ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
George Crawford
Plaintiff
– and –
Belinda Erica Earle St. Ville et al
Defendants
Khaled Gheddai, for the Applicant
Self-Represented
HEARD: January 13, 2026
CORRECTED REASONS FOR DECISION
Mathen J.
OVERVIEW
1This is a motion brought pursuant to Rule 60.12 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The moving party seeks to strike, without leave to amend, a Statement of Defence and Counterclaim dated May 6, 2025, as well as other corresponding relief.
2The parties on this motion are the Plaintiff/Defendant by Counterclaim, George Crawford, and his niece, the Defendant/Plaintiff by Counterclaim, Belinda Earle St. Ville. Consistent with past endorsements, I refer to them by their first names. Belinda is self-represented.
3The underlying dispute concerns a residential property located at 28 Leila Jackson Terrace, North York. Belinda and her sister purchased the property on June 18, 2010. On September 17, 2018, the property was transferred to George, who is the sole registered owner on title. Belinda says this transfer was “on paper”: it was temporary and eventually would be reversed.
4After the 2018 transfer, Belinda continued to live in the home and rent out rooms out to students. In or about 2022, the parties’ relationship deteriorated. By May 2024, George decided that he no longer wanted Belinda in charge of the rental arrangements. He gave formal notice to the tenants to begin paying rent to him. When that did not happen, George started an action in September 2024 for declaratory and injunctive relief, and damages. Belinda filed a counter claim asking for, among other things, a vesting order and specific performance to transfer the property back to her name.
5The current mortgage on the property is held by BMO. BMO has sent demand letters on May 5, 2025, and November 10, 2025.
6This matter has involved many appearances before numerous judges of this court. Initially, George wanted to sell the property and put the proceeds in trust. Belinda objected. Eventually, the parties agreed to a certificate of pending litigation (CPL). Although the CPL was ordered in August 2025 out of inadvertence it was not issued until November 2025.
7Since July 2025, Justice Papageorgiou has been a de facto though not formally appointed case management judge. She had extensive involvement with the parties, holding at least five case conferences and deciding one motion. In October she decided that this matter should proceed to a 5-day trial on an expedited basis. At a pre-trial conference in December, Akazaki J. determined that the trial actually requires ten days. It is scheduled to begin January 19, 2026.
8Over the course of this litigation, Belinda has been subject to many court orders, including for costs, payment of arrears for the home’s mortgage and carrying costs, and ongoing contributions to the mortgage.
9George argues, and Justice Papageorgiou has agreed, that Belinda has consistently failed to abide by those court orders.
10On January 5, 2026, at an urgent case conference, George sought to:
a. strike Belinda’s statement of defence;
b. lift the CPL;
c. receive a default judgment; and
d. receive damages and costs.
11Justice Papageorgiou declined to decide George’s requests at a case conference, but set an urgent motion for January 13, 2026, which proceeded before me. The parties submitted extensive materials in support of their position. The motion was scheduled for 90 minutes but lasted for approximately 2 hours and 15 minutes. I gave each party additional time to make their case.
12Striking out a party’s pleadings, especially so close to a trial date, is an extraordinary remedy which must not be done lightly. Having considered all the evidence in this case, including the various endorsements and the parties’ affidavits, I am satisfied that this extraordinary remedy is warranted.
ISSUES AND BRIEF CONCLUSION
13The issues to be decided are:
a. Should Belinda’s statement of defence and counterclaim be struck under Rule 60.12 of the Rules?
b. Is George entitled to default judgment pursuant to Rule19.05 of the Rules?
c. Should the certificate of pending litigation be lifted from 28 Leila Jackson under subsection 103(6)(a)(ii) of the Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c.C43?
d. What if any costs are owing?
14As stated above, I find that this is the rare case that warrants striking out pleadings. Belinda’s persistent refusal to obey this court’s orders has greatly prejudiced George. George has had to take out additional mortgages on his own residence to maintain 28 Leila Jackson and has been deprived of the latter’s rental income. Without Belinda’s pleadings, George’s statement of claim entitles him to default judgment in all but one respect: I decline to award punitive damages. The certificate of pending litigation is lifted. George is entitled to costs.
15The following is the parties’ respective accounts of their dispute.
Belinda
16Belinda is an accountant. She is currently divorcing her husband. She lives with her four children.
17Belinda says that she first brought up the possibility of transferring 28 Leila Jackson to George in February 2018. Belinda and her husband wanted to buy a second property across the street and were having difficulties securing a low-interest rate mortgage. Belinda and George entered a verbal agreement that the property would be transferred to George only temporarily. George would neither have any proprietary right and obligations, nor be liable for any carrying costs including the mortgage. The transfer back to Belinda’s name would happen upon the maturity of a 5-year mortgage.
18As beneficial owner of 28 Leila Jackson, Belinda would continue to have all the rights of an owner, including to collect rent from tenants.
19Belinda says she wanted the title transfer amount to be $560,000 but George insisted that it be $860,000.
20On September 17, 2018, 28 Leila Jackson was transferred to George’s name. After the transfer Belinda continued to live at the home and rent out the rooms. Belinda says she would deposit rent to a joint account held by her and George to pay the mortgage.
21Belinda produced an agreement dated September 30, 2018, signed by her as ‘Owner’ and by George as ‘Manager’. The agreement states:
This Agreement shall be in force on an annual basis beginning on the 30 day of September 2018, which includes the sale and purchase of 28 Leila Jackson Terrace, North York, ON M31 OB3. This Agreement shall continue thereafter until either the Owner or the Manager Partner terminates it, effective the last day of any month, by written notice to the other party ninety days prior to said date. Manager/Partner has a one percent interest in the 28 Leila Jackson Terrace property which commenced on August 27, 2018. Property Owner has a 99 percent interest in the Leila Jackson Terrace property, although legally the property is in the Manager Partner's name. In the event the parties cannot mutually agree on acceptable terms, the Agreement shall terminate within the period specified before the renewal date, the then-existing terms of the Agreement shall remain in full force and effect for the next one-year renewal period unless the Agreement is otherwise terminated.
LEASING AND RENTING Authority. Manager/Partner is authorized to sign on behalf of the owner upon review and consent of the Owner and includes Owner signature. All costs of leasing and renting shall be e-transferred and paid by the Owner out of the Property joint Account between the parties listed above. All rental mortgage/ property tax payments will be the sole responsibility of the Owner and will be transferred by the Owner to the Property joint account between the parties listed above.
Enforcement of the Leases. Manager/Partner is authorized to institute, in Owner's name and on behalf of the Owner, all legal actions or proceedings for the enforcement of any lease term, the collection of rent or other income from the Property, or for the eviction or dispossession of the tenants or other persons from the property.
Manager/Partner is authorized to sign and serve such notices as Manager Partner deems necessary for lease enforcement, including the collection of rent or other income in the Owner's names on behalf of the Owner. If deems necessary, Owner is responsible to retain a legal counsel.
Manager/Partner is authorized to make management/maintenance reviews of the property at the time of occupancy, when the tenant vacates and at such other times as Manager/ Partner feels necessary or advisable and report matters concerning the condition of the property to Owner. In the event of vacancy Owner is solely responsible for all expenses including maintenance repair/upkeep of the property.
22Belinda says that she is a single mother who needs to live in the home with her children, that she is too poor to pay the various amounts she has been ordered to, and that she is afraid of George. Belinda alleges that George’s aggressive behaviour has scared off existing and prospective tenants.
23Belinda’s stated fear of George carries over to a suspicion and fear of real estate agents who work with him.
George
24George is a 67-year-old retiree. He decided to purchase the property from Belinda and her sister, Shushanna Earle, because they were struggling to make the mortgage payments (they said), and he saw the home was an investment opportunity. He supported renting out rooms in the property.
25In this court, George produced documents for the closing including a standard form agreement of purchase and sale at $860,000 with all the usual schedules. Every party to the transaction was represented by counsel.
26George asked Belinda to continue to manage the property. The two verbally agreed that Belinda and her family could stay at the home rent-free as needed. According to George, Belinda frequently travels to St. Lucia. Part of Belinda’s duties included placing tenants, collecting rent and utilities, and depositing rental income to the joint account. Once the mortgage and carrying costs were paid, Belinda was entitled to the account balance as remuneration.
27George also has an agreement dated September 30, 2018. It is virtually identical to the one that Belinda produced which is cited above at paragraph 21 – except that George’s version identifies him as the ‘Owner’ and Belinda as the ‘Manager’. Each party alleges that the other’s document is fake.
28George says that, in 2022, Belinda was having marital problems, so she and her children moved in with him. Living together strained the parties’ relationship. According to George, Belinda made him nervous by calling herself a ‘tenant’ in his home. Eventually, George became convinced that Belinda was plotting to steal his property. He found a last will and testament in his name that, according to him, he had not signed, and that left his properties to Belinda. George also discovered that Belinda had removed the original tenant agreements for 28 Leila Jackson as well as the originals of the sale closing documents.
29As a result, in May 2024, George told Belinda to leave his home and that he no longer wanted her to manage 28 Leila Jackson. He tried but failed to have the tenants pay him directly. He posted notices in accordance with the Residential Tenancies Act 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 17. He attended at the home to find that the locks had been changed without his consent. He has been paying the mortgage on 28 Leila Jackson since approximately May 2024 without any contributions from its rental income. Around the same time, George cancelled the parties’ joint account.
30Belinda moved back into 28 Leila Jackson after George asked her to leave his home. She has been living there ever since.
PRIOR COURT PROCEEDINGS
31George commenced an action in September 2024. He amended his Statement of Claim in October 2024 and filed a Reply and Defence to Counterclaim in May 2025.
32The first proceeding was a May 27, 2025, case conference before Penman J. George wanted to sell 28 Leila Jackson and have the proceeds paid into court. Belinda objected. Justice Penman ordered Belinda to pay George’s counsel the outstanding amount of the mortgage by the end of May 30, 2025, for transfer to the bank. As well, Penman J. ordered the parties to again open a joint bank account.
33Belinda then tried to bring a CPL motion without notice. The court directed the parties to a second case conference, on notice, before Chalmers J on June 3, 2025. Belinda asserted that George was trying to sell the property. She said she intended to pay the amounts on the mortgage to put it in good standing. Chalmers J. ordered the parties to attend at the bank to set up a joint account. He ordered that all rents be deposited into the joint account, which would then pay for the home’s carrying costs and mortgage. He also ordered Belinda to transfer to George’s lawyer the outstanding amount required to put the mortgage in good standing. He ordered, on consent, that neither party sell the home pending further order. The joint account was eventually set up in August.
34Belinda continued to insist on a CPL motion, which was heard by Papageorgiou J. on July 16, 2025. By July 16, 2025, Belinda had still not paid any arrears. Belinda continued to insist that George was intending to sell the property, but Papageorgiou J. found no evidence for this. Nevertheless, because George agreed, Her Honour granted the CPL. Belinda again offered to pay “all carrying costs and outstanding arrears”. This, too, was ordered on consent, subject to George providing Belinda “with a mortgage statement and proof that he had paid all arrears from the lender’s lawyer after which she shall pay him this amount which can be paid by cheque or bank draft within 5 days of receipt of proof of payment of these arrears.” Papageorgiou J. subsequently found that George fulfilled this requirement.
35On August 25, 2025, at an urgent case conference at her request, Belinda argued that George was “harassing” her tenants. As a result, Belinda said, she was losing tenants, should not have to pay the arrears and could not pay the ongoing mortgage. Justice Papageorgiou timetabled an urgent motion to deal with Belinda’s new arguments. At the same time, on a without prejudice basis, Papageorgiou J. varied her prior order so that Belinda would pay ½ the $27,739.46 in arrears but continue paying the mortgage. Her Honour reasoned that Belinda had said that she had a money draft for the full arrears and had tried to pay them. Therefore, “if [Belinda] had the money and then only had to pay ½ of the arrears, this would leave her with enough money to make ongoing mortgage payments pending the outcome of her motion”: Crawford v. Earle St. Ville, 2025 ONSC 6137 at para. 56 (Crawford).
36The motion to vary was heard on October 29, 2025. It was scheduled for two hours but lasted all day. Papageorgiou J. said that Belinda, while unrepresented, “is highly intelligent and well spoken”, with “well-written materials”.
37In her endorsement on the motion to vary, released on October 31, 2025, Papageorgiou J. found that:
a. “Belinda has not complied with the order to pay arrears, not even half of them. She has also not paid the mortgage. She has only deposited $2,838.69 into the joint account and George withdrew it to pay himself a portion of the arrears that he paid out of pocket. While she complains that this is some kind of breach of an order I disagree. She was ordered to pay him the arrears and she failed to. He was entitled to take those funds.”
b. “Belinda has breached four court orders in respect of payment of the arrears and the mortgage: Penman J.’s May 27, 2025 Order, Chalmers J.’s Order of June 2, 2025, my Order of July 16, 2025 and my varied Order of August 25, 2025.”
c. “[Belinda has] come to court each time with shifting positions that do not make a great deal of sense, each time seeking to alter promises that she has made with new unsubstantiated allegations.”
d. “What Belinda essentially wants to do is continue living in the Property that she has not paid the mortgage on since May 2024, without paying the mortgage all the while impeding George’s ability to examine whether she actually has lost renters and requiring him to keep paying.”
Crawford, paras 59, 76-77, 79.
38Accordingly, Justice Papageorgiou made the following orders:
a. “Belinda shall pay the ongoing mortgage and all arrears.”
b. “The monthly mortgage is $4,792.99 and she shall pay this into the joint account on the first of each month beginning November 1, 2025.”
c. “She shall pay the arrears in the amount of $27,739.46, which George paid, within 5 days.”
d. “There are additional arrears owing now of $19,171.96 because of her nonpayment in breach of court orders, and she shall pay this within 5 days.”
e. “Further, since Belinda takes the position, she has lost her renters, George may arrange for a realtor to immediately attend at the Property to assess the rental potential, and Belinda shall provide the realtor access.”
f. “Belinda shall produce an accounting of all rental income she has received since May 2024 as well as the names of all renters, copies of any lease agreements and if she does not have the agreements, then the amount that she rented for within 10 days.”
g. “Belinda shall produce all agreements that she has had with any of the international schools that she has rented the Property through including the names of any students who rented, the duration of the time that they rented and all written communications she has had with these international schools related to the renting of rooms and any income she has received from these international schools, all within 10 days.”
h. “Belinda shall produce the master videos that show the dates as not all of them have dates, all within 10 days.”
i. “If Belinda does not produce the rental agreements and an accounting of rental receipts, make the payments of arrears and/or ongoing mortgage payments and/or will not give a realtor access, then George may arrange an immediate case conference to seek a remedy. If that is required, then George should advise what the remedy he seeks is in advance of the case conference in a case conference brief no longer than 5 pages and Belinda may respond with a case conference brief no longer than 5 pages.”
Crawford at paras. 80, and 100-101 [emphasis added].
39Justice Papageorgiou also decided to expedite the trial to January 2026 for five days, and ordered Belinda to pay costs of $6,000 though without specifying a date. Those costs have not yet been paid.
40George’s counsel wrote to Belinda on November 4, 2025, requesting that George’s relator be provided access on November 5, 2025. Belinda did not grant access. This prompted further endorsements and orders from Justice Papageorgiou on November 5 and 10, 2025.
41On November 5, 2025, Justice Papageorgiou issued an order and endorsement, reiterating her prior decision from October 31, 2025, and expressly permitting George to seek police assistance if Belinda failed to comply with granting the realtor access to the home.
42George’s realtor was again denied access on November 7, 2025.
43At the same time, because Belinda had made what Justice Papageorgiou considered to be “serious” allegations of intimidation and harassment against George, Her Honour ordered an appearance on November 10, 2025, to timetable a separate in-person hearing for a restraining order.
44On November 10, the timetabling did not occur. Instead, Her Honour issue an endorsement that stated, among other things:
a. Belinda had wanted to schedule a 2-hour case conference “to address my [October 31] decision where she said I made conclusions without factual evidence.”
b. The November 10 case conference was scheduled for only 30 minutes but because of Belinda’s insistence on “relitigating” the October 31 decision, the matter took two hours.
c. Belinda had not complied with “any” of Justice Papageorgiou’s orders made on October 31, 2025. For example, she had obstructed the realtor’s access to the property.
d. “I am giving [Belinda] one last chance.”
e. “She shall comply with all orders by November 14, 2025 at 9:00 am.”
f. “This endorsement shall have the full effect of an order even if an order is not taken out formally.”
[emphasis added]
45On November 11, 2025, the realtor again was not provided access to 28 Leila Jackson. George’s counsel advised me that access did not occur until January 2026.
46Belinda does not dispute that, by November 14, 2024, at 9:00 am, she had not complied with Justice Papageorgiou’s orders of October 31, November 5, or November 10, 2025.
47As a result of the foregoing issues, among other things, an urgent case conference proceeded before Justice Papageorgiou on January 5, 2026. George sought to strike and dismiss Belinda’s pleadings. As stated earlier in these reasons, Her Honour directed a motion to deal with that issue, as well as George’s request for default judgment.
ANALYSIS
48The facts as I find them are set out in the following analysis.
Issue One: Should Belinda’s Statement of Defence and Counterclaim be struck without leave to amend?
The Law
49The Rules of Civil Procedure provide:
60.12 Where a party fails to comply with an interlocutory order, the court may, in addition to any other sanction provided by these rules,
(a) stay the party's proceeding;
(b) dismiss the party's proceeding or strikeout the party's defence; or
(c) make such other order as is just.
50Courts have struck pleadings where the defaulting party repeatedly and without excuse failed to comply with the Rules and several court orders, and, as a result, the non-defaulting party has suffered prejudice as a result of the default: Kohlsmith v Sterling Mutuals Inc 2014 ONSC 4696; Madonia v Mulder, 2002 CarswellOnt 481.
51The Ontario Court of Appeal lists the following considerations will apply to a decision to strike a pleading under Rule 60.12:
a. whether the party’s failure is deliberate or inadvertent;
b. whether the failure is clear and unequivocal;
c. whether the defaulting party can provide a reasonable explanation for the default, coupled with a credible commitment to cure it promptly;
d. whether the substance of the default is material or minimal;
e. the extent to which the party remains in default at the time the request to strike the pleading is made; and
f. the impact of the default on the Court’s ability to do justice in the particular case.
Falcon Lumber Limited v. 2480375 Ontario Inc. (GN Mouldings and Doors), 2020 ONCA 310 at para 57
Application
52The factors outlined in Falcon are not an absolute test. They guide the court’s exercise of discretion. Nevertheless, having considered the factors, I find that the circumstances warrant striking Belinda’s pleadings. In fact, every factor in Falcon favours George.
Whether the failure is deliberate or inadvertent
53I am satisfied that at least some of Belinda’s breaches are deliberate. Belinda’s statement to me that she did not intend to breach any of the orders is not supported by the evidence. For example, Belinda says that she did not have the funds to pay the arrears of $27,739.46 owing on October 31, 2025. Yet, Belinda does not dispute that, in November, after she happened to receive a copy of the second demand letter from BMO (because it was sent to 28 Leila Jackson), she went to the bank to try to personally pay $29,000. Eventually, Belinda did transfer that money to George. The point is that Belinda pleads that she had no money to pay the arrears on October 31^st^. George’s counsel suggests, and I am persuaded, that Belinda was motivated by the fear that the bank would foreclose on the home but not motivated by this court’s orders.
54Similarly, when I asked Belinda why she had not complied with the October 31st order to provide an accounting of all rental income within 10 days, Belinda said that she had too much going on, that this case has “taken over her life” and that she is a single mother of four. While I do not doubt that Belinda faces challenges, she has gathered a tremendous amount of evidence in this case – easily, hundreds of documents. Given the stakes of the proceeding, I do not find it credible that Belinda was unable to make any progress towards substantiating the property’s rental income and could not show evidence of that progress within 10 days of the order.
Whether the breach is clear or equivocal
55Belinda does not deny that she has failed to comply with court orders, including Justice Papageorgiou’s specific directions in the October 31, 2025, order. Nor does she deny that those orders were clear on their face.
56Belinda also acknowledged, to me, that Justice Papageorgiou gave her “one last chance” on November 10, 2025.
Whether the defaulting party can provide a reasonable explanation for the default, coupled with a credible commitment to cure it promptly
57Belinda tried to explain some of the earlier breaches. She says she tried to pay the arrears owing in May 2025 as ordered by Penman J. and Chalmers J. Her explanations were difficult to follow. In any event, on October 31, 2025, Justice Papageorgiou found that Belinda did not reasonably explain her failure to pay arrears. Rather, Belinda, “has come to court each time with shifting positions that do not make a great deal of sense, each time seeking to alter promises that she has made with new unsubstantiated allegations”: Crawford at para. 77.
58I am satisfied that, by August 2025, Belinda no longer thought it just for her to have to pay arrears because she had realized that the payments would go to George rather than the bank. At that point, she sought a motion to vary the order to pay the arrears. On October 31, 2025, Justice Papageorgiou dismissed that motion.
59Belinda does not have a reasonable explanation for (a) failing to abide by the production timelines Justice Papageorgiou set in paragraph 100 of the October 31 order; and (b) refusing George’s realtor access attend the home in November 2025 as she was explicitly ordered to do.
60I am not satisfied that Belinda has made a credible commitment to curing the default promptly. She acknowledges that, in November 2025, she attempted to get George to agree to an installment plan where she would pay him $1500 a month. She continued to press that position at the hearing of this motion, which indicates that Belinda thinks that the court order was open to negotiation.
61At the hearing of this motion, Belinda tried to go over issues that this court has already been decided. Belinda routinely tries to relitigate matters, but she has not appealed a single order in this case.
Whether the substance of the default is material or minimal
62I am satisfied that Belinda’s defaults are material because:
a. She has continually failed to pay arrears despite being under an obligation to do so since May 2025. By the time of this motion, she finally paid some arrears but not all of them.
b. She has not paid the home’s carrying costs in the amounts and for the periods she was ordered to.
c. The mortgagee for 28 Leila Jackson (BMO) has sent two demand letters.
d. Belinda has not paid a $6,000 costs award ordered on October 31, 2025.
e. For several weeks, Belinda obstructed George’s ability to have agents enter the home.
f. Belinda’s actions have affected George’s right to possession and use of 28 Leila Jackson. George has exhausted his Home Equity Line of Credit. He has taken out a second mortgage on his primary residence.
g. Belinda’s actions have affected George’s own ability to pay for the trial.
h. Belinda has not cooperated with orders to produce information critical to issues in the trial.
The extent to which the party remains in default at the time the request to strike the pleading is made
63Belinda remains in default of $27,000 in arrears. Given the nature of the case, this is a significant amount of money. While Belinda says she has now complied with the documentary production ordered by Justice Papageorgiou, George said Belinda has not fully complied with her undertakings. If Belinda has provided documentary information, she did so out of time of the October 31 order, the November 10 order, and even the Pre Trial Conference order of Akazaki J. in December. It is therefore not possible, on this motion, to determine whether that documentary evidence actually satisfies the orders. Given that the trial is scheduled to being in less than a week, this is also a serious matter. I add that it is for Belinda to establish her compliance with the orders.
The impact of the default on the Court’s ability to do justice in the particular case
64This case has required great judicial and legal resources. I find much of that owing to the way Belinda has conducted herself. Between July 2025 and January 2026 Justice Papageorgiou met with the parties at least half of a dozen times. Many of the appearances lasted much longer than they were scheduled for. The court has given Belinda, a self-represented litigant, leniency and many chances. She was expressly given a final chance to bring herself into good standing by November 14, 2025, at 9:00 am.
65The original amounts owing in this case were low – around $25,000. The case has since exploded. A relatively modest title dispute is now set for a 10-day trial. George, who is represented, could face legal fees exceeding $100,000. The trial costs will greatly eclipse the original claim and counterclaim.
66Continuing a trial in this matter is not in the interests of justice.
Conclusion on Rule 60.12
67Non-compliance with a court order risks creating abuse of process. “[The court] failing to act may deprive the moving party of justice according to law and risks rendering the court a paper tiger”: Bottan v. Vroom, 2001 O.J 2737 at para. 24-25.
68Self-represented litigants, like Belinda, merit accommodation and assistance – which Belinda has received in abundance. At the same time, such litigants are not entitled to abuse the system or opposing party. Orders must be enforced against self-represented litigants as assiduously as against anyone else: see Myers J. in Baradaran v. Tarion Corp., 2015 ONSC 7892; Bilich v. Toronto (City) Police Services Board, 2014 ONSC 6765.
69In 2012, Justice Sharpe observed that: “At some point, a party who has failed to respect the rules designed to ensure timely and effective justice loses the right to have its dispute decided on the merits”: 1196158 Ontario Inc. v 6274013 Canada Ltd., 2012 ONCA at para. 19. This matter has reached that point. The numerous breaches, the impact on the other party, the low likelihood that the breaches will be rectified and the impact of the breaches on the trial’s complexity and cost all make it appropriate for this court to exercise its authority under Rule 60.12 to strike Belinda’s pleadings without leave to amend.
Issue Two: Is George entitled to default judgment?
The Law
70Pursuant to Rule 19.02 of the Rules, a defendant who has not defended the proceeding is deemed to admit the truth of all allegations of fact made in the statement of claim.
71On a motion for default judgment the inquiry undertaken by the court is the following:
a. What deemed admissions of fact flow from the facts pleaded in the Statement of Claim?
b. Do those deemed admissions of fact entitle the plaintiff, as a matter of law, to judgment on the claim? and
c. If they do not, has the plaintiff adduced admissible evidence, which when combined with the deemed admissions, entitles it to judgment on the pleaded claim?
Elekta Ltd. v. Rodkin, 2012 CarswellOnt 2928 (ONSC)
Application
72George seeks default judgment (as sought in the Amended Statement of Claim) as follows:
a. A declaration that the Plaintiff is the sole legal and beneficial owner of 28 Leila Jackson Terrace, and Belinda has no property interest in 28 Leila;
b. An order directing the existing tenants of 28 Leila Jackson to pay monthly rent to the Plaintiff; and
c. An order that Belinda and her family forthwith vacate 28 Leila Jackson and to take with them all their personal belongings.
73George also seeks damages arising from breach of contract, civil fraud and deceit, trespass and unjust enrichment as of January 7, 2026, in the total amount of $75,224.80, inclusive of prejudgment interest.
74Having struck out Belinda’s statement of defence, I find that George’s pleadings contain sufficient facts to justify:
a. A declaration that the Plaintiff is the sole legal and beneficial owner of 28 Leila Jackson, and that Belinda has no property interest in 28 Leila. George, alone, is on title to the property. George pleads that he executed a bona fide transaction with Belinda and her sister, following which Belinda continued to live in the home as a property managed. Belinda is deemed to admit that after being advised that her position as property manager was terminated, she nevertheless continued to live in the home rent-free.
b. An order directing the existing tenants of 28 Leila to pay monthly rent to the Plaintiff. George plead that he gave multiple notices, in accordance with the Residential Tenancies Act, to the existing tenants at 28 Leila Jackson to pay their rent to him and they have not.
c. An order that Belinda and her family vacate 28 Leila Jackson and to take with them all their personal belongings. George pleads that he has asked Belinda to leave the premises with her family and she has not done so. Given that Belinda has no legal or equitable interest in the property, and is not paying rent, she has no right to be there. Therefore, George’s request is reasonable and shall be granted. However, instead of an order that Belinda and her family leave forthwith, I am granting them 45 days to do so.
d. An order for damages in the amount of $75,224.80. Belinda is deemed to admit George’s expenses. For clarity, I have reviewed and accept George’s calculations of the damages he has suffered as set out in paragraphs 80 and 85 of his affidavit sworn January 7, 2026.
75Therefore, Belinda shall pay compensatory damages of $75,224.80.
76For the following reasons, I decline to award George punitive damages in the amount of $200,000.
77George argues that:
It is trite law that an award of punitive damages requires an independent actionable wrong and conduct that is so reprehensible, malicious, or high-handed that it offends the Court’s sense of decency. In determining entitlement to punitive damages, the Supreme Court of Canada in Whiten v. Pilot Insurance Co., 2002 SCC 18, [2002] 1 SCR 595 held that the test is whether the defendant’s conduct was so outrageous that punitive damages are rationally required to serve the purposes of punishment, deterrence, and denunciation
In this case, the Plaintiff built a relationship of trust with Belinda, and she abused it for financial gain. The Amended Statement of Claim pleads that Belinda deliberately directed the existing tenants not to remit rental income to the Plaintiff, but instead to herself. There is no dispute that she, in turn, pocketed the rental income for her own benefit. This conduct directly caused the mortgage on 28 Leila to fall into default on two occasions and constitutes the type of high-handed and reprehensible behaviour that warrants an award of punitive damages. Belinda's actions have fallen below the ordinary standards of decent behaviour.
An award of compensatory damages would not adequately achieve the objectives of retribution, deterrence and denunciation. An award of $200,000 in punitive damages would deter Belinda from pursuing similar fraudulent schemes against other people in the future and would strip her of any profits she may have been able to make from the Plaintiff.
Plaintiff’s Factum, paras. 87-89.
78George’s pleadings, which are summarized at the beginning of this decision, outline facts that could justify punitive damages. However, determining whether Belinda’s behaviour “falls beneath the ordinary standards of decent behaviour” is a question of mixed fact and law. In the absence of a trial, I am not prepared to find that Belinda’s behaviour is so egregious as to warrant punitive damages.
79Even if I am wrong about the nature of Belinda’s behaviour, she will suffer grave consequences from this motion, namely: having her pleadings struck, so that she has no opportunity to make her case at trial; being ordered, along with her family, to vacate 28 Leila Jackson; the prospect that the house will be sold; being ordered to pay compensatory damages of $75,224.80; and paying costs. These are heavy consequences that adequately communicate retribution, deterrence and denunciation. Therefore, had it been necessary to reach the issue, I still would not award punitive damages in this case.
Issue Three: Should the certificate of pending litigation be lifted from 28 Leila Jackson?
80Subsection 103(6)(a)(ii) of the Courts of Justice Act provides that the Court may make an order discharging a certificate of pending litigation where the party who obtained the certificate does not have a reasonable claim to the interest in the land claimed.
81I find it appropriate to lift the CPL. Although George consented to the CPL, it was instigated at Belinda’s insistence. Given that Belinda’s pleadings are struck, and she is not on title to the property, I agree with George that she has no reasonable claim to an interest in the land.
82Because of Belinda’s allegations that she is afraid of George, Justice Papageorgiou temporarily ordered George not to attend 28 Leila Jackson. Her Honour was willing to schedule a motion to consider a restraining order against George, but the motion was never timetabled when the case was overtaken by Belinda’s breaches of court orders. George asks that this injunction be lifted. Given that George’s legal claim is granted, and he is the declared owner of the home, it is appropriate to lift the injunction. However, out of prudence, the injunction is maintained for 45 days, which is the period I have given Belinda and her family to vacate the property. After 45 days, George is at liberty to attend 28 Leila. For clarity, George is at liberty to have his agents attend at the property at any time including before the expiry of 45 days.
Issue Four: What if any costs are owing?
83Over the entirety of these proceedings, George incurred costs of over $66,000. His substantial indemnity costs are $49,643,64.
84George was almost entirely successful on this motion which affects his success in the entire proceedings. Granting George default judgment makes it appropriate to consider the costs George incurred prior to this motion such as for the many case conferences and the examinations for discovery.
85In the circumstances, I will award costs fixed at $50,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.
ORDER
86In conclusion, I make the following order:
87George’s motion is granted in part:
a. Pursuant to Rule 60.12 of the Rules, the Statement of Defence and Counterclaim of the Defendant, Belinda Earle St. Ville, is struck in its entirety, with no leave to amend.
b. The Plaintiff George Crawford is hereby granted default judgment in part:
i. A declaration shall issue that the Plaintiff is the sole legal and beneficial owner of the property municipally known as 28 Leila Jackson Terrace, North York, and the Defendant has no property interest in 28 Leila Jackson Terrace;
ii. The existing tenants of 28 Leila Jackson Terrace shall pay monthly rent to the Plaintiff; and
iii. Within 45 days, the Defendant and her family members shall vacate 28 Leila Jackson Terrance and take with them all their personal belongings;
iv. The Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff compensatory damages in the amount of $75,224.80 which includes prejudgment interest.
v. The Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages is dismissed.
c. Pursuant to subsection 103(6)(a)(ii) of the Courts of Justice Act, the certificate of pending litigation on 28 Leila Jackson Terrace is hereby discharged.
d. Forty-five days from the date of this Order, the order temporarily restraining the Plaintiff from attending 28 Leila Jackson shall be lifted.
e. Within 90 days, the Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff costs fixed at $50,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.
Mathen J.
Released: January 14, 2026
CITATION: Crawford v. Earle St Ville et al, 2026 ONSC 269
COURT FILE NO.: CV-24-00728199-0000
DATE: 20260114
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
George Crawford Plaintiff
– and –
Belinda Erica Earle St. Ville et al Defendants
REASONS FOR DECISION
Mathen J.
Released: January 14, 2026