ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
RE: Iman Abbasi, Applicant -and- Vida Masoumeh Younesizadeh, Respondent
BEFORE: Diamond J.
COUNSEL: Ash Mazinani, for the Applicant Poroshad Mahdi (agent), for the Respondent
HEARD: February 17, 2026
ENDORSEMENT
1On February 17, 2026, the trial of this proceeding was set to commence before me for up to 5 days. At the outset of the hearing (and before any evidence was called by either party), I raised a concern with counsel for both parties arising from my review of the parties’ trial affidavits filed in advance of the hearing.
2Without making any findings of fact, I noted the following evidence which was not in dispute between the parties:
The parties were married on March 29, 2011 in Iran
The parties have one child of the marriage
The parties resided together as husband and wife in Iran
In or around 2019, the parties began planning to immigrate to Canada
The applicant came to Ontario in late February 2021
The applicant ultimately moved to Ontario permanently in April 2021
The respondent and the parties’ son arrived in Canada in September 2021
The parties never resided together in Ontario
3Both parties advance a different separation date. While both parties acknowledge marital difficulties while they resided together in Iran, the applicant states that the parties separated with no prospect of reconciliation on July 1, 2021 when the respondent (who was still in Iran with the parties’ son) advised the applicant via text message that she was no longer interested in moving to Canada. For her part, the respondent maintains that the parties separated with no prospect of reconciliation on February 28, 2021 when the applicant left Iran without any prior notice to the respondent or the parties’ son.
4No matter what separation date may be found to be accurate, both parties confirmed under oath that prior to either separation date, they never resided together in Ontario. The last common residence shared by the parties during their marriage was Iran.
5Section 15 of Family Law Act R.S.O. 1990 c.F.3 provides as follows:
“The property rights of spouses arising out of the marital relationship are governed by the internal law of the place where both spouses had their last common habitual residence or, if there is no place where the spouses had a common habitual residence, by the law of Ontario.”
6In Gazo v. Gazo 2005 3386 (ONSC), Justice Murray held as follows:
“The second jurisdictional issue to determine arises because of the provisions of section 15 of the Family Law Act. Pursuant to section 15 of the Family Law Act, the property rights of spouses arising out of the marital relationship are governed by the internal law of the place where both spouses had their last common habitual residence or, if there is no place where they had a common habitual residence, by the law of Ontario. The last common habitual residence of the spouses is the place where they last lived together as husband and wife and participated in everyday family life. See generally, Pershadsingh v. Pershadsingh (1987), 1987 4361 (ON SC), 9 R.F.L. (3d) 359 (Ont. H.C.); Adam v. Adam (1994), 1994 18164 (ON SC), 7 R.F.L. (4th) 63 (Ont. Gen. Div.), aff'd (1996), 1996 10260 (ON CA), 25 R.F.L. (4th) 50 (Ont. C.A.). In the case at bar, Jan and Maria Gazo’s last common habitual residence was the Slovak Republic. Therefore, this Court has no jurisdiction to deal with the property rights of this husband and wife. The property rights of spouses arising out of the marital relationship are governed by the internal law of the Slovak Republic.”
7In Rezagholi v. Ezami 2010 ONSC 5649, Justice McGee refused to address the equalization claims advanced by both parties at trial due to the parties’ last common habitual residence being outside Ontario:
“I find that the last common habitual residence of Mansoureh Rezagholi and Ali Naimi Ezami was in Tehran, Iran; and that it had been for some considerable time prior to separation. The Family Law Act states at paragraph 15 that:
Conflict of laws
- The property rights of spouses arising out of the marital relationship are governed by the internal law of the place where both spouses had their last common habitual residence or, if there is no place where the spouses had a common habitual residence, by the law of Ontario. R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, s. 15.
The court has no jurisdiction under the Family Law Act to make an order for equalization. The citizenship of the applicant is not determinative: Nicholas v. Nicholas [1995] O.J. No. 28 (Gen.Div), aff’d in [1996] O.J. No. 3543 (C.A.). A claim for equalization is based in statute, the terms of which must be met in order for the court to make an award of equalization.”
8There is no need for me to make a finding as to the location of the parties’ last habitual common residences, as they have both admitted it in their respective trial affidavits. The parties never cohabited in Ontario, and their last (and only) common habitual residence was Iran.
9As such, section 15 of the Family Law Act applies. The parties’ claims for equalization cannot be adjudicated by this Court in accordance with Ontario law.
10Neither party filed any expert evidence to instruct the Court as to the governing Iranian law dealing with martial property upon separation. Counsel for the respondent submitted that due to public policy and natural justice concerns, the governing Iranian law should not be applied despite the provisions of section 15 of the Family Law Act not explicitly providing the Court with a residual discretion. While I do not foreclose the respondent’s right to make such an argument, this is a matter for the judge ultimately presiding over this trial as this Court did not have any expert evidence to review in support of the respondent’s position.
11Accordingly, the parties were effectively left with two choices:
a) jointly abandon their equalization claims and proceed with the trial before me on the issues of divorce and spousal support only; or
b) adjourn the trial at this proceeding to a later date in order to enable the parties to file expert evidence on the governing Iranian law dealing with martial property upon separation
12The parties jointly chose the second option. As such, the trial of this proceeding shall now commence on May 11, 2026, for up to 5 days.
13With the parties’ consent, the balance of the attendance before me on February 17, 2026, was converted into a settlement conference. Some progress was made towards a potential resolution of the outstanding issues. I am ordering that the exit pre-trial conference shall take place before me, in person, on April 27, 2026, at 10:00 a.m. for up to 2 hours. A Farsi interpreter shall be provided by the Court for that exit pre-trial conference (in addition to the rescheduled trial to take place before another judge).
14In advance of the exit pre-trial conference, the parties shall adhere to the following timetable:
The applicant shall serve and file his Iranian expert report on or before March 13, 2026.
On or before March 20, 2026, counsel for the respondent shall advise whether her client takes issue with the contents of the applicant’s Iranian expert report, and whether the respondent intends to serve and file her own Iranian expert report.
If the respondent seeks to file her own Iranian expert report, that report shall be served and filed by no later than April 10, 2026.
15For the exit pre-trial conference, counsel for the parties need not file updated briefs, but instead update the Court with the parties’ respective settlement positions in their confirmation forms.
16The costs of today’s attendance are reserved to the trial judge.
Diamond J.
Date: February 18, 2026