His Majesty the King v. Anthony Baglieri, 2026 ONSC 2278

CITATION: R. v. Baglieri, 2026 ONSC 2278

NEWMARKETCOURT FILE NO.: CR-22-91109856-0000

DATE: 20260417

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

– and –

ANTHONY BAGLIERI

Defendant

Alice Pan, for the Crown

Ehsan Ghebrai and Savreet Chuckal, Counsel for the Defendant

HEARD: March 2, 3, 4, 6, and 9, 2026

Overview

1On October 12, 2022, at 2:03 p.m., Mr. Baglieri was operating a dump truck towing a flatbed trailer loaded with three pieces of heavy construction equipment southbound on Markham Road approaching Elson Street.

2Tragically, Mr. Baglieri struck an Acura sedan going eastbound on Elson Street causing the death of three individuals.

3At the time of the collision the green light was displayed for the eastbound Acura. At the time of the collision the light for southbound traffic on Markham Road was red.

4Mr. Baglieri is charged with three counts of dangerous driving causing death.

The Evidence

5To the credit of both the Crown and the defence, most of the facts relating to the collision involving Mr. Baglieri and the Acura are not in dispute. It is agreed that Mr. Baglieri was driving the dump truck. It is agreed that at the time of the collision a green light was displayed for the east and westbound traffic on Elson Street, and a red light was displayed for the north and southbound traffic on Markham Road.

6It is an agreed fact that at time of the accident Mr. Baglieri’s dump truck was in good working order. There were no issues with respect to the brakes on the dump truck and the attached trailer.

7It is an agreed fact that Mr. Baglieri was in no way intoxicated by any substance at the time of the collision and that he was driving within the speed limit posted of 60 km/h. There is no evidence that Mr. Baglieri was using his cell phone at the time of the collision.

The Expert Qualification of the Police Accident Reconstruction Expert – DC Paterson’s Opinion and How it Changed in Cross Examination

8The trial of this matter began with a jury. The jury was sent home while the court conducted a voir dire on the qualifications of DC Paterson. After the completion of the voir dire Mr. Baglieri re-elected to be tried by judge alone.

9DC Paterson was a Collision Reconstructionist with the Major Collision Investigation Unit of the York Regional Police (YRP). The Crown sought to qualify DC Paterson as an expert in accident reconstruction.

10DC Paterson prepared a collision reconstruction report dated March 30, 2023 (hereinafter the Report). In the report DC Paterson offered the following summary of his conclusions:

(a) The road and weather conditions were good, environmental factors were not an issue, and the vehicles were in good operating condition. The roads were in good condition, and the traffic signals were working properly.

(b) The southbound dump truck driven by Mr. Baglieri entered the intersection six seconds after the red light and 12 seconds after the amber light was displayed for southbound traffic.

11The eastbound Acura entered the intersection on a green light and was in the intersection legally.

12More than three seconds after the green light was displayed for the Acura the dump truck driven by Mr. Baglieri collided with the Acura killing the driver and driver-side rear passenger and caused serious injuries to the front seat passenger to which that passenger ultimately succumbed.

13No other factors were identified by DC Paterson as being contributory to the collision.

14Driver error on the part of Mr. Baglieri was the principal cause identified for the collision.

15Both in his report and in his evidence in-chief DC Paterson observed that motor vehicle collisions are caused by one or more of the following factors:

(a) Environmental conditions.

(b) Roadway condition or design.

(d) Driver error; or

(e) Pedestrian induced.

16DC Paterson’s opinion in chief as reflected in his report, was that the only cause of the accident was driver error. Specifically, the driving errors of Mr. Baglieri noted by DC Paterson were:

(a) Mr. Baglieri entered the intersection 6 seconds after the red light and 12 seconds after the amber light was displayed for southbound traffic. More than 3 seconds after the green light for eastbound traffic had been displayed Mr. Baglieri struck the eastbound Acura which had entered the intersection legally on a green light.

(b) The southbound traffic signal was visible for more than 250 metres away; the Acura would have been visible from 67 metres away. The minimum stopping distance for Mr. Baglieri was 58.2 metres.

(c) Mr. Baglieri made a lane change manoeuvre as he approached the intersection which caused another driver – Ms. Chen Lin – to make an evasive lane change.

17DC Paterson concluded that driver error was the only cause of the accident. He testified in chief that road conditions were not a factor. He also testified that environmental conditions were not a factor. Specifically, as it relates to environmental conditions DC Paterson testified that the sun could not have affected Mr. Baglieri. In arriving at that conclusion DC Paterson determined that the weather conditions were cloudy “or possibly partly sunny”.

18DC Paterson also concluded that road conditions were not a factor in the accident. Specifically, he concluded that there were no obstructions or hazards observed on the dash cam video entered into evidence.

19When DC Paterson was initially cross examined, he refused to acknowledge that sun glare could have been a factor in the accident. In coming to that initial conclusion, he relied on the video showing the collision as well as meteorological reports. He had available to him the notes of the police officer who was one of first on the scene which reflected “broken clouds”. Another police officer had recorded in his notes that the weather was sunny and partly cloudy.

20It stands to reason that police officers who arrived on the scene within minutes of the accident would be in a better position than DC Paterson to assess the weather conditions at the time of the accident. None of the police officers who were first on the scene of the accident were called to give evidence at the trial. DC Paterson never asked any of the police officers who were first on the scene on what basis that officer concluded the weather was “broken clouds”.

21DC Paterson had been cross examined at length at the preliminary hearing about the weather conditions. When confronted with the differing versions of the weather conditions reflected in the notes of the various attending police officers DC Patterson conceded that the weather could have been sunny with cloudy periods and as such sun glare could have been a factor in the accident. Noteworthy is the fact that DC Patterson, despite his evidence at the preliminary hearing, did not change his evidence in chief. Nor did DC Patterson provide an amending report that reflected his evidence at the preliminary hearing.

22DC Paterson in cross examination was shown dash cam video that shows the accident happening. He was asked if it showed “considerable brightness”. While he agreed there was considerable brightness, he disagreed it showed “sun leaking through the clouds”. Ultimately after cross examination DC Paterson agreed he could not rule out that it was partly sunny and partly cloudy at the time of the accident.

23DC Paterson was then taken to various academic articles that dealt with the impact of sun glare on drivers. He agreed that bright sunlight presents the highest risk for a bad accident because bright sunlight can cause misperception on the part of a driver. DC Paterson acknowledged that he did not consider sun glare as a factor that may have contributed to the accident. In cross examination he ultimately agreed that the sun could have been a factor if it was partly sunny at the time of the accident. He agreed that at the time of the accident the sun would have been 26 degrees off to the right of Mr. Baglieri’s vision which would have been within his “vision apex”.

24In his evidence in chief and as reflected in his report DC Patterson was of the view that the flashing lights of construction vehicles located in the right lane approximately 200 meters south of the intersection would not have impacted on the way a driver southbound approaching amber lights would have responded.

25Having reviewed the video evidence DC Patterson conceded that there were four vehicles in the right lane all with flashing emergency lights. DC Patterson in his evidence in chief stated that these flashing lights would not have caused any confusion for drivers approaching the intersection.

26In cross examination DC Patterson was taken to several academic articles that suggest flashing lights can create a distraction. After reviewing these articles DC Patterson conceded that he could not rule out the flashing lights seen south of the intersection as a possible contributing factor to the accident.

27In his evidence in chief DC Patterson determined that there was no involvement of any other drivers that might have contributed to the accident. Ms. Chen Linn testified that she was southbound on Markham Road approaching the intersection. She conceded in her evidence that she may have been lingering beside the dump truck. She testified that she moved into the left turn lane approximately one and a half car lengths before the intersection. She testified she never saw the amber lights. It was only when she looked up as she turned towards the left turn lane that Ms. Chen Lin saw the red light.

28DC Patterson conceded in cross examination that he did not include in his report any of the evidence relating to the driving conduct of Ms. Chen Lin. He conceded in cross examination that it is the responsibility of an expert to consider alternative hypothesis. He conceded that if another driver i.e. Ms. Chen Lin didn’t see the amber lights that the driver of the dump truck might also have experienced divided attention as he approached the intersection.

29DC Patterson conceded in cross examination that the lane change made by Ms. Chen Lin could explain why Mr. Baglieri never saw the amber light signal.

30At the completion of the cross examination of DC Patterson his opinion had changed as to the potential causes of the accident. His evidence in chief and his report all reflected driver error as the sole cause of the accident. After cross examination DC Patterson conceded that there were three other possible causes that may have contributed to this tragic accident specifically:

(a) sun glare,

(b) the flashing lights on the opposite side of the intersection which may caused Mr. Baglieri to be distracted,

31In his evidence in chief DC Paterson acknowledged his understanding of his role as an expert was to assist the court by providing an impartial opinion within his area of expertise. DC Paterson performed two roles in this matter. He was initially investigating the collision as the assigned officer from the major collision unit of the YRP. He prepared a report based on that investigation. The investigation and report were part of the Crown case against Mr. Baglieri.

32Until DC Paterson was cross examined, he held one opinion as to the cause of the accident – that being driver error. The error was that Mr. Baglieri entered the intersection 6 seconds after the light had turned red and 12 seconds after the amber light was displayed for traffic southbound on Markham Road. Until he was cross examined and confronted with several academic writings DC Paterson summarized his conclusion that “there were no other factors identified as contributory to this collision.”

33If DC Paterson had not been challenged in cross examination his opinion could, standing alone, justify a finding that Mr. Baglieri drove in a manner that met the definition of dangerous driving.

34The role of an expert requires that the expert is independent and objective. The role of an expert doesn’t begin when he or she is called as a witness at trial A report prepared by an expert will be shared with the parties involved. The report may assist in resolution discussions before a trial ever begins.

35Much has been written about experts who all too frequently adopt a position favorable to whichever side has retained them. A police officer who is an expert in accident reconstruction must be vigilant to ensure that he or she is in fact independent and objective from the moment they begin their investigation to the final preparation of their expert report and their evidence in court. The role of an expert is ultimately to provide the trier of fact with an independent and unbiased opinion. I would suggest that the role of an expert also includes an obligation to provide an independent and unbiased opinion to whoever reads the report of the expert. The evidence of an expert must be the independent opinion of the expert uninfluenced by whoever retained the expert.

36What happened in the voir dire of DC Paterson was a fundamental change in his opinion. DC Paterson went from opining that the only cause of this tragic accident was driver error to accepting that there were three other possible causes for the accident as reflected in para [30] above.

Defence Position

37At the end of the Crown evidence Mr. Ghebrai brought a motion for a directed verdict. Mr. Ghebrai’ s argument as it relates to the motion also underlies his position as it relates to whether the Crown has established the requisite mens rea for the offence of dangerous driving causing death.

38Mr. Ghebrai argues that the mental element to establish dangerous driving is objectively based. It could be proven if a driver was shown to have run a red light on purpose or was driving at a high rate of speed, or under the influence of drugs or alcohol. In this case there is no evidence that Mr. Baglieri was driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol. There is no evidence of distracted driving i.e. no suggestion that Mr. Baglieri was using his cell phone at the time of the accident.

39Mr. Ghebrai argues that any evidence relating to the mental element for dangerous driving is entirely circumstantial. In this case it is argued there is some evidence that sun glare may have impacted on Mr. Baglieri's ability to perceive the traffic lights ahead. It is also argued there is some evidence that Mr. Baglieri may have been distracted by the vehicle being driven by Ms. Chen Lin immediately adjacent to his vehicle and immediately prior to the traffic signals ahead. There is also evidence of the flashing lights of various vehicles blocking the right lane on the other side of the intersection. It is argued that these flashing lights may also have presented a distraction to Mr. Baglieri impacting on his ability to perceive and react to the red lights.

40Mr. Ghebrai argues that the fact that Mr. Baglieri drove through a red light is not reflective of criminal conduct but rather can be explained because of a tragic and awful mistake. While Mr. Baglieri made a mistake that might give rise to a civil negligence claim it does not give rise to a criminal offence.

41Mr. Ghebrai reviewed all the various cases referred to by the Crown and suggested that each of the cases can be distinguished on their facts. In R v Patel, 2017 ONSC 4048 the accused was fighting with his girlfriend and was therefore not paying attention which is the objective behavior that substantiates the necessary mens rea for dangerous driving. In R v He, 2021 ONSC 7253 the accused was driving towards the traffic lights with no visible obstructions and was in a dreamlike state. In R v Chan, 2026 ONSC 581 there was dash cam video that demonstrates the accused was driving aggressively and thus objectively was driving in a dangerous manner. In R v Sainin, 2018 ONSC 581, afdd 2023 ONCA 445 the accused had a medical condition of which he had knowledge and therefore should not have been driving.

42Mr. Ghebrai argues that there must be a marked departure from what is required of a reasonably prudent driver before there can be a finding of guilt. Guilt must be the only reasonable inference on the evidence and on the evidence before this court it is argued on behalf of Mr. Baglieri that such a reasonable inference is not available to this court.

43Mr. Ghebrai fundamentally disagrees with Crown counsel when she argues that if a red light has been red for six seconds this must equate with dangerous driving and reflective of something that is objectively dangerous and a marked departure from the standard of a reasonable driver. Mr. Ghebrai argues that there are multiple explanations for why Mr. Baglieri missed the red-light explanations that do not amount to criminal misconduct.

Crown Position

44Crown counsel argues that there is direct evidence that establishes the mens rea component for dangerous driving. There is evidence that 12 seconds prior to the collision the amber light was showing. There is evidence that the collision occurred six seconds after Mr. Baglieri had entered a red light which it is argued demonstrates a lack of attention and a marked departure from what a reasonable prudent driver would have done.

45Crown counsel also asks this court to reflect upon the risks attendant with anyone driving a dump truck with a trailer fully laden with construction equipment. The combined weight of the truck and trailer was 35,000 pounds. It is argued that any driver of such a construction type vehicle should have been aware of the attendant risk of entering a red light particularly a stale red light and the catastrophic consequences that might occur in a T-bone type collision as occurred in this case.

46In assessing Mr. Baglieri's actions Crown counsel notes that he was making a lane change very close to the intersection. It is argued that this cannot be construed as a momentary lapse of attention as any reasonable driver would have begun to brake after observing an amber light at the approaching intersection.

47Without acknowledging that there was in fact any sun glare Crown counsel argues that a reasonable driver confronted with sun in their eyes would have taken appropriate precautions knowing there was an intersection ahead. Similar observations were made by Crown counsel as it relates to the argument that Mr. Baglieri may have been distracted by the flashing lights on the other side of the intersection. All of these are distractions that any reasonable driver should be able to anticipate and engage with without the catastrophic consequences seen in this accident.

48As it relates to the argument that Mr. Baglieri may have been impacted by sun glare Crown counsel urges this court to look at the video which she argues demonstrates an absence of any sunlight at the time of the accident. At its highest Crown counsel argues that the weather conditions were cloudy with sunny intervals.

49As it relates to the flashing lights on the vehicles approximately 200 meters from the intersection Crown counsel argues there was no risk that Mr. Baglieri would have collided with any of these vehicles. He had ample time to make a lane change but chose to do so approximately one and a half car lengths from the intersection. It is argued this lane change was clearly unsafe and not reflective of the actions of a reasonably prudent driver especially a reasonably prudent truck driver. Fundamentally Crown counsel argues that Mr. Baglieri’s lane change was unsafe.

50As for the role of Ms. Chen Lin she acknowledged that she may have been in Mr. Baglieri’s blind spot. Ms. Chen Lin observed the dump truck coming into her lane which forced her to move over to the left turn lane. While her evidence establishes that she only saw the approaching red light as she was approaching the intersection Crown counsel notes that nonetheless she was able to stop. Crown counsel argues that Mr. Baglieri’s driving reflected a marked departure from what is expected of a reasonably prudent driver when he forced Ms. Chen Linn to move into the left turn lane. The actions of Mr. Baglieri it is argued reflect a substantial inattentiveness on his part.

The Law

51The offence of dangerous driving causing death requires the Crown to prove the following essential elements:

(a) the prohibited conduct, which is that Mr. Baglieri operated a motor vehicle in a dangerous manner that resulted in death; and

(b) the required degree of fault, which is a marked departure from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in all the circumstances.

52In dealing with the issue of the prohibited conduct the Supreme Court in R. v. Roy, 2012 SCC 26, at paras 33-35 stated:

33Beatty held that the actus reus for dangerous driving is as set out in s. 249(1)(a) of the Code, that is, driving “in a manner that was ‘dangerous to the public, having regard to all the circumstances, including the nature, condition and use of the place at which the motor vehicle is being operated in the amount of traffic that at the time is or might reasonably be expected to be at that place’” (para 43).

34In considering whether the actus reus has been established, the question is whether the driving, viewed objectively, was dangerous to the public in all the circumstances. The focus of this inquiry must be on the risks created by the accused’s manner driving, not the consequences, such as an accident in which he or she was involved. As Charron J. put it paragraph 46 of Beatty, “The court must not leap to its conclusion about the manner of driving based on the consequence. There must be a meaningful inquiry into the manner of driving” (emphasis added). A manner of driving can rightly be qualified as dangerous when it endangers the public. It is the risk of damage or injury created by the manner driving that is relevant, not the consequences of a subsequent accident. In conducting this inquiry into the manner driving, it must be borne in mind that driving is an inherently dangerous activity, but one that is both legal and of social value brackets (Beatty, at paras. 31 and 34). Accidents caused by these inherent risks materializing should generally not result in criminal convictions.

35To summarize, the focus of the analysis in relation to the actus reus of the offence is the manner of operation of the motor vehicle. The trier of fact must not simply leap from the consequences of the driving to a conclusion about dangerousness. There must be a meaningful inquiry into the manner of driving.

53The Ontario Court of Appeal has recently clarified the actus reus and mens rea of dangerous driving in R. v. Kelly, 2025 ONCA 92, at paras 52 and 53, Sossin JA. stated as follows:

52The actus reus of dangerous operation requires the Crown to prove that the accused was driving in a manner that is dangerous to the public, viewed on an objective standard, having regard to all the circumstances, including the nature, condition, and use of the place, and the amount of traffic that was or might reasonably have been expected to be there. It is the manner of driving, not its consequences, that matter. The mens rea requires the trier of fact to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt “on the basis of all the evidence, including evidence about the accused’s actual state of mind, if any, that the conduct amounted to a marked departure from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the accused’s circumstances”: R. v. Beatty, 2008 SCC 5, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 49, at para. 43.

53The core question to be addressed in a case of dangerous driving has been described by the Supreme Court as follows: “[W]hether the manner of driving which is a marked departure from the norm viewed in all of the circumstances, supports the inference that the driving was the result of a marked departure from the standard of care that a reasonable person in the same circumstances would have exhibited”: R. v. Roy, 2012 SCC 26, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 60, at para. 41.

54It is worthwhile repeating the instruction trial judges give as it relates to the mens rea of dangerous driving. Taken in part from Watts Manual of Criminal Jury Instructions 2024, jurors in this case would have been instructed as follows:

To decide whether Mr. Baglieri operated the motor vehicle in a manner that was dangerous to the public, you have to consider all the circumstances in which the driving occurred. Take into account, but do not limit yourself to evidence such as

the nature, condition and use of the place where the driving occurred.
the amount of other traffic, both vehicles and pedestrians, actually there at the time; and
the amount of other traffic, both vehicles and pedestrians, that might reasonably be expected to be there at the time.

Dangerous operation of a motor vehicle involves more than just carelessness in Mr. Baglieri driving. Crown counsel must satisfy you beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Baglieri’s driving was a marked departure from what a reasonable, prudent driver would do in the same circumstances. What you have to decide, in all the circumstances (including evidence about Mr. Baglieri’s state of mind), is not what Mr. Baglieri meant to do, but rather, whether Mr. Baglieri drove in a manner that was a marked departure from the manner in which a reasonable, prudent driver would drive in the same circumstances. It is the manner of Mr. Baglieri’s driving on which you must focus.

In deciding whether the manner of Mr. Baglieri’s driving resulted from a marked departure from the standard of care which a reasonable person would have exercised in the same circumstances, you might find it helpful to approach your decision by asking yourselves two questions.

First, ask yourselves whether, on the basis of all the evidence, a reasonable person would have foreseen the risk and taken steps to avoid it if possible.

Second, if you are satisfied that a reasonable person would have foreseen the risk or taken steps to avoid it, ask yourselves whether Mr. Baglieri’s failure to foresee the risk and take steps to avoid it, if possible, was a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable person in Mr. Baglieri’s circumstances.

Crown counsel does not have to prove that Mr. Baglieri meant to cause death to or endanger the life of any of the persons who died in this collision. Nor does Crown counsel have to prove that Mr. Baglieri meant to cause the death of any of the persons killed in this collision.

55The test for the mens rea of dangerous driving causing death is set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in Roy, at para 36, as well as in R. v. Chung, 2020 SCC 8t, at para 14, as follows:

The focus of the mens rea analysis is on whether the dangerous manner of driving was the result of a marked departure from the standard of care which a reasonable person would have exercised in the same circumstances (Beatty, at para. 48). It is helpful to approach the issue by asking two questions. The first is whether, in light of all the relevant evidence, a reasonable person would have foreseen the risk and taken steps to avoid it if possible. If so, the second question is whether the accused’s failure to foresee the risk and take steps to avoid it, if possible, was a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable person in the accused’s circumstances. [Emphasis in original.]

56In Chung at para 19, the Court accepted that:

… momentary speeding on its own can establish the mens rea for dangerous driving where, having regard to all the circumstances, it supports an inference that the driving was the result of a marked departure from the standard of care that a reasonable person in the same circumstances would have exhibited (Roy, at para 41).

57As for the mens rea component of dangerous driving causing death, the Supreme Court in both Roy and Chung and now Kelly have directed the court to focus on whether the dangerous manner of Mr. Baglieri’s driving was the result of a marked departure from the standard of care which a reasonable person would have exercised in the same circumstances. It is suggested that the court ask two questions. The first is whether a reasonable person would have foreseen the risk and taken steps to avoid it if possible. The second question is whether Mr. Baglieri’s failure to perceive the risk and take steps to avoid it was a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable person in Mr. Baglieri’s circumstances.

Analysis

58The offences charged in this case are serious criminal charges where someone convicted in theory could face a maximum punishment of life in prison – see s 320.21 of the Code. It is perhaps because of this that the fault component of dangerous driving ensures that this type of criminal punishment will only be imposed on those who deserve the stigma of a criminal conviction. This is reflected in the overview comments of Cromwell J in Roy where he states:

Dangerous driving causing death is a serious criminal offence punishable by up to 14 years in prison. Like all criminal offences, it consists of two components: prohibited conduct — operating a motor vehicle in a dangerous manner resulting in death — and a required degree of fault — a marked departure from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in all the circumstances. The fault component is critical, as it ensures that criminal punishment is only imposed on those deserving the stigma of a criminal conviction. While a mere departure from the standard of care justifies imposing civil liability, only a marked departure justifies the fault requirement for this serious criminal offence.

59On the facts of this case it would be easy to fall into the trap of concluding, based solely on the video tape evidence filed as part of the Crown case, that a person driving a dump truck through a red light is deserving of criminal punishment.

60There is no escaping the fact that the video evidence makes clear that Mr. Baglieri entered the intersection on a red light. It is equally clear that the light had not just turned red. The light was red for about 6 seconds. The video shows north and southbound traffic stopped for the red light. The Acura that Mr. Baglieri struck clearly entered the intersection on a green light. On these facts Mr. Baglieri committed from an objective perspective a dangerous act while driving his dump truck. The bigger question is whether his driving through the red light displayed a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable person in the circumstances.

61On the facts of this case there can be little doubt that the actus reus of dangerous driving has been proven by the Crown. The proof of the actus reus does not however lead to the inevitable conclusion or inference that the required fault element was present when Mr. Baglieri drove through the red light. It is only if Mr. Baglieri’s driving constitutes a marked departure from the norm that this court can then draw that inference.

62As Mr. Baglieri was approaching the intersection the evidence from the Event Data Recorder (EDA) as interpreted by DC Paterson shows that Mr. Baglieri was not speeding. When the lights at the intersection turned yellow (approx. 15 seconds prior to the collision) the EDA shows Mr. Baglieri was travelling at 53kmph. The speed limit for Markham Road is 60kmph.

63The EDA shows that as Mr. Baglieri got progressively closer to the intersection with the lights yellow and then red his speed increased from 54kmph to 59kmph – still within the speed limit albeit not slowing down. The EDA also demonstrates that there was no braking recorded in the 15 seconds prior to the collision.

64It would not be an uncommon experience in the Greater Toronto Area to see drivers confronted with yellow traffic lights increase their speed to “beat” a red light. While less common it would not be an uncommon experience to see drivers running red lights at a speed clearly greater than the posted speed limit. The EDA on Mr. Baglieri’s dump truck does not suggest he was increasing his speed to beat the red light. The fact that Mr Baglieri’s speed remained relatively constant and under the speed limit with no braking requires the court to ask two questions as it relates to the mens rea for dangerous driving. These questions are as follows:

A) Based on all the evidence, would a reasonable person have foreseen the risk and taken steps to avoid it if possible? And,

B) If a reasonable person would have foreseen the risk or taken steps to avoid it, was Mr. Baglieri’s failure to foresee the risk and take steps to avoid it, if possible, a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable person in Mr. Baglieri’s circumstances?

I propose to answer these questions to explain my decision in this case.

Based on all the evidence, would a reasonable person have foreseen the risk and taken steps to avoid it if possible?

65A reasonably prudent driver is expected to be aware of the circumstances in which they are driving and to drive accordingly. A reasonably prudent driver approaching an intersection is expected to be aware that there may be traffic lights that will govern an approaching intersection. That same reasonable prudent driver will be expected to stop in a safe manner if the traffic lights ahead are yellow warning of a soon to be red light. On the evidence in this case Mr. Baglieri was not braking for the traffic lights about to turn red. He was not speeding but he was not braking. Absent any circumstances that might give rise to a reasonable explanation for why he didn’t brake and then stop for the red light this court could conclude that Mr. Baglieri’s driving displayed a marked departure from the norm.

66A review of the video evidence as well as the evidence of DC Paterson leads me to conclude that Mr. Baglieri was not driving his dump truck in an aggressive manner. Nonetheless he drove through a stale red light. All the other drivers evident from the video evidence stopped for the red light. There is no evidence to suggest his dump truck had any mechanical defect. Driving through a red light falls below the standard of care of a reasonable prudent driver.

If a reasonable person would have foreseen the risk or taken steps to avoid it, was Mr. Baglieri’s failure to foresee the risk and take steps to avoid it, if possible, a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable person in Mr. Baglieri’s circumstances?

67A driver approaching an intersection controlled by traffic lights is expected to obey the signal as he or she approaches the intersection. Traffic cannot flow safely if drivers do not obey traffic signals . A reasonably prudent driver must be attentive to the road conditions around them including the colour of traffic signals that will impact on a driver’s ability to drive through an intersection without impacting on the safety and lives of other drivers.

68This then begs the question as to why Mr. Baglieri did not evidence any intention to slow down as he approached the intersection. There is no evidence he applied his brakes in any meaningful way. On the other hand, there is no evidence Mr. Baglieri was speeding up in a manner suggesting he was trying to “beat” a red light. There is no evidence that Mr. Baglieri was under the influence of drugs or alcohol. There is no evidence of bad driving on the part of Mr. Baglieri prior to the collision. In fact, the evidence from Mr. Baglieri’s employer – Mr. Joe Bruno – would suggest that Mr. Baglieri was a good employee who had worked for his company for twelve years without any prior accidents. Mr. Bruno attended the scene of the collision and testified that Mr. Baglieri kept saying to him “it was green for me.”

69The expert evidence of DC Patterson makes very clear that motor vehicle accidents are caused due to one or more of the following factors: driver error, environmental conditions, mechanical issues or failures of a vehicle involved in the collision; roadway conditions or the design of the roadway, and pedestrian involvement. In the case of the accident involving Mr. Baglieri there is no suggestion any pedestrian might have caused the accident.

70DC Patterson was at least until he testified at the preliminary hearing of the view that there was only one explanation for the accident: that being driver error on the part of Mr. Baglieri. There is little dispute that Mr. Baglieri made a terribly tragic error – he didn’t stop for a red light. If there was no other plausible explanation it would not be difficult for this court to conclude that any other reasonable person would have foreseen the risk and or would have taken steps to avoid it. Specifically, that reasonable person approaching the intersection would have appreciated that a yellow light was warning approaching drivers to slow down in anticipation of a red light.

71But the question that remains to be answered is whether Mr. Baglieri’s failure to foresee the risk and his failure to take steps to avoid it was a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable person in Mr. Baglieri’s circumstances. This question needs to be answered in the context of the opinion of DC Patterson who ultimately conceded that it was not just driver error that might have caused the accident but also issues with sun glare. As well DC Patterson conceded that the flashing lights of four vehicles on the opposite side of the intersection may have distracted Mr. Baglieri. Finally, DC Patterson also conceded that Mr Baglieri may have been distracted by Ms. Chen Lin driving in his blind spot and her manoeuvre into the left turn lane.

72In R. v. O’Neill, 2022 ONSC 981 Mew J. dealt with a tragedy that unfolded when a transport truck failed to stop for traffic that had stopped because of an accident up ahead. Everyone else had stopped safely. As Mew J. observed at para 63 of his reasons there was no evidence to explain why the accused had failed to apprehend what was going on ahead of him other than the possible effect of the sun. The evidence was clear that the accused didn’t see or appreciate the hazard presented by the stopped traffic ahead until it was too late to avoid the collision. At para 74 Mew J. stated:

I take a similar review to Mr. O'Neill's conduct. In the absence of any evidence of other distractions, mechanical failings, loss of consciousness or driver fatigue, I accept as possible that Mr O'Neill failed to apprehend and appropriately react to the sudden challenge of a blinding sun after he came past the slight bend and knoll in the highway.

73In addition to the possibility acknowledged by DC Patterson that sun glare may have been a factor in Mr. Baglieri not seeing and reacting to the traffic lights ahead this court must also consider the possible distraction caused by the flashing lights on four vehicles on the opposite side of the intersection, coupled with the possible distraction caused by Ms. Chen Lin lingering in Mr. Baglieri’s blind spot. These acknowledged distractions may have all, according to DC Patterson, contributed to Mr. Baglieri’s failure to appreciate and respond to the traffic lights in a manner consistent with that of the reasonable prudent driver.

74A reasonably prudent driver is not a prefect driver. Drivers regrettably make mistakes every day – sometimes with very tragic circumstances. But the law does not render those mistakes as criminal unless the driver’s actions reflect a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable person in that driver’s circumstances. It is worth repeating what Charron J. wrote at para 35 of Beatty on this issue:

…Because driving, in large part, is automatic and reflexive, some departures from the standard expected of a reasonably prudent person will inevitably be the product, as Corey J states, of “little conscious thought”. Even the most able and prudent driver will from time to time suffer from momentary lapses of attention. These lapses may well result in conduct that, when viewed objectively, falls below the standard expected of a reasonably prudent driver. Such automatic and reflexive conduct may even pose a danger to other users of the highway…. The fact that the danger may be the product of little conscious thought becomes of concern because, as McLachlin J (as she then was) aptly put it in R v Creighton [1993] 34 S.C.R. 3 at p.59 “The law does not likely brand a person as a criminal….” If every departure from the civil norm is to be criminalised, regardless of the degree, we risk casting the net too broadly in branding as criminals’ prisoners who are in reality not morally blameworthy. Such an approach risks violating the principle of fundamental justice that morally innocent not be deprived of liberty.

75The evidence in this case establishes that Mr. Baglieri was not driving at a speed more than the speed limit. While speeding by itself will not inevitably lead to a dangerous act it is certainly one factor a court may consider in the determination of whether the Crown has established the mens rea for dangerous driving. A reasonable inference from a review of all of the evidence in this case is that Mr. Baglieri did not appreciate the lights ahead of him were changing from yellow to red and that he therefore did not alter the manner of his driving by doing what any reasonably prudent driver would have done – specifically slow down, apply the brakes and come to a full stop at the red light.

76The reasonably prudent driver would also have been driving in a manner consistent with the weather, road conditions and other drivers on the roadway. If there was sun glare the reasonably prudent driver would have responded to the sun glare in any manner of ways – one of which would have been to use the equipment on board the vehicle to eliminate or reduce the sun glare. The evidence in this case from photographs taken of Mr. Baglieri’s vehicle after the accident would suggest he had his sun visors down – possibly reflecting the impact the sun was having on his ability to perceive and react to the traffic lights.

77In addition to the weather conditions the reasonably prudent driver is expected to drive in a manner that will allow him or her to respond to the unexpected actions of other drivers – such as a driver lingering in one’s blind spot. The reasonably prudent driver will also be expected to drive in a manner that will allow one to respond to emergency lights up ahead. The expectation is that drivers can expect construction and emergency lighting daily that will require the need to respond in a manner that will allow for the safe passage of all traffic on the roadway.

78Mr. Baglieri was confronted with not one but three possible distractions as he approached the intersection – sun glare, a driver lingering in his blind spot and the emergency flashing lights of several vehicles on the opposite side of the intersection. This court may look to other case law where courts have determined the actions of a driver has amounted to a marked departure from the standard of a reasonably prudent driver. No doubt there are other tragic cases where a driver has driven through a stale red light with tragic consequences where the driver was found to have the requisite mens rea to sustain a conviction for dangerous driving. But in this case as Martin J. cautioned in R. v. Chung 2020 SCC at para 27:

…Although case law may be helpful in providing examples of what has previously been determined to be a marked departure, courts must still analyze the accused’s actions relative to the reasonable person in the specific circumstances at issue.

79Can it be said that the answer to the question as to whether the driving of Mr. Baglieri was a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable person in Mr. Baglieri’s circumstances, must be a firm and unassailable No. The answer may seem to be simple if the only evidence this court had to consider was the video evidence of a dump truck colliding with another vehicle in the middle of an intersection after the dump truck ignored a red light. The answer to the question will also seem to be a simple one if one considers that three very innocent people were killed because of the dump truck ignoring a red light. But the law requires this court to consider the circumstances presented to Mr. Baglieri. The law requires the court to consider all the evidence which must include the expert opinion of DC Patterson. Taken together Mr. Baglieri was confronted with three possible distractions which were the circumstances he was presented with. These distractions may explain why Mr. Baglieri missed the red light and caused him to tell his employer “I thought the light was green.” Other reasonable drivers presented with the exact same circumstances may have responded differently but the law does not criminalize conduct because a driver made a terrible mistake.

80What happened on October 12, 2022 was a tragedy for the victims and their families. It was a tragedy that was without any doubt the fault of Mr. Baglieri. There may have been consequences in the civil context for the negligence of Mr. Baglieri. But civil negligence does not equate with the criminal mens rea of dangerous driving. On the unique facts of this case reflected in the opinion evidence of DC Patterson I am not satisfied the Crown has established beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of Mr. Baglieri. The charges are dismissed.

Edwards, R.S.J.

Date: April 17, 2026

NOTE: As noted in court, on the record, this written Ruling is to be considered the official version and takes precedence over the oral reasons read into the record. If there are any discrepancies between the oral and written versions it is the official written Ruling that is to be relied upon.

CITATION: R. v. Baglieri, 2026 ONSC 2278

NEWMARKETCOURT FILE NO.: CR-22-91109856-0000

DATE: 20260417

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

– and –

ANTHONY BAGLIERI

Defendant

reasons FOR DECISION

Edwards J

Released: April 17, 2026