His Majesty the King v. E.A., 2026 ONSC 2510

CITATION: R v. E.A., 2026 ONSC 2510

COURT FILE NO.: CR-24-00000809-0000

DATE: 2026 04 27

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

Crown

– and –

E.A.

Defendant

Ryan Mushlian, for the Crown

Pierre Bonsu, for the defence

HEARD: April 27, 2026

REASONS FOR SENTENCE

PUBLICATION BAN

An Order has been made pursuant to s. 486.5 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, directing that the identity of the complainant and information that could disclose such identity shall not be published or broadcast or transmitted in any way.

MANDHANE J.

INTRODUCTION

1E.A. is a 34-year-old man who appeared before me for a four-day trial by jury on the charges of robbery (s. 344, Criminal Code), unlawful confinement (s. 279(2)), and sexual assault (s. 271). The jury found him guilty of a single count of theft under $5000 (s. 334(b)).

2The offender now appears before me for his sentencing hearing. The Crown and defence both ask for a discharge with the following conditions: 12 months’ probation, regular reporting to a probation officer, counselling as recommended by the probation officer, no contact with the complainant, and no weapons (“the conditional discharge”). Based on the joint submission of the Crown and defence counsel, I would impose the conditional discharge.

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OFFENCE

3At trial, the Crown relied on the evidence of the complainant, N.K., who admitted that she owed the offender money, but testified that he lured her into an unfinished basement apartment, put her in a choke hold, tried to insert his penis into her vagina, took her phone, fled the premises, and then fought with her on the street when she tried to get her phone back. The Crown also relied on video surveillance footage that showed the complainant and offender fighting on the street, and the offender pushing the complainant to the ground before fleeing in his car.

4The offender pleaded not guilty and took the stand in his own defence. He admitted to luring the complainant into the basement apartment, demanding that she repay him the money she owed, and taking her phone as “collateral” for the outstanding loan. However, he denied ever choking her, exposing his penis or trying to insert it in her vagina, or blocking her from exiting the apartment. He testified that the complainant chased him out of the apartment to get her phone back, and that a struggle ensued on the street before he drove away with it. The defence forcefully argued that the complainant had a motive to fabricate the allegations so that she could her phone back without having to repay the offender. In fact, the complainant admitted to calling the offender after she went to the police and demanding that he return the phone to her, which he did.

5The jury found the offender not guilty of the three offences charged in the Indictment, but guilty of the lessor included offence of theft under $5,000. Based on their verdict, the jury must have either accepted the offender’s version of events or had a reasonable doubt about the complainant’s version: Criminal Code, s. 724(2); R. v. Ferguson, 2008 SCC 6, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 96, at paras. 17-18; R. v. Aragon, 2022 ONCA 244, 413 C.C.C. (3d) 79, at paras. 104-106; R. v. Nelson, 2014 ONCA 853, 325 O.A.C. 381, at para. 56; R v. Forsellino, 2022 ONSC 262.

6Given the offender’s admission that he stole the complainant’s phone and the fact that the video surveillance footage clearly showed the offender assaulting the complainant on the street by pushing her to the ground, a key factual issue for the jury to decide was whether he used violence for the purpose of stealing her phone. The jury was alive to this issue since they asked two questions during their deliberations that sought further clarification about the nexus required between the stealing and the violence to ground a charge of robbery.

7Having found the offender guilty of the lessor included offence of theft (and not guilty of robbery), the jury must have found that the offender did not use violence for the purpose of stealing the complainant’s phone: Ferguson, paras. 17-18; see also R. v. Roncaioli, 2011 ONCA 378, para. 59. The jury must have accepted the offender’s evidence that the complainant owed him money, that he took her phone as collateral for the outstanding loan, and that the struggle on the street ensured after he had taken the phone inside the basement and while the complainant was trying to get it back from him.

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OFFENDER

8I had before me a pre-sentence report, dated April 27, 2026. The offender does not have a prior criminal record, and is relatively youthful at 34-years-old. He immigrated to Canada from Ghana in 2015. As a Black man, the offender is part of a group that is over-represented in the criminal justice system. However, in my view, this is not a mitigating factor in this case because there is no connection between the criminal conduct at issue and any overt and systemic racism experienced or identified in the community: R. v. Morris, 2021 ONCA 680, para. 97.

9The offender is married with three children—one of whom has autism—and he is actively involved in their lives. The offender’s wife attended his trial and continues to support his rehabilitation. The offender is self-employed as a contractor. He has a valid work permanent and has applied for permanent residency in Canada. Because he is not a Canadian citizen, however, he will only be eligible to remain in Canada if I grant him a discharge: Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, C.27, s. 36; Criminal Code, s. 730(1).

10Though he did not provide an allocution before me, when speaking with the probation officer, the offender expressed remorse about the incident, noting that he becomes emotional when “betrayed,” and stating that the incident “just happened.” In his report, the probation officer noted that the offender lacks insight and might benefit from counselling or programming focused on healthy relationships and boundaries.

THE APPROPRIATE SENTENCE

11The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and contribute “to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society”: Criminal Code, s. 718. To do this, judges must impose “just sanctions” that reflect one or more traditional sentencing objectives, including denunciation, general and specific deterrence, separation of offenders from society, rehabilitation, reparation to victims, promoting a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledging the harm done to victims and the community: s. 718(a)-(f).

12Sentencing is highly discretionary, and there is no set formula for fixing the correct sentence: R. v. Parranto, 2021 SCC 46, [2021] 3 S.C.R. 366, para. 13. Proportionality is the organizing principle to reach the ultimate goal of imposing a fair, fit, and principled sentence: Parranto, para. 10. The starting point is that the sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. While important, the principles of parity and individualization are secondary but must be reconciled for a sentence to be proportionate: R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089, at para. 53.

13Because the Crown and defence make a joint submission seeking a conditional sentence, I can only reject it if it is contrary to the public interest or brings the administration of justice into disrepute: R. v. Anthony Cook, 2016 SCC 45, at para. 5.

14In exercising my limited discretion in the face of a joint submission, I am mindful of the law regarding conditional sentences. A judge has the discretion to grant a conditional discharge where the offender is found guilty of an offence punishable by imprisonment of less than 14 years, and where they consider it to be in the best interests of the offender and not contrary to the public interest: Criminal Code, s. 730(1). Some of the factors that the judge can consider are the seriousness of the offence, and any unusual circumstances peculiar to the offender: R. v. Sanchez-Pino, 1974 794 (ON CA). A discharge will generally be in the offender’s best interests where the effect of a criminal record would be disproportionate to the offence. To assess whether granting a discharge would be contrary to the public interests, the sentencing judge must consider the circumstances of the accused, the nature of the offence, and the importance of proper law enforcement in the community: Sanchez-Pino, paras. 17-19.

15Here, I am willing to accept the joint submission because it would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute and is not contrary to the public interest. Indeed, there are a lot of mitigating factors that favour imposing a conditional sentence on the facts before me. The offender was convicted of a relatively minor offence. He is relatively youthful, he has an otherwise clean record in Canada, he is a family man and provider, he is gainfully employed, and he has a supportive spouse. All these factors suggest high rehabilitation prospects if he is allowed to remain in Canada. I also accept that—on its face—it would be disproportionate for the offender to be potentially removed from Canada and have his ties with his children forever severed for stealing a phone that he eventually returned to the rightful owner.

16That said, there are some aggravating factors: the circumstances of the offence, and the offender’s limited insight. The offender admitted to luring the complainant—a younger, petite, woman—into an abandoned basement with the express goal of making her afraid. After taking the complainant’s phone, I find beyond a reasonable doubt that the offender assaulted her when she tried to get it back; the assault is clearly depicted on the surveillance footage that was exhibited at trial (but was not charged). The offender then fled, leaving the complainant alone on a dark suburban street without a phone or any way of getting help. From his evidence at trial and the PSR report, I am still unclear about the circumstances under which the offender “loaned” money to the complainant, and his motivations for stealing her phone that night. His lack of candour makes it more difficult to assess his moral blameworthiness. While this troubles me, it is balanced against the fact that this is a first-time offence, and that the offender did not breach the terms of his release while on lengthy bail pending his trial.

CONCLUSION

17On the whole, I am willing to impose the conditional sentence sought jointly by the parties because doing so does not bring the administration of justice into disrepute. I am satisfied that imposing the conditional discharge is both in the offender’s interest and not contrary to the public interest.

Mandhane J.

Released: April 27, 2026

CITATION: R v. E.A., 2026 ONSC 2510