CITATION: Jodi L. Feldman Professional Corporation v. Foulidis, 2026 ONSC 2489

COURT FILE NO.: CV-18-00592247-0000

DATE: 20260427

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

JODI L. FELDMAN PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION

Plaintiff

– and –

LYNNE CATHERINE FOULIDIS

Defendant

Sean N. Zeitz and Cora Madden, for the Plaintiff

Lynne Catherine Foulidis, self-represented

Michael Crampton, for the Non-Party, George Foulidis

HEARD: April 17, 2026

Leiper J.

REASONS FOR DECISION

1These are reasons for decision in three related motions. The context is a dispute over the payment of legal fees in the aftermath of matrimonial litigation between former spouses George and Lynne Foulidis. Lynne is a party to the underlying action. George is not.

2In February of 2018, Lynne parted company with her matrimonial lawyer, Jodi L. Feldman Professional Corporation, the law firm plaintiff in this action.

3The law firm sought payment of its fees from Lynne. Lynne did not pay those fees. The law firm sued Lynne. The claim went to trial before Dow, J., who gave judgment for the law firm in 2024.

4Prior to the trial, Lynne transferred title in her only asset, the matrimonial home (the “property”), to her spouse, George. As a result of that transfer, the law firm added George to its claim against Lynne. The law firm alleged that the two of them made a fraudulent conveyance of the property to defeat its claim for fees.

5To settle the claim against him, George signed minutes of settlement and a guarantee in favour of the firm for any fees that Lynne would have to pay to the law firm.

6Lynne appealed the trial judgment. She also declared bankruptcy.

7In July of 2025, the Court of Appeal dismissed Lynne’s appeal.

8In the aftermath of Lynne’s declaration of bankruptcy, the law firm sought to enforce George’s guarantee by bringing a motion to an Associate Justice for a writ of possession over the property. The law firm obtained that order and obtained a writ of possession.

9After Lynne learned that the law firm was attempting to evict her from the property using the writ of possession, Merritt, J. scheduled the current motions on an urgent basis. Then, George Foulidis initiated his own action seeking to set aside his guarantee. The law firm has counterclaimed in that proceeding. The law firm seeks relief by way of an order to sell the property to realize on the debt guaranteed by George.

10In the motions before me, the parties have moved for two opposing orders:

a. George Foulidis moves for an order setting aside the writ of possession, or alternatively, an order staying the writ of possession pending a decision in his recently initiated action to set aside his guarantee; and,

b. The law firm is moving to sell the property and to realize its security. The law firm submits that George’s motion to set aside is an attempt to avoid his longstanding and clear obligations under the guarantee.

11Lynne attended the motions, but she did not participate. She filed no material for these motions. She was self-represented at the hearing. I permitted her to address the court briefly after counsel had completed their submissions.

12Counsel for the law firm objected to the court taking any of Lynne’s comments into account. She described her personal objectives: seeking to stay in the house and to continue healing from a stroke that she suffered last year. Lynne did not address the legal issues briefed by counsel.

13I have not applied Lynne’s comments to my legal analysis. Given that her health issues, including a stroke that she suffered in the summer of 2025 were put into evidence by George, I concluded that it was appropriate for Lynne to speak briefly to the court, and to be heard if her position deviated from that of the other parties to the motion.

14For the reasons set out below, I grant George’s motion to set aside the writ of possession. I dismiss the law firm’s motion for an order to sell the property without prejudice to its right to seek that relief in the context of the claim and counterclaim involving the guarantee.

15Because of my findings on setting aside the writ of possession, I need not rule on George’s alternative relief to stay of the writ of possession.

Background

16The chronology of events begins with the matrimonial litigation in 2015 between George and Lynne. Lynne was represented by the law firm. In February of 2018, the solicitor client relationship between Lynne and the law firm broke down. The law firm brought this action against Lynne for payment of outstanding legal fees.

17In March of 2018, the law firm discovered that Lynne had registered a charge against title to the property in favour of George’s brother Danny Foulidis, not long after Lynne had been served with the law firm’s claim.

18The law firm added Danny to its claim, alleging that this was a fraudulent mortgage which should be removed from title.

19In June of 2018, Lynne and George settled their matrimonial claim, with Lynne to receive payments from George over a 20-year period. George agreed that Lynne would reside in the property until 2025, with George paying for the house expenses.

20The law firm added Danny as a defendant after discovering that Lynne and Danny had registered a mortgagee on title to the property after the claim was served.

21On March 23, 2021, Lynne transferred title in the property to George, for consideration of $5.00.

22In September of 2021, the law firm moved successfully before Shore, J. to obtain a charging order against the property to secure any legal fees found to be owing to the firm. The Court of Appeal upheld the charging order on Lynne’s appeal.

23The law firm amended its claim in 2022 to allege that Lynne and George had executed a fraudulent conveyance.

The Minutes of Settlement

24On February 10, 2023, George, Danny, Lynne, and the law firm entered into Minutes of Settlement, with all being represented by independent counsel. Under the settlement terms, the law firm agreed to discontinue its fraudulent conveyance application against the couple, release Danny and George from the litigation, and to withdraw its bankruptcy proceedings involving Lynne.

25In return, George agreed to personally guarantee any debts found to be owed by Lynne to the law firm for fees. George and Lynne consented to an order granting the law firm leave to seek a writ of possession in respect of the property as further security for the guarantee. Danny agreed to subordinate his charge to the law firm’s charging order against the Property.

26The Minutes required that George and Lynne’s consent to a writ of possession of the property be held in escrow as follows:

Lynne and George shall consent to an Order for a Writ of Possession in the form attached hereto as Schedule “B” as security for the payment of the amount owing to JLFPC to be determined in the Action or as may be agreed to by the parties. The consent to the Order for a Writ of Possession shall be held in escrow by Messrs. LZW PC only to be taken out and signed by the court in the event Lynne and/or George fail or refuse to remit payment of the full amount owing to JLFPC so long as 45 days have elapsed from the date of any final endorsement/reasons in the Action or 45 days after the date any appeal therefrom is dismissed.

27The Guarantee bound George to be “directly, unconditionally and primarily liable with the Debtor for her indebtedness due and owing” to the law firm.

28As with the consent, the Guarantee permitted the law firm to make a demand for payment under the Guarantee 45 days “from the date of any final endorsement/reasons in the Action or 45 days after the date any appeal therefrom is dismissed.”

The Trial and the Appeals

29The trial of the action between Lynne and the law firm proceeded in 2024. On April 24, 2024, and August 1, 2024, Dow, J. found that Lynne owed her former lawyers fees and costs totalling $853,765.45. The law firm notified George and Lynne that the firm would be filing their consent to the writ of possession for the property.

30Lynne retained counsel to appeal the trial judgment of Dow, J. After her lawyer failed to perfect the appeal by the deadline, Lynne’s appeal was formally dismissed by Gillese, J.

31The law firm also pursued an appeal of Dow, J.’s order to the Divisional Court, seeking an order for prejudgment interest which was not part of the judgment. In oral submissions on these motions, counsel to the law firm estimated that if their appeal succeeded, this would add approximately $35,000 to the judgment against Lynne.

32Lynne sought a review of the Gillese, J.’s decision to dismiss her appeal before a full panel of the Court of Appeal.

33On May 2, 2025, the law firm sent a demand to George that he pay the judgment in accordance with his guarantee. The law firm enclosed a “Notice of Sale” in respect of the Property. The law firm advised George that if he did not pay the debt by June 18, 2025, it would proceed to enforce the writ of possession to which George had consented. The law firm confirmed that if the review motion in the Court of Appeal was not heard before June 18, 2025, it would hold off on executing its rights to judgment.

34On June 17, 2025, Lynne declared bankruptcy. On June 25, 2025, the Divisional Court stayed the law firm’s appeal. It remains stayed as of the date of these motions.

35On July 4, 2025, the Court of Appeal denied Lynne’s review motion and upheld the dismissal of her appeal for delay. Thus, her appeal was finally dismissed.

The 2025 the law firm moves in-writing for a writ of possession

36On September 10, 2025, the law firm brought a motion in writing, without notice to Lynne and George, before Associate Justice Eckler seeking a writ of possession based on Lynne and George’s signed consents under the Minutes of Settlement.

37Associate Justice Eckler noted there was no consent executed by Danny, who was still shown as one of the named parties in the title of proceedings. Associate Justice Eckler declined to provide the relief sought, without prejudice to the firm’s ability to refile its motion and explain the role of Danny.

38In dismissing the motion, Associate Justice Eckler directed: “For the motion to proceed as an in-writing motion pursuant to Rule 37.12.1, it must be clear from the motion record that all parties and non-parties who may be affected by the relief sought either consent to or do not oppose the motion.”

39At para. 6-7 of her endorsement, Associate Justice Eckler wrote:

The motion material filed for this motion is deficient in that it does [not] contain the required position letter or email or signed consent from all parties to the action confirming their respective positions.

As a result, this motion is dismissed without prejudice to the moving party bringing a new motion to be heard orally and on notice to all parties, or as an in-writing motion with evidence that meets the requirements of Rule 37.12.1.

40The law firm did not seek an oral hearing of the motion after Associate Justice Eckler issued this endorsement. It relied on Rule 37.12.1(1) and (2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194. Which requires:

(1) Where a motion is on consent, unopposed or without notice under subrule 37.07 (2), the motion may be heard in writing without the attendance of the parties, unless the court orders otherwise.

(2) Where the motion is on consent, the consent and a draft order shall be filed with the notice of motion.

41The law firm’s notice of motion stated that the order sought was “on consent” and could be heard in writing. The law firm did not file a consent with the draft order to the subsequent motion, as required under Rule 37.12.1(2).

42Motions without notice must comply with Rule 37.07(2). Rule 37.07 (1) and (2) provide:

Required as General Rule

37.07 (1) The notice of motion shall be served on any party or other person who will be affected by the order sought, unless these rules provide otherwise.

Where Not Required

(2) Where the nature of the motion or the circumstances render service of the notice of motion impracticable or unnecessary, the court may make an order without notice.

See: Henry v. Google Canada et al., 2021 ONSC 666 at paras. 12-14.

43The law firm’s motion was filed on September 19, 2025, and assigned to Associate Justice La Horey.

44The law firm filed George and Lynne’s consent to judgment, the Minutes of Settlement, and affidavits of execution by the lawyers who witnessed the Minutes. Counsel provided the prior endorsement from Eckler, A.J. the Amended Amended Statement of Claim, the Judgment of Dow, J., the costs order of Dow, J., the two endorsements from the Court of Appeal dismissing Lynne’s appeals, and the demand letter under the terms of the Guarantee for payment. The law firm also provided evidence that explained Danny’s role in the litigation, and why he had not signed a consent to the writ of possession.

45The law firm did not provide any information about its stayed appeal before the Divisional Court, Lynne’s bankruptcy or whether that might mean that one of the conditions for relying on the Foulidis’ consents to the writ of possession, had not yet been satisfied.

46Counsel for the law firm submits on these motions that they did not think that this was necessary, because the law firm planned to submit its claim to the trustee in bankruptcy to determine its merits and whether it should be added, rather than move to lift the stay in the Divisional Court. Ultimately, the trustee added the prejudgment interest claim to the list of claims in February of 2026. However, at the time of the motion before Associate Justice La Horey, that had not yet happened and the appeal before the Divisional Court had not been dismissed.

47On October 28, 2025, Associate Justice La Horey issued the order sought by the law firm. In her endorsement, La Horey, A.J. described the motion as being made “without notice”. Associate Justice La Horey wrote that:

The plaintiff, Lynne Catherine Foulidis and George Foulidis executed a consent to an order for leave to issue a writ of possession on February 10, 2023. Following the dismissal of the defendant Lynne Foulidis’ motion for panel review of the decision of Justice Gillese and upholding the dismissal of her appeal for delay on July 4, 2025 (2025 ONCA 479), the moving party intends to execute on its charging order given that payment has not been made of the amounts owing.

48Associate Justice La Horey directed that the law firm “forthwith” serve a copy of the motion record, order and this endorsement on the defendant and George.

49The law firm did not serve the record, order and endorsement, “forthwith.” On December 9, 2025, when the law firm served its motion to list and sell the property, it included a copy of the order for the writ of possession. It did not include the motion record that was before the Associate Justice. The law firm produced that document to George and Lynne in 2026.

The Lead Up to the Urgent Motions of April 17, 2026

50On January 2, 2026, the law firm obtained its writ of possession.

51On January 27, 2026, the law firm and George attended civil practice court to set a timetable for the responding materials on the law firm’s motion. Counsel to George submitted that the law firm did not mention that it had obtained a writ of possession and would be acting on it.

52On January 30, 2026, counsel to the law firm sent a letter to Lynne and George advising that the law firm required vacant possession of the property by March 1, 2026, so that it could sell the property pursuant to the writ of possession.

53On February 23, 2026, George commenced a new action seeking to set aside his guarantee and the writ of possession. George’s motion to set aside the writ order and stay the writ of possession was scheduled to be heard on November 13, 2026.

54On February 27, 2026, Lynne received notice to vacate the property by March 23, 2026.

55On March 11, 2026, Lynne sought to bring an urgent motion to stay the enforcement of the writ of possession.

56On March 16, 2026, the court convened an urgent case conference in response to Lynne’s stay motion. The parties and George were given leave to argue these motions on today’s date. Lynne, who was not represented, was provided with resources for self represented individuals. In advance of that hearing, Lynne disclosed medical records confirming that she had suffered a stroke in August of 2025, and at the time of the ex parte proceedings that led to the order for the writ of possession, she was still recovering from neurosurgery.

57On March 17, 2026, the law firm counterclaimed against George, seeking to enforce the guarantee that George provided to the law firm.

The Issues on the Motions

58I must determine the following:

a. Should the writ order be set aside on this motion?

b. If not, and in the alternative, should the writ of possession be stayed?

c. Should the law firm be granted an order permitting the firm to sell the property?

59I begin with the first issue.

Should the Writ Order be Set Aside for Incomplete Disclosure?

60 Rule 37.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure allows the Court to set aside an order obtained without notice to a party or person affected obtained on the motion:

a. A party or other person who,

i. is affected by an order obtained on motion without notice;

ii. fails to appear on a motion through accident, mistake or insufficient notice; or

iii. is affected by an order of a registrar,

may move to set aside or vary the order, by a notice of motion that is served forthwith after the order comes to the person’s attention and names the first available hearing date that is at least three days after service of the notice of motion.

b. On a motion under subrule (1), the court may set aside or vary the order on such terms as are just.

(5) A motion under subrule (1) or any other rule to set aside, vary or amend an order of an associate judge may be made,

i. to the associate judge who made it, at any place; or

ii. to any other associate judge or to a judge, at a place determined in accordance with rule 37.03 (where motions to be brought).

61The parties agree that the order for the writ of possession was the product of a motion without notice. However, the law firm submits that this was not truly an ex parte matter because it relied on George and Lynne’s consents as part of the Minutes of Settlement described above. The law firm relies on this as prior notice: Broom v. Pepall, [1911] O.J. No. 166.

62Thus, the law firm submits that its obligation to make full disclosure was not engaged on the motion for an order for the writ of possession. The law firm describes this as precisely the type of debtor-creditor motion where “the nature of the motion or the circumstances render service of the notice of motion impracticable or unnecessary” as contemplated by Rule 37.07(2).

63George submits that he would not have consented to such an order issuing at that time, because the terms of the escrow clause in the Minutes of Settlement had not yet been satisfied. The law firm’s outstanding appeal in the Divisional Court on the question of prejudgment interest has not been dismissed, and George submits that he was prevented from making those submissions to Associate Justice La Horey.

64The law firm submits that it was not required to either give notice or to disclose Lynne’s bankruptcy and the law firm’s stayed appeal before the Divisional Court on its in-writing motion to obtain the order for a writ of possession.

65I disagree. The consent to a writ of possession signed by George and Lynne was not unconditional. The consent to the order could not be used until 45 days after the dismissal of “any appeal” in the action. There is no carve out in the consent for appeals stayed for reason of bankruptcy, or any outcome other than dismissal. Lawyers drafted these documents and all parties were represented. Part of the context included questions of whether the law firm might initiate bankruptcy proceedings against Lynne at the time.

66George submits that had he been given notice of either motion before AJ Eckler or AJ La Horey, he would have raised the interpretation of the consent and that question could have been addressed at those motions.

67The law firm submits that its correspondence to George and Lynne, sent when Lynne’s review motion was pending at the Court of Appeal, was sufficient notice the firm would be moving for a writ of possession. The law firm received no response; counsel submits that no further notice was required of its in-writing motion to Associate Justice La Horey.

68I agree that the law firm asserted its rights in the June 2025 correspondence; however, it omitted to say when it would move to do so, other than it would forbear given that the Court of Appeal had not yet ruled on Lynne’s review in her appeal. The law firm clearly had an eye on the timing of when it could so move, based on the final disposal of Lynne’s appeal. Thus, the law firm held off until that appeal was finally dismissed. But it did not similarly hold off pending the final dismissal of its own appeal to the Divisional Court. Nor did its letter inform the parties that it was not treating that appeal as any impediment to it moving for an order for a writ of possession.

69I find that the firm’s letter did not amount to adequate notice of its motion to the parties affected, because of the conditional nature of the consent granted. The circumstances are not analogous to the facts in Broom. The principle described in Broom emerged in a different context: the plaintiff tenant obtained the defendant landlord’s consent to dismiss the action on various conditions and presented that consent to the Master. The issue arose from the plaintiff’s substitution of an order that included terms that were not in the consent. However, it was open on the terms of the consent for the Master to make the order. In that context while the defendant was not present at the motion, the court concluded that this was not truly an “ex parte” matter.

70I find that this motion was made without notice because of the timing, and the escrow conditions that required the dismissal of “any appeal” engaged subrule 39.01(6) which provides that:

Where a motion or application is made without notice, the moving party or applicant shall make full and fair disclosure of all material facts, and failure to do so is in itself sufficient ground for setting aside any order obtained on the motion or application.

71Material facts in the context of r. 39 must be something that could have affected the outcome of the motion: “the question is whether the moving party on the ex parte motion neglected to advise the court of a fact that may have influenced its approach to the motion”: Correct Group Inc. v. City of Barrie, 2013 ONSC 4477, at para 70.

72While the law firm submits that an interpretation that required disclosure of the escrow conditions to the Associate Justice is overly “restrictive,” I do not agree. The appeal before the Divisional Court was stayed and not “dismissed.” The law firm did not provide that information to the Associate Justice. The terms of the escrow conditions had to be met, and the law firm must have been aware of this because it included all of the information about Lynne’s dismissed appeal before the Court of Appeal as part of its record on the motion.

73A party seeking an order without notice must be “scrupulous” in disclosing the relevant facts to the court. A party may not present only one side of a case, but must make a balanced presentation in law, including “any points of fact…known to it which favour the other side” : See Sweda Farms Ltd. et al. v. Ontario Egg Producers, 2011 ONSC 1570, at paras 9-10, quoting from United States v. Friedland, [1996] OJ No 4399 at paras 27-28 (Gen Div).

74It may be true that the law firm could have persuaded Associate Justice La Horey at the time of the motion that the escrow conditions had been met. But that is not the issue. The issue is the lack of notice to George and Lynne, accompanied by the law firm’s omission to include the information about the appeal and Lynne’s bankruptcy. The combination of the two guaranteed that this argument would not be considered. The law firm did not scrupulously disclose all of the relevant facts to the court.

75For that reason, I find that the order for the writ of possession made by La Horey, J. A. made without notice and full disclosure must be set aside.

76Given this finding, the alternative motion brought by George for a stay need not be determined.

77I turn to the law firm’s motion for an order permitting the sale of the property.

Should the law firm have leave to sell the property as a conventional mortgagee?

78The law firm moves for leave to sell the property pursuant to the Charging Order and orders permitting it to list the property for sale and have exclusive conduct thereof as if it were a conventional mortgagee selling under power of sale.

79This relief relies on the proper issuance of the writ of possession, giving the law firm must have vacant possession of the property to carry out any sale.

80The parties have now engaged in a second round of litigation. They have a date in November of 2026 to argue the validity of George’s guarantee and the law firm’s counterclaim for orders enabling it to sell the property to satisfy the debt as guaranteed by George.

81Accordingly, having found that the writ of possession must be set aside, I dismiss the law firm’s motion, without prejudice to its ability to seek similar relief in future proceedings involving this debt.

Conclusion

82I order:

a. That the order for the writ of possession, and the writ of possession issued pursuant to that order be set aside; and,

b. The motion for sale is dismissed without prejudice of the plaintiff to seek similar relief, including a writ of possession on notice to the affected parties.

83If the parties are not able to agree as to the costs of the motions, they may deliver written submissions (max 4 pages) to judicial assistant Aishat Olaleye at aishat.olaleye@ontario.ca on or before May 8, 2026.

Leiper J.

Released: April 27, 2026