CITATION: 2623876 Ontario Inc. et al v. Broomfield et al, 2026 ONSC 2170
COURT FILE NO.: CV-24-2437
DATE: 2026 04 14
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO
RE:
2623876 ONTARIO INC.
GRANT, JESSICA
WATKINS, GARTH, plaintiffs/defendants by counterclaim
AND:
BROOMFIELD, MICHAEL
BROOMFIELD, MERRICK
1655066 ONTARIO INC.
2722170 ONTARIO LTD.
BROOMFIELD, DAHLIA ANDREA, defendants/plaintiffs by counterclaim
BEFORE:
Justice Mandhane
COUNSEL:
JARVIS, Adam and WIGLE, Dawson, for the plaintiffs
BROWN, James A., for the defendants
HEARD:
March 30, 2026, in person
reasons on motion for interim injunctive relief
A. INTRODUCTION
[1] Garth Watkins and Merrick Broomfield are family friends whose trucking joint venture failed, resulting in this salty litigation. Each side now accuses the other of diverting company assets for personal benefit.
[2] At the outset, Garth owned 262 Ontario Inc. ("GLW"), while Merrick’s father, Michael Broomfield, owned 165 Ontario Inc. (“165”). GLW and 165 incorporated 272 Ontario Ltd. (“ETA”) to operate a larger fleet. GLW and 165 were equal shareholders in ETA. Garth, Merrick, and Jessica Grant—Garth’s romantic partner—were its directors and officers.
[3] ETA operated from a yard where it stored trucks, equipment, and luxury cars. Jessica handled the accounting, working out of a trailer on the property. Merrick dispatched vehicles and occasionally drove trucks with Michael. Garth was less involved in the day-to-day operations.
[4] ETA became insolvent in late 2023. Garth and Jessica resigned as directors and officers on April 24, 2024. However, GLW retained a 50% interest in ETA.
[5] The plaintiffs obtained a temporary Mareva injunction without notice before Justice Emery. They now seek to continue that order and to register a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) on the Broomfield’s personal residence. The defendants seek to set aside the injunction.
[6] The issues are:
a) Should parts of the defendants’ record be struck?
b) Should the temporary Mareva injunction be set aside?
c) Should I grant the plaintiffs’ equitable relief pending trial?
[7] After answering these questions, I would set aside the temporary Mareva injunction and decline to order any further equitable relief pending trial.
[8] This case is not about one party improperly dissipating assets after ETA became insolvent. It is about both sides doing so. The plaintiffs’ failure to disclose their own role when seeking ex parte relief is fatal to their request for ongoing equitable remedies.
B. OVERVIEW
[9] In May 2024, the plaintiffs launched this claim alleging oppressive conduct, breach of fiduciary duty, fraudulent conveyance, and constructive dismissal. They alleged that ETA stopped paying wages, taxes, and priority creditors. They accused Merrick of diverting assets, customers and business to 165, while using ETA funds to pay down the mortgage on the Broomfield house.
[10] The defendants counter-sue. They say the plaintiffs were the ones who were diverting funds from ETA to third parties, GLW and themselves personally. Pleadings are still open. The defendants recently amended their pleadings to add various third parties who have not yet been served or responded.
a) The ex-parte hearing before Emery J.
[11] On May 15, 2025, Emery J. heard the plaintiffs’ ex parte motion for injunctive relief.
[12] The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had failed to account, refused to submit to examinations for discovery, and actively dissipated ETA assets. They relied on Ministry of Transportation records to corroborate their allegations. At Appendix A, I set out the plaintiffs’ allegations and evidence about the disputed ETA assets.
[13] Because they were moving without notice, to assure the court of their bona fides, both Jessica and Garth undertook to compensate the defendants for any loss or injury caused by the injunction if it ought not to have been granted.[^1]
[14] On May 20, 2025, after applying the RJR-MacDonald test and based on arguments advanced by the plaintiffs in paragraphs 18 to 44 of their factum, Emery J. granted the temporary Mareva injunction.
[15] Justice Emery accepted the plaintiffs’ evidence (summarized in their factum), that:
a) ETA was insolvent and was not paying secured creditors,
b) The defendants refused to account or submit to examinations for discovery,
c) The defendants were “in secret, and without notice” transferring and using ETA assets,
d) The plaintiffs only learned about the impugned vehicle transfers on May 1, 2025 after pulling the transport records, and
e) The estimated value of the wrongfully dissipated assets was $500,000.
[16] Based on this unchallenged evidence, Emery J. reasoned that there was a serious question to be tried: namely, whether the defendants had fraudulently conveyed ETA assets to third parties. The balance of convenience favoured the plaintiffs because it was essential that the defendants be restrained from stripping ETA of any remaining value. Justice Emery accepted the plaintiffs’ submission that no harm could possibly come to the defendants because ETA was no longer a going concern.
[17] Justice Emery signed the plaintiffs’ draft order. He froze ETA’s bank accounts and assets, and enjoined the defendants from encumbering or transferring certain vehicles in which GLW claimed an interest. The signed order was to remain in force until it was varied or discharged by further court order.
[18] Emery J. adjourned the balance of the motion to May 23, 2025 so the defendants could be served. On the return date, Justice André timetabled the defendants’ response, reply, and cross-examinations.
b) The defendants’ collateral attacks on the temporary Mareva injunction
[19] On June 13, 2025, the defendants brought an urgent, cross-motion to set aside the temporary Mareva injunction. Justice Stewart refused to schedule it on an urgent basis, instead ordering them to abide by the timeline ordered by Justice André.
[20] On July 4, 2025, the parties appeared before Justice Emery to timetable the return of the Mareva motion and the defendants’ cross-motion to set it aside. Justice Emery held that the motions were two sides of the same coin and could be heard together as a long motion before any judge of the court.
[21] Regarding the cross-motion, the defendants confirmed that they would be relying on Merrick’s affidavit dated June 7, 2005, and an additional affidavit from a “silent investor.” Emery J. timetabled delivery of the silent investor’s affidavit, the plaintiffs’ response, and related cross-examinations. The defendants did not seek leave to file an additional affidavit from Merrick.
[22] On September 10, 2025, the defendants appeared before Emery J.—this time to settle the terms of the temporary Mareva injunction. The defendants argued that the temporary order had expired ten days after it was issued by operation of law. Emery J. determined that he was functus to grant the relief sought because he had already signed the temporary Mareva injunction and its terms did not contemplate automatic expiration after ten days.
[23] As of the parties’ October 29, 2025 appearance before Justice Shaw, the litigation was at a standstill because the defendants had appealed the temporary Mareva injunction to the Court of Appeal. On November 13, 2025, the appeal was dismissed because it was not perfected on time. The defendants were ordered to pay the plaintiffs $3,000 in costs.
c) The merits hearing
[24] I was assigned to case manage this action. By way of endorsement dated January 12, 2026, I timetabled Dahlia Broomfield’s response and scheduled a merits hearing.
[25] The parties appeared before me on March 30, 2026 for a full day hearing and I reserved my decision.
[26] The plaintiffs rely on Garth’s affidavit sworn May 9, 2025, which includes a summary of the disputed ETA assets at Exhibit A; and three affidavits from Jessica, which include ETA’s corporate and creditor information. Both Garth and Jessica were cross-examined on their affidavits.
[27] The defendants oppose the motion. They rely on two affidavits sworn by Merrick; the first on June 7, 2025, and the second on December 9, 2025. The defendants also rely on an affidavit from Allen Fakorede—a “silent investor” in ETA. Both Merrick and Allen were cross-examined. The defendants also rely on certain documents produced by the plaintiffs in their affidavit of documents (the “plaintiffs’ documents”).
[28] As a preliminary matter, the plaintiffs challenged the admissibility of Merrick’s December 2025 affidavit and the plaintiffs’ documents.
C. ANALYSIS
[29] Turning now to the questions I must answer to decide this motion.
a) Should parts of the defendants’ record be struck?
[30] The short answer is yes, and I told the parties as much at the outset of the hearing. These are my reasons.
[31] I will deal with the cross-motion record first, which includes affidavits from Merrick and Allen.
[32] Rule 39.02(2) prohibits parties from trying to amplify the motion record after cross-examinations are completed.
[33] As Justice Emery identified when timetabling this motion, the cross-motion does not seek any new or independent relief. It is simply a response to the Mareva in a different form and with new arguments.
[34] In that respect, I agree with the plaintiffs that the defendants are effectively trying to split their case by filing an additional affidavit from Merrick that supplements their original response, and which deals with the same substantive issues under the guise of bringing a "cross-motion.”
[35] If the defendants discovered new information after cross-examination that changed Merrick’s substantive response to the motion, they should have sought leave to amend their response and file an additional affidavit even though cross-examinations were completed: Rule 39.02(2). This is effectively what they did in relation to the silent investor, and Emery J. timetabled the plaintiffs’ response and related cross-examinations. Having failed to seek leave to file an additional affidavit from Merrick, no further cross-examinations of Merrick were sought, ordered, or timetabled.
[36] It would be unfair to allow the defendants to rely on Merrick’s second affidavit because the plaintiffs were deprived of the substantive opportunity to cross-examine him on the contents of the second affidavit.
[37] I deal next with the admissibility of the plaintiffs’ documents.
[38] Rule 30.03(5) provides that an affidavit of documents should not be filed unless it is relevant to the motion. Here, the defendant says the plaintiffs’ entire affidavit of documents is relevant because it was made an exhibit to Jessica’s August 2025 cross-examination.
[39] I disagree. Having reviewed the cross-examination transcript, I find that only the index to the affidavit of documents was properly made an exhibit and only for ease of reference. Each document was not identified and exhibited at the cross-examination—some were, and some were not. Mr. Jarvis repeatedly reminded Mr. Brown that cross-examination was not an examination for discovery. The plaintiffs’ documents uploaded to Case Centre are struck.
b) Should the temporary Mareva injunction be set aside?
[40] A Mareva injunction is an extraordinary equitable remedy. I can only grant it in clear cases, and where the moving party comes to court with clean hands.
[41] Under Rule 39.01(6), parties seeking ex parte relief owe a strict duty of fairness, including disclosing all material facts, including facts adverse to their position: Chitel et al. v. Rothbart et al., 1982 CanLII 1956 (ON CA), 39 O.R. (2d) 513 (C.A.).
[42] A fact is material if it could affect the judge’s decision or is something the other party would raise if present: Elsley v. Bordynuik, 2013 ONSC 1210, at para. 58. The obligation to provide the court with notice about the defendants’ likely position is not met by simply attaching their pleadings to an affidavit: Elsley, at para. 56. The question is whether the motion judge was given a complete and accurate picture, not whether the result would have been different: Elsley, at para. 58.
[43] Having the benefit of a more fulsome record, I find that the temporary Mareva injunction must be set aside because the plaintiffs did not make full and frank disclosure.
[44] First, the evidence before me strongly supports a finding that the plaintiffs were involved in transferring trucks to Allen, not just the defendants. The parties all agree that Allen invested cash in ETA from 2020 onwards. Allen testified that, when ETA went insolvent, Garth, Jessica, and Merrick all agreed to transfer trucks to him as repayment.
[45] There are emails showing that Jessica helped prepares bills of sale and send transfer documents to Allen in February 2024. Garth admitted to agreeing to at least some of the transfers. While Jessica initially denied knowing about any transfers before May 1, 2025, she eventually admitted to sending the transfer documents to Allen in February 2024.
[46] Second, the plaintiffs were not in the dark about asset transfers and personally participated in disposing of ETA assets to third parties. Transport records show multiple ETA vehicles (an Audi, Mercedes, and float equipment) were transferred to third parties in 2024, and that Jessica signed at least some of the paperwork.
[47] Garth admitted to transferring the float equipment but, again, Jessica’s evidence evolved on this point. First, she claimed not to know anything about transfers to third parties, but by the end of her cross-examination, she had admitted that she had transferred the Audi and Mercedes to the third parties around the time of her resignation.
[48] Third, both Jessica and Garth admitted to knowing that Merrick had transferred the lease for Truck 701 to 165 so that he could continuing making the lease payments. However, they both told Emery J., that ETA owned Truck 701, that Merrick had transferred it to 165, and that he had sold to a third party for profit.
[49] Based on the totality of the evidence, I find that the plaintiffs were required to disclose to Emery J. that:
a) Garth, Jessica, and Merrick agreed to transfer ETA assets to Allen in February 2024, and that Jessica prepared the transfer paperwork and sent it to Allen;
b) Garth and Jessica transferred ETA assets to GLW before resigning as directors and officers;
c) Garth and Jessica transferred ETA assets to third parties in and around when ETA became insolvent; and
d) Jessica knew that Merrick transferred ETA leases to himself and 165 so that he could continue making the lease payments.
[50] The failure to disclose these facts left Emery J. with the misleading impression that only the defendants were dissipating assets. That was incorrect. The motion judge was entitled to know that both parties were depleting ETA assets after insolvency.
[51] The failure to disclose was particularly serious because the plaintiffs proceeded without notice despite ongoing litigation between the parties. There is no evidence before me to suggest that the defendants were actively dissipating assets at the time of the motion.
[52] Accordingly, the Mareva order is set aside nunc pro tunc.
c) Should I grant any equitable relief pending trial?
[53] Having set aside the temporary Mareva injunction, I cannot extend it. I would also not impose another Mareva order pending trial or grant the CPL because the plaintiffs do not come before the court with clean hands.
[54] Both sides transferred or dealt with ETA assets after insolvency. The plaintiffs knew about and participated in key transfers, and then purposefully misled the court about them.
[55] I am also troubled that Jessica admitted under cross-examination to actively encouraging Allen not to swear an affidavit in support of the defendants’ cross-motion to set aside the temporary Marev injunction. This shows the lengths the plaintiffs’ will go to distort the factual record before the court in pursuit of their ends.
[56] For these reasons, I would dismiss the plaintiffs’ motion for interim injunctive relief and their request for a CPL in the Broomfield residence.
D. COSTS AND NEXT STEPS
[57] The parties shall schedule a case management conference to discuss next steps in the litigation.
[58] The defendants were successful on the substance of this motion and are presumptively entitled to costs. The parties shall endeavour to agree on the matter of costs. If they cannot, the issue of costs will need to be scheduled for a hearing.
[59] At the same time, I know that the plaintiffs are anxiously awaiting the hearing of their outstanding production motion, which will need to be timetabled.
[60] That all being said, given my factual findings here, I would encourage the parties to consider settling this matter before engaging in further protracted litigation over pleadings and productions. If they would like my assistance or the assistance of another judge, they can request the same.
[61] It would also be prudent for the plaintiffs and defendants to work together to try to recover assets that were wrongfully dissipated to Allen, GLW, 165, and themselves personally to repay ETA’s priority creditors as soon as possible.
[62] I remain seized as case management judge.
Appendix A
Asset Identifier
Description
ETA interest
Plaintiffs’ allegations
Defendants’ response
Pickup truck
1999 Ford F350
Owner
Used by Merrick
Purchased by Merrick as scrap for $500; used as personal vehicle
Luxury 008
2001 Mazda MX-5 Miata LS
Owner
Removed from ETA yard
Purchased by Merrick as scrap
Luxury 009
2009 Volkswagen Passat CC
Owner
Sold to third party
Luxury 010
2011 BMW 5 Series 5351
Owner
Removed from ETA yard
Purchased by Merrick as scrap
Luxury 011
2011 BMW X5 X Drive 501
Owner
Sold to third party
Transport documents confirm that the car was transferred to a third party on September 19, 2024
Truck 701
2011 Freightliner M2
(Disputed)
Owned by ETA and sold to third party
Transport documents confirm that the truck was transferred to a third party on May 28, 2024
Lease transferred to Merrick for repayment
Truck 702
2001 Sterling STE L9500
Owner
Sold to third party
Transport documents confirm that the truck was transferred to a third party on June 3, 2024
Transferred to Allen by Merrick, Garth, Jessica in February 2024
Truck 703
2003 Sterling STE L950
Owner
Sold to third party
Transport documents confirm that the truck was transferred to a third party on June 3, 2024
Transferred to Allen by Merrick, Garth, Jessica in February 2024
Truck 706
2003 Mack CU713
(Not indicated)
Stored at ETA yard
Transferred to Allen by Merrick, Garth, Jessica in February 2024
Truck 707
2005 Western Star 4900
Leasee
Transferred from ETa to 165; personally guaranteed by Garth
Transport documents confirm that the truck was transferred to 165, and then a third party on January 21, 2025
Transferred to 165 after Garth and Jessica refused to pay monthly lease obligations
Truck 708
2001 Mack RB688S
Owner
Sold to third party
Transport documents confirm that the truck was transferred to a third party on March 25, 2024.
Transferred to Allen by Merrick, Garth, Jessica in February 2024
Truck 709
2021 Kenworth T880
(Disputed)
Transferred from ETa to 165; loan personally guaranteed by Garth
Transport documents confirm that the lease was transferred to 165 on March 7, 2024
165 assumed lease after Garth and Jessica refused to pay monthly lease obligations
Truck 710
2012 Western Star WBI
Leasee
Transferred from ETa to 165
Transport documents confirm that the truck was transferred to a third party on May 22, 2024
165 assumed lease after Garth and Jessica refused to pay monthly lease obligations
Mandhane J.
Released: April 14, 2026
CITATION: 2623876 Ontario Inc. et al v. Broomfield et al, 2026 ONSC 2170
COURT FILE NO.: CV-24-2437
DATE: 2026 04 14
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
2623876 ONTARIO INC.
GRANT, JESSICA
WATKINS, GARTH
Plaintiffs/Defendants by counterclaim
- and –
BROOMFIELD, MICHAEL
BROOMFIELD, MERRICK
1655066 ONTARIO INC.
2722170 ONTARIO LTD.
BROOMFIELD, DAHLIA ANDREA
Defendants/Plaintiffs by counterclaim
REASONS ON MOTION FOR INTERIM INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Mandhane J.
Released: April 14, 2026
[^1]: They did not, however, provide any information about their personal or corporate income or assets. Under cross-examination, Jessica stated that she could satisfy a damage award of $400,000 if she liquidated her assets, but refused to enumerate them.