children shall be with the Applicant; the habitual residence of the children shall be Canada; that the Respondent was to have unsupervised in-person and virtual parenting time with the children; that the Applicant will keep the Canadian and Iranian passports and birth certificates issued in the respective names of the children; that the Respondent may not remove the children from the province of Ontario, Canada, without written consent of the Applicant or Order of the Court; and, on consent, the Respondent will pay child support for the children in the amount of $1,716 per month on the first day of each month.

[3] On 17 May 2023 an interim order was issued, adjusting the visitation schedule to two virtual visits per week until the Motion to Change could be heard.

[4] The Applicant moved with the children to Los Angeles, California for her employment in January 2023. She has a PhD in Chemistry from the University of Waterloo and is now employed as a PhD researcher at an institute affiliated with UCLA, and is now also an adjunct professor. She commenced full-time employment in January 2025. Her current salary is $92,000 per annum, plus a $103/hour teaching assignment.

[5] The Respondent strenuously objects to the Applicant having taken the children with her to live in California. He has weekly virtual calls with the children, but has raised many concerns with this.

[6] The Respondent has paid only a small amount of child support, and his arrears as of 1 October 2025 stand at $85,441.13, including an unpaid costs award.

Motions to Change

[7] The Applicant brings a Motion to Change the Order of Valente J. dated 27 April 2023 to: confirm the children’s relocation to the United States to permit the children to continue to reside in California with her; vary paragraph 3 of the Order to reflect the children’s current established residence in the United States; provide for extended in-person parenting time during official holidays and school breaks, subject to appropriate safeguards and with travel costs offset against child support arrears; provide for ongoing therapeutic assessment to determine progression of parenting time arrangements; dismiss the Respondent’s Motion to vary child support based on what the Applicant submits is his demonstrated pattern of intentional underemployment, asset concealment, and non-compliance with existing orders; make an order imputing income to the Respondent of $90,000 annually based on his qualifications, demonstrated earning capacity, and access to undisclosed resources; continuing enforcement of existing child support obligations and accelerated collection of arrears of $85,441.13; continuation of proportionate sharing of Section 7 expenses based on actual and imputed incomes; an order requiring discharge of a Legal Aid Ontario lien on the property located at 72 Underhill Crescent, Kitchener, Ontario; to sign an Iranian Divorce Order; a prohibition of the Respondent from recording virtual visits without express written consent; and costs.

[8] The Respondent resists the Applicant’s Motion and brings his own Motion to Change seeking a variation of the Order of Valente J. regarding child support. He seeks an Order that: the children shall be returned by the Applicant to Ontario; that the habitual residence of the children is and shall remain the Province of Ontario; joint decision-making responsibility for the children; that primary residence of the children be with the Applicant within the Regional Municipality of Waterloo; parenting time for the Respondent with the children on an alternating weekend basis; that the Respondent’s annual income for child support be fixed at $27,326 commencing 1 May 2023; the Applicant to provide full and updated financial disclosure of her annual income; an adjustment in table child support be based on an annual income of $27,326, retroactive to 1 May 2023; all arrears of child support accrued since 1 May 2023 to be re-calculated based on this income; that the costs order of Valente J. dated 31 May 2023 be set aside; and that the Applicant be ordered to take all necessary steps to withdraw any outstanding legal claims in the courts of Iran, to permit the finalization of the parties’ divorce in Iran; and for costs of this trial.

Issues

[9] The Issues before the Court include:

1. Whether there is a material change in circumstances;

2. If so, does the material changes in circumstances warrant variation of the existing order;

3. Whether confirming the children's relocation to the United States, where they have resided for almost three years, serves their best interests;

4. Whether the Respondent's Motion to Change seeking reduced child support should be granted given his pattern of non-compliance with existing orders, his history of intentional unemployment that previously resulted in imputed income, and his continued access to hidden assets in Iran while claiming inability to support his children; and,

5. What parenting time arrangements, if any, are appropriate given the current circumstances, the Respondent's pattern of non-cooperation, and the children's need for stability and safety.

Analysis

[10] I start by observing how unfortunate this litigation has been, and remains. Both the Applicant and Respondent are well-educated and clearly highly intelligent people. But their relationship is toxic. As always, the appropriate and required lens for me to apply is to assess is what is in the best interests of the children. Determining a child’s best interest is always a fact-specific and highly discretionary decision.

Relocation

[11] The Applicant concedes that, pursuant to the Order of Valente J., the children’s habitual residence is in Ontario and that she removed the children in contravention of a court order. She argues that the Court should nevertheless retroactively grant her request for relocation.

[12] As observed by Law J. in similar circumstances in Wilamowski v. Kostyrko, 2026 ONSC 2126, this is a very difficult decision which forces this court to wrestle with the application of the test for interim relocations post-Diallo v. Bah, 2025 ONSC 2106 (Div. Ct.). There must be an initial concern that retroactively approving of the mother’s relocation may lead to a further diminishment of the children’s relationship with their father.

[13] Because there is a pre-existing parenting order, the court must first consider whether there is a material change in circumstances: Barendregt v. Grebliunas, 2022 SCC 22, [2022] 1 S.C.R. 517, at para. 112.

[14] Since the Order of Valente J. in April 2023, the mother relocated in contravention of the order. The children are now living in Los Angeles. In addition, the relationship between the father and the children has drastically changed. There is clearly a material change in circumstances.

[15] Whether the mother’s move is a “relocation” or a “change of residence” was not fully argued by the parties. However, both parties appeared to concede that the mother’s move is a “relocation” as defined by the Divorce Act. Both parties provided caselaw that assumed the mother’s move was a relocation and argued the motions to change essentially on that basis.

[16] However, even if the parties had not conceded this issue, I would have determined that the mother’s move is a relocation. The mother’s move potentially significantly impacts the father’s relationship with the children and is inconsistent with the 27 April 2023 final order which, to this date, remains the operative order and court-ordered status quo. In addition, given that there was a clear term in the order at least implicitly limiting the mother’s ability to move (which she clearly breached), I find that the mother’s move is most fairly characterized as a relocation.

[17] Therefore, the primary issue to be determined by this court is whether it should authorize the mother’s relocation to California, given the circumstances as described above, having regard to the best interests of the children.

[18] Prior to the amendments to the Divorce Act, Gordon v. Goertz, 1996 191 (SCC), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 27, was the governing authority for mobility applications. In Barendregt, the Supreme Court considered the continued applicability of Gordon and held that the legislative changes in the Divorce Act largely mirrored developments in the common law since Gordon, with a few notable exceptions. It is clear from Barendregt that the relocation provisions in the Divorce Act are meant to provide a framework for judicial decision-making in relocation cases.

[19] The relevant relocation provisions are located at ss. 16.9 to 16.94 of the Divorce Act:

Relocation Notice

16.9 (1) A person who has parenting time or decision-making responsibility in respect of a child of the marriage and who intends to undertake a relocation shall notify, at least 60 days before the expected date of the proposed relocation and in the form prescribed by the regulations, any other person who has parenting time, decision-making responsibility or contact under a contact order in respect of that child of their intention.

Content of notice

(2) The notice must set out

(a) the expected date of the relocation;

(b) the address of the new place of residence and contact information of the person or child, as the case may be;

(c) a proposal as to how parenting time, decision-making responsibility or contact, as the case may be, could be exercised; and

(d) any other information prescribed by the regulations.

Exception

(3) Despite subsections (1) and (2), the court may, on application, provide that the requirements in those subsections, or in the regulations made for the purposes of those subsections, do not apply or may modify them, including where there is a risk of family violence.

Application without notice

(4) An application referred to in subsection (3) may be made without notice to any other party.

Relocation authorized

16.91 (1) A person who has given notice under section 16.9 and who intends to relocate a child may do so as of the date referred to in the notice if

(a) the relocation is authorized by a court; or

(b) the following conditions are satisfied:

(i) the person with parenting time or decision-making responsibility in respect of the child who has received a notice under subsection 16.9(1) does not object to the relocation within 30 days after the day on which the notice is received, by setting out their objection in

(A) a form prescribed by the regulations, or

(B) an application made under subsection 16.1(1) or paragraph 17(1)(b), and

(ii) there is no order prohibiting the relocation.

Content of form

(2) The form must set out

(a) a statement that the person objects to the proposed relocation;

(b) the reasons for the objection;

(c) the person’s views on the proposal for the exercise of parenting time, decision-making responsibility or contact, as the case may be, that is set out in the notice referred to in subsection 16.9(1); and

(d) any other information prescribed by the regulations.

Best interests of child — additional factors to be considered

16.92 (1) In deciding whether to authorize a relocation of a child of the marriage, the court shall, in order to determine what is in the best interests of the child, take into consideration, in addition to the factors referred to in section 16,

(a) the reasons for the relocation;

(b) the impact of the relocation on the child;

(c) the amount of time spent with the child by each person who has parenting time or a pending application for a parenting order and the level of involvement in the child’s life of each of those persons;

(d) whether the person who intends to relocate the child complied with any applicable notice requirement under section 16.9, provincial family law legislation, an order, arbitral award, or agreement;

(e) the existence of an order, arbitral award, or agreement that specifies the geographic area in which the child is to reside;

(f) the reasonableness of the proposal of the person who intends to relocate the child to vary the exercise of parenting time, decision-making responsibility or contact, taking into consideration, among other things, the location of the new place of residence and the travel expenses; and

(g) whether each person who has parenting time or decision-making responsibility or a pending application for a parenting order has complied with their obligations under family law legislation, an order, arbitral award, or agreement, and the likelihood of future compliance.

Factor not to be considered

(2) In deciding whether to authorize a relocation of the child, the court shall not consider, if the child’s relocation was prohibited, whether the person who intends to relocate the child would relocate without the child or not relocate.

Burden of proof — person who intends to relocate child

16.93 (1) If the parties to the proceeding substantially comply with an order, arbitral award, or agreement that provides that a child of the marriage spend substantially equal time in the care of each party, the party who intends to relocate the child has the burden of proving that the relocation would be in the best interests of the child.

Burden of proof — person who objects to relocation

(2) If the parties to the proceeding substantially comply with an order, arbitral award or agreement that provides that a child of the marriage spends the vast majority of their time in the care of the party who intends to relocate the child, the party opposing the relocation has the burden of proving that the relocation would not be in the best interests of the child.

Burden of proof — other cases

(3) In any other case, the parties to the proceeding have the burden of proving whether the relocation is in the best interests of the child.

Power of court — interim order

16.94 A court may decide not to apply subsections 16.93(1) and (2) if the order referred to in those subsections is an interim order.

[20] In describing the assessment of the best interests of the child, s. 16 of the Divorce Act provides:

16 (1) The court shall take into consideration only the best interests of the child of the marriage in making a parenting order or a contact order.

(2) When considering the factors referred to in subsection (3), the court shall give primary consideration to the child’s physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being.

(3) In determining the best interests of the child, the court shall consider all factors related to the circumstances of the child, including

• (a) the child’s needs, given the child’s age and stage of development, such as the child’s need for stability;
• (b) the nature and strength of the child’s relationship with each spouse, each of the child’s siblings and grandparents and any other person who plays an important role in the child’s life;
• (c) each spouse’s willingness to support the development and maintenance of the child’s relationship with the other spouse;
• (d) the history of care of the child;
• (e) the child’s views and preferences, giving due weight to the child’s age and maturity, unless they cannot be ascertained;
• (f) the child’s cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing and heritage, including Indigenous upbringing and heritage;
• (g) any plans for the child’s care;
• (h) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to care for and meet the needs of the child;
• (i) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to communicate and cooperate, in particular with one another, on matters affecting the child;
• (j) any family violence and its impact on, among other things,
  • (i) the ability and willingness of any person who engaged in the family violence to care for and meet the needs of the child, and
  • (ii) the appropriateness of making an order that would require persons in respect of whom the order would apply to cooperate on issues affecting the child; and
• (k) any civil or criminal proceeding, order, condition, or measure that is relevant to the safety, security and well-being of the child.

(4) In considering the impact of any family violence under paragraph (3)(j), the court shall take the following into account:

• (a) the nature, seriousness and frequency of the family violence and when it occurred;
• (b) whether there is a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour in relation to a family member;
• (c) whether the family violence is directed toward the child or whether the child is directly or indirectly exposed to the family violence;
• (d) the physical, emotional and psychological harm or risk of harm to the child;
• (e) any compromise to the safety of the child or other family member;
• (f) whether the family violence causes the child or other family member to fear for their own safety or for that of another person;
• (g) any steps taken by the person engaging in the family violence to prevent further family violence from occurring and improve their ability to care for and meet the needs of the child; and
• (h) any other relevant factor.

(5) In determining what is in the best interests of the child, the court shall not take into consideration the past conduct of any person unless the conduct is relevant to the exercise of their parenting time, decision-making responsibility or contact with the child under a contact order.

(6) In allocating parenting time, the court shall give effect to the principle that a child should have as much time with each spouse as is consistent with the best interests of the child.

In this section, a parenting order includes an interim parenting order and a variation order in respect of a parenting order, and a contact order includes an interim contact order and a variation order in respect of a contact order.

[21] The Divorce Act does not provide specific guidance as to the process or test to be followed for temporary relocation motions. However, it is clear from the scheme of the Divorce Act that the court must consider the following: the burden of proof applicable to the case and whether the relocation is in the best interests of the child.

[22] Prior to the amendments to the Divorce Act in 2021, the leading test applicable to temporary motions for relocation was Plumley v. Plumley, 1999 13990 (Ont. S.C.). More recently, in Diallo v. Bah, 2025 ONSC 2106 (Div. Ct.), the Divisional Court held that the factors set out in Plumley are now overtaken by the amendments to the Divorce Act.

[23] While Diallo does not explicitly set out a new test, subsequent cases have interpreted Diallo as meaning that relocation decisions must be based on a child’s best interests: see Gomez v. Isaza, 2025 ONCJ 324, at para. 81. These best interests factors include the relevant considerations at s. 16 and the additional relocation considerations at s. 16.92 of the Divorce Act.

[24] Section 16.93(1) and (2) apply in situations where the parties have been substantially complying with a court order. That is clearly not the case here. As a result, and in accordance with section 16.93(3), the parties each have the burden of proving whether the relocation is in the best interests of the children, or not. Given that the mother is the party proposing the move, she bears the primary onus.

[25] The Applicant submits that the children's best interests require confirmation of their relocation to the United States, where they have been thriving under her care, and modification of the access arrangements to reflect current realities while maintaining their stability, safety and well-being.

[26] In assessing the factors referred to in subsection (3), I must give primary consideration to the child’s physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being.

[27] In this regard, Daniel is now 12, and Dina is now 9. Since the parties' separation in 2018, the children have resided exclusively with the Applicant. The children have never resided with their father, save for a brief period in 2017 when they were abducted - an incident that resulted in court and Children and Family Services intervention and a child protection order against the father.

[28] Following an 11-day trial between November 2022 and January 2023, Valente J. rendered a comprehensive final order on April 27, 2023. That order granted the Applicant sole decision- making responsibility for the second time and limited the Respondent's parenting time to four hours per month due to established concerns about manipulation, inappropriate conduct during visits, and the ongoing risk of abduction.

[29] There is an important context to the habitual residence provision in the April 2023 order. It included a provision that the children's habitual residence would remain in Canada. This provision was specifically included as a safeguard against Iranian court orders that the Respondent had obtained for parenting time in Iran, and Respondent’s ties to Iran as reflected in paragraphs 23 - 27 of the Reasons for Judgment. The Court noted the Respondent's ongoing claim that "he has the right to keep children in Iran and that mother kidnapped them and brought them back to Canada." I accept the Applicant’s submission that the habitual residence provision was designed as protection against potential further removal of the children by the Respondent to Iran, not as a barrier to legitimate relocation for employment and the children's best interests.

[30] All issues relating to the Respondent's history of abuse, the 2017 abduction incident, child protection involvement, Net Family Property issues and Divorce have been fully adjudicated and are res judicata. These matters form the foundation upon which the current Motion to Change must be assessed.

[31] Since the April 2023 order, two significant material changes have occurred. The first is the Applicant’s employment circumstances. Her contract with the University of Waterloo ended in December 2022. She secured employment through a collaborative project between the University of Waterloo and the Terasaki Institute for Biomedical Innovation (UCLA affiliated), which eventually led to a direct position with Terasaki Institute and subsequently an adjunct faculty position at Los Angeles City College. I accept that this employment provides greater stability and career advancement than her previous Canadian position.

[32] The Applicant acknowledges that she relocated with the children to the United States before seeking formal court approval. This decision was made in the context of what was initially a temporary work arrangement. She informed the Respondent immediately about changes in her employment situation and offered multiple alternative arrangements for his contact with the children. She also made some efforts to communicate with the Court about the evolving employment circumstances. She submits that the move began as a temporary necessity related to her work obligations, and as the employment became more stable and permanent, it became clear that formal court approval was required, and she filed her Motion to Change. She should have done this from the outset, but I accept her submission that it was done in good faith.

[33] The second material change relates to the Respondent's employment. The Respondent lost his employment in Canada and seeks a reduction in child support based on this change in circumstances. However, I accept the Applicant’s submission that the Respondent has been intentionally underemployed or unemployed for extended periods. During the previous trial, Valente J. imputed income to him due to his deliberate unemployment and ordered retroactive child support. He has hidden assets in Iran and supports himself through those assets while residing in Canada, yet claims inability to support his own children. Simply being unemployed for three years does not relieve a parent of their fundamental obligation to financially support their children, particularly when that unemployment appears intentional and when hidden assets are available.

[34] The Court must assess the children’s current circumstances and the children’s best interests, including the impact of the relocation on the children. The evidence indicates that Daniel and Dina are thriving in the United States: they attend a highly ranked school; both children have received multiple awards and entered gifted programs; they participate in sports and music; and they are fully integrated into their community in the large Persian Diaspora in Los Angeles. They appear to be healthy, happy, and well-adjusted.

[35] There has been a consistent pattern of obstructive and retaliatory conduct by the Respondent. The Respondent has opposed even basic procedural matters, including requests for virtual court appearances. The costs award of $35,000 against him dated 31 May 2023 remains largely unpaid. His strong animosity towards the Applicant is evident.

[36] The evidence suggests that the Respondent has no meaningful relationship with the children. His access has always been extremely limited due to his inappropriate conduct during visits. He has refused all reasonable alternative arrangements offered to facilitate contact, including extended in-person visits in the United States and reciprocal travel arrangements. Despite claiming to want contact, he has not traveled to see the children in the United States once in almost three years, yet has traveled to Iran. He refused in-person visits when the children were brought to Canada in September 2023, because the proposed arrangements were not exactly to his preferences. He has failed to comply with financial obligations and court orders, including Iranian and Canadian child support orders.

[37] In his virtual parenting time with the children, the Respondent’s focus has been on legal proceedings rather than on building a meaningful relationship with the children. His interactions with the children have often been aggressive and interrogatory. The children, as a consequence, are reluctant to participate. The Respondent asserts that the Applicant has engaged in parental alienation of the children. The evidence rather suggests that the Respondent has himself alienated the children through his behaviour.

[38] In Barendregt v. Grebliunas, 2022 SCC 22, at para. 173, the Supreme Court of Canada noted the interrelatedness of a parent’s well-being with the best interests of a child:

[173] It is often difficult to disentangle the interests of a parent from the interests of a child. Indeed, “the reality that the nurture of children is inextricably intertwined with the well-being of the nurturing parent” is far from novel: Pelech v. Pelech, 1987 57 (SCC), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 801, at p. 845; see also Willick, at pp. 724-25, per L’Heureux-Dubé J. A child’s welfare is often advanced in tandem with improvements in the parent’s financial, social, and emotional circumstances.

[39] I accept the submission of the Applicant that she is thriving in her current employment and residence circumstances in Los Angeles, and that this enhancement in her well-being promotes the best interests of the children. On the basis of the evidence adduced at this trial, having regard to the factors specified in the Divorce Act, I conclude that the bests interests of the children are best served by remaining with their mother in Los Angeles.

[40] There is a history of family violence in this case, which must be factored into the analysis. It weighs against the Respondent.

Imputation of Income

[41] The Applicant seeks the imputation of income to the Respondent. The decision to impute income as part of the calculation of support is discretionary. The only limitation to that discretion is that there must be some evidentiary basis for the amount of income imputed. The imputation of income for support purposes is a finding of fact made by the trial judge. It is not an exact science, but the findings must fairly reflect the parties’ financial circumstances.

[42] Section 19(1)(a) of the Child Support Guidelines reads as follows:

19(1) The court may impute such amount of income to a spouse as it considers appropriate in the circumstances, which circumstances include the following:

(a) the spouse is intentionally under- employed or unemployed, other than where the under-employment or unemployment is required by the needs of a child of the marriage or any child under the age of majority or by the reasonable educational or health needs of the parent or spouse[.]

[43] The onus is on the party seeking to impute income to the other party to establish that the other party is intentionally unemployed or under-employed. The person requesting an imputation of income must establish an evidentiary basis upon which this finding can be made.

[44] In Kohli v. Thom, 2025 ONCA 200, at paras. 123 - 124, the Court stated:

[123] This court, in Drygala, at para. 23, set out the following three questions that should be answered by a court in considering a request to impute income:

1. Is the party intentionally under-employed or unemployed?

2. If so, is the intentional under-employment or unemployment required by virtue of his or her reasonable educational needs, the needs of the child or reasonable health needs?

3. If not, what income is appropriately imputed?

See also Lavie v. Lavie, 2018 ONCA 10, at para. 28.

[124] Intentional unemployment is particularly complex. The court need not be satisfied that a payor spouse has acted in bad faith before it imposes a support order based on imputed income: Drygala, at paras. 29-30, and 36. Rather, the court must consider whether the parent’s decisions around work choices are reasonable: Drygala, at paras. 38-40; see also Duffy v. Duffy, 2009 NLCA 48, 73 R.F.L. (6th) 233, at para. 25; Tillmanns, at paras. 59-60.

[45] I did not find the Respondent to be a credible witness. He was evasive in his evidence about his employment, and his ability to pay child support. He was evasive about how long he was in Iran in 2021 after his father passed away, about what assets he has in Iran, and what he received from his father’s estate after his father’s passing.

[46] In the present case, I am satisfied that the Applicant has established that the Respondent is intentionally underemployed, and that the intentional under-employment or unemployment is not required by virtue of his reasonable educational needs. It is not reasonable. The Respondent has a Master’s Degree in Computer Engineering from the University of Waterloo, a very valuable degree qualification. He was making some $120,000 a year. Immediately following the trial, in April 2023, the Respondent became unemployed and has remained so to date, despite having the ability and qualifications to secure employment and there being a demand for his skills in his field.

[47] The Respondent’s efforts at seeking employment have not been realistic, and much of it appears to have been for show. With his background in computer engineering and software, it is patent that the Respondent could be employed in short order at a very substantial salary, as he has been in the past. I do not accept his contention that he is not currently employable and must upgrade his qualifications before he will be employable again. The Applicant has provided the requisite evidentiary basis to establish a reasonable income to be imputed to the Respondent, having regard to his past earnings.

[48] The Respondent’s conduct demonstrates intentional underemployment to evade child support obligations, transfer of assets to family members to appear less solvent than he actually is, persistent non-compliance with court orders when seeking new relief, and surveillance of the children during parenting time.

[49] There is no basis to reduce the Respondent’s child support arrears, or the amount that he is obligated to pay for child support, to the levels that he suggests.

Conclusion

[50] The Applicant’s Motion to Change will be granted in part.

[51] The Respondent’s Motion to Change will be dismissed.

Order

[52] The Court Orders that:

1. The Applicant may relocate with the children to Los Angeles, California, USA;

2. The children shall be primarily resident with the Applicant;

3. Paragraph 3 of the Order of Valente J. dated 23 April 2023 is varied to reflect that the habitual residence of the children will now be in Los Angeles;

4. The Respondent may have in-person parenting time with the children during official holidays and school breaks, with travel costs offset against child support arrears, with the maximum per trip not to exceed 50% of the child support for that month. The current schedule of virtual parenting time for the Respondent with the children is to continue;

5. The Respondent’s Motion to Change is dismissed;

6. Income for child support purposes shall be imputed to the Respondent in the amount of $90,000 per annum. On this basis, commencing 1 May 2026, and on the first day of each month thereafter, the Respondent shall pay child support in respect of the children Daniel Moodi, born 16 December 2023, and Dina Moodi, born 15 August 2016, of $1,351 per month;

7. Arrears of child support are fixed at $85,441.13;

8. The parties shall share responsibility for Section 7 expenses proportionately based on their actual and imputed incomes;

9. The Respondent shall comply with paragraph 19 of the 27 April 2023 Order regarding discharge of the Legal Aid Ontario liens on the property located at 72 Underhill Crescent, Kitchener, N2A 2S8; and,

10. The Respondent shall not record virtual visits with the children without the express written consent of the Applicant.

Costs

[53] The parties are encouraged to agree upon appropriate costs. If the parties are not able to agree on costs, they may make brief written submissions to me (maximum three pages double-spaced, plus a bill of costs) by email to my judicial assistant at mona.goodwin@ontario.ca and to Kitchener.SCJJA@ontario.ca. The Applicant may have 14 days from the release of this decision to provide her submissions, with a copy to the Respondent; the Respondent a further 14 days to respond; and the Applicant a further 7 days for a reply, if any. If no submissions are received within this timeframe, the parties will be deemed to have settled the issue of costs as between themselves. If I have not received any response or reply submissions within the specified timeframes after the Applicant’s initial submissions, I will consider that the parties do not wish to make any further submissions, and will decide on the basis of the material that I have received.

M.R. Gibson J.

Date: 12 May 2026