Bernard v. Fuhgeh, 2026 ONSC 2502

CITATION: Bernard v. Fuhgeh, 2026 ONSC 2502

COURT FILE NOS.: FC-17-361 / FC-12-912-5

DATE: April 30, 2026

BETWEEN:

Edith Marie Marielle Bernard Kimberly Melissa Stewart Applicants

– and –

William Ndze Fuhgeh Respondent

Marie-Hélène Godbout and Marc Coderre Intervenors

COUNSEL: Applicant Bernard, Self-represented Applicant Stewart, Not appearing Respondent, Self-represented S. Sack, for the Intervenors

HEARD: March 20, 2026, at Ottawa, Ontario

Corrected Decision: May 5, 2026 – In para. 98.1 dates are corrected as underlined – No other changes to content.

BEFORE: The Honourable Justice J. R. Henderson

REASONS FOR DECISION ON MOTION

INTRODUCTION

1The applicant, Edith Marie Marielle Bernard (“Bernard”), and the intervenors, Marie- Hélène Godbout (“Godbout”) and Marc Coderre (“Coderre”), bring motions pursuant to rule 1(8) of the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99, for an order striking, or staying, the motions brought by the respondent, William Fuhgeh (“William”) to set aside the orders made by Justice Audet in these two proceedings on December 18, 2017 (“the Audet orders”).

2The Audet orders were made in two separate applications in which William is the respondent. The applicant is Kimberly Melissa Stewart (“Stewart”) in court file number FC-12-912-5, and Bernard is the applicant in court file number FC-17-361. The intervenors in the present motion, Godbout and Coderre, are lawyers who acted on behalf of Bernard and Stewart during the court proceedings in 2017 and 2018.

3In December 2018, William delivered his initial motion to set aside the Audet orders pursuant to rule 25(19) based on William’s allegation that the Audet orders had been obtained by fraud or mistake. Justice Shelston became the case management judge and thereafter made a series of case management orders that resulted in William delivering replacement motions and affidavits. William currently has two outstanding rule 25(19) motions, one in each proceeding, that were delivered in December 2021.

4On the rule 1(8) motions that are before me, the moving parties submit that William has failed to comply with case management orders made by Justice Shelston dated February 25, 2019, and June 17, 2020. Further, the moving parties allege that William has filed material in support of his rule 25(19) motions that is scandalous, vexatious, and inflammatory, and that William has engaged in conduct that has unnecessarily prolonged the litigation.

5In response, William submits that he has not breached any of the case management orders made by Justice Shelston. Further, he submits that, although he makes allegations of fraud and dishonesty, his material is not scandalous, vexatious, or inflammatory as he brings his motions to set aside the Audet orders pursuant to rule 25(19) which requires proof of fraud or mistake. He also denies that he has unnecessarily prolonged the litigation; rather he submits that some of the judges, court staff, and the intervenors have interfered with his ability to access the courts.

THE FACTS

6The history of these proceedings is long and complex. Regarding the Stewart application, William and Stewart have one child, Joshua, who was born on February 14, 2012. Litigation between William and Stewart commenced in 2012. A final order in the Stewart application was made by Justice Robertson on May 9, 2013. That final order was amended by Justice Kershman on February 24, 2014. In August 2017, William brought a motion to change the 2014 final order of Justice Kershman. A case conference was scheduled for November 27, 2017.

7Regarding the Bernard application, William and Bernard have one child, William Junior, who was born July 27, 2013. The parties lived together in a common-law relationship for approximately four years before they separated in early 2017. Bernard served her application in February 2017. William responded by delivering an answer. A contested access motion was heard by Justice Sheard in October 2017, and Justice Sheard’s decision was released on November 21, 2017.

8On November 21, 2017, William delivered a written Notice of Withdrawal in both applications. In the Stewart application, William withdrew his motion to change. In the Stewart Notice of Withdrawal William stated that he believed that Justice Audet and several other named judges were biased against him by reason of his race, gender, and national origin. In addition, in the Notice of Withdrawal he wrote, “Access orders is [sic] hereby cancelled.” Then, in early December 2017, Stewart served her motion to change, to which William did not respond.

9In the Bernard application, William withdrew his answer and his motion that was returnable December 18, 2017. In the Bernard Notice of Withdrawal, he made similar comments with respect to bias on the part of several judges including Justice Audet, and he also wrote, “Access orders is [sic] hereby cancelled.”

10On December 18, 2017, both matters came before Justice Audet who made the Audet orders. In the Stewart application, Justice Audet reviewed Stewart’s motion to change and made a temporary order that William would have supervised access to Joshua at Stewart’s discretion. Justice Audet also ordered that William pay costs fixed at $2,300 for the withdrawal of his motion to change. There has never been a final order regarding Stewart’s motion to change.

11The Bernard application proceeded before Justice Audet as an uncontested trial. Justice Audet reviewed the amended application, William’s Notice of Withdrawal, Bernard’s affidavit for an uncontested trial, and the continuing record. Justice Audet then made a final order that included, among other things, orders that Bernard have full custody of William Junior, that William have supervised access at Bernard’s discretion, that William pay child support of $461 per month based on imputed income of $50,000 per year, that arrears of support be fixed at $4,050, that the funds held in trust as a result of the sale of the house be released to Bernard, and that William pay costs of $70,000.

12Very little occurred in either of these proceedings for approximately one year. In his 2021 affidavit, William stated that he became aware of the Audet orders shortly after the orders were made, that he ordered a transcript of the proceedings, and that he engaged in an investigation regarding the alleged unlawful conduct of Bernard, Stewart, the intervenors, and the judges. Also, he deposed that in February 2018 he attempted to obtain a date for a motion to set aside the Audet orders, but that Godbout conspired with court staff to make it difficult for him to obtain a date.

13On December 3, 2018, William delivered a single notice of motion jointly in the Bernard and Stewart matters returnable on January 8, 2019. In his notice of motion, he requested that the final order in the Bernard matter and the temporary order in the Stewart matter, as well as all costs orders, be set aside. It should be noted that the request was for an order setting aside the Audet orders pursuant to the provisions of rule 25(19) based on fraud or mistake. William has never requested a change to the Audet orders based upon a material change in circumstances.

14The December 2018 motion was supported by one affidavit that was sworn by William, dated November 30, 2018. The affidavit was a total of 2,189 pages in length. The affidavit is replete with allegations that Bernard and Stewart engaged in fraud, that the intervenors were parties to the fraud, that Justice Audet, several other judges, and court staff, were dishonest, that Justice Audet had a relationship with the intervenors that put her in a conflict of interest position, and that all of these parties acted in a manner that prohibited William from fairly accessing the courts. This has been described as William’s first attempt to set aside the Audet orders.

15In January 2019, Justice Shelston became the case management judge. There were a number of concerns raised by William’s affidavit that were addressed at case management conferences through 2019 and 2020. Because of William’s allegations against the intervenors, Godbout and Coderre, both intervenors were added to the proceedings in June 2019 on consent.

16On February 25, 2019, after a case management conference of February 20, 2019, Justice Shelston made an order in the Bernard proceeding as follows:

Mr. Fuhgeh [William] shall prepare, serve and file a new affidavit in FC 17-361 by April 26, 2019, which will canvass the following issues:

(i) the period of December 18, 2017 to December 3, 2018, specifically setting out the circumstances when Mr. Fuhgeh had knowledge of the order of Justice Audet and his efforts made by him once he became aware of the existence of the order until he filed his materials on December 3, 2018, with supporting documentary evidence;

(ii) what evidence contained in the affidavit of Ms. Bernard… filed before Justice Audet at the uncontested trial was fraudulent and why;

(iii) he shall prepare a chart setting out the evidence that he has to prove his allegations of fraud; and

(iv) he shall include a transcript of the hearing before Justice Audet.

17Justice Shelston further ordered that William’s affidavit in the Bernard matter could not exceed 30 pages plus exhibits, and he set a timeline for the delivery of material.

18Regarding the Stewart proceeding, on February 25, 2019, Justice Shelston made an order that William was to serve and file an affidavit that was limited to 10 pages plus exhibits in length setting out the reasons for his request to set aside Justice Audet’s temporary order.

19On April 26, 2019, William delivered his next affidavit. This has been described as his second attempt to set aside the Audet orders. William’s affidavit was 287 pages in length, but it included references to many exhibits. Again, the affidavit raised several concerns that were dealt with at subsequent case management conferences, including the length of the affidavit, William’s failure to comply with the February 2019 order, and the scope of William’s requests.

20In a lengthy endorsement dated June 17, 2020, Justice Shelston noted at paragraph 64 that the April 2019 affidavit sought to incorporate exhibits from the November 2018 affidavit that were approximately 2,055 pages in length. Further, Justice Shelston noted at paragraphs 71-72 of the endorsement that he had directed William to provide a chart setting out the evidence in support of his allegations of fraud, but that William had in fact provided six charts in the April 2019 affidavit, most of which contained William’s comments on the interlocutory proceedings and the appeals. Also, Justice Shelston found that parts of the April 2019 affidavit had been cut and pasted from the November 2018 affidavit.

21As to the scope of William’s requests, at paragraph 35 of the endorsement Justice Shelston noted that the material in William’s affidavit referred to proceedings and matters other than the Audet orders. After questioning William at the case management conference, Justice Shelston found that William was attempting to set aside approximately 10 final and interlocutory orders in the two proceedings.

22Moreover, at paragraph 75 of the endorsement Justice Shelston wrote, “Mr. Fuhgeh has failed to address the period from December 18, 2017 to December 3, 2018, failed to provide one required chart, and failed to file the transcript of the hearing before Justice Audet.”

23Consequently, Justice Shelston wrote at paragraph 76, “I find that Mr. Fuhgeh has failed to follow the direction in my endorsement and I find that his action is an abuse of process.”

24At paragraphs 77-82 of the endorsement, Justice Shelston purported to make orders in the Bernard matter, but the orders clearly relate to both proceedings. The relevant parts of Justice Shelston’s orders can be summarized as follows:

William may not move to set aside or stay any of the underlying interim and interlocutory orders in the Bernard proceeding.
William may not move to set aside the final orders of Justice Robertson dated May 9, 2013, and Justice Kershman dated February 24, 2014, in the Stewart proceeding.
William shall file a copy of the transcript before Justice Audet on December 18, 2017, on or before July 17, 2020.
William’s affidavit dated April 26, 2019, is struck in its entirety in both the Stewart and Bernard proceedings.
William shall serve and file a replacement notice of motion on or before July 17, 2020.
William shall file a new affidavit no longer than 30 pages by July 17, 2020, that shall only address the grounds for seeking to set aside the December 18, 2017 final order of Justice Audet and focus on the period of December 18, 2017 to December 3, 2018. The new affidavit shall not relate to any other orders or motions and shall not include the charts that were in the April 2019 affidavit.

25I note that there was a minor correction to Justice Shelston’s endorsement of June 17, 2020, and it was re-issued on December 2, 2020. However, in this decision I will refer to that endorsement as the June 17, 2020 endorsement to maintain the chronological order.

26The next event in the matter is what has been called the third attempt by William to set aside the Audet orders. William delivered two notices of motion dated December 17, 2021, one in each proceeding, pursuant to rule 25(19). In the Bernard notice of motion, he seeks to set aside the final order of Justice Audet dated December 18, 2017, and all notices of garnishment. In the Stewart notice of motion, William seeks to set aside the temporary order of Justice Audet dated December 18, 2017. This third attempt is the subject of the present motions under rule 1(8).

27In support of the December 2021 notices of motion, William delivered an affidavit in the Bernard matter, sworn December 8, 2021, that is 1,016 pages in length. The text of the affidavit is 30 pages in length, but in addition to the text is a seven-page index to the exhibits and 55 exhibits. William also delivered an affidavit in the Stewart matter, sworn December 17, 2021, that is 185 pages in length.

28The rule 1(8) motions before this court are the motions of Bernard and the intervenors to strike, or stay, William’s two notices of motion dated December 17, 2021, the affidavit in the Bernard matter sworn December 8, 2021, and the affidavit in the Stewart matter sworn December 17, 2021.

THE POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES

29Bernard and the intervenors take the position that William’s December 2021 motions do not comply with the case management orders of Justice Shelston. They submit that William’s affidavit in the Bernard matter exceeds 30 pages in length, that William has not filed the transcript of the proceedings before Justice Audet, that the affidavit goes beyond addressing the grounds for seeking to a set aside the Audet orders, that a large part of the affidavit relates to the interlocutory proceedings and appeals, that the affidavit does not focus on the period of December 18, 2017 to December 3, 2018, and that William has not provided evidence in support of his allegations of fraud.

30In addition, the moving parties submit that both of the affidavits are scandalous, vexatious, and inflammatory as they refer to fraud, lies, misrepresentation, and dishonesty by Bernard, Stewart, Justice Audet, a variety of other judges, the intervenors, and court staff, and that the affidavits contain irrelevant and inadmissible material.

31William’s position is that the text of his affidavit is 30 pages in length which complies with Justice Shelston’s order. There was no limit on the number of exhibits that could be attached to the affidavits. He submits that a transcript has been filed with the court, as ordered. He states that he is unable to address the Audet orders and the period between December 2017 and December 2018 in isolation as it is necessary to provide a history of the proceedings in order to provide context for these matters. Therefore, he submits that the material in his affidavits is relevant. He further submits that his allegations of fraud and dishonesty are not scandalous or inflammatory as evidence of fraud or mistake is a prerequisite to an order under rule 25(19).

32In submissions, the moving parties made detailed references to William’s affidavit in the Bernard matter, but only passing reference to his affidavit in the Stewart matter. In my view, the main difference between the two affidavits is that the Bernard affidavit is longer and more expansive, but the tone and content is similar. For that reason, in my analysis I will refer to specific parts of William’s affidavit in the Bernard matter, but I will not make specific reference to William’s affidavit in the Stewart matter. Further, in this decision when I refer to “William’s affidavit” I mean William’s affidavit in the Bernard matter, unless I specify otherwise.

THE LAW

33The motions before this court are brought pursuant to rule 1(8) which reads, “If a person fails to obey an order in a case or a related case, the court may deal with the failure by making any order that it considers necessary for a just determination of the matter, including….” The rule then provides for several possible remedies, including dismissing a claim, striking out a pleading or document, and making a costs order.

34During oral argument all parties also referred to rule 2(2) which states that the primary objective of the Family Law Rules is to enable the court to deal with cases justly. Further, rule 2(3) states that “dealing with a case justly” includes, “ensuring that the procedure is fair to all parties; saving expense and time; dealing with the case in ways that are appropriate to its importance and complexity; and giving appropriate court resources to the case….”

35On a rule 1(8) motion, a three-part analysis required. The court must determine first if there is a triggering event in the form of a failure to comply with a court order. Second, if there is a triggering event, the onus is on the non-complying party to persuade the court that there should be no sanction. If the non-complying party is unable to do so, at the third step of the analysis, the court has a broad discretion to make whatever order it considers necessary in the circumstances: see Ferguson v. Charlton, 2008 ONCJ 1, at para. 64.

ANALYSIS OF THE ALLEGATIONS

The page limit of the affidavit

36The February 25, 2019 order of Justice Shelston provided that William’s affidavit could not exceed “30 pages plus exhibits”. The June 17, 2020 order simply reads, “no longer than 30 pages”. In my view, it was reasonable for William to interpret Justice Shelston’s order to mean that the text of his affidavit could be no longer than 30 pages, but that there was no limit on the number of exhibits that could be attached to the affidavit.

37It may still be argued that the exhibits that were attached constitute scandalous, vexatious, or irrelevant pleadings. However, I find that the length of the affidavit, including exhibits, does not breach any order made by Justice Shelston.

The transcript of the December 18, 2017 proceedings.

38William was ordered by Justice Shelston both in February 2019 and June 2020 to file a transcript of the proceedings. William deposed that he ordered the transcript when he learned of the Audet orders in early 2018. Further, in his affidavit and in oral argument, William stated that the transcript has been filed with the court. I note that he did not state that he was the person who filed the transcript.

39I find that the complete transcript of the proceedings before Justice Audet has not yet been filed with the court. When I reviewed the documentation in Case Center, I observed that a portion of the transcript had been uploaded, and therefore I questioned the parties about this issue on the return of the motion.

40I was informed that Bernard had obtained a portion of the transcript for her own purposes. It appears that the transcript that has been uploaded to Case Center is a partial transcript of some of the proceedings before Justice Audet in the Bernard matter. However, it is clear that none of the Stewart proceedings from that day are contained in that transcript. Further, it is unclear as to whether that transcript contains all of the proceedings in the Bernard matter.

41For these reasons, I find that William has not filed a transcript of the entire proceedings in both the Stewart and Bernard matters as ordered. This constitutes a triggering event under rule 1(8) as it is a breach of Justice Shelston’s order.

Only address the grounds for setting aside the Audet orders

42Justice Shelston specifically ordered that William’s affidavit shall only address the grounds for seeking to set aside the Audet orders. I appreciate that Justice Shelston was trying to focus on the true issue, the legitimacy of the Audet orders, and to prevent William from re-litigating every step that had taken place in the proceedings.

43William’s affidavit addresses the Audet orders, at paragraphs 8 to 14, by setting out William’s allegations as to how parts of Bernard’s affidavit for an uncontested trial are fraudulent or inaccurate. This is perfectly acceptable in the context.

44However, the affidavit is 97 paragraphs long, and for 66 paragraphs, between paragraphs 15 and 81, William veers off into arguments about the interlocutory proceedings, appeals, and the conduct of the judges and lawyers. I disagree with William’s submission that most of this material is necessary. It is obvious that William is offended by the earlier proceedings and that much of the material in his affidavit is an attempt to re-litigate matters he believes were incorrectly decided. This is exactly what Justice Shelston was hoping to avoid by way of his order.

45In summary, much of the affidavit deals with issues that are well beyond the grounds to set aside the Audet orders. Therefore, I find that this large amount of excessive material is a breach of Justice Shelston’s order. This also constitutes a triggering event under rule 1(8).

Focus on the period between December 2017 and December 2018

46In his motions under rule 25(19) William must establish when he became aware of the Audet orders and show that he moved expeditiously to set aside the orders. This element of this rule was clearly contemplated by Justice Shelston in his order that William’s material was to focus on the period between December 2017 and December 2018. Unfortunately, much of the material in William’s affidavit relates to events outside of this period of time.

47I accept the argument that it is necessary to provide some history in order to put the relevant period in context, but most of William’s affidavit deals with matters that led up to the Audet orders. The affidavit is 97 paragraphs long. Most of the first 81 paragraphs constitute lengthy, rambling, criticisms of Bernard’s conduct, Stewart’s conduct, the police, the Law Society of Upper Canada, the interlocutory proceedings and appeals, the alleged conflict of interest of Justice Audet, and the alleged fraud and misrepresentation by the two applicants, the intervenors, judges, and court staff.

48There is some material in the affidavit that deals with William’s actions between December 2017 and December 2018, but it is sparse. Starting at paragraph 82 and for approximately two pages thereafter, the affidavit references steps that William took after December 18, 2017. Of the 10 paragraphs that deal with that period, five deal with William’s difficulty obtaining a court date, and two deal with the fact that he types slowly.

49Technically, the affidavit does address the period referenced by Justice Shelston, but the affidavit does not “focus” on this period. Therefore, this is also a breach of Justice Shelston’s order that constitutes a triggering event under rule 1(8).

The allegations of fraud

50A bald allegation of fraud is not only insulting, but it taints the integrity and reputation of the person who is accused of being fraudulent. For that reason, courts have not permitted cases based solely on bald allegations of fraud to continue. Thus, if a party alleges fraud, that party must show some evidence in support of the allegation before a court will permit the matter to proceed to trial.

51In February 2019, Justice Shelston ordered that William was to serve and file a new affidavit that set out William’s position as to what evidence contained in Bernard’s affidavit for an uncontested trial was fraudulent and why. At the same time, Justice Shelston ordered William to provide a chart setting out the evidence that he had to prove his allegations of fraud. In my view, these two orders by Justice Shelston were designed to deal with the above-mentioned concerns about a party making bald allegations of fraud.

52I note that one part of Justice Shelston’s order specifically refers to William’s allegations of fraud committed by Bernard. Another part of the order refers generally to “allegations of fraud”. For that reason, I will deal with the alleged fraud, deceit, and dishonesty of the judges, court staff and lawyers separately from the alleged fraud, deceit, and dishonesty of Bernard.

53I start by observing that William makes numerous allegations of fraud, deceit, or dishonesty throughout his affidavit. He uses the word “fraud” or “fraudulent” 30 times in the first 21 paragraphs. In paragraph 22(a) to (h) he uses words such as “fraudulent”, “deceit”, “misleading”, or “misrepresentation” another 20 times. The affidavit is filled with critical, offensive, insulting comments about the dishonesty of others.

54As to the fraud, deceit, or dishonesty of the judges, staff and lawyers, I can summarize the allegations into general categories. In the first category are allegations that the lawyers were fraudulent because the lawyers were aware that Bernard was being dishonest or fraudulent, and they either acquiesced to her dishonesty or exacerbated it.

55For example, at paragraph 7 of his affidavit William alleges that Godbout and Coderre advised Bernard to file a misleading police report. At paragraph 12, he alleges that Godbout wrote a fraudulent and false allegation in Bernard’s affidavit regarding William’s income. At paragraph 22, William deposes that Bernard’s fraudulent application was initiated by Godbout who did so to protect herself from a complaint to the Law Society. At paragraph 44, William alleges that Godbout and Coderre were aware of Bernard’s fraudulent affidavit regarding his income. There are many more similar statements in the affidavit.

56In my view, William’s allegations that the lawyers must have known that Bernard was being dishonest and that the lawyers intentionally supported Bernard’s dishonesty is not based on evidence. William simply made an assumption that if Bernard was being dishonest, her lawyers must have known about the dishonesty, and therefore her lawyers must also be dishonest. This assumption gives rise to his bald assertion that the lawyers were fraudulent. William’s assumption is mere speculation; it is not evidence that supports an allegation of fraud by the lawyers.

57The next category relates to William’s statement at paragraph 22(h) that Coderre attempted to mislead the court by forging rules 63.01 and 63.02. In fact, a close reading of that paragraph suggests that Coderre might have provided an incorrect version of those rules to the court, but the error was quickly discovered and corrected.

58Another category of allegations of fraud is William’s assertion that the lawyers conspired with court staff so that William could not obtain a date for his motion, as discussed in paragraphs 89 to 91. William deposes, without any supporting evidence, that court staff gave a “coded message” to Godbout about court dates. There is no explanation as to what message was sent to Godbout or what code was being used. The fact that William could not obtain an early date for his motion, even if there were discussions between court staff and Bernard’s lawyers, is not evidence that there was a conspiracy between staff and Bernard’s lawyers. Again, this is mere speculation by William.

59In the same part of the affidavit, William deposes that several court staff deliberately ignored his request for motion dates, and that he was therefore prohibited from obtaining a date. In fact, it is not unusual for litigants to complain about the lack of available dates for motions. This again does not constitute evidence of a conspiracy.

60Another of William’s allegations is his statement, at paragraph 22(b), that Godbout and Bernard conspired to impersonate William. William deposes that Godbout, Bernard, or their agent accessed a court file, removed a page from an affidavit, and replaced it with another page so as to impersonate William. The only evidence that William can offer in this respect is that there appears to be an error on one of the pages regarding a birth date. There is no other evidence to support such an allegation. Again, this is a bald allegation based on an assumption by William and his own speculation.

61The final category relates to William’s assertion at paragraphs 13(k) and (l) that Godbout and Coderre were close personal friends of Justice Audet, and that Godbout and Justice Audet were business venture partners. William further deposes at paragraph 28 that Godbout and Justice Audet were involved in a mediation practice that they wished to expand to Jamaica. This connection, according to William, compromised how Justice Audet dealt with this case. Because William has provided some detail for this allegation, it is particularly important to determine whether William has complied with Justice Shelston’s order to provide supporting evidence.

62William appears to have two pieces of evidence upon which he relies to support his claim that there was a personal connection between Justice Audet, Godbout, and Coderre. The first is his statement at paragraph 27 of his affidavit that he observed a heated and profane conversation between Godbout and Coderre that occurred outside of the courtroom. As William came upon the two lawyers, he deposed that Godbout saw him and whispered to Coderre that they should stop talking. This caused William to believe that they had been talking about their relationship with Justice Audet. However, other than profanity, there are no details of any statement made by the lawyers that was overheard by William.

63The second piece of evidence relied upon by William is at paragraph 95 of his affidavit where he deposes that he spoke with a former employee of Justice Audet about the relationship between Justice Audet, Godbout, and Coderre. William states that the employee agreed to provide him with an affidavit, but that employee has recanted and will not be delivering an affidavit. Clearly, this “evidence” in William’s affidavit is hearsay evidence. Whatever becomes of these motions, this part of the affidavit must be struck as it is inadmissible.

64Overall, I find that William has failed to provide any evidence that supports the allegations of fraud, deceit, or dishonesty by any of the judges, the intervenors, or the court staff. He has no admissible evidence in support of these allegations. At best, he relies on speculation, assumptions, and hearsay. At worst, William is using the affidavit to angrily lash out at persons who have been involved in making orders that he does not like.

65For these reasons, regardless of any other remedy, I find that the allegations of fraud, deceit, or dishonesty by the judges, the intervenors, and court staff must be struck from the affidavit. Further, I find that William’s failure to provide evidence of his allegations of fraud against these parties constitutes a breach of Justice Shelston’s order and a triggering event.

66William’s allegations of fraud, deceit, and dishonesty by Bernard must be treated differently. When a party moves under rule 25(19) to set aside an order based on fraud or mistake, it should be expected that there are allegations of fraud or mistake.

67There are many allegations of Bernard’s fraud, dishonesty, or mistake in Wiliam’s affidavit. At paragraph 7, it is alleged that Bernard gave a false report to police. At paragraph 8, it is alleged that Bernard misrepresented William’s status under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. At paragraph 13, it is alleged that Bernard misrepresented William’s income, and at paragraph 19, it is alleged that Bernard misrepresented the number of times that their child was with William.

68Although William in each case characterizes these allegations against Bernard as “fraud”, I find that these allegations are really disagreements as to the facts. That is, most of these allegations are William’s statements of fact that contradict Bernard’s statements of fact. This type of evidence is admissible on a rule 25(19) motion. One party may allege the existence of a fact, and the other party may allege that the first party is not correct.

69I find that there is no specific supporting evidence for the allegations of Bernard’s fraud. However, fraud that is based on the presentation of incorrect facts is usually proved by inference, rather than direct evidence. If this case proceeds to trial, the trial judge will hear testimony as to the two different versions of the facts. If the judge concludes that Bernard made incorrect statements about the facts, then the judge would go on to consider whether those mistakes constituted fraud. This is acceptable.

70For these reasons, I find that there has been no breach of Justice Shelston’s order with respect to providing supporting evidence of fraud as it relates to fraud committed by Bernard.

Scandalous, vexatious, inflammatory, and irrelevant material

71The basic rules of pleadings include a requirement that affidavits contain a concise statement of relevant facts. Therefore, an affidavit cannot include inadmissible evidence or opinion evidence, and an affidavit cannot include scandalous, vexatious, or inflammatory material.

72I agree with the moving parties that there are large parts of William’s affidavit that are in breach of these basic rules, and that those parts must be struck from the affidavit. For example, at paragraph 6 of his affidavit William makes comments as to how Bernard and her lawyers will spend the proceeds of the sale of the home. At paragraph 5, William comments that Godbout and Bernard intended to destroy any path to meaningful access for him. At paragraph 11, William makes a lengthy comment on the mental health crisis in Canada. At paragraph 22, William makes a comment that a certain judge gave an “open cheque” to Godbout and Coderre. At paragraph 23, he references a case conference brief. At paragraph 27, he comments that Justice Audet “brushed off” his complaint. At paragraph 51, he makes references to the plight of racialized persons in Canada. At paragraph 95, he includes hearsay evidence from an employee of Justice Audet.

73All of the above-mentioned parts of the affidavit are improper and must be struck from the affidavit. The fact that this material is included in the affidavit, does not technically constitute a breach of Justice Shelston’s order, but it is a factor for consideration when this court contemplates an appropriate remedy.

THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY

74Given the analysis set out above and in consideration of the three-step approach to rule 1(8), I find that there are clear breaches of Justice Shelston’s orders that constitute triggering events. Those breaches include the failure to file the transcript of the proceedings, the failure to only address the Audet orders, the failure to focus on the relevant time period, and the failure to provide supporting evidence of the allegations of fraud by the judges, the intervenors, and the court staff. Therefore, step one has been proved.

75At step two, I find that William has not provided any reason for this court to use its discretion to not impose a sanction. William in fact takes the position that he has not breached any order, and there is no triggering event. Therefore, I must move to step three.

76At step three, I must decide on the appropriate remedy. This is a discretionary remedy that should be made in consideration of the many factors that exist in this case.

77There are really two possible remedies. First, I could strike the affidavits and direct that William file further and better affidavits within a certain period of time on specific terms that deal with my findings. Second, I could strike the motions and the affidavits and order that William be prohibited from proceeding with any future 25(19) motion regarding the Audet orders.

78In reaching a decision, I have first considered the nature and extent of the breaches of Justice Shelston’s orders. I note that there is more than one breach of the court orders, and therefore more than one triggering event. The multiple breaches suggest a pattern of defiance of court orders.

79Regarding the nature of the breaches, I agree that a minor breach, such as the failure to provide a transcript, on its own would not support an order that would permanently stay William’s rule 25(19) motions. However, I find that there are some significant breaches in this case that are offensive and reflect on the integrity of the courts and its process. For example, bald assertions of fraud on the part of a judge, lawyers, or court staff without supporting evidence needlessly undermines the entire court system. A breach of that nature requires a more drastic remedy.

80Next, in addition to the breaches of Justice Shelston’s orders, I have taken into account the fact that William has consistently breached the rules as to the permissible content of affidavits. For example, he has breached the requirements that an affidavit must contain only relevant facts, that an affidavit must not contain scandalous or offensive material, and that an affidavit may only contain admissible evidence. As discussed, large parts of William’s 2021 affidavit must be struck for this reason.

81Another factor, as identified by Justice Shelston, is that the true issue relates to the Audet orders that were made in December 2017. However, large parts of the affidavit relate to events that occurred well before December 2017. William’s complaints about the interlocutory proceedings and appeals are not only unnecessary but also constitute a breach of Justice Shelston’s orders. Again, as discussed, large parts of the affidavit must also be struck for this reason.

82I also take into account the fact that William has had many chances to file material and has not properly done so. William has now attempted to set aside these orders on three occasions, and on each occasion, he has not fully complied with the rules. Over eight years have expired since the Audet orders were made, and the material before the court is still not appropriate for a hearing.

83I have also considered whether William’s rule 25(19) motions will be successful. That is, I have considered whether the motions have a reasonable chance of success, or if a continuation of his motions will simply waste more time. I acknowledge that the moving parties have not brought a rule 16 summary dismissal motion, but I believe that it is important in a case such as this to consider the strength of the case that the moving parties seek to strike.

84In his rule 25(19) motions, William will be required to prove fraud or mistake that affected the Audet orders. In my view, proving fraud is difficult, proving fraud that occurred eight years ago is more difficult, and proving that it affected an eight-year-old decision is a monumental task.

85Further, there is a real possibility that William will not be able to prove that he proceeded expeditiously after learning of the Audet orders, and therefore his motions may fail for this reason. I note that he did not bring his first motion under rule 25(19) until approximately one year after he became aware of the Audet orders.

86Therefore, in considering these rule 1(8) motions, I take into account that William’s rule 25(19) motions have a low probability of success.

87I acknowledge that access to justice for William is a key issue of concern. Specifically, in making a decision as to whether or not to strike William’s rule 25(19) motions, I must consider that a person living in Canada is entitled to access the justice system. If a person has a legitimate legal dispute, the courts should, if possible, provide that person with a path to the courts so that the dispute can be adjudicated on its merits.

88Moreover, even if a party’s pleading is vexatious or scandalous, the courts still must consider that there may be a legitimate claim hidden within the scandalous material. Therefore, a court order that denies a person a path to a courtroom should be seen as a last resort in dealing with a recalcitrant or defaulting litigant.

89However, in this case, if I were to strike William’s 2021 motions and prohibit William from proceeding on the motions in the future, I find that William’s access to justice would not be entirely denied. In the Stewart proceeding, the case is only at the temporary order stage, and either William or Stewart can arrange for the matter to proceed to a final hearing. Thus, William has a path that he can access by simply moving the case to a final hearing. It is not necessary for William’s rule 25(19) motion in the Stewart matter to proceed in order to provide William with access to justice.

90In the Bernard matter, if William’s motion is permanently struck, he would obviously be denied the possibility of obtaining an order to set aside the final order in the Bernard matter ab initio. However, he would not be denied the ability to bring a motion to change the order under rule 15 if there has been a material change in circumstance. I acknowledge that under a rule 15 motion, William’s ability to obtain retroactive financial relief will be restricted.

91Overall, in the big picture, if William is denied the opportunity to proceed with his motions, the impact will be insignificant in the Stewart matter, and modest in the Bernard matter.

92Next, the most significant factor, in my view, is that the Audet orders were based on uncontested actions. William’s voluntary withdrawal from the proceedings by filing his Notices of Withdrawal in November 2017 speaks volumes. William deliberately chose to walk away from these two proceedings in November 2017 and allow the proceedings to continue in his absence. That is, the uncontested nature of the matters was intentionally permitted by William.

93I find that the courts should generally not condone the conduct of a party who intentionally allows a matter to proceed in his absence and then attempts to resurrect his case after orders that he did not like were made in his absence. This is the type of conduct that is squarely contemplated by rule 2(2) and (3).

94I have also considered that a great deal of time has passed since the orders were made. Almost all of the delay in getting this matter to a hearing can be attributed to William. At this point, it would be very difficult to reconsider the events surrounding the Audet orders and potentially make new orders based on the circumstances that existed in 2017.

95Finally, if William’s affidavits are struck and William is given specific instructions for filing further and better affidavits in support of his rule 25(19) motions, there is a real question as to whether William is capable of complying with those instructions and delivering acceptable affidavits. Given his track record, it is very likely that if William is given a chance to deliver further affidavits, then we will be back in this court a year from now dealing with further rule 1(8) motions.

96For all of these reasons, I find that the appropriate remedy, on balance, is to strike William’s rule 25(19) motions and prohibit him from proceeding in the future with these motions.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

97In summary, I find that it would be an inefficient and out of proportion use of the justice system to allow William’s rule 25(19) motions to proceed. The factors against allowing these motions to continue far outweigh any benefit that would be gained by giving William another chance to amend and proceed with these motions.

98Therefore, I hereby make the following orders:

The two notices of motion dated December 17, 2021, and the supporting affidavits dated December 8, 2021 and December 17, 2021, are hereby struck.
William will be prohibited from bringing any further motion to set aside the orders made by Justice Audet on December 18, 2017 in either the Bernard matter or the Stewart matter.

99Nothing in this decision prohibits William from bringing a motion to change in either proceeding, and William is not prohibited from moving the Stewart matter to a final hearing.

100If any party wishes to make submissions as to costs, I direct that the party seeking relief shall serve and file written submissions, no longer than five pages within 20 days of the release of this decision, with responding submissions to be delivered within 10 days thereafter. If no submissions are received within this time frame, the parties will be deemed to have settled all of the costs issues as between themselves. A copy of any such submissions, once filed with the court, shall also be emailed to the Judicial Assistants at: St.Catharines.SCJJA@ontario.ca.

J. R. Henderson J.

Released: April 30, 2026