Court File and Parties
KINGSTON COURT FILE NO.: FC-22-00000236-0000
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: S.J., Applicant
AND
J.G., Respondent
BEFORE: Mr. Justice Timothy Minnema
COUNSEL: Andrew Bala, for the Applicant
Christina Rorabeck, for the Respondent
HEARD: March 5, 2026
Amended Endorsement - Form 14 Motion by the Applicant dated October 20, 2025
1In a previous endorsement, I had ordered that the children be present at the courthouse when this decision is delivered and had requested that a worker from Family and Children’s Services of Frontenac, Lennox and Addington (“CAS”) familiar with the file also be present. Along with the reasons noted in that endorsement, I also had concerns about the safety of the mother and the children following the release of this decision.
2For the reasons below, a Temporary Order will issue as follows:
The father shall have interim sole decision-making for the children with an obligation to consult the mother on all major decisions. The father shall follow the recommendations of third-party professionals with respect to the children’s education and medical care.
The father shall have the primary residence of the children.
A.P. and/or the mother shall deliver to the father the children’s birth certificates and health cards, all medications and instructions, and advise him of all upcoming appointments for the children.
For a period of 90 days the mother shall have no contact with the children. After 90 days the mother shall have parenting time at the Salvation Army Supervised Access Centre to be arranged in advance so that it can start immediately. This is hoped to be temporary, noting the Family Court Clinic Assessment long-term goal of equal parenting time and decision-making, but shall continue until further order.
Failing compliance with the above terms, the police force where the children are located, or any other police force in Canada where the children are located, shall do all reasonable things to assist the father to locate, apprehend, and deliver the children in order to ensure compliance with the terms of this Order. At any time of day, a police officer may enter and search any place where he or she has reasonable and probable grounds for believing the children may be, with such assistance and with as much force as are reasonable in the circumstances.
If they have not already done so, given that it was previously ordered, the parties shall create an Our Family Wizard account and pay all necessary fees within 7 days. They shall communicate exclusively about the children using that platform.
The father shall re-enroll the children in their previous school or, but only if that is not possible, in a school in his catchment area. The schooling shall take place in-person.
The father shall immediately arrange a resumption of counselling services for the children locally and shall take advantage of the available school resources. He shall also immediately follow through on his commitment to retain Kathryn Davis to provide therapeutic support to the twins in adjusting to their placement with him.
The father shall take any parenting courses recommended by the CAS if it becomes/remains involved with the family, and/or Ms. Davis.
A copy of this decision shall be provided to the CAS. Both the CAS and the mother’s counsel are asked to assist as best they can to immediately arrange for mental health supports for the mother.
Adjourned to a further Settlement Conference date to be set by the Trial Coordinator to take place after 120 days.
The mother’s consent regarding the approval of the draft order is dispensed with. The order shall be issued and entered on an urgent basis.
The parties are requested to negotiate and resolve the issue of costs, failing which they shall ask the Trial Coordinator for a 1-hour hearing. Given that he will be preoccupied, the father can also elect to have costs reserved to the final disposition. If that request or election is not made within 15 days, the matter shall be deemed to be settled.
The balance of the motion is dismissed.
The Trial Scheduling Conference dated May 15, 2026 is vacated.
Reasons
3The parties began a relationship of some sort around 2012 and it lasted for about 10 years, but they never lived together. This matter concerns the twins A. and S., who were born in 2017, about 5 years into that relationship. They are now 8 years old. Both parents had meaningful parenting time with them prior to the relationship ending in May of 2022. The father has had three children from prior relationships in his primary care for long periods, the mother similarly has had one. There were no noted issues.
4In early 2022, the mother contacted the CAS alleging physical abuse of the twins. The allegation was not verified.
5Then in May of 2022, the father was charged with making threats against the mother and a CAS worker, and of sexual assault on the mother. The relationship ended.
6The mother subsequently made allegations of the father sexually abusing the twins. There were no criminal charges. The father began having minimal parenting time supervised by an agency. All the records of those visits were positive.
7The father had been convicted at the age of 21 of sexual assault on a 14-year-old girl. On January 18, 2023, Dr. Jan Looman completed a comprehensive Sexual Behaviours Assessment aware of that event. Although it had some qualifications, the conclusion of the assessment was that, the father “… presents a low risk for sexual abuse of children, and the results of phallometric testing indicate a non-deviant profile”.
8Pursuant to the Temporary Without Prejudice Order of Justice Waters dated April 19, 2023 at a Settlement Conference and on consent, the father was granted regular parenting time on Tuesdays and Thursdays after school, and Sundays from 10 am to 4 pm. Notably, the order indicates that “both parties shall adhere to the terms attached hereto” which included parental covenants one of which was that “[i]n particular, without limitation, the following narratives shall be prohibited … [that] …[e]ither parent abused the Child.”
9A Courts of Justice Act section 112 assessment was subsequently completed, and the report by the Office of the Children’s Lawyer assessor Mitch Fallis is dated August 22, 2023. The mother was alleging physical and sexual abuse by the father on the children. The father’s criminal charges referred to above were still before the court. Notwithstanding all that, the assessor noted that there were reasons to doubt the veracity of the children’s disclosures, and he further noted strong suggestions of coaching by the mother. Also noted was the negative impact that the mother’s behaviour was having on the children, some examples of which were her maintaining that their father abused them and that they should fear their father, her encouraging the children to misbehave to support her narrative, her projecting diagnoses on them that they may not have, and her own mental health (possible borderline personality disorder and dissociative personality disorder). Commenting “[w]hile the concerns about J.G. might lead one to question if the girls should be with her at all”, the assessor ultimately recommended roughly equal parenting time in view of the mother having been the historical primary caregiver and given the magnitude of change that a reversal of custody would represent. However, having considered the possibility of a custody reversal, the assessor cautioned “… if the girls spend more time with their father and J.G. appears to continue to negatively influence A. and S., or make frequent allegations, thereby subjecting the girls to continued investigative interviews, the court, or the CAS may need to consider such a move.”
10Shortly after receiving the OCL report the parties agreed to gradually increasing parenting time for the father such that after 3 months it would be equally shared, as reflected in the consent Temporary Order by Justice Waters dated September 13, 2023.
11However, just two days after that Temporary Order was made, there were more complaints made to the police about the father, alleging sexual and physical assault against the twins. The complainant was the mother’s friend.
12The father continued with his graduated parenting time per the Temporary Order and had 6 overnight visits before his parenting time was suspended in October of 2023 due to the criminal investigation. On December 15, 2023, he was arrested and charged with a half dozen sexual and physical assaults against the twins, and a no-contact order was put in place such that his parenting time formally ended.
13Although summarized in a much later letter dated October 3, 2025 (because the CAS overlooked sending a closing letter to the parties when its involvement ended), the CAS indicated that a referral was made to it regarding sexual abuse by the father on the twins on September 17, 2023, and was investigated until the file closed on May 22, 2024. The Society accepted that the twins sustained abusive sexual activity by their father. Although there was some admitted inappropriate messaging by the father, most of the information was based on disclosures from the children to the Society and to collateral sources. The father maintained that these were as a direct result of coaching by the mother which, not withstanding that the OCL report suggested the same, the CAS apparently did not accept. The investigation also verified that the mother herself had a mental/emotional problem (related to her experiencing suicidal ideation) that threatened to interfere with her child-caring ability, but it said that it was satisfied that supportive services were in place to stabilize the situation. It further said that if the criminal charges were withdrawn or the father was found not guilty, his parenting time should as a minimum be supervised.
14On June 6, 2024, the parties consented to a Children’s Law Reform Act section 30 parenting assessment to be conducted by the Family Court Clinic (“FCC”).
15On September 18, 2025, the criminal charges against the father relating to the twins were withdrawn.
16The father says on September 19, 2025 the mother took the children out of school and placed them with a friend out of the court’s jurisdiction. This is not disputed. The mother confirmed at the hearing that the children have been and still are with her friend A.P. in Waterloo. She claimed she moved them there because the father attempted to pick the children up from school following the charges being withdrawn, which the father denies and there is no corroborating evidence from the school.
17On September 25, 2025, the father was acquitted after trial of all the charges from May 2022 (threats to the mother and a CAS worker, and sexual assault on the mother).
18As noted, the mother has a long history of mental health issues, and on September 25, 2025 upon learning of the acquittal, she was involuntarily admitted to the hospital due to her mental health, according to her by the police as she was a threat to herself. She remained in the hospital until October 10, 2025. The children remained outside of the jurisdiction.
19On October 20, 2025, the father brought this motion seeking a return of the children to this jurisdiction, and a full range of parenting possibilities from primary residence to him to increasing parenting time. He also sought decision-making orders ranging from sole decision-making to him to certain specific incidents of decision-making, plus other heads of relief.
20On October 23, 2025, in view of planning to return the children to Kingston and for the father to have supervised parenting time, the CAS wrote another letter to the lawyers for both parties. The timing of this letter is important, as it was while the Family Court Clinic Assessment (“FCCA”) was still underway. The CAS stood by its previous verification of sexual abuse and said that the children have been unable to process their own experiences of sexual victimization. It said the children needed to be supported emotionally and therapeutically in reengaging with the father. It said that it was prepared to work voluntarily with the family to “pause” any planning for supervised parenting time with the father until an updated risk assessment is completed, a therapeutic plan is developed, and the children are engaged in therapeutic counselling. It was also very focussed on the mother’s mental health, and indicated that it was worried that “the current plan for supervised access between the children and S.J. will further destabilize J.G’s mental health” and said it was also willing to voluntarily assess “both parents to determine the extent of J.G.’s mental health needs as well as the impact of the allegations and verification of sexual abuse of the children by S.J. on the children.”
21On November 10, 2025, the parties consented to a Temporary Order by Justice Waters that the children shall be returned to Kingston and resume in-person school, and that the father shall not pick the children up from school pending further order or agreement.
22On November 13, 2025, Dr. Rowe, clinical psychologist, submitted his very thorough and detailed Parenting Plan Evaluation referred to herein as the Family Court Clinic Assessment (“FCCA”). It is important to note that Dr. Rowe in his investigation had reviewed both the letters from CAS referred to above (October 3 and 23, 2025) and the CAS’ position. Following an exhaustive review, Dr. Rowe indicated regarding the allegations of sexual abuse by the father on the children “[t]he evidence surveyed and obtained during the current assessment supports the position that these have, on the balance of probabilities, been false allegations” and later while acknowledging that “[t]there are no certainties when it comes to determining whether allegations are false” he went on to say “[in] this case, almost every empirically supported marker of a false allegation of child abuse is present”. He found that the mother either intentionally or unintentionally engages in alienating behaviour.
23In assessing the mother’s caregiving ability, Dr. Rowe noted numerous concerns. I only refer to a few selected passages as the report as noted is very extensive:
To be precise, J.G.’s current mental health presentation on its own, with no regards to S.J.’s status, is likely to have had and will likely continue to have a serious negative impact on her ability to effectively parent and increases the likelihood of poor outcomes for her children.
Although she would likely currently meet criteria for multiple psychological disorders, Borderline Personality Disorder and Fictitious Disorder seemed to best depict her presentation during the current assessment process.
J.G. engages in a high number of alienating behaviours as well as non-justified gatekeeping tactics. This likely undermines the relationship between her children and the co-parent and increases the likelihood of future negative outcome for the children.
It should be remarked that the likelihood of success in targeting change for J.G. in the short term was considered small.
24While a placement with the mother was clearly contraindicated, the father was considered to only be an average risk for child maltreatment:
Dynamic factors identified places S.J.’s children at an Average level risk for maltreatment. The domains of Child Factors, Lifestyle, Personality/Temperament, Substance Misuse, and Mental Health/Psychopathology were all considered Low need areas. Similarly, Parenting Connectedness and Parenting Attitudes were rated as Low need areas at this time. As such, these areas contribute minimally to overall risk. The Need areas that were moderately or highly elevated were Supports/Resources, Spousal/Partner Relationship, Stressors, Parenting Skills, and Parenting Style. Specific risk factors identified within these domains included limited time with children, custody dispute, hostile partner, single parent, and no recent contact. No key or over-riding risk factor was identified.
25It was noted that many of the specific elevated risk factors were clearly outside of the father’s direct control (hostile partner, no recent contact with the children, etc.).
26In the end, Dr. Rowe acknowledged that there “appears to be no good options”, and recommended as starting points that the father have primary residence and sole decision-making, with the two nuanced main recommendations set out in full as follows:
The children be placed in S.J.’s primary care and he be provided with sole decision making authority. Thus, a reversal. This will need to be gradual and likely, at least initially, under the supervision of a qualified professional. The children being placed in a neutral location for a set period of time while reintegration attempts are made could be part of this strategy. This should include A. and S. having contact with their siblings.
J.G. should not have the children in her unsupervised care while the children are reintegrating into their father’s care. Any unsupervised contact is seen as likely to subvert reintegration attempts with their father. Virtual but monitored contact could be instituted as a compromise.
27The father’s lawyer wrote the CAS asking it to reconsider its position in view of the FCCA and to assist with the transition of the children into the father’s care. The Society responded by a letter from its legal counsel dated November 28, 2025, indicating as follows:
The Society will not be revising its position as set out in its letters of October 3, and 23, 2025. In addition, the Society notes that its recommendations are consistent with the recommendations made by Dr. Rowe in the Family Court Clinic Assessment dated November 13, 2025, particularly given that the Society notes that any contact between the children and their father would necessitate therapeutic involvement and that the Society had concerns about the mother's mental health.
The Society will not be assisting with transition (sic) the children to S.J.'s primary care. Dr. Rowe references the need for the children to be placed in a neutral location for a set period. The Society does not provide services related to the type of reintegration proposed by Dr. Rowe. However, while the parents work to determine a neutral location/residence for the children, the Society could assist with supporting the continued placement of the children in Waterloo including supporting the children in being registered in school in Waterloo.
Society staff will not be meeting with the parents to have a joint meeting. If Ms. Rorabeck and Mr. Bala wish to meet with me to discuss this matter that may be arranged.
28I would note that Dr. Rowe’s main recommendation is that the children be placed in the father’s care, and he tried to soften the adjustment by the need for a gradual transition “likely” under the supervision of a qualified professional noting a neutral location “could” be part of the strategy. It is hard to see how the CAS’ position (per the October 23, 2025 letter affirmed by the November 28, 2025 letter) that the father not have any parenting time, even supervised, until after certain conditions are met, is entirely consistent with that.
29On January 20, 2026, there was a meeting between parents’ counsel and CAS counsel. The father’s lawyer sent an email summarizing key points from the meeting, which neither the mother or Society have responded to or disputed. According to his summary, the Society now does not oppose the father’s contact with the children, but it wanted to ensure the children’s physical and emotional wellbeing, and as such it believed that there would be a benefit to some professional counselling, but it would not get involved to assist implementing Dr. Rowe’s recommendations. It still supported the children living with the mother’s friend in Waterloo and not with the mother due to mental health reasons.
30As noted, as of the date of the hearing, the children had not been returned to Kingston contrary to Justice Waters’ clear order, and they remained with A.P. in Waterloo. I was told over the bench that they are being home schooled, presumably by A.P., but there was no information about her, or her suitability for that task.
Positions/Issues
31The father is seeking that the children come into his primary care and have no contact to the mother or limited supervised contact for an adjustment period. As noted, his motion preceded the receipt of the FCCA and as such he sought other relief as well that was not directly addressed at the hearing.
32The mother’s position per her Confirmation is that the father should have no contact with the children until he puts forward an acceptable therapeutic plan addressing the children’s mental health. In other words, that the motion be dismissed and he continue to have no parenting time.
33I will say more about their positions when I address the parenting plans. The issue for me to decide is what temporary parenting plan is in the children’s best interests, informed by the legal tests as set out below.
Law
34As the parties were not married, this case is governed by the Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, Chapter C.12 as amended. All references to legislation are to that Act.
35Section 72 allows the court to make an interim order “as the court considers appropriate”.
36While the parties did not address the context of the motion before me, there is a Temporary Order. Per S.H. v. D.K., [2022] O.J. No. 874 (Div. Ct.) para. 26:
26 Parenting arrangements may be informal, they may arise from a separation agreement, or they may be fixed by an interim or final judicial order. From time to time, courts are asked to vary parenting arrangements in each of these circumstances on an interim or temporary basis. As stated by Pazaratz J. in F.K. v. A.K., 2020 ONSC 3726, 43 R.F.L. (8th) 411, at para. 52, and accepted by the parties before the motion judge here, courts must exercise caution before changing an existing arrangement that children have become used to, particularly where the change is sought on an interim motion. There is ample authority for this requirement. To refer to but one example, in Grant v. Turgeon (2000), 2000 22565 (ON SC), 5 R.F.L. (5th) 326 (Ont. S.C.), at para. 15, MacKinnon J. stated that "generally, the status quo will be maintained on an interim custody motion in the absence of compelling reasons indicative of the necessity of a change to meet the children's best interests. That is so whether the existing arrangement is de facto or de jure." As was stated by Benotto J., as she then was, in Davis v. Nusca, 2003 2301 (ON SCDC), [2003] O.J. No. 3692 (Div. Ct.), at para. 8"the basic principle of maintaining the status quo until trial ... is extraordinarily important in family law cases."
37This passage reflects a melding of two separate tests, namely the status quo test (where there is no previous order) and an enhanced material change in circumstances test (where the request is to change a previous order on a temporary basis; see also section 29(1)). As noted in Churchill v. Elliot and Ward, 2024 ONSC 1907 at para. 48, where the child’s placement has been for an extended period, these tests are indistinguishable. Kirichenko v. Kirichenko, 2021 ONSC 2833, starting at para. 26, refers to two exceptions to the requirement that a change in circumstances first be found, one where the existing order is time-limited and the other where the request is to change a Temporary Order that is noted to be ‘without prejudice’. I would posit that the list of exceptions is not closed and could include other situations where it is clear that the Temporary Order was not meant to endure unchanged until trial, for example where limited supervised parenting time is initially ordered absent the words “without prejudice”. The ‘without prejudice’ exception itself may not apply in situations where the order indicating the same has been long standing, given that such orders are generally intended to stabilize the situation until the parties can either resolve the interim placement issue or a full motion can be heard; in other words they may have time-limited significance (Churchill at paras. 44 and 47).
38Where the test applies, the onus is on the party seeking to disrupt the governing order or status quo to satisfy the court that a material change in circumstances exist of so compelling and exceptional a nature that they require an immediate change (S.H. at para. 40). This initial test must be addressed prior to a detailed examination of the best interest criteria (see S.H. at paras. 40, 43, 55, and 56 to 61).
39If that initial test does not apply or has been met, the court is to apply the test found in section 24(1) which indicates that in making a parenting order with respect to a child the court shall only take into account the best interests of the child in accordance with section 24. Subsection 24(2) directs the court in determining best interests to consider all factors related to the circumstances of the child. It goes on to provide a list of included factors in subsection 24(3), and in subsection 24(2) directs the court when considering those to give primary consideration to the child's physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being. The remaining subsections in section 24 clarify how family violence is to be approached, how past conduct is to be considered, and that in allocating parenting time the child should have as much time with each parent as is consistent with his or her best interests (this latter “parenting time factor” was the previously misnamed “maximum contact principle” under the Divorce Act: see Barendregt v. Grebliunas, 2022 SCC 22 at para. 135).
Analysis – Change in Circumstances
40The current consent Temporary Order of September 13, 2023, as noted, is for equal parenting time. It is “without prejudice” and therefore at first glance is an exception to the change of circumstances test. However, with the order being over 2 ½ years old, at second glance that the exception would no longer apply. Notwithstanding that, it is critical here that the order’s terms have not been followed nearly from its making. Indeed, neither party was asserting that the Temporary Order be continued or enforced; a new order was presumed.
41The mother took the children out of their school and community 6 months ago and placed them in the care of a non-party without the father’s consent or a court order. The father resides in Kingston. That is also still the mother’s address in her most updated court materials.
42It is therefore questionable whether there is even a dejure or defacto status quo of any kind that the court could continue. These basic facts alone provide compelling and exceptional reasons indicative of the necessity of new Temporary Order to meet the children's best interests following a full best interest assessment.
Analysis – Best Interests
43In going through the factors from subsection 24(3), the headings below are loose short forms for the more detailed text of the actual subsections. I have taken some of them out of order.
44Although the father had regular parenting time prior to the separation “almost daily” as noted in the OCL report, the children were primarily resident with their mother both before and after the separation. The father’s parenting time since the separation is chronicled above, including some supervised parenting time, unsupervised and expanding parenting time, and then no parenting time since at least December of 2023. Neither parent has had the children in their primary care for about the last 6 months.
Children’s Needs
45I am to look at the children’s needs given their age and stage of development. Stability is a need noted in subsection 24(3)(a).
46From the FCCA both children appear to have been assessed as meeting the criteria for ADHD but, somewhat inconsistently, the school reports are that they were preforming well academically and behaviourally.
47I am aware of the Parenting Plan Guide (“PPG” or “Guide”) published by the Association of Family and Conciliation Courts – Ontario (AFCC-O) which provides a good up-to-date summary of the social science research. It is of limited relevance where, as here, we actually have a specific assessment from a psychologist regarding the children to rely on. However, I do note regarding ‘Early School Age Children: 6 to 9 Years’, the Guide notes that: “Children of this age often feel they need a parent’s “permission” to see the other parent. They have developed an appreciation for others’ points of view; if they believe that a parent is unsettled or anxious about their spending time away, the child may have feelings of guilt, anxiety, or even anger.” This is relevant given the mother’s very negative view of the father and her alienating behaviours. It has been noted in the reports that the mother projects her own anxieties and fears onto the children, and it was clear to Dr. Rowe that the mother engages in alienating behaviour, leaving open only the question whether it was intentional or unintentional. Not surprisingly, the Guide and the FCCA are consistent.
48It is noted that the children have been receiving counselling. Proper schooling is a need, and the FCCA specifically recommends that the twins be returned to full-time in-person school. Again, a specific court order was made to that effect over 4 months ago that has not been complied with.
Children's Relationships
49The evidence is that the children had a positive relationship with the father prior to his parenting time ending 2 ½ years ago. The children have a positive relationship with their mother, although it is not clear what level of contact she has had with them over the last 6 months. It is unknown how well the children get along with A.P. with whom they live. The twins have not seen certain of their half siblings (namely the father’s other three children) also for over 2 ½ years, and it goes without saying that needs to be rectified; the twins having contact with their siblings was a recommendation of the FCCA.
Children's Views and Preferences
50It is telling that at the time of the OCL report (August of 2023) the assessor noted that both children expressed only positive views of their father and their time with him, despite the suspected influence of the mother and the risk that her coaching of them was causing them emotional harm. Since the father’s contact with children ended shortly afterward, the children were until recently only under their mother’s care and influence. Not surprisingly, the FCCA reported that for the last two years the girls have consistently provided a preference to reside exclusively with their mother. However, with respect to that preference, Dr. Rowe noted:
… I do not find that this is likely, for either child, to be an independent preference. It seems more than probable that they have been unduly influenced by their mother, either on purpose or inadvertently, to be fearful of their father and anything or anyone associated with their father. Given their age, the lack of likely independence of their positions, and information provided, little weight should be afforded to their views and preferences.
51The children’s views and preferences, while they must be taken into consideration, must be taken in context and, given the above, reliance on them after 2023 at least is problematic.
Plans of Care
52The Plans of Care are tied to the parties’ positions on the motions.
53The father has a plan. He has a Registered Psychotherapist lined up “to provide therapeutic support to A. and S. in the context of their gradual reintegration into their father’s care” in line with Dr. Rowe’s recommendations. The problem of course is that the children are in Waterloo, and implementing Dr. Rowe’s recommendation of a gradual transition from a neutral placement is practically impossible. The father suggested in argument that his sister R.Y. could help in this regard as she was an access supervisor with CAS, but there was no detailed placement plan. The father asks that, with no other option, that the children come into his primary care, with no contact or limited contact with the mother.
54The mother has no plan. She had a mental health hospital admission in September/October 2025 and the children have been out of her care since before then. An immediate return to her is not supported by the CAS nor the FCCA. She seems to understand that. Her main position is therefore that the father should have no parenting time. Presumably this means by default that her plan is that the children remain with A.P.
55The mother cites as a reason for her position that the father is unable to implement all of the FCCA recommendations, specifically, a gradual reintegration from a neutral base cannot be done. Of course, it was she who placed the children in Waterloo and left them there in contravention of a court order.
56The mother suggested that this is a matter that should wait until trial, because the facts are untested, arguing that the caselaw that the father relies on only provides for custody reversals after trial. In his rather disorganized and convoluted Factum, the father referred to two cases that to the contrary ordered a custody reversal on an interim basis: Y.H.P. v. J.N., 2023 ONSC 5755 and Hutchings v. Hutchings, 2025 ONSC 7328. The mother’s suggestion of waiting until trial supports her main position (no parenting time to the father) and as this matter has yet to even have a Trial Scheduling Conference, we are talking of a long time, potentially a year or more. While I cannot presume that the recommendations from the assessments of Mr. Fallis and Dr. Rowe would prevail at trial, the evidence from those assessments are most relevant to the question of whether an immediate change is required to protect the children and support their best interests (Churchill, supra, starting at para. 50).
57The mother asserted, quite incredibly, that she agrees with the FCCA recommendations, and has already competed the first step of its recommendation, namely by placing the children in a neutral location. This is clearly disingenuous. Her placing the children in Waterloo with A.P. was done prior to the FCCA recommendations, and rather than being in line with the spirit of its recommendations, the move was to put a distance barrier between the children and the father. Her maintaining that placement despite a court order requiring her to return the children to Kingston only serves to thwart the FCCA recommendations.
58The mother argued in support of her main position that she is simply following orders, namely the CAS letter of October 23, 2025 which indicated that the father have no parenting time until certain preconditions are met. Indeed, she relies on the CAS as her authority to justify the continued breach of the court order to return the children to Kingston, notwithstanding that the court order was made after the above noted letter. Further, the CAS position itself predated the FCCA, and the subsequent FCCA investigation was a much deeper dive into the evidence surrounding the best interests of the children than the child protection investigation. Regardless, without formally intervening itself or on consent of the parents, the CAS cannot authorize a party to breach an order from the court.
59Still in keeping with her main position, the mother argued that the transition to the father’s care should not be rushed or forced, as otherwise it would destabilize the children. Again, the children are not in the care of either parent and have been taken out of their school and community by the mother. Avoiding their destabilization did not appear to be a concern when that occurred.
Willingness to Support the Children’s Relationship with the Other Spouse
60Clearly the mother has had no interest in supporting the children’s relationship with the father. Alienating behaviours were noted in the OCL report and in detail in the FCCA. I find that the mother has been alienating the children from the father. This has continued as noted in the mother’s plan of care and position on this motion, and in her removing the children from Kingston effectively thwarting any even restricted parenting time for the father.
61The father in his position supports the mother’s continuing relationship with the children, but only after a cessation sufficient to reverse the alienation and allow him and the children to re-establish their relationship. He argues being cautious with the mother’s parenting time, given her negative messaging and mindful of her mental health.
Children's Cultural, Linguistic, Religious and Spiritual Upbringing and Heritage
62None of these factors were developed or given any role in this hearing.
Ability of Parents
63These have been touched on above in the quoted passages from the FCCA.
Ability to Cooperate with Other Parent
64There has been no positive contact or cooperation between the parties during the court process.
Family Violence
65As noted in Barendregt at para. 142, any family violence or abuse may affect a child’s welfare and should always be considered, not just in relocation decisions.
66I agree with the mother that the criminal charges being dismissed against the father does rule out a finding in this case that there has been any family violence. However, the mother’s allegations of violence against her personally will require further evidence and cross-examination to be fully considered. The allegations of family violence against the children have been tested by the OCL and FCC assessors, and upon a review of the evidence including that in those reports, are not substantiated on a balance of probabilities.
67Lastly, it needs to be noted that alienating behaviours by the mother is also family violence (Y.H.P. at para. 59) and emotional abuse of the children by the mother.
Other Relevant Proceedings
68The criminal proceedings against the father and their outcomes have been noted, and there are no other relevant proceedings at this time.
Non-Listed Factors
69As noted, the CAS in its assessment from a child protection perspective was very concerned about the mother’s welfare and how any parenting time that the father has with the twins will impact her mental health (see para. 20 above). I too am very concerned about the mother’s reactions upon any parenting time being ordered for the father, and in particular the risk of her self-harming. Dr. Rowe noted her numerous self-reported suicide attempts and her declarations that her children were the only reason she goes on living. This is very serious and will require some careful attention by those assisting her. However, that risk cannot be leveraged to ignore the evidence in favour of the father having a relationship with the children, and to deny that from ever happening. While the mother’s fragile mental health is extremely worrisome, section 24(1) very specifically directs the court to only take into account the best interests of the children.
Conclusion – Parenting Time and Decision-Making
70None of the relevant best interest criteria reviewed above has priority over another. While the Children’s Law Reform Act test and family law experts/educators call for a multi-factor approach when assessing claims of alienation, the mother’s opposition to the father’s relationship with the children is a standout factor on this motion.
71Dr. Rowe noted that there are no good options. There are even fewer than he may have been aware.
72I note that his recommendations align with those given by Dr. Barbara Jo Fidler in the case of W.C. v. C.E., 2010 ONSC 3575 at para. 129, a decision following a trial, which were discussed subsequently in Y.H.P. at para 40, a decision on a motion. They list the dispositions available to the court as follows:
Do nothing and leave the child with the alienating parent;
Do a custody reversal by placing the child with the rejected parent;
Leave the child with the favoured parent and provide therapy; or
Provide a transitional placement where the child is placed with a neutral party and therapy is provided so that eventually the child can be placed with the rejected parent.
73Along the same lines, I note the helpful May 23, 2024 paper by Nicholas Bala, Rachel Birnbaum, and Jessica Farshait ‘Children Resisting Contact and Parental Alienation: Strategies for Lawyers in High Conflict Parenting Cases’ (2024Docs 921), and in particular the following passage:
Many parents engaging in alienating behaviours can be educated, cajoled or pressured by their lawyers or the courts into supporting their children’s relationship with the other parent. However, for the most severe alienation cases, it may be in the child’s best interests to change the parenting arrangements. Judicial options for response to alienation include “custody reversal” and suspending contact with the alienating parent or, at the other end of the spectrum, deciding it is better for the children to give up on legal efforts at trying to establish a meaningful relationship with the rejected parent.
74This case is what the above passage referred to as one of “the most severe alienation cases” where the alienating behaviours have been consistent over a long period and there is no possibility of the mother allowing the father parenting time by agreement. The children are much too young for me to find that it is better for them to give up on their having a relationship with their father. Further, they would be at risk if they are returned to the mother herself any time soon.
75Looking at the four available orders as set out above, I start by pointing out that, as indicated in W.C., there is no one option that fits each case. I would also note that Dr. Rowe’s recommendation touches on (2) and (4), namely a custody reversal, but gradual and with supports; both have the same ultimate objective.
76Looking at those options in the context of this case, regarding (1), there was no suggestion from either the CAS or Dr. Rowe that the children should be placed in the mother’s sole care, and, perhaps in light of those views, she was not seeking that. If I were to do nothing, I would not be leaving the children with the mother, the alienating parent, but rather with A.P. whom I know nothing about where they reside on the mother’s direction. The alienation would continue with no hope of the children having a relationship with their father prior to a distant trial. Delaying would make a transition to the father’s care only more difficult in the future.
77Regarding option (2), placing the children with the father, this is the ultimate recommendation of the FCCA, and stands the best chance for the children to benefit from that relationship. It would not even be a true ‘custody reversal’ as it is arguable that the children are not even with the mother.
78Option (3) is to leave the children with the “favoured parent” (meaning with the mother per W.C. at para. 134) and providing therapy. This is simply not available. The children are not with their mother. Even when they were, nothing along these lines occurred and it is clear the mother would be unable to support this process. The mother said to Dr. Rowe that she hates the father and will never change her feelings of disgust and loathing. It is reasonable to expect that the mother would sabotage any such reunification planning.
79Lastly, option (4), a transitional reunification with the father while the children are with a neutral party with therapy, which is supported by the FCCA and the CAS. Dr. Rowe’s first recommendation was that the children be in the father’s primary care – a reversal of custody – and that it happen in a measured way. However, as I have noted, the mother has taken steps such that the court does not have this available as a choice. Per W.C. at para. 135, neutrality is crucial, and there is no evidence that A.P. is a truly neutral placement. Indeed, relying on the mother alone to choose a neutral placement would be highly suspect. Further, the Waterloo placement was over 6 months ago, the FCCA recommendation of working from a neutral placement was delivered over 4 months ago, and the father has still not seen the children. The distance between Kingston and Waterloo alone makes this option unworkable. No other neutral plan has been developed. The mother suggests it is the father’s responsibility to make the arrangements, and as he can’t the motion should simply be dismissed. That is simply her putting up an impossible barrier to him having any parenting time, as the children have always until recently been under her control.
80In my view, with the Y.H.P. option 4 and Dr. Rowe’s identical gradual reversal recommendation practically unavailable, the only order remaining that would allow the children a relationship with their father is to place them with him directly with supports. The twins are at a critical age, and difficult decisions cannot be unduly deferred. The father having major decision-making authority is the only way to close off the mother from further driving a wedge between father and daughters.
81While the changing of primary residence is undoubtedly a drastic remedy, it may be seen as less so in this case where the children are not being removed from the direct care of a long-term primary parent. A change to the father’s care will be very difficult for the father to manage and for the children, who are my sole focus, to manage. However, as noted in A.A. v. S.N.A., 2007 BCCA 363, [2007] B.C.J. 1474 (C.A.) at para. 27, a case where the father had limited contact with a child and a mother was not permitting any sort of relationship, paramountcy needs to be given to A. and S.’s long-term interests over their short-term interests, and the short-term risk is necessary for them to have a chance to develop normally.
Decision
82Orders to go as set out in paragraph 2 above.
Minnema J.
Date: April 28, 2026