CITATION: Harris v. Kirby, 2026 ONSC 2536

COURT FILE NO.: FS-23-129

DATE: 2026 05 19

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

Annya-Kaye Krystal Harris

Applicant

Bridget Osei-Boadi, for the applicant

-and-

Ronnique Paul Kirby and Office of the Children’s Lawyer

Respondents

Ronnique Kirby, appearing in person

Stephen Beck, agent for the Children’s Lawyer

HEARD: April 28-30, 2026

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

The Honourable Justice Ranjan k. agarwal

I. OVERVIEW

[1] The parties were common-law spouses for nine years. They have two children, NK and LK. The applicant Annya-Kaye Krystal Harris applies for several property, support, and parenting orders. Before and during the trial, she and the respondent Ronnique Paul Kirby settled many of the issues in dispute.

[2] The remaining issues are:

(a) whether Harris has a beneficial interest in a house titled in Kirby’s name;

(b) whether Kirby’s 2021 income should include capital gains from the sale of an investment property;

(c) whether Kirby is liable for retroactive table child support; and

(d) whether Kirby is liable for retroactive private school tuition costs.

In addition, Harris asks for several ancillary orders.

[3] For the reasons discussed below, I find that:

(a) Harris has a beneficial interest in the house;

(b) Kirby’s reported 2021 income doesn’t need any adjustment;

(c) Kirby is liable for retroactive table child support in the amount of $26,336; and

(d) Kirby isn’t liable for the children’s tuition costs.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Facts

[4] The parties met in 2009, shortly after Harris moved from England to Canada. Later that year, Harris became pregnant with the parties’ first child, NK. The parties began cohabiting in January 2010. NK was born in August 2010. Around that time, the parties opened a joint account for their family expenses. Their second child, LK, was born in October 2014. The children have attended Brampton Christian School since kindergarten.

[5] In April 2016, Kirby signed an Agreement of Purchase and Sale for a pre-construction home at 53 Hogan Manor Drive, Brampton. The purchase closed in September 2017; title to the property was taken in Kirby’s name alone. The parties and the children lived at Hogan Manor until October 2018. At that time, to save money, they rented the house to a tenant and moved into Kirby’s mother’s home.

[6] The parties separated in August 2019. Harris and the children continued living in Kirby’s mother’s house. They moved back into the Hogan Manor house from March 2020 to December 2022. Otherwise, it has been rented to tenants.

[7] Harris works for the TTC. Kirby works for Brampton Transit. He’s also involved in real estate development through several companies.

B. Litigation History

[8] In December 2023, Kirby registered a charge against the Hogan Manor house without Harris’s knowledge. As a result, she started this case and moved for a CPL. Kirby didn’t oppose the motion, and the CPL remains on title.

[9] In April 2024, the parties consented to an order that Kirby shall pay child support in the amount of $1222 per month. The court also asked the OCL to represent the children.

[10] Before trial, the parties resolved the issues of decision-making authority and child support, and agreed on ancillary orders for travel consent and the children’s health insurance. At trial, they also settled parenting time.

C. Trial Evidence

[11] McGee J directed that the matter proceed by way of summary trial. The parties tendered affidavit evidence but did not attach any exhibits. Instead, several documents were proven orally and marked as exhibits during the hearing.[^1]

[12] Harris adduced evidence from herself, her sister, Mizzane Harris, and her mother, Verna Grant. Kirby cross‑examined only Harris. Harris also relied on a request to admit.

[13] Kirby adduced evidence from himself and his mother, Paulette Hill‑Japp. Both witnesses were cross‑examined.

[14] Mr. Beck, appearing as agent for the Office of the Children’s Lawyer, cross‑examined Harris and Kirby and made submissions respecting the children’s views and preferences. See Ludwig v Ludwig, 2019 ONCA 680.

[15] Kirby has been self‑represented since May 2015. While self‑represented litigants are expected to familiarize themselves with applicable legal practices and to prepare their own cases, they shouldn’t be denied relief for minor or easily rectified deficiencies. Courts must also facilitate, to the extent possible, access to justice for self‑represented litigants. See Pintea v Johns, 2017 SCC 23, at para 4. During case conferences, Kirby was provided with links to the Superior Court of Justice’s Mini Guide to Family Law Trials and the CJC Family Law Handbook.

[16] In accordance with the CJC Statement of Principles on Self‑represented Litigants and Accused Persons, I explained the relevant procedures and applicable law to Kirby and applied the court’s procedural and evidentiary rules flexibly where appropriate. That said, there are limits to the assistance a trial judge may provide. Harris is entitled to have this case decided according to the same rules of evidence and substantive law whether Kirby is represented or self‑represented. See Girao v Cunningham, 2020 ONCA 260, at para 151.

[17] Both parties tendered hearsay evidence relating to parenting time. I admitted this evidence on a threshold basis, in part because Kirby was self-represented. As parenting time is no longer in dispute, I need not determine the evidence’s ultimate admissibility.

D. Credibility

[18] Credibility and reliability are different. Credibility has to do with a witness’s veracity; reliability deals with the accuracy of the witness’s testimony. Reliability engages consideration of the witness’s ability to accurately observe, recall, and recount events in issue. Any witness whose evidence on an issue isn’t credible can’t give reliable evidence on the same point. Credibility, on the other hand, isn’t a proxy for reliability: a credible witness may give unreliable evidence. See R v GF, 2021 SCC 20, at para 82; R v HC, 2009 ONCA 56, at para 41.

[19] The factors relevant to assessing credibility and determining reliability include: (a) honesty; (b) an interest in the outcome of the proceeding; (c) accuracy and completeness of observations; (d) circumstances of the observations; (e) memory; (f) availability of other sources of information; (g) inherent reasonableness of the testimony; (h) internal consistency, and consistency with other evidence; and (i) demeanour. See David Watt & Jill D Makepeace, Watt’s Manual of Criminal Jury Instructions, 2026 (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2026), at Final 14. See also Verma v Bhooi, 2025 ONSC 4260, at para 72.

[20] I found Harris and Kirby to be, for the most part, credible witnesses. They seemed generally honest and had an accurate recollection of the events. They were fair in describing documents and conceded reasonable points made by the other side. That said, as I discuss below, I prefer Harris’s evidence over Kirby’s evidence about the beneficial ownership of the Hogan Manor house. His evidence on several issues around the property wasn’t inherently reasonable.

[21] The non-party witnesses gave evidence mostly on the issue of parenting time. This evidence became irrelevant by the time of the closing argument. Some of the remaining evidence was inadmissible hearsay. For example, Mizzane Harris testified about her “understanding” regarding the Hogan Manor house, but the source of that information isn’t specified.

III. ISSUES

A. Issue #1: whether Harris has a beneficial interest in the Hogan Manor house

[22] Harris submits that she holds a 50 percent beneficial interest in the Hogan Manor house under a resulting trust. She says she contributed to both the purchase price and mortgage payments through her severance package and a tax refund. Kirby disputes this—he argues that Harris has never assumed any financial obligations for the house and her payments merely reimbursed him for prior living expenses.

[23] I agree with Harris. I find that she contributed to the down payment and to the mortgage payments. As a result, she holds a beneficial interest in the house.

1. Law

[24] A presumption of a resulting trust arises when two parties contribute to the purchase of a property and only one of them takes title to it. See Kerr v Baranow, 2011 SCC 10, at para 17. There’s a rebuttable presumption that the parties to the purchase “intended for the person who advanced the funds to hold a beneficial interest in the property in proportion to that person’s contribution”. See Nishi v Rascal Trucking Ltd., 2013 SCC 33, at para 1. Subsequent mortgage payments are contributions to the original purchase. See Afatmirni v Sharifi, 2024 ONSC 3471, at para 95.

2. Evidence and Findings of Fact

[25] When the parties started cohabiting, they either lived with family or rented. In 2015 or 2016, Harris became involved in an employment dispute with her former employer. She says that she and Kirby discussed using any settlement funds to invest in a new home.

[26] In April 2016, Kirby entered into the APS for the Hogan Manor property. Harris says title to the house was taken in Kirby’s name alone because her credit was poor and the parties wouldn’t otherwise have qualified for a mortgage.

[27] The purchase price was $469,900. The APS required four deposits of $5000 each, payable in April 2016, August 2016, December 2016, and April 2017. The first deposit was paid by cashier’s cheque from Kirby’s Alterna Savings account. Harris says the funds initially came from an informal rotating savings arrangement (pardner) that she and Kirby participated in. Kirby says the funds came from his personal savings, though he acknowledges participating in the pardner. Ms. Hill-Japp deposed that Kirby was saving for an investment property by living rent-free in her basement.

[28] In July 2016, Harris received net severance proceeds of $10,844.08 and a tax refund of $3358.47. On that same date, she transferred $13,278.28 into the parties’ joint account. Between January 2016 and the closing date, Harris transferred another $15,751 into the joint account in small, regular increments. Between September 2017 and March 2018, she deposited a further $3250. Kirby says these transfers were repayments for Harris’s living expenses that he had paid.

[29] The remaining three deposit payments were made by post-dated cheques drawn on the joint account and signed by Harris. Kirby says they used the joint account because he didn’t have cheques for his personal account and that Harris signed “on his behalf”. He says he transferred funds into the joint account several days before each payment. The closing costs, totaling $15,046.27, were also paid from the joint account by bank draft.

[30] Harris selected the interior finishes and dealt directly with the builder, lawyers, utility companies, and the bank. Kirby says she acted solely “on his behalf” and not as a beneficial owner.

[31] Following closing, the mortgage payments and utilities were paid from the joint account.

[32] In November 2018, Kirby applied for the GST/HST New Housing Rebate. The program requires that the home be purchased for use as the purchaser’s or a relation’s primary residence. Kirby signed a letter stating that the property had been purchased “to provide a home for my children and the mother of my children, Annya-Kaye Harris.” Harris faxed this letter to the CRA.

[33] The parties and their children lived in the house from September 2017 until October 2018. They then rented out the house. The rental income and Kirby’s WSIB benefits were deposited into the joint account, and the mortgage and other carrying costs were paid from that account.

[34] In May 2019, Kirby took out a second mortgage on the house to start a new business. Harris says Kirby consulted her before borrowing these funds.

[35] The parties separated in August 2019. Around the same time, the tenant moved out. Harris and the children moved back into the house in March 2020.

[36] During this period, Harris paid the mortgage and utilities, while Kirby paid the property taxes and home insurance. Both parties transferred money from their personal accounts into the joint account to cover these expenses. Kirby also paid the children’s private school tuition and his own housing costs. He says that Harris, at this stage, was merely a tenant.

[37] When the mortgage term expired in 2022, Harris and Kirby jointly decided on the new mortgage terms and interest rate. Harris sent the paperwork to the bank.

[38] In September 2022, Kirby stopped paying the children’s private school tuition allegedly due to financial hardship. Beginning in October 2022, Harris covered these expenses.

[39] In December 2022, Harris asked Kirby for financial help because she could no longer afford the mortgage, utilities, and tuition. Harris and the children subsequently moved out, and Harris suggested that the house be rented again. She says Kirby told her that if she moved out, she would be giving up any interest she had in the property.

[40] Around the same time, Kirby closed the joint account. He says it was used only for record-keeping and to transfer funds between the parties, and that it helped him in documenting his support for the children.

[41] Kirby rented out the house from 2022 until December 2024. Although the rental income exceeded the mortgage payments, property taxes, and insurance, he has not paid the taxes since Harris started this case. As a result, more than $15,000 in taxes are outstanding. Kirby provided an accounting for the income and expenses for the house since Harris moved out but only at trial.

[42] In March 2023, Kirby took out a second mortgage for $60,000, which remains outstanding.

3. Analysis and Disposition

[43] Kirby doesn’t suggest that Harris’s deposits into the joint account were gifts. Rather, he submits that she reimbursed him for prior living expenses and that the funds weren’t contributions to the down payment or mortgage. The issue, therefore, is whether Harris contributed to the purchase of the property.

[44] I find that Harris did contribute funds towards both the purchase and the mortgage. As a result, she holds a 50 percent beneficial interest in the house.

[45] First, Harris made multiple deposits to the joint account in 2016, including her severance payment and tax refund. Kirby’s characterization of the account as only for recordkeeping and “administrative convenience” is inconsistent with how the parties used it. Both parties had access to the account, funds were transferred to and from their personal accounts, and the account was used to pay three deposits and the closing costs, as well as other day-to-day expenses. Where funds for a purchase come from a joint account, there’s a presumption of a resulting trust. See OK v MH, 2024 ONSC 1612, at para 103.

[46] Kirby argues that Harris can’t trace her deposits to the down payment. While Harris deposited her severance and tax refund on July 8, 2016, and $10,000 was transferred that day to Kirby’s line of credit, I’m not prepared to find that the August deposit was funded solely by Kirby. The evidence shows that the parties’ funds were commingled. Although Kirby says Harris’s funds merely repaid earlier expenses, he provided no evidence of those expenses.

[47] Also, Ms. Grant corroborates Harris’s narrative—she and Kirby were saving up for a new house, they planned to use the severance payment for the deposit, and Harris couldn’t go on title because her credit was poor.

[48] Second, after closing in 2017, Harris continued to deposit funds into the joint account. The mortgage, utilities, and insurance were paid from that account. Although most deposits during this period came from Kirby, his funds were intermingled with Harris’s contributions. Kirby says that he bought the property solely as an investment, but he provided no evidence that the carrying costs were paid exclusively from his own funds.

[49] Third, Kirby’s explanation of Harris’s role in the purchase and management of the property isn’t persuasive. He says the joint account was used only because he didn’t have personal cheques. Yet he obtained a certified cheque for the first deposit and could’ve obtained cheques for his own account. He also had a business account. Kirby further says Harris dealt with the builder, utilities, and other matters solely on his behalf, but there’s no evidence that he had any involvement in those dealings. If Harris had no financial interest in the property, it’s difficult to understand why she alone managed all aspects of the purchase and ongoing expenses. While some communications were sent “on behalf of” Kirby, that language is readily explained by the fact that he alone was on title.

[50] Fourth, after the parties moved out, the rental income was deposited into the joint account and used to pay the mortgage and other expenses. Harris continued to contribute to the account, and her deposits were again commingled with Kirby’s. There’s no evidence that Kirby treated the rental income as solely his own. For example, he didn’t report the rental income to the CRA.

[51] Harris places significant reliance on the letter to the CRA. I place little weight on this letter. It addressed apparent inconsistencies in the parties’ tax filings and explained who lived in the home. It shows that the property was a family residence, not that Harris held a beneficial interest.

[52] At bottom, I find that Harris contributed to both the purchase and the carrying costs of the Hogan Manor house. She deposited funds into the joint account, those funds were commingled with Kirby’s, and the parties used these joint funds to pay the deposits, closing costs, and carrying costs until their separation. As the account and the funds in the account were held jointly, I find that Harris has a 50 percent ownership interest in the property.

B. Issue #2: whether Kirby’s 2021 income should include capital gains from the sale of an investment property

[53] Harris asks the court to determine Kirby’s child support obligations for 2021 by adding unreported capital gains income. Kirby responds that the amount sought by Harris fails to reflect his business losses in that year.

[54] I don’t accept Harris’s submission. The capital gain was a one‑time event and adding it would go beyond what’s required to fairly determine child support.

1. Law

[55] A spouse’s annual income is determined using the sources of income set out under the heading “Total income” in the T1 General form issued by the CRA and is adjusted in accordance with Schedule III of the Child Support Guidelines, O Reg 391/97. If the determination of a spouse’s annual income would not be the fairest determination of that income, the court may have regard to the spouse’s income over the last three years and determine an amount that’s fair and reasonable in light of any pattern of income, fluctuation in income, or receipt of a non-recurring amount during those years. See Child Support Guidelines, ss 16, 17(1); Ludmer v Ludmer, 2013 ONSC 784, at para 152, aff’d in part 2014 ONCA 827.

[56] The courts have considered the following factors when determining fair income:

• is the gain really a bonus or incentive payment earned through work?

• did it come from selling assets that were the source of the payor’s income?

• will the proceeds generate income in the future?

• does the gain form all or part of the payor’s retirement savings?

• does the payor regularly buy and sell assets as part of earning income?

• is including the gain necessary to ensure proper child support?

• would including the gain effectively redistribute assets already divided?

• did the gain actually result in cash, or was it only a paper transaction?

• would including the amount go beyond providing support and instead amount to wealth sharing?

See Bonas v Houston, 2021 ONSC 2116, at para 94, citing Ewing v Ewing, 2009 ABCA 227, at para 35.

2. Evidence and Findings of Fact

[57] In 2020, Kirby purchased an investment property in Oshawa. He renovated it and sold the property in January 2021. In that same month, $263,889.80 was deposited into his joint business account, representing the gross sale proceeds.

[58] For 2021, Kirby reported income of $73,358.21 from employment income and WSIB benefits. He didn’t report any capital gains from the sale of the Oshawa property.

[59] Kirby testified that the property was purchased and sold through his business and that he incurred a loss on the transaction. He says the sale proceeds were used to discharge the mortgages registered on title and to pay various contractors, and that the remaining funds were applied to a debt from a separate business venture. As a result, he says he didn’t take any income from the business that year. When asked why he did not at least report the business loss to the CRA, he testified that reporting a significant loss would have reduced his reported income and, in turn, made it more difficult for him to obtain financing for future investment properties.

3. Analysis and Disposition

[60] I decline to add the proceeds from the sale of this property to Kirby’s 2021 income.

[61] I don’t accept that Kirby was transparent with either Harris or the court about this transaction. He should’ve disclosed the documentation relating to the sale and traced the disposition of the proceeds through his business accounts. Kirby didn’t produce any business or tax records to substantiate his alleged losses. I therefore draw an adverse inference from his failure to produce this documentation and find that the sale generated income that Kirby didn’t report to the CRA.

[62] But even accounting for that inference, I don’t find it fair to include this amount in Kirby’s 2021 income for child support purposes. First, the income arose from a one‑time transaction. There’s no evidence that Kirby routinely supplemented his income through real estate investment. Second, there’s no evidence that any gain enhanced Kirby’s lifestyle or standard of living in a manner that should now be shared with the children. See Saroli v Saroli, 2021 ONSC 4450, at para 225. The purpose of child support is to allow children to maintain the standard of living they enjoyed before the separation. See Ewing, at para 34.

[63] Accordingly, I find that Kirby’s 2021 income is appropriately reflected in the amount reported on his tax return.

C. Issue #3: whether Kirby is liable for retroactive table child support

[64] Upon separation, the parties agreed that Kirby would pay the children’s tuition in lieu of child support and Harris would pay the mortgage and utilities for the home. Kirby stopped paying tuition in September 2022, and Harris stopped paying the mortgage in December 2022. In April 2024, the parties consented to an interim child support order.

[65] Harris seeks retroactive child support, less Kirby’s share of the children’s tuition and bussing costs. Kirby submits that his agreement to pay tuition was intended to replace child support—if he had known he would be responsible for both, he would have removed the children from private school.

[66] In the circumstances, I conclude that Kirby is liable for retroactive child support starting in September 2022. Harris’s delay in seeking retroactive child support and Kirby’s good-faith conduct until then militates against a retroactive award.

1. Law

[67] A court may, on application, order a person to provide support for their dependants and determine the amount of support. See FLA, s 33(1). A court making an order for child support shall do so in accordance with the Child Support Guidelines. See FLA, s 33(11).

[68] Support is the right of the child. See DBS v SRG, 2006 SCC 37, at para 60.

[69] “Retroactive” awards aren’t truly retroactive. They don’t hold parents to a legal standard that didn’t exist at the relevant time. But they’re “retroactive” in that they’re not being made on a go-forward basis: the payor is being ordered to pay what, in hindsight, should have been paid before. See DBS, at para 2.

[70] This case engages the third situation identified in DBS: there’s no court order for child support. There’s no restriction in the FLA as to the date from which the court may order that the support award take effect. See FLA, s 33(1).

[71] There are four key factors to consider before making a retroactive child support order:

• the reason why support or variation of support wasn’t sought earlier

• conduct of the payor parent

• circumstances of the child at the current time and at the time the support should have been paid

• hardship occasioned by the retroactive award to the payor parent

See DBS, at paras 94-116.

2. Evidence and Findings of Fact

[72] Kirby’s table child support obligations were:

Year	Annual Income	Monthly Support
2020	$67,444	$1028
2021	$73,358	$1114
2022	$52,740	$802
2023	$79,888	$1209
2024	$105,654.04	$1541
2025	$65,391.70	$1003
2026	$97,798.40	$1484

[73] Harris calculates the retroactive child support arrears at $51,172.

[74] Kirby says that upon separation, he agreed to pay the children’s private school tuition and bussing in lieu of child support. Harris states that she accepted this arrangement because she was unaware of her legal rights and believed it was in the children’s best interests.

[75] Kirby stopped paying tuition and bussing in July 2022, citing financial hardship arising from a failed real estate investment and the suspension of his WSIB benefits. The children were demitted but were re‑enrolled in October 2022 after Harris assumed the costs.

[76] Kirby acknowledges that he did not begin paying child support until 2024, under the order of Fragomeni J. He submits, however, that he made in‑kind contributions by providing Harris with a supplementary credit card that he paid off.

3. Analysis and Disposition

[77] Having regard to all the factors, I find that Kirby is liable for child support only from September 2022 onward.

[78] First, Harris hasn’t justified her delay in seeking child support after separation. I find that she accepted Kirby’s payment of the children’s education costs in lieu of support. Although she states in her affidavit that she regularly requested child support, the first documentary evidence is a text message dated October 2, 2022, asking what Kirby was willing to contribute. This aligns with the parties’ evidence that they managed expenses informally after separation, leading Kirby to reasonably believe he was meeting his obligations. See DBS, at para 80.

[79] Second, there’s no evidence that Kirby engaged in blameworthy conduct before 2022. He genuinely believed that paying the children’s education costs satisfied his legal obligations. Until he stopped making those payments, he wasn’t avoiding or diminishing his responsibilities. In fact, the education costs exceeded his guideline obligations—in 2020–2021, they totalled $1,917.50 per month. See DBS, at para 109.

[80] Third, there’s no evidence that the children were in need before July 2022, nor any evidence of hardship during that period.

[81] After September 2022, however, Kirby is liable for retroactive child support. Once he stopped paying the education costs, Harris put him on notice that she was seeking support. Kirby’s claim of financial hardship is unsupported by any evidence—his income has remained stable since separation, and he provided no proof of losses. The children’s standard of living declined, including having to move from the Hogan Manor home because Harris couldn’t afford both education and living expenses. Kirby’s payment of some expenses through a shared credit card doesn’t discharge his statutory support obligations. It’s not for Kirby to determine how those obligations are met. See DBS, at para 109.

[82] Kirby also asserts that a retroactive award would cause him financial hardship, but he has provided no evidence to support this claim. He has not shown that a lump‑sum award would prevent him from meeting his basic needs or cause hardship to his stepchildren. The award is based on past income, which is less than his current earnings. See DBS, at para 115.

[83] Based on all the evidence, I find that Kirby’s table child support obligation from September 2022 to May 2026 is $55,664:

Period	Monthly Child Support	Total
2022 (Sept-Dec)	$802	$3208
2023	$1209	$14,508
2024	$1541	$18,492
2025	$1003	$12,036
2026 (Jan-May)	$1484	$7420
		$55,664

[84] Under Fragomeni J’s temporary order, Kirby has paid $29,328. As a result, I order and adjudge that Kirby shall pay to Harris the lump sum amount of $26,336 for retroactive child support.

[85] As the interim child support order was temporary, I endorse the following final orders:

• starting on June 1, 2026, and on the first day of each month thereafter, Kirby shall pay to Harris support for the children in the monthly amount of $1484

• this amount is in accordance with the Child Support Guidelines to be adjusted annually in accordance with his income

• Kirby’s obligation to pay child support to Harris as set out above shall continue until further order of the court

• Kirby shall provide disclosure of his current income, including copies of his most recent income tax return, together with all schedules, attachments, and slips, and any notice of assessment or reassessment provided by the CRA, to Harris by June 1 in each year starting in 2026

• unless the support order is withdrawn from the Family Responsibility Office, it shall be enforced by the Director and amounts owing under the order shall be paid to the Director, who shall pay them to the person to whom they are owed. A support deduction order will be issued.

• Kirby shall provide to Harris and the Director of the FRO notification of any change in address or employment, including full particulars about the change, within ten days of the change taking place

D. Issue #4: whether Kirby is liable for retroactive tuition costs

[86] Harris seeks an award that Kirby is liable for a proportionate share of the children’s education costs. She proposes that Kirby receive a credit for her share against his child support obligations. Kirby responds that he notified Harris that he couldn’t afford the tuition costs, and she chose to unilaterally enrol the children at her expense.

[87] I agree with Kirby. I find that the children’s tuition costs aren’t necessary or reasonable. As a result, I decline to make an order that Kirby is retroactively liable for these expenses.

1. Law

[88] Section 7 expenses include any extraordinary expenses for primary or secondary school education or for any other educational programs that meet the child’s particular needs. See Child Support Guidelines, s 7(1)(d).

[89] In awarding section 7 expenses, the trial judge must:

(a) calculate each party’s income for child support purposes;

(b) determine whether the claimed expenses fall within one of the enumerated categories of section 7 of the Child Support Guidelines;

(c) determine whether the claimed expenses are necessary “in relation to the child’s best interests” and are reasonable “in relation to the means of the spouses and those of the child and to the family’s spending pattern prior to the separation”;

(d) if the expenses fall under sections 7(1)(d) or (f) of the Child Support Guidelines, determine whether the expenses are “extraordinary”; and

(e) finally, consider what amount, if any, the child should reasonably contribute to the payment of these expenses and then apply any tax deductions or credits.

See Titova v Titov, 2012 ONCA 864, at para 23.

[90] In determining the necessity of private school fees, the court will consider whether the parties would’ve paid the expense if they hadn’t separated “but were facing the financial circumstances of the post-separation family.” See Iddon v Iddon, 2006 1450 (Ont Sup Ct), at paras 76-77.

2. Facts

[91] Harris says that Kirby insisted the children attend private school even before they reached school age. The children have attended Brampton Christian School since kindergarten. Kirby acknowledged that they chose Brampton Christian School because his brother went there.

[92] The children’s tuition and bussing costs, and the parties’ respective contributions, are:

Annual Cost	Harris’s Contribution	Kirby’s Contribution
2020-2021	$19,175	$3075
2021-2022	$21,900	nil
2022-2023	$22,056.50	$20,446.50
2023-2024	$9130	$9130
2024-2025	$9098.30	$9098.30

[93] After Kirby stopped paying tuition in July 2022, the school notified Harris that the children would be demitted unless the arrears were paid. The children attended public school for around six weeks. Harris then unilaterally re‑enrolled them in Brampton Christian School because they were unhappy in public school. Harris obtained a bursary that covered a portion of the tuition in the 2023–2024 and 2024–2025 school years. She seeks $14,736.95, which she calculates as Kirby’s 50 percent proportionate share of the education costs.

3. Analysis and Disposition

[94] Harris argues that the parties’ historical approach to the children’s schooling should govern. See Korman v Korman, 2015 ONCA 578, at para 74.

[95] I disagree. There’s no dispute that Kirby wanted the children to attend Brampton Christian School, and that they have done so since kindergarten.

[96] Even so, this evidence is insufficient to bind Kirby. Although the parties’ incomes have remained stable or increased, their financial circumstances changed after separation. They now carry the costs of two households, including rent and utilities. Kirby remarried in April 2024. While his spouse contributes to household expenses, she has two children for whom Kirby bears some responsibility. Further, Kirby’s business investments have apparently suffered losses. Parents are entitled to revisit educational decisions based on changed family circumstances, available alternatives, and evolving priorities. See Iddon, at para 75.

[97] Beyond the children’s longstanding attendance at Brampton Christian School and their dissatisfaction with public school, there’s no evidence establishing the necessity of private schooling. Nor are the expenses “extraordinary,” as the school offers no specialized programming required by the children. Children have no freestanding right to a private school education. See Iddon, at para 76.

[98] Accordingly, I find that Kirby isn’t liable for any portion of the children’s private school or bussing expenses after September 2022. Harris’s proposal for a retroactive credit based on 2020–2021 expenses depends on a finding that Kirby owed child support during that period, which I haven’t accepted.

[99] Going forward, Kirby shall pay 50 percent of the children’s special or extraordinary expenses.

IV. OTHER ORDERS

[100] Harris seeks two ancillary parenting orders. First, she requests authority to apply for the children’s important documents (i.e., health cards, passports, SIN cards, and birth certificates) without Kirby’s written consent. Although this issue was not resolved by agreement, Kirby filed no evidence and made no submissions in response.

[101] The children primarily reside with Harris. Given their ages, they may require access to government documents from time to time, for example, for travel or employment. I’m satisfied that it’s in the children’s best interests for Harris to be authorized to apply for their passports, health cards, and other government documents without Kirby’s consent or signature. This order will avoid unnecessary delay. Kirby shall be provided with copies of the documents for his records.

[102] Second, Harris seeks security for child support. In closing submissions, she limited her request to an order requiring Kirby to designate the children as irrevocable beneficiaries under any life insurance policies he holds. See Family Law Act, s 34(1)(i).

[103] Neither party led evidence on this issue. Kirby acknowledged the possible existence of workplace life insurance. I’m not persuaded that such an order is warranted. Kirby has other dependents, and Harris didn’t explain why his child support obligations should be secured through life insurance in the circumstances.

[104] To implement my order regarding Harris’ beneficial interest in the Hogan Manor house, I endorse an order that the property be partitioned and sold for the purpose of realizing the interests in it on the following terms:

• the Hogan Manor house shall be listed for sale by July 30, 2026, with a real estate agent to be agreed upon by the parties

• Kirby shall maintain the matrimonial home in good condition until its sale or further agreement or court order

• Kirby shall cooperate fully with the listing and sale of the matrimonial home

• the proceeds of sale from the matrimonial home shall be divided between the parties as follows: 50 per cent to Kirby, less the amount to discharge the second mortgage (PR4182853) and the property tax arrears, and 50 per cent to Harris

[105] The uncontradicted evidence at trial is that Kirby earned sufficient rental income to pay the property taxes but didn’t do so because of his child support obligations. Further, he hasn’t accounted for the funds from the second mortgage—some of these funds were used to pay property tax arrears. As a result, he is responsible for these debts.

V. CONCLUSION

[106] Harris’s application is granted, in part. I direct that Harris’s lawyer shall prepare a draft of the order. She shall send the draft, for approval of its form and content, to Kirby by May 29, 2026. If Kirby disagrees with the form or content of the draft order, he shall send a notice disputing approval (Form 25E) and a copy of the order, redrafted as proposed, to Harris’s lawyer by June 8, 2026. In that case, Harris’s lawyer shall email SCJ.CSJ.General.Brampton@ontario.ca by June 15, 2026, to schedule a time and date with me to settle the order by videoconference. Alternatively, if the parties approve the form and content of the order, the order may be signed by the clerk.

[107] In reviewing the order, I remind Kirby that a formal order reflects the ultimate disposition of a proceeding, whether he agrees or disagrees with my decision. See Schnarr v Blue Mountain Resorts Limited, 2018 ONCA 668, at para 4. The process of settling an order is “not the time to request new or additional relief, re-argue points already decided by the court, or to vary relief granted by the reasons.” See 1000425140 Ontario Inc. v 1000176653 Ontario Inc., 2024 ONSC 319, at para 4.

[108] If the parties can’t agree on costs, they shall deliver and upload brief submissions (2500 words), together with bills of costs, by June 15, 2026, 4pm.

Agarwal J

Released: May 19, 2026

[^1]: The parties misunderstood the TSEF. As a best practice, parties in a summary trial should agree to a joint document brief, along with the agreement as stated in §24. The affidavits should refer to the joint brief for any documentary evidence. If the parties can’t agree on a joint document brief, the affidavit should refer to the individual party document briefs.