His Majesty the King v. C.M., 2026 ONSC 2411

CITATION: R v. C.M., 2026 ONSC 2411

COURT FILE NO.: CR-24-000021-0000

DATE: 2026-04-23

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

— and —

C.M.

COUNSEL: M. Chant and H. Apel, for the Crown G. Holder, for the Accused

HEARD: March 3, 5 and 6, 2026; April 6, 7, 8, 16, 20, 21, and 22, 2026

ENDORSEMENT – RULINGS ON THE PRETRIAL APPLICATIONS

CONLAN J.

I. Overview of the Case

1The accused, C.M. (“Accused”), stands charged with very serious allegations. It is alleged that she is the person who caused the victim, her niece, to sustain life-threatening and permanent life-altering injuries when the victim was attacked on the street in Milton on March 9, 2023.

2Allegedly, the Accused drove from Montreal to Milton, stalked the victim, approached the victim on the street, threw some acidic noxious substance at the face and body of the victim, stole the victim’s cellular telephone, and then fled the area and drove back to Montreal.

3On the theory of the Crown, this was done, at least in part, because of the Accused’s longstanding and ongoing conflict with her brother, D.M., the father of the victim.

II. Bottom-Line Rulings on the Pretrial Applications

4For reasons that this Court reserves the right to deliver on a later date, whether in writing or orally, this Court rules as follows with regard to the various pretrial applications that were heard between March 3, 2026 and April 22, 2026. For now, I have to be very brief because the trial is about to start right after the pretrial applications ended.

5First, the Crown’s voluntariness application is granted. If that was the only application that impacted on the admissibility of the Accused’s audio-video recorded statement given to Detective Constable Golba, which it is not, then this Court would have ruled that the said statement is admissible at trial.

6I do not accept the defence arguments about alleged oppressive circumstances and an alleged lack of an operating mind on the part of the Accused. I find that the voluntariness of the said statement has been proven by the Crown beyond a reasonable doubt.

7Second, the Crown’s other discreditable conduct evidence application is granted. This Court rules that the decision of Justice Kurz in the related non-criminal court proceeding is not admissible at trial, however, (i) the fact that the Accused was declared a vexatious litigant, and (ii) the date of that declaration having been made, and (iii) the fact that it was made in the context of that specific non-criminal court proceeding involving D.M., are all admissible at trial.

8I do not accept the defence argument about probative value versus prejudicial effect. This is a judge-alone trial, and the prejudicial effect here is none, in my view. Prejudicial effect does not mean that something is inculpatory; it refers to something that may give rise to legal prejudice by way of, for example, prohibited reasoning by the trier of fact; there is no such prejudice here. The probative value, on the other hand, is relatively high in that this evidence is clearly relevant to issues of animus and motive on the part of the Accused.

9Third, with regard to the defence Charter application, this Court rules as follows:

(i) Detective Constable Lyons’ questioning of the Accused about her work, in the police motor vehicle en route from Montreal to Oakville, after the Accused was arrested in Montreal, was a violation of the Accused’s section 10(b) Charter right to counsel, and anything and everything said by the Accused in that regard is excluded from the evidence at trial under section 24(2) of the Charter – after the Accused clearly asserted her right to counsel during the transport, the police ought to have refrained from asking her further questions until the Accused had an opportunity to exercise that right at the police station;

(ii) for the same reason, Detective Constable Johnson’s questioning of the Accused about her injuries and her cosmetic or medical procedure, in the police motor vehicle en route from Montreal to Oakville, was a violation of the Accused’s section 10(b) Charter right to counsel, and anything and everything said by the Accused in that regard is excluded from the evidence at trial under section 24(2) of the Charter;

(iii) the argument that the Accused’s section 10(b) Charter right to counsel was violated at the police station in Oakville as a result of the delay between 4:26 p.m. and 5:35 p.m. is dismissed as abandoned by the defence – in fact, there was hardly any delay at all in the police calling duty counsel once they arrived at the police station from Montreal, and the police cannot be held responsible for the delay in duty counsel calling back;

(iv) there was no violation of the Accused’s section 10(b) Charter right to counsel as a result of her allegedly being told by the police that she would have the opportunity to speak with a lawyer just prior to the apprehension under the Mental Health Act and her allegedly not being given that opportunity until the next day – there was no legal requirement for the Accused to have been given that opportunity at that time;

(v) there was no violation of the Accused’s section 9 Charter right when the police apprehended the Accused under the Mental Health Act – it was not an arbitrary detention as the police had the requisite grounds to make the apprehension under section 17 of the Mental Health Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7, as amended;

(vi) there was no violation of the Accused’s section 10(a) and/or 10(b) Charter right(s) after the apprehension of the Accused under the Mental Health Act – in fact, the Accused was promptly informed by the police of the reasons for her detention, and there was no section 10(b) Charter right to counsel that arose in those circumstances;

(vii) whether one characterizes it as coming within section 9 of the Charter, or within section 10(c) of the Charter, or within both sections, the unreasonable failure of the police to comply with section 503(1) of the Criminal Code was a violation, and the remedy for that Charter violation, under section 24(2) of the Charter, is the exclusion of the Accused’s audio-video recorded statement given to Detective Constable Golba – that statement, in its entirety, is inadmissible at trial – there is no evidence before this Court that a justice was unavailable when the Accused got back to the police station from the hospital, and hence section 503(1)(b) is not applicable, and the police clearly failed to comply with section 503(1)(a) as the Accused was not brought before a justice in bail court anywhere close to within 24 hours after her arrest, and the police choice to proceed with an interview of the Accused rather than respect section 503(1) was unreasonable;

(viii) a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Charter, however, is not an appropriate remedy in this case;

(ix) although this is now a moot point, there was no violation of the Accused’s section 7 Charter right to silence with regard to the Accused’s audio-video recorded statement given to Detective Constable Golba – the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Singh, 2007 SCC 48 is a complete answer to the defence arguments on this issue; and

(x) the defence Garofoli application, regarding the various judicial authorizations granted in this case, is dismissed – there was no violation of section 8 of the Charter, and thus, it is unnecessary to address section 24(2) of the Charter – even after excision if and where necessary, and even in light of any amplification evidence, in each instance there was sufficient, reliable evidence contained in the Information to Obtain such that the justice could reasonably have issued the authorization in question.

10Regarding number (vi) above, this Court would direct counsel to the very helpful article written by Robert Diab and Jolene Sanderson, Reasonable Apprehension Under Mental Health Law, Queen’s Law Journal, 2022 CanLIIDocs 4557. That article makes it clear that the decision in R. v. Holdsworth, 2019 ABQB 856, in particular paragraph 82 thereof, which paragraph is relied upon by the defence in our case, must be treated cautiously. The prevailing weight of the authority is that an apprehension under provincial mental health legislation, like in our case, does not trigger a section 10(b) Charter right to counsel, although someone who is ultimately detained in a medical facility will have a right to counsel.

11I may expand on this issue further if and when reasons are delivered on a later date, however, suffice it to say at this stage that I am not prepared to find, in the circumstances of our particular case, that the police violated the Accused’s rights under either or both of sections 10(a) and 10(b) of the Charter after the Mental Health Act apprehension.

III. Other Issues

12This Court expects that the Crown will not rely at trial upon any evidence obtained by the police further to the judicial authorizations that were granted for the ITOs marked Exhibits 1 (tracking warrant) and 33 (Bell Mobility records), since the Crown made no submissions on the validity of those two judicial authorizations. If this Court is wrong in that expectation, then both counsel may give further submissions in that regard.

13Finally, this Court would ask for clarification from the Crown as to whether it is relying at trial on anything said by the Accused to the police while en route from Montreal to Oakville, even things said by the Accused before she was asked the improper questions by Detective Constables Lyons and Johnson identified above. Depending on the answer to that question, this Court may have to seek further submissions from both counsel on the issue of section 24(2) as it relates to the Charter violations described at numbers (i) and (ii) above.

14In addition, this Court would ask for clarification from the Crown as to whether it is relying at trial on any evidence obtained by the police, whether through things said by the Accused or through observations made of the Accused, including her injuries, after the Accused was apprehended under the Mental Health Act. Depending on the answer to that question, this Court may have to seek further submissions from both counsel on the issue of section 24(2) as it relates to the Charter violation described at number (vii) above.

Conlan J.

Released: April 23, 2026