2026 ONSC 2470
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
RE: GRANT THORNTON LIMITED, in its capacities as trustee in bankruptcy of 2398035 ONTARIO INC., 2488123 ONTARIO LIMITED, 2538139 ONTARIO LIMITED, 2540594 ONTARIO LIMITED and VIRK HOSPITALITY CORP.
Applicants
-and-
2180366 ONTARIO INC., GUARDIAN REAL ESTATE VENTURES LIMITED a.k.a. 345205 ONTARIO INC., 2514367 ONTARIO INC., 2490793 ONTARIO LIMITED, 1809313 ONTARIO LIMITED, 2346448 ONTARIO INC., MPIRE CAPITAL CORPORATION, ENZO MIZZI, FILIPPO MIZZI and MARY CAMPISI and NORTH 44 PROPERTY MANAGEMENT INC.
Respondents
BEFORE: FL Myers J
COUNSEL: George Benchetrit, Maya Poliak, and Maleeha Anwar, for Grant Thornton Inc. in its capacities as trustee in bankruptcy of the Applicants
Robert G. Zochodne, for Mary Campisi
Micheal Simaan, for Enzo Mizzi and all corporate respondents
HEARD: April 22, 2026
ENDORSEMENT
The Proceeding
1What began as hotly contested matters has resolved to much simpler issues. The Trustee’s thorough financial analysis left little room for contested facts.
2Although two related proceedings were brought forward for hearing, counsel all agree that I am called upon to decide issues and make orders only in the application by the Trustee to set aside certain transfers at undervalue under s. 96 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC 1990, c B-3, or alternatively, as fraudulent conveyances under s. 2 of the Fraudulent Conveyances Act, RSO 1990, c. F.29.
3For the reason set out below, I grant the relief sought by the Trustee in paras. 1(a) to (d) of its factum. The relief sought under the BIA and the FCA are pleaded as alternatives. Accordingly judgment will go under the BIA. I resolve the issues under the FCA for completeness and in case an appellate court later determines that my order under the BIA was made in error.
The Facts
4The basic facts are not contested. Paramount Group agreed to lend approximately $45 million to corporations owned and controlled by the three Mizzi siblings.1 Some $16.2 million of those funds were transferred to other Mizzi companies for no apparent consideration. It is those subsequent movements of approximately $16.2 million that are under review in this proceeding.
5The impugned transfers are listed with particularity in the Summary of Transfers chart appended to the Trustee’s factum.
6Enzo Mizzi agrees that he owns or controls all the Respondent companies. He says notwithstanding his siblings’ positions with some of the companies, they left operations to him. He says they were not involved in any of the transactions that are under review in this proceeding.
7Mary Campisi says that she assisted her brother Enzo by performing tasks as he directed. She was the contact person for the Respondents when the lawyers needed instructions or documents to enable them to move money as directed. She likens her position to that of a senior law clerk rather than a principal.
8Filipo Mizzi has not appeared in this proceeding. He has not adduced any evidence.
9One most telling feature of this proceeding is that there has been almost no contemporaneous correspondence or records produced by any of the Respondents. Their explanations of events are generally unsupported by contemporaneous documents except as have been obtained from their former lawyers.
Mary Campisi
10There is documentary evidence showing that Mary Campisi became the sole shareholder, director, and officer of one of the recipients of funds, 1809313 Ontario Limited, from October, 2009 through the period when the impugned transfers occurred in 2016 and thereafter.
11Enzo Mizzi incorporated the company and became its first director on October 29, 2009. In 2021, he and Mary Campisi signed corporate documents and confirmed to the Province that Enzo Mizzi ceased being a director and Mary Campisi became the sole director on the date of incorporation of the company in 2009.
12Mary says that the documents were signed in 2021 to move Enzo’s company to her for use by her adult sons in a new venture. They now say they realize that moving this company to new owners for a new venture was a mistake because the company came with the baggage of the Trustee’s claims.
13Mary Campisi has produced no documentation or evidence of any dealings with her sons. She has not produced documents showing her sons having any involvement with this corporation. She has produced no explanation for why Enzo Mizzi would transfer the company to her sole ownership if it was to be used for her sons’ venture. Wouldn’t they have some ownership and management appointments?
14More telling is that the volume and content of the documents do not support Mary Campisi’s versions of events. She signed a resolution of the sole shareholder appointing herself as the sole director as of October 29, 2009. She passed the corporate general bylaw as at October 29, 2009 as sole director and sole shareholder. She and Enzo Mizzi filed regulatory forms with the Province of Ontario confirming expressly that Enzo Mizzi ceased being a director of the company on the date of its incorporation in 2009 and Mary Campisi was elected to the position that day.
15None of this is consistent with Mary Campisi simply taking ownership of the company from her brother in 2021 for use by her children in a new venture. Moreover, Mary Campisi has confirmed that she has no further documentation or information to produce
16I take great care considering credibility findings in an application. Mary Campisi has been cross-examined. There are no additional facts, documents, or witnesses that either side seeks to present at a trial. There are no material facts in dispute requiring a trial. V2 Investment Holdings Inc. v. Mizrahi, 2026 ONCA 275,at para. 34.2
17I am in as good a position as a trial judge to look at the documentation and find that it does not support at all Mary Campisi’s unsupported story about taking ownership of the company recently for her children. Rather, it is apparent that in 2021, knowing that 1809313 Ontario Limited had received over $2.5 million of the funds borrowed by other Mizzi companies from Paramount Group, Enzo Mizzi and Mary Campisi made extensive efforts to confirm retroactively Mary Campisi’s sole ownership and control of 1809313 Ontario Limited from and after the date of its incorporation.
18I do not accept that the effort to spend money on lawyers to create so many specific documents was all just a mistake because all they meant to do was just to transfer one of Enzo Mizzi’s shelf companies to Mary Campisi for her sons’ venture as at 2021. There is no support for this story in any contemporaneous evidence. Neither does it make sense in light of the volume and contents of the documents actually drafted and signed by Mary Campisi. Neither does it make sense that Mary Campisi would be sole owner and director of her sons’ venture. None of it is consistent with the record or makes business sense.
19I therefore do not accept the evidence of Mary Campisi and Enzo Mizzi regarding 1809313 Ontario Limited..
20I find that Mary Campisi was the sole shareholder of 1809313 Ontario Limited from and after its incorporation.
Enzo Mizzi’s Evidence about Profit Sharing
21There are commitment letters between Paramount Group entities and Mizzi companies evidencing loans for specific projects. Each Mizzi borrower was the owner of a different project site. They were single-purpose entities.
22The Trustee is the trustee in bankruptcy of these borrower companies.
23The commitment letters discuss future joint ventures between Paramount and Mizzi entities to develop each site on a new entity to be held on a 50/50 basis. Joint venture agreements were never signed however.
24The same law firm acted for Paramount Group as lender and the now bankrupt Mizzi borrower corporations.
25On instructions of Mary Campisi, the law firm advanced Paramount funds to each relevant Mizzi borrower to allow it to buy the piece of land to be secured. Then, on Mary Campisi’s instructions, the lawyers advanced the remining funds ostensibly borrowed by the Mizzi borrowers to the other Mizzi recipient companies. These other recipient corporations are the targets of the Trustee’s application under s. 96 of the BIA and s. 2 of the FCA.
26Mary Campisi gave instructions to the law firm to move the funds to the non-borrower recipients. She also obtained and provided the directions signed by her brothers as may have been required by the lawyers to do so.
27Enzo Mizzi agrees that the transfers to the non-borrowers left the borrowers insolvent. They had obligations to repay Paramount Group for funds they never received. To the extent that the borrowers were required to develop properties for a future joint venture, they had no funds left to do so.
28But, Enzo Mizzi has provided a narrative under which, he says, that because the lender Paramount Group was obtaining lending fees in advance and requiring some money to be segregated from the initial
advances to be held for payment of interest when due, that the Mizzi side of the future joint ventures were also entitled to be paid their profit at the front end of the loan transactions. He says Paramount Group knew this.
29There is not a single document supporting Enzo Mizzi’s construction of events. The commitment letters expressly provided for the payment of lending fees and segregation of some future interest payments in favour of the lenders. These were payments for the loan transaction. They were not early payments for future joint venture profits.
30Nothing in the agreements provided for Mizzi companies to take out “profit” from the advances of the various loans. The borrowers were supposed to develop each project. There was no profit to realize before projects were developed and sold. Moreover, removing funds remaining after payment of the purchase price for project lands left the borrowers with no funds to build out each project to make a profit.
31If, on Enzo Mizzi’s understanding, the recipients of the funds were then committed to performing the construction or development of the project, there is nothing in writing to say so. There a nothing binding them to use the funds for construction or development of a future joint venture project at all. Moreover, they did not do so.
32The Trustee’s evidence is that there was no sign of any development work having been conducted at any of the project sites. The Trustee sold all the project lands and left Paramount Group (and its creditors) suffering a $35 million shortfall.
33There is a much bigger story about how Paramount Group came to make these loans and how that led to the Province of Ontario to appoint the Trustee as Receiver over Paramount Group in the interest of its investors and creditors. But that is not germane to the issues before me at this stage.
34The claim that the transfers at undervalue were prepayments of profit also fails when considered in the context of the commitment letters as a whole. Of course a lender receives fees and interest for its loans. The commitment letters provide for a 50/50 sharing among the parties in respect of the future joint venture development of the various projects. If the Mizzi side takes out prepayments of some kind of future profit to match the timing of the lender taking fees for making the loan, that will skew the sharing of profits under the joint ventures. Will the lender then receive 100% of the profit from the joint ventures once they are up and running? How is the prepayment of profit or future profit sharing to be determined? What if one or more projects do not make any profit but the Mizzis have already taken funds on account of non-existent profit?
35The commitment letters contain agreements to agree to joint venture terms. It is not clear that there is any binding agreement yet to hold or to vend properties into joint venture. If there were to be terms for the sharing of profit, if any, in future joint ventures, if any, sophisticated parties and lawyers will include those terms in the joint venture agreements.
36In my view it is absurd to suggest that the commitment letters implicitly allow the Mizzi’s to strip from the borrowers the funds borrowed and needed to develop their project sites by moving them to affiliates without any terms agreed with the lender or the various recipient affiliates. Enzo Mizzi’s evidence on this issue is incapable of belief.
37Enzo Mizzi’s counsel apparently agreed with this assessment. At the hearing of the application, Mr. Simaan did not submit that all the funds stripped from the Mizzi borrowers were pre-payments of unearned future joint venture profits. Rather, he conceded that the transfers from the bankrupt Mizzi borrowers to the non-borrower Mizzi recipient companies were transfers at undervalue.
38Instead, Mr. Simaan submitted, that the expectations of the parties to the loans (i.e. Paramount Group and Mizzi) was that there would be some profit earned by the Mizzi side of future joint ventures at some point. Therefore, some amount of the funds transferred to the Mizzi recipient companies represents some amount on account of anticipated future profits. As such, he submits, at least part of each impugned transfer was made for consideration in relation to the future profit of the Mizzi side. Moreover, since there is no evidence of Mizzi’s anticipated profit on each project, there needs to be a reference or trial of an issue to determine the amount of profit to deduct from the impugned transfers to calculate the net amount of each transfer at undervalue.
39I do not accept these submissions. The funds were transferred contemporaneously with the advances of the loans before any development work had been done. The joint ventures had yet to be formed. There were only agreements to agree that required negotiations to be held. There were no contracts between a joint venture and any Mizzi company for development or construction. There were no budgets. There was no real or projected profit agreed in favour of anyone at the time of the transfers at undervalue.
40Apart from Enzo Mizzi’s unsupported oral evidence, there is no indication that any of the Mizzi recipient companies was to be a joint venture partner or a contractor to develop or construct each site to make profit. The deals hadn’t been done yet.
41Moreover, April 22, 2026 was the Respondents’ day in court. If the Respondents assert that they paid consideration or transferred value to the bankrupt Mizzi borrowers in return for the impugned transfers, the burden was on them to disclose documents and prove those assertions in this proceeding. They did neither. This application has not been bifurcated by a court order. With no evidence adduced to put facts in dispute (let alone material facts in dispute requiring a trial) it is not open to the Respondents to seek a further hearing in which to do so.
42At the time that the transfers were made there was no value paid or provided to the bankrupt Mizzi borrowers by any of the non-borrower Mizzi recipients. There were no agreements obligating any of them to convey value. There is no evidence of anyone having a profit expectation on any actual proposed work to be performed or value to be provided. Enzo Mizzi produced a small number of disembodied invoices purportedly from Mizzi companies for services rendered. They were not supported by evidence of actual work performed. They were contradicted by the Trustee’s evidence that no work was performed.
Analysis - Transfers at Undervalue
43No one disputes that the transfers listed in the Trustee’s Summary of Transfers met the definition of “Transfer at undervalue” in s. 2 of the BIA.
44Under subsection 96 (2) of the BIA, the Trustee has stated its opinion that the bankrupt Mizzi borrowers received no consideration for any of the impugned transfers. The Respondents have submitted insufficient evidence to put the value in issue to overcome the presumptive proof arising from the Trustee’s opinion. The mostly bald oral stories do not jibe with the documentary record or make business sense. When coupled with the lack of production of contemporaneous communications and financial documentation in the possession, power, or control of the Respondents, this conclusion is straightforward.
45Given that all Respondent companies are controlled by Mizzi siblings, they are presumed not to deal with each other at arm’s length under s. 4 of the BIA.
46Under sub-paragraph 96 (1)(b)(ii) of the BIA, on proof of defined conditions, the court may order a party to a transfer at undervalue and anyone privy to the transfer to pay the difference between the value transferred and the value received by the bankrupt. Under the conditions relied upon by the Trustee, transfers at undervalue from a bankrupt debtor to parties with whom it did not deal at arm’s length that were made within five years of the initial bankruptcy event may be set aside if:
(A) the debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer or was rendered insolvent by it, or
(B) the debtor intended to defraud, defeat or delay a creditor.
47As noted above, Enzo Mizzi concedes that each of the bankrupt corporations was left insolvent by the transfer of funds to each Mizzi recipient. The value of the assets of each bankrupt, the land purchased with a piece of the loan proceeds or otherwise held, was well less than its total loan obligation to Paramount Group. There was no corresponding receivable from any of the Mizzi recipients of the impugned transfers to each bankrupt transferor. The funds were simply stripped from each bankrupt leaving each with a loan obligation to Paramount Group in respect of the transferred funds but with insufficient assets to fund repayment.
48While Mr. Mizzi concedes that the Trustee has met the requirements of clause 96 (1)(b)(ii)(A), the Trustee submits that it has also established the requirements in clause 96 (1)(b)(ii)(B).
49The law is well established that because a third party cannot definitively establish the unstated intention of someone who makes a payment, the intention will be inferred upon proof of sufficient recognized criteria referred to as “badges of fraud.” If the court finds sufficient badges of fraud to justify an inference that a payment was made with the intent to defraud, defeat, or delay creditors, the burden of proof will switch to the payor party to prove its bona fides.
50I agree with the Trustee’s submissions in its factum on this point as follows:
The Trustee submits that multiple badges of fraud are present in the circumstances of the Transfers, including: (a) all of the Transfers were among non-arm's-length entities; (b) the Mizzi Borrowers were stripped of the funds advanced by the Paramount Lenders to them, leaving only their highly over-leveraged property as assets; (c) no adequate explanation has been provided as to why the Transfers were made, and no evidence has been provided demonstrating that work was performed as consideration for receipt thereof. In particular, the invoices provided by the Respondents are primarily blanket invoices from related parties that are unsupported by any documentary evidence; and (d) minimal to no renovation, construction or development services were performed on the Mizzi Borrowers' properties despite the Mizzi Recipients receiving millions of dollars to allegedly perform such work.
The related-party, hasty and secretive nature of the Transfers, the absence of any consideration and lack of remaining assets after the Transfers were made collectively support a strong inference of fraudulent intent. The Respondents have failed to provide a viable explanation for the Transfers or to adduce any evidence to rebut this inference.
51Mr. Simaan submits that since the same lawyer acted for the lender Paramount Group and the bankrupt Mizzi borrowers, Paramount Group is deemed to have knowledge that Ms. Campisi instructed the lawyers to transfer parts of the loan advances to the Mizzi transferees. While true as a matter of law, and perhaps subject to proceedings elsewhere, the deemed knowledge does not have much weight in assessing the badges of fraud. Without some basis in documentary evidence to show that the proposed loan transactions included the movement of big portions of the borrowed funds (that were allocated to building out the various properties) to Mizzi affiliates with no commitment to repay or perform any services as part of any anticipated joint ventures, the impugned transfers remain unexplained asset stripping.
52I find that the bankrupts and those controlling them, who had statutory fiduciary duties to their respective bankrupt corporations, made the impugned transfers at undervalue with the intention to defraud, defeat, or delay creditors. Unexplained asset stripping leads to no other rational business conclusion. Funds were borrowed from Paramount Group or its investors and were transferred by the Mizzi siblings to avoid the bankrupt debtors’ obligations to repay their ultimate lenders. That is dishonesty amounting to fraudulent intention.
53Each of the Mizzi siblings is also a privy to the transfers at undervalue or at least some of them. A privy can be held liable for the value delta between the amount transferred and the amount of consideration received by the bankrupt. A privy is defined in subsection 96 (3) of the BIA as some who “by reason of the transfer, directly or indirectly, receives a benefit or causes a benefit to be received by another person.”
54With Enzo Mizzi claiming to control all the related entities, he either caused or received the benefit of all the impugned transfers.
55Mary Campisi directed the bulk of the transfers for her brothers and her own company 1809313 Ontario Limited. It is apparent that she was able to produce and convey documents sought by counsel from among the entire group of Mizzi companies. She held herself out as director of operations of two Mizzi operating corporations. Although Enzo Mizzi tries to give her cover as his mere dupe or scribe, it is apparent from the detailed emails and documents obtained from the law firm that Mary Campisi was an autonomous agent engaged in furthering the family’s fortunes to the prejudice of the lender and its creditors by implementing the bulk of the impugned transactions in league with her brothers. She was capable of managing a business and understanding corporate documents that she signed. She was no one’s dupe.
56Mr. Zochodne, for Ms. Campisi, submits that Ms. Campisi functioned as a mere law clerk processing paper for a client. Surely, he submits, the law clerks at the law firm who Ms. Campisi instructed are not also liable for the transfers at undervalue. But this is a false dichotomy. The law clerks at the firm are acting for clients for fees. They are not engaged in a family enterprise holding shares in at least one recipient facilitating all of them to misdirect funds for their own benefit.
57Mr. Zochodne submits that in Ernst & Young Inc. v Anwar, 2025 SKKB 62 the Court of King’s Bench for Saskatchewan distinguished among family members based on their degree of involvement in the common enterprise. He submits that Mary Campisi had too little involvement to be a “privy.”
58At para. 114 of the Anwar decision, Elson J. held:
114As I read s. 96(1), a party to a transfer at undervalue is not “any other person who is privy to the transfer”. In my view, this phrase refers to individuals with connections to the impeached transfer and know, or ought to know, of its undervalued nature, but who were not actual parties to the transaction. A possible example of this might apply to the manager, director or shareholder of a corporate entity that is a party to the transfer. Another example might arise where there are multiple transfers at undervalue and one person was a party to one transfer but served only to facilitate another. In such a situation, the person might well be regarded as “privy” to the facilitated transfer.
59I do not think this helps Ms. Campisi. She satisfies all the tests for identifying a “privy” posited by Elson J. from a shareholder connected to the transactions to a mere facilitator.
60In my view Mary Campisi indirectly received benefit as part of the family from the impugned transactions. The Mizzis have not favoured the Trustee or the court with the information about the ultimate division of the proceeds of the impugned transactions as among themselves. Despite undertaking to produce bank statements to allow the Trustee to trace proceeds, they failed to do so. I accept that Ms. Campisi is an autonomous agent who knew or ought to have known the undervalued nature of the impugned transactions. Her email communications leave no doubt in that regard.
61Accordingly, I find that Mary Campisi caused or benefited from all the impugned transactions. As controlling minds of the Respondents, Mary Campisi with her brothers indirectly benefited from the full enterprise. She was moving money loaned to borrowers out of those companies with nothing going back into them. She could not have received her piece of the action without the others receiving their pieces as well. They all acted in concert throughout. Together they frustrated the remedial purpose of the BIA as discussed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Peoples Department Stores Inc. (Trustee of) v. Wise, 2004 SCC 68, at para. 91.
62I make the same finding for Filipo Campisi. He participated by signing cheques to divert funds to his own companies as well as to companies controlled or owned by his siblings. He has not appeared or adduced any evidence. Like Ms. Campisi, treating him as an autonomous agent receiving millions of dollars in unearned benefit, I infer that he was a knowing and willing participant in the siblings’ dishonest effort to strip the borrowers of funds for their own benefit. His failure to come forward with evidence to the contrary and to face cross-examination in circumstances that call out for an innocent explanation of seemingly wrongful conduct leads me to draw an adverse inference against him. That is, I infer that he has not adduced evidence because he has no exculpatory evidence to adduce.
63If an appellate court determines that despite the breadth of the term “privy,” I have applied it too broadly, I accept that evidence set out in the Trustee’s Summary of Transfers that Mary Campisi received the benefit of $2,730,962.59 in her wholly owned company 1809313 Ontario Limited. Filipo Mizzi received the benefit of $6,010,222.03 through his wholly owned company 2180366 Ontario Inc. In addition, Mary Campisi caused benefits of impugned transfers to be received by others by implementing transfers valued at another $8,982,373.38. Filipo signed documents to bestow benefit on others with a value of an additional $2,469,476.59. They ought therefore to be held to be privies and liable for at least the aggregates of these respective amounts.
[Fraudulent Conveyances Act](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/stat/rso-1990-c-f29/latest/rso-1990-c-f29.html)
64Section 2 of the FCA entitles a creditor to ask the court to declare void as against creditors all conveyances made with the intent to defeat, hinder, delay, or defraud creditors. I have already found that the impugned transfers from the bankrupt corporations to the Mizzi recipients rendered the payors insolvent and were made with fraudulent intent. Were I not making orders under s. 96 of the BIA, I would give the declarations sought under the FCA. I am not sure that the two heads of relief are necessarily mutually exclusive. But paragraphs 1 (a)(i) and (ii) of the Trustee’s factum only claim the relief in the alternative.
Judgment
65Judgment will issue declaring the transfers listed in the Trustee’s Summary of Transfers, with an aggregate total value of $16,200,952.50, void as against the Trustee under s. 96 of the BIA.
66Judgment is granted requiring each of the Mizzi recipients listed below to pay to the Trustee the listed amounts of the transfers at undervalue received from bankrupt Mizzi borrowers. In the absence of proof of any consideration flowing back from the recipients to the bankrupt borrowers, the amounts payable are the full amounts of the transfers received.
Respondent
Amount
1809313 Ontario Limited
$2,469,476.59
2180366 Ontario Inc.
$6,010,222.03
Guardian Real Estate Ventures Limited
$338,880.50
2490793 Ontario Limited
$900,000.00
2514367 Ontario Inc.
$6,482,373.38
67Judgment is also granted against Enzo Mizzi, Filippo Mizzi, and Mary Campisi, jointly and severally, as parties or privies to the transfers at undervalue, in the aggregate amount of all the transfers at undervalue of $16,200,952.50.
68Finally, s. 12 of the Assignments and Preferences Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. A.33, allows creditors to follow invalid transfers into the hands of further recipients from the transferee. The Trustee has put forward uncontradicted evidence that the Mizzi corporations listed below have received further transfers from the Mizzi recipients that originated with the impugned transfers.
69Judgment is therefore granted against the companies listed below in the amounts set out beside each name:
Respondent
Further Transfer Amount
North 44 Property Management Inc.
$2,270,000.00
Mpire Capital Corporation
$261,450.00
1809313 Ontario Limited
$1,600,000.00
2514367 Ontario Inc.
$2,540,000.00
Costs
70The parties may deliver written submissions on costs of this proceeding. Costs submissions shall be no longer than 750 words. Pages shall be double-spaced with normal margins printed in at least 12-point font (including footnotes, if any). The parties shall each deliver Costs Outlines with their submissions. They may also deliver copies of any offers to settle on which they rely for costs purposes.
71The Trustee’s submissions shall be delivered on or before May 4, 2026. The Respondents’ submissions shall be delivered on or before May 11, 2026.
FL Myers J
Date: April 27, 2026
Footnotes
- In her factum Mary Campisi took some umbrage at being referred to as a “Mizzi” rather than by her own name Campisi. I deal with her as an independent participant throughout. I use the term “Mizzi siblings” to describe the three siblings collectively by their familial relationship to avoid having to name each of the three each time I am referring to them all together. I mean no disrespect to Ms. Campisi. I recognize and respect her autonomy.
- As discussed in that case, the findings of fact arise either pursuant to the authority in Rule 14.05 (3)(h) to determine if a trial is required, or alternatively, pursuant to the enhanced powers set out in Rule 20.04 (2.1) as incorporated into Rule 14.05 (3)(h). See: Rubner v. Bistricer, 2018 ONSC 1934, at paras. 105 to 107, appeal allowed, in part, on other grounds, 2019 ONCA 733.