Court File and Parties
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
– and –
C.D.
Counsel:
Cynthia Valarezo, for the Crown
David Oake, for the accused, C.D.
HEARD: March 6, 2026
REASONS FOR SENTENCE
(Subject to a publication ban that applies to any information that could identify the complainant or a witness, pursuant to section 486.4 of the Criminal Code)
VERMETTE J.
1On January 21, 2026, I found C.D. guilty of the following three offences in relation to his former intimate partner, T.M.: sexual assault, mischief and assault causing bodily harm. I found C.D. not guilty of attempted murder. My Reasons for Judgment are reported at 2026 ONSC 411 (“Reasons for Judgment”).
2On March 6, 2026, I heard sentencing submissions and reserved judgment. These are my reasons for sentence.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
1. Circumstances of the offences
3The relevant facts are set out in my Reasons for Judgment. The following is a summary.
4C.D. and the complainant, T.M., are former intimate partners. They were in a common-law relationship for approximately eleven years. Their relationship ended in January 2019, after C.D. sexually assaulted T.M. They have two children together: a seventeen-year-old daughter and a nine-year-old son. At the relevant time, their daughter was ten years old and their son was three years old.
5The sexual assault and mischief occurred on January 18, 2019 in the apartment in Brampton where T.M. and C.D. were living at the time with their two children. Their children were not present in the apartment at the time of the offences.
6C.D. and T.M. were supposed to go to a party on that day, but they ended up not going. C.D. got drunk and fell asleep. T.M. then went into her bedroom and lay down on the bed. Approximately 20 to 25 minutes after T.M. went to her bedroom, C.D. came into the bedroom. They had a discussion about going to the party, but C.D. said that he was not going anywhere. C.D. then said that he needed sex. T.M. said: “No.”
7C.D. got mad. He grabbed T.M.’s leg and pulled it. T.M. kicked his hand with her other foot. C.D. then came onto the bed. He came on top of T.M. Despite the fact that T.M. physically resisted, screamed, cried and begged him to stop, C.D. did not stop what he was doing and he eventually was able to push his penis in her vagina.
8This lasted approximately five minutes. After T.M. started screaming and crying, C.D. told her to shut up. T.M. got mad and started to hit C.D., push him and call him names. C.D. then punched T.M. in the head. As he was coming back to punch her a second time, T.M. covered her head with her hand and C.D. punched her on her left shoulder. The following day, T.M. had a bruise on her left arm.
9Eventually, T.M. was able to push C.D. off. She screamed that she was going to call the police and she grabbed her phone which was on the nightstand. C.D. took T.M.’s phone and smashed it on the floor. The screen was damaged and the phone was no longer functioning after that happened.
10Using the house phone, T.M. was able to call C.D.’s sister who later came to the apartment with C.D.’s brother. That night, T.M. stayed at the house of C.D.’s sister and brother. The following day, she and her children started living with T.M.’s mother in North York.
11T.M. subsequently got her own apartment in the same building as her mother’s apartment. After T.M. got her own apartment, she went back to the apartment in Brampton to get her belongings. At some point, C.D. went to live with his sister in Brampton. He did see his children after they left with T.M. T.M. and C.D. had an arrangement pursuant to which C.D. picked up the children every two weeks and took them to his sister’s house. There was no formal custody arrangement at the time.
12Between January and April 2019, C.D. talked to T.M. about getting back together almost every time that they were having telephone conversations about him picking up the children or when he came to pick up the children. T.M.’s response was always “no”, which made C.D. angry.
13On April 27, 2019, T.M. was in her apartment with her children. On that day, C.D. called T.M. He said that he was going to Scarborough and wanted to spend time with the children. T.M. agreed.
14C.D. was dropped off at T.M.’s apartment by his brother. While at T.M.’s apartment, C.D. drank some beer. Later in the evening, after C.D. failed to go back to Brampton, T.M. decided that she was going to spend the night at her mother’s apartment with her son, and that her daughter and C.D. would stay in her apartment.
15At some point, C.D. went up to the apartment of T.M.’s mother. T.M.’s mother, two sisters and nephew were in the apartment. C.D. went to the bedroom where T.M. was. He told her that they needed to talk. T.M. told him that she did not want to talk. C.D. kept repeating that they needed to talk about getting back together, and T.M. kept repeating “no”.
16C.D. eventually left the bedroom. He went to the kitchen where he got a knife with a blade that was approximately 12 centimetres long. He came back to the bedroom. He told T.M. that they needed to get back together, and T.M. responded that she had no intention of getting back together with him. C.D. then stabbed T.M. in her left breast with the knife. She screamed and grabbed the knife as C.D.’s hand was going up because she did not want to be stabbed a second time. After she screamed, T.M.’s mother and two sisters came to the bedroom to help her. A struggle ensued in the bedroom and C.D. left the apartment. The police were called.
17T.M. was taken to the hospital by ambulance. She suffered a flesh wound near her nipple which required three to five stitches. The stitches were removed two to three weeks later. T.M. had pain for two weeks and she was prescribed pain medication. The bra that T.M. was wearing that night was perforated by the knife and had blood stains on it. The cut in the bra was approximately 1.2 centimetres long. T.M. now has a scar on her left breast and she still feels a little tingle now and then.
18In addition to the injury on her left breast, T.M. also sustained two small cuts or scratches to two fingers from holding the knife.
2. Pre-sentence report
19A pre-sentence report (“PSR”) was prepared in this case. The following information is set out in the PSR.
20C.D. is 46 years old and single. He was born in Guyana and was raised by both of his parents alongside his two brothers and three sisters. He is the second youngest in birth order amongst his siblings.
21C.D. stated that he has always had a great relationship with his parents and siblings. His father passed away unexpectedly in 1991, when he was struck by a vehicle as a pedestrian. C.D. was 10 or 11 years old at that time. C.D. was then raised and supported by his mother and her extended family. C.D. reported experiencing a childhood devoid of substance abuse, alcohol abuse, domestic violence, or any physical, sexual or emotional abuse.
22C.D. completed high school in Guyana. He stated that he was a good student and had positive relationships with his peers and teachers. Following his completion of high school, C.D. was employed in masonry and cabinetry. He also worked for a brief period as a bus conductor.
23C.D. subsequently immigrated to Canada to join his mother, older brother and older sister, who had arrived in Canada three years earlier. The family was in Calgary for a few years prior to moving to Scarborough. C.D. described the transition to living in Canada as being an easy one, with the support of his family. C.D. is now a Canadian citizen.
24C.D. did not pursue any further education in Canada as he had no desire to do so. Since his arrival in Canada, C.D. has been employed in various manufacturing and fabrication positions. His most recent employment was obtained through an employment agency, where he worked at a manufacturing company continuously for approximately one year.
25A few years after relocating to Scarborough, C.D. entered into a relationship that resulted in the birth of his eldest daughter. The relationship lasted approximately one to two years and C.D. has not had contact with his daughter, who is now 21 years old, since she was approximately five or six years old. C.D. attributes the separation to disagreements regarding financial matters.
26C.D. met T.M. in 2008, when their families became neighbours. C.D. and T.M. began cohabiting within several months of meeting, after they discovered that T.M. was pregnant with their first child. They resided together in a common-law relationship from 2008 until their separation in 2019. Their two children remain in the full-time care and custody of T.M. C.D. has not had any contact with his two children with T.M. for over six years. T.M. reported that C.D. failed to participate in or complete counselling requirements directed by child protection services in and around 2020 or 2021. As a result of his non-compliance, C.D. lost his visitation rights with the children.
27C.D. currently resides with his mother, his older sister and his older brother. He stated that they all get along well and that he is happy with his current living arrangements.
28C.D. stated that during his relationship with T.M., he was the primary financial provider for his family, supporting both T.M. and his two children through his employment efforts. This account was contradicted by T.M. and her mother who reported that C.D. experienced multiple periods of unemployment, with the family relying on social assistance and child benefit payments to survive. They further stated that C.D. lost employment on several occasions because of his alcohol use.
29C.D. reported that he consumes alcohol socially, typically having a few beverages on weekends, while in the company of family and friends. He stated that he does not engage in partying. He abstains from hard liquor and limits his consumption to a few beers at a time. C.D. does not view his alcohol use as problematic. This account was supported by C.D.’s sister and brother. In contrast, statements provided by T.M. and her mother described C.D.’s alcohol consumption as occurring on a daily basis. According to T.M., C.D. would regularly consume six or more beers in the evening, subsequently “sleep it off” and attempt to attend work the following day. T.M. identified C.D.’s alcohol use as a recurring source of conflict in their relationship and that it frequently interfered with his ability to maintain employment.
30C.D. has never experimented with drugs, including marijuana.
31With respect to the offences before the Court, C.D. denied that the incidents occurred. According to the author of the PSR, C.D. did not appear to take any responsibility for his involvement in any wrongdoing. C.D. described his relationship with T.M. as “perfect” and claimed that he was “confused” as to why she would fabricate such allegations against him.
32C.D.’s brother described C.D. as a loving and giving person, who easily makes friends everywhere he goes. C.D.’s brother had believed that C.D. and T.M. had a wonderful relationship for many years, and he could not provide any insight into the matter before the Court.
33C.D.’s sister described C.D. as a kind and social individual. She has never witnessed C.D. display any abnormal or concerning signs or behaviour. She is shocked and confused by the charges before the Court as she does not believe C.D. to be capable of such actions. She said that she has never known her brother to be a jealous or violent man.
3. Victim impact statement
34In her victim impact statement, T.M. wrote that she was left with a small scar on her breast and that she occasionally still has sharp pain. She stated that she was also left with a lot of emotional and mental scars. She said that after the incident, her anxiety became worse and she started having panic attacks. She regularly spoke with a social worker during a two-year period after the incident to help her deal with her emotional and mental health. T.M. wrote that for months after the incident, she was constantly in fear for her children’s life and her own life, not knowing if C.D. would return and try to hurt them. T.M. also noted that she was unable to start her current job on the expected start date due to the physical pain.
35Similarly, T.M. reported to the author of the PSR that she had ongoing anxiety and panic attacks resulting from the incident. She said that she often felt most fearful at night, which interferes with her ability to sleep and subsequently impacts her functioning during the day. T.M. stated that she continues to experience physical pain at the site of her injuries.
4. Pre-sentence custody
36C.D. was arrested on April 28, 2019. At that time, he spent three days in custody. C.D. was rearrested on March 5, 2024, and his prior release was vacated pursuant to section 524 of the Criminal Code. He was released on March 21, 2024, after spending 17 days in custody. C.D. has used 12 days in relation to another matter.
37In light of the foregoing, the parties agree that C.D. should receive credit for eight “real days” spent in pre-sentence custody.
II. POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
1. Position of the Crown
38The Crown seeks a custodial sentence of five years. The Crown submits that, based on the appellate authorities, the sexual assault calls for a custodial sentence of four years, and the assault causing bodily harm, given all the aggravating factors, calls for a custodial sentence of two years. However, taking into account the principle of totality, the appropriate sentence is a custodial sentence of five years.
39The Crown also seeks the following ancillary orders:
a. an order authorizing the taking from C.D. of such bodily substances as are necessary for the purposes of a forensic DNA analysis, pursuant to sections 487.04 and 487.051(1) of the Criminal Code;
b. an order pursuant to section 109 of the Criminal Code prohibiting the possession of weapons for 10 years;
c. an order requiring C.D. to comply with the Sex Offender Information Registration Act for a period of 20 years pursuant to subsections 490.012(3) and 490.013(2)(b); and
d. an order for non-communication with T.M. during the custodial period of the sentence, pursuant to section 732.21 of the Criminal Code.
40The Crown points out that, based on appellate cases, the sentencing range for sexual assault involving penetration is from three to five years. The Crown submits that there are no highly mitigating factors present in this case that would justify departing from this sentencing range.
41The Crown states that deterrence and denunciation must be the paramount sentencing principles in this case. According to the Crown, the sentence must also promote a sense of responsibility among like-minded offenders in intimate partner relationships, and acknowledge that this type of behaviour is wrong and causes harm to their loved ones and the community at large.
42The Crown submits that the following aggravating factors are present in this case:
a. C.D. abused an intimate partner – subsection 718.2(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code.
b. C.D. abused a position of trust in relation to T.M. – subsection 718.2(1)(iii) of the Criminal Code. The Crown states that T.M. trusted that C.D. would not engage in this type of behaviour.
c. The offences had a significant impact on T.M. – subsection 718.2(a)(iii.1) of the Criminal Code. The Crown refers to the PSR and T.M.’s victim impact statement, and notes that the tremendous psychological impact that sexual offences have on victims has been recognized in the case law. The Crown also points out that T.M.’s wound required stitches.
d. In committing the sexual assault, C.D. engaged in gratuitous acts of violence. He punched T.M. to the head and her left shoulder, and T.M. had a bruise on her shoulder.
e. C.D. attempted to prevent T.M. from disclosing the sexual assault and from seeking help by taking her phone and breaking it.
f. The location of the offences is an aggravating factor. The sexual assault was committed in the sanctity of T.M.’s home, and the assault causing bodily harm occurred in the home that T.M. was using at the time for sleeping.
g. The timing of the assault causing bodily harm is also an aggravating factor, in that T.M. had broken up with C.D. and had conveyed to him that their relationship was over. The Crown submits that a person who breaks up with another should be able to live their life normally and safely, free from harassment and criminal behaviour on the part of their former partner.
h. C.D. displayed obsessive behaviour towards T.M. leading up to the assault causing bodily harm. The Crown points out that C.D. did not want to leave T.M.’s apartment on the day of the offence, that he kept calling her and trying to talk to her, and that he wanted to get back with her.
i. The nature of the weapon used to commit the assault, i.e., a knife, is an aggravating factor.
j. The use of the knife was premeditated. The Crown notes that C.D. went to the kitchen area to retrieve a knife which he then brought to the bedroom where the assault occurred.
43The Crown identifies as a mitigating factor the fact that C.D. did not have a criminal record at the time the offences were committed, and that he is a first-time offender. However, the Crown notes that the offences that C.D. committed are significant. The Crown acknowledges that C.D. has the support of his family, but the Crown argues that C.D.’s family appears to have limited insight with respect to his alcohol consumption. The Crown also notes that C.D. had the same support in his life at the time that he committed the assault causing bodily harm and, to some extent, the sexual assault.
44The Crown also identifies circumstances that are neither aggravating nor mitigating. The Crown notes that C.D. does not acknowledge any wrongdoing and, as a result, submits that the Court should focus more on the principles of deterrence and denunciation rather than on the principle of rehabilitation.
45The Crown states that the sexual assault and the assault causing bodily harm were two separate delicts committed on two separate dates in two different sets of circumstances. The Crown argues that the fact that the offences involved the same parties is not sufficient to justify the imposition of concurrent sentences, which is different from totality.
2. Position of C.D.
46The defence’s position is that an appropriate sentence in this case is a global custodial sentence of three years, composed of the following: three years for sexual assault, 12 months for assault causing bodily harm to be served concurrently, and three months for mischief to be served concurrently. The defence submits that the sentences should be served concurrently in light of the principle of totality.
47The defence agrees that, based on the appellate case law, the sentencing range for sexual assault is from three to five years. The defence is not asking the Court to depart from this range, but asks the Court to exercise restraint in sentencing C.D. The defence also relies on subsection 718.2(c) of the Criminal Code for the proposition that when consecutive sentences are imposed, the combined sentence should not be unduly long or harsh.
48The defence points out that C.D. is a first-time offender and he did not have a criminal record at the time of the commission of the offences. The defence submits that the Court should focus on specific deterrence rather than general deterrence in this case.
49The defence states that C.D. has worked at various jobs, and that he does the most he can given what he is capable of doing. The defence notes that it is challenging to find a job without marketable job skills. According to the defence, at the time of the sentencing hearing, C.D. had been working part-time in a packaging plant for five weeks. After this matter concludes, C.D. would like to find a good job to support his family and buy a house one day.
50The defence points out that C.D. has maintained the love and support of his family, and he gets along well with his family. The defence also points out that C.D. lost his father at a young age.
51With respect to C.D.’s alcohol consumption, the defence acknowledges that this may be an issue for C.D. The defence notes that alcohol was mentioned with respect to both sets of offences, but that the amounts that were consumed are up for debate.
52The defence made submissions with respect to the case law relied upon by the Crown and distinguished the facts of a number of cases. The defence also made submissions with respect to the PSR.
53The defence points out that many aggravating factors are not present in this case.
III. DISCUSSION
1. Relevant legal principles
a. General principles
54The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society: see section 718 of the Criminal Code. The main principles of sentencing are set out in sections 718, 718.1 and 718.2 of the Criminal Code. Section 718 recognizes that “just sanctions” will have one or more of the objectives identified in subsections (a) to (f), including denunciation, general and specific deterrence and rehabilitation. However, those objectives will not necessarily point toward the same sentencing disposition. The individualization of the sentencing process requires the sentencing judge to prioritize and blend the different objectives of sentencing so as to properly reflect the seriousness of the offence and the responsibility of the offender. The search for a just sanction that reflects a proper blending of the objectives of sentencing is guided by the principle of proportionality. See R. v. Morris, 2021 ONCA 680 at paras. 58-59 (“Morris”).
55The goal in every case is a fair, fit and principled sanction, and proportionality is the organizing principle in reaching this goal. All sentencing starts with the principle that sentences must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. Individualization is central to the proportionality assessment. The question is always whether the sentence reflects the gravity of the offence, the offender’s degree of responsibility and the unique circumstances of each case. See R. v. Parranto, 2021 SCC 46 at paras. 10, 12, and R. v. Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13 at para. 37.
56The objectives of individual deterrence and rehabilitation are paramount with respect to the sentencing of first offenders. The principle of restraint serves to minimize a first offender’s sentence in that it requires a sentencing judge to consider all sanctions apart from incarceration and, where incarceration is required, make the sentence as short as possible and tailor it to the individual circumstances of the offender. Further, a first penitentiary sentence should be as short as possible. See R. v. Priest, 1996 1381 (Ont. C.A.), R. v. Desir, 2021 ONCA 486 at paras. 31, 41 (“Desir”), R. v. Batisse, 2009 ONCA 114 at paras. 32-33 (“Batisse”), and R. v. Borde, 2003 4187 at para. 36 (C.A.). The principle of restraint also requires the sentencing judge to consider rehabilitation in determining the appropriate length, recognizing that in very serious cases and cases involving violence, including sexual assault, rehabilitation alone is not the determinative factor and general deterrence and denunciation must also be considered. See Desir at para. 41, Batisse at paras. 33-34, and R. v. Thurairajah, 2008 ONCA 91 at para. 41.
b. Sexual assault
57All sexual assaults are inherently violent and serious acts of violence. They reflect the wrongful exploitation of the victim whose personal autonomy, sexual integrity and dignity are harmfully impacted while being treated as nothing more than an object. Victims of sexual violence suffer profound emotional and physical harm and their lives can be forever altered. See R. v. A.J.K., 2022 ONCA 487 at para. 74 (“A.J.K.”) and R. v. S.W., 2024 ONCA 173 at para. 93 (“S.W.”). As a result, denunciation and deterrence are primary considerations on sentencing in cases of sexual assault. See R. v. R.S., 2023 ONCA 608 at para. 39 (“R.S.”) and A.J.K. at para. 83.
58Absent some highly mitigating factor, the forced penetration of another person will typically attract a sentence of at least three years in the penitentiary. The suggested sentencing range in the case law is three to five years. See A.J.K. at para. 77 and R.S. at paras. 4, 22. “Forced” penetration refers to the lack of consent and does not require the presence of additional violence beyond the violence inherent in non-consensual intercourse. See S.W. at paras. 38-39.
59While sentencing ranges reflect the principles and objectives of sentencing and are used to ensure the parity of sentences, they are primarily guidelines, not straightjackets. Sentencing judges must still exercise their discretion in each case. See A.J.K. at para. 71 and R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64 at paras. 57-60.
c. Pre-sentence custody
60In determining a sentence, a court may take into account any time spent in custody by the person as a result of the offence, but the court shall limit any credit for that time to a maximum of 1.5 days for each day spent in custody: see subsections 719(3) and (3.1) of the Criminal Code and R. v. Summers, 2014 SCC 26 at para. 70 (“Summers”). In order to ensure that an offender who spent time in pre-sentence custody does not serve longer in jail than an identical offender who was granted bail, a day of incarceration requires at least a credit of one day towards the sentence. See Summers at para. 21. Courts generally give enhanced credit to account for: (a) lost eligibility for early release and parole during pre-sentence custody, and (b) the relative harshness of the conditions in detention centres. See Summers at para. 70.
61The “Summers” credit is a deduction from what the court determines to be the appropriate sentence for the offence. The credit is calculated to identify and deduct from the appropriate sentence the amount of the sentence that the accused has effectively served by virtue of the pre-sentence incarceration. See R. v. Marshall, 2021 ONCA 344 at para. 51.
62In this case, the parties agree that C.D. is entitled to a credit for pre-sentence custody at a rate of 1.5 days for each day spent in custody, i.e., a credit of 12 days.
2. Aggravating circumstances
63There are some aggravating circumstances in this case.
64It is an aggravating circumstance that C.D. abused the person who was his intimate partner or former intimate partner at the relevant time. See subsection 718.2(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code.
65Further, in committing the offences, C.D. abused his position of trust in relation to T.M. The fact that there was a pre-existing intimate partner relationship between C.D. and T.M. places them in a position of trust: see A.J.K. at para. 76. This constitutes an aggravating factor on sentencing pursuant to subsection 718.2(a)(iii) of the Criminal Code.
66A related aggravated circumstance is the fact that the offences took place in the sanctity of T.M.’s home (sexual assault) and her mother’s home (assault causing bodily harm). I note that on April 27, 2019, T.M. had decided to go to her mother’s apartment to sleep in order not to be with C.D. T.M. should have been feeling safe and secure in her home and in her mother’s home. See R.S. at para. 51.
67Based on the victim impact statement, the PSR and the evidence at trial, I am also satisfied that the offences had a significant emotional impact on T.M., as well as a lasting physical impact. See subsection 718.2(a)(iii.1) of the Criminal Code. It has been recognized that all sexual assaults are serious acts of violence, and that victims of sexual violence suffer profound emotional and physical harm and their lives can be forever altered. See A.J.K. at para. 74.
68During the sexual assault, C.D. used added violence against T.M. by punching her in the head and on her left shoulder. He also grabbed T.M.’s phone and smashed it on the floor when she tried to call for help, which led T.M. to run and seek refuge in the washroom. As noted by the Court of Appeal in S.W. at para. 39, non-consensual sexual intercourse is inherently violent, but added violence may be an aggravating factor.
69The assault causing bodily harm involved the use of a knife which was not impulsive and showed a measure of premeditation.
70The assault causing bodily harm occurred after T.M. repeatedly asked C.D. to leave her alone and told him that she had no intention of getting back together with him.
3. Mitigating factors
71I now turn to the mitigating circumstances relevant to sentence.
72C.D. is a first offender. He did not have a criminal record at the time of the commission of the offences.
73C.D. lost his father when he was only 10 or 11 years old.
74C.D. has a supportive family. However, based on the PSR, C.D.’s brother and sister appear to have limited insight or to be willfully blind with respect to certain aspects of C.D.’s behaviour. Some of the comments that C.D.’s brother and sister made to the author of the PSR are surprising in light of the fact that they both came to the apartment of T.M. and C.D. after T.M. called C.D.’s sister on the night of the sexual assault.
75C.D. has been gainfully employed over the years, although he may have had some periods of unemployment.
76Remorse is not a mitigating factor in this case as remorse requires an acceptance of guilt or willingness to take responsibility for one’s actions, which C.D. has not done. However, C.D.’s lack of remorse and denial of guilt do not constitute an aggravating factor. An accused person is entitled to maintain their innocence. See R. v. Bradley, 2008 ONCA 179 at para. 16 and Morris at paras. 157, 159. However, C.D.’s refusal to take responsibility for his criminal conduct does not augur well for his rehabilitative potential. See Morris at para. 159.
77There is evidence that C.D. was intoxicated at the time of the sexual assault, and that he had consumed some alcohol prior to the assault causing bodily harm. While this is relevant to his moral culpability, this mitigating factor is not one that can be given any significant effect. I also note that there has been no suggestion that C.D. has taken steps to address issues related to his consumption of alcohol. See R. v. Berseth, 2019 ONSC 888 at paras. 105, 108-109 and R. v. M.V., 2023 ONCA 724 at para. 71.
4. The appropriate sentence
a. Sexual assault
78Denunciation and deterrence are primary considerations on sentencing in cases of sexual assault. I must also consider the fact that C.D. is a first offender. However, the circumstances of the sexual assault in this case and the circumstances of the accused do not justify a departure from the sentencing range of three to five years. There are no highly mitigating factors present, and there are serious aggravating factors.
79The parties did not cite many cases in their submissions. They relied on the sentencing range set out in A.J.K. and recognized that cases that were decided before A.J.K. may no longer be authoritative. While references to other cases are generally helpful, most cases can be distinguished, one way or another, based on the circumstances of the case and/or the circumstances of the offender.
80There are some similarities – and also some dissimilarities – between the circumstances in this case and the circumstances in S.W. and R.S., where a sentence of three years of imprisonment was imposed for sexual assault. In both cases, the accused was a first offender, the victim was an intimate partner or a former intimate partner, and the sexual assault took place in the victim’s home. There are some aggravating factors that are present in these two cases that are not present in this case (e.g., in S.W., the accused had non-consensual sexual intercourse with the victim on four occasions during the night in question, and in R.S., the crime was facilitated by choking), but there are also some mitigating factors that are present in these two cases that are not present in this case (e.g., remorse and insight).
81In light of the circumstances of this case, C.D.’s circumstances, the mitigating and aggravating factors that have been identified, the cases referred to by the parties (including their similarities and dissimilarities with this case), and the various objectives and principles of sentencing discussed above (including the principle of restraint), I conclude that a sentence of three years’ imprisonment for the offence of sexual assault committed by C.D. is a fit sentence that is proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of C.D.
b. Assault causing bodily harm
82While I found C.D. not guilty of attempted murder, and while T.M. only suffered a flesh wound, the circumstances of the assault causing bodily harm are very troubling and the aggravating factors in this case are significant. Among other things, it is very troubling that C.D. assaulted his former intimate partner after she had gone to her mother’s apartment in order not to be with him, while she was lying down in bed and trying to sleep, and after she had repeatedly asked C.D. to leave her alone and told him that she had no intention of getting back together with him.
83Denunciation and deterrence are the sentencing principles that exert the greatest influence in determining the sentence in cases of violence against an intimate partner. The sentence imposed in such cases must also promote a sense of responsibility among violent partners and an acknowledgement of the harm done not only to their immediate victims, but equally to the community at large. See R. v. Ibrahim, 2011 ONCA 611 at para. 15.
84In light of all of the relevant circumstances, the principles of sentencing (including the principle of restraint), the aggravating factors and the mitigating factors in this case, I conclude that a custodial sentence of 18 months is the appropriate sentence for the offence of assault causing bodily harm.
85I agree with the Crown that the sentence for assault causing bodily harm should be consecutive to, and not concurrent with, the sentence for sexual assault. The two offences do not arise out of the same event or series of events, and they are not “so closely linked to each other as to constitute a single criminal adventure”. See subsection 718.3(4)(b)(i) of the Criminal Code and R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9 at para. 155.
c. Mischief
86The Crown did not make any specific submissions with respect to the sentence for this offence. The defence submitted that a sentence of three months, to be served concurrently, would be appropriate.
87I accept the defence’s position. It is appropriate that the sentence for this offence be served concurrently with the sentence for the offence of sexual assault because these two offences arise out of the same events.
d. Conclusion
88I find that a global sentence of imprisonment of four and a half years for all convictions is a fit sentence that is proportionate to the gravity of the offences and the degree of responsibility of C.D. C.D. is entitled to a credit of 12 days for pre-sentence custody.
89In my view, the ancillary orders requested by the Crown are standard and uncontroversial. They were not opposed by the defence. They are granted.
IV. DISPOSITION
90For the reasons set out above, C.D. is sentenced as follows:
a. Count 2 – Sexual assault: Three years of imprisonment, minus 12 days, for a total of two years and 353 days of imprisonment.
b. Count 3 – Mischief: Three months of imprisonment, concurrent.
c. Count 5 – Assault causing bodily harm: 18 months of imprisonment, consecutive
91In addition, I make the following ancillary orders:
a. Pursuant to sections 487.04 and 487.051(1) of the Criminal Code, I make an order in Form 5.03 authorizing the taking of the number of samples of bodily substances that is reasonably required for the purpose of forensic DNA analysis from C.D.
b. Pursuant to subsections 109(1) and 109(2) of the Criminal Code, I make an order prohibiting C.D. from possessing: (i) any firearm (other than a prohibited firearm or restricted firearm), cross-bow, restricted weapon, firearm part, ammunition, and explosive substance for a period of 10 years; and (ii) any prohibited firearm, restricted firearm, prohibited weapon, prohibited device and prohibited ammunition for life.
c. Pursuant to subsections 490.012(3) and 490.013(2)(b) of the Criminal Code, I make an order in Form 52 requiring C.D. to comply with the Sex Offender Information Registration Act for a period of 20 years. In my view, this order would not have a disproportionate impact on C.D.’s privacy and liberty interests, and I am not satisfied that the factors in subsections 490.012(3)(a) and (b) have been established.
d. Pursuant to subsection 743.21(1) of the Criminal Code, I make an order prohibiting C.D. from communicating, directly or indirectly, with T.M. during the custodial period of the sentence.
e. Pursuant to subsections 737(1) and 737(2)(b)(ii) of the Criminal Code, I order C.D. to pay a victim surcharge in the amount of $600.00 within 18 months after his release.
Vermette J.
Released: April 30, 2026