CITATION: La France v. Saroli, 2026 ONSC 2167

COURT FILE NO.: FS-23-00039701-0000

DATE: 20260413

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

RE: Louise Lenore La France, Applicant

-and-

Robert Anthony Saroli, Respondent

BEFORE: Robert Centa J.

COUNSEL: Martha McCarthy, Crystal Heidari, and Ella Benedetti, for the applicant

Geoffrey Wells, Isabel Brisson (Student-at-law), for the respondent

HEARD: April 8, 2026 (in writing)

ENDORSEMENT

[1] On March 24, 2026, I released my reasons for decision following a nine-day trial.[^1] I made the following findings:

a. Ms. La France and Mr. Saroli were spouses for the purposes of Part III of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, because they cohabited in a conjugal relationship from January 1, 2019, until August 23, 2023.

b. Ms. La France was entitled to spousal support on a non-compensatory basis but not on a compensatory basis. I determined that Mr. Saroli’s annual income for spousal support purposes should be set at $63.69 million. Considering the purposes of a support order set out in s. 33(8) of the Family Law Act, and the circumstances of this case, including the factors set out in s. 33(9) of the Family Law Act, I determined that Ms. La France was entitled to an award of approximately $200,000 per month for three years. However, in the circumstances of this case, I found it appropriate to convert that figure to a lump sum of $3 million.

c. I dismissed Ms. La France’s claim for monetary award for unjust enrichment and a mutual no-contact or non-harassment order.

[2] I invited the parties to make submissions regarding whether Ms. La France is entitled to prejudgment interest on the spousal support award and, if so, the appropriate calculation of that award. I also invited the parties to make submissions on the costs of the proceeding if they could not reach an agreement.

[3] I have now reviewed the written submissions of both parties and this endorsement addresses the issues of prejudgment interest and costs.

1. Prejudgment interest

[4] Ms. La France submits that she is entitled to an award of prejudgment interest pursuant to s. 128(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43. She submits that she has been entitled to spousal support since the date of separation (August 23, 2023) and that the order for lump sum spousal support constitutes an order for the payment of money within the meaning of the Courts of Justice Act.[^2] Ms. La France notes that she made a claim for prejudgment interest in her application and 31 of the 36 notional months of spousal support contained in the lump sum had already passed by the date of the award. She submits that there is no reason for the court to exercise its discretion under s. 130 of the Courts of Justice Act to disallow her claim for interest.

[5] Ms. La France proposes that the court adopt the following methodology:

a. Divide the $3 million lump sum into 36 equal monthly portions;

b. Assign one monthly portion to each month commencing in December 2023 (the date of the initial application) and running to December 2026;

c. For each month up to and including March 2026, calculate the amount of simple interest owed from December 2023 to the date of judgment at the applicable prejudgment interest rate for that month.

[6] Using Ms. La France’s methodology yields a total prejudgment interest calculation of $129,698.

[7] Mr. Saroli submits that the court should exercise its discretion under s. 130(1)(a) of the Courts of Justice Act to disallow the claim for prejudgment interest. Mr. Saroli submits that the applicant delayed the case unnecessarily by initially seeking much broader relief in her application including a claim for a 50% interest in the Lakeshore house, and damages for pain, suffering, and emotional harm. Mr. Saroli submits that these claims significantly and unnecessarily prolonged the litigation. Mr. Saroli submits that his obligation to pay support did not crystallize until the court rendered its decision. In the event that Ms. La France is entitled to an award of prejudgment interest, Mr. Saroli agrees with Ms. La France’s calculation.

[8] I see no reason to exercise the court’s discretion to disallow Ms. La France’s claim for prejudgment interest. Ms. La France made a claim for prejudgment interest in her application and obtained an order for the payment money at trial. She is presumptively entitled to an award of prejudgment interest to reflect the fact that she did not have access to that money from (at least) the date of her application until trial. The time value of money strongly supports an award of prejudgment interest so that the value of the award is not eroded by the time to get to trial.

[9] I disagree with Mr. Saroli’s submission that the obligation to pay support did not crystallize until the decision was released. The reasons for decision merely recognized Mr. Saroli’s obligation to pay spousal support, which arose (at the latest) when the application was commenced. Mr. Saroli was entitled to maintain his position through trial that Ms. La France was not his spouse and not entitled to spousal support and to decline to pay interim support absent a court order requiring him to do so. However, he enjoyed the benefit of the money that he should have been paying to Ms. La France from 2023 to 2026. It is only fair that he now compensate Ms. La France for the benefit he enjoyed at her expense.

[10] I also do not accept Mr. Saroli’s submission that the scope and value of Ms. La France’s original application justifies denying her prejudgment interest. If Mr. Saroli felt that those claims significantly and unnecessarily prolonged the action, he could have delivered a severable offer to settle that included payments in respect of spousal support and a dismissal of the property claims. However, he maintained his position that Ms. La France did not have standing to claim support throughout the trial and did not deliver a pre-trial offer in respect of spousal support.

[11] In all of the circumstances of this case, I find that Ms. La France is entitled to an award of prejudgment interest on the lump-sum spousal support award. The parties agree on the appropriate methodology and calculations, and I award Ms. La France $129,698 in prejudgment interest pursuant to s. 128 of the Courts of Justice Act.

2. Costs

[12] Ms. La France seeks her costs of the application fixed in the amount of $797,000. She submits that she was entirely successful on the spousal support issue, which she describes as the “primary issue in the litigation.” She also submits that she beat an offer to settle that she made on November 6, 2025, and should recover her costs on a full recovery basis after that date.

[13] Mr. Saroli submits that no costs should be payable by either side or, in the alternative, he should be ordered to pay $100,000 in costs to Ms. La France. He submits that the trial was about more than spousal support. He submits that he succeeded on the issues of unjust enrichment and the restraining order and that Ms. La France abandoned her claim for the 50% beneficial interest in the Lakeshore house.[^3]

[14] The parties agree on the general principles to be applied. Rule 24 provides that costs are discretionary, a successful party is presumed to be entitled to their costs, but a successful party that behaves unreasonably may face costs sanctions.[^4] In certain circumstances, a party who makes an offer may be entitled to full recovery of costs from the date of a qualifying offer to the end of trial.[^5] In setting the amount of costs, I am to consider that factors set out in rule 24(14):

(14) In setting the amount of costs in relation to a step in a case, the court may consider,

(a) the reasonableness and proportionality of the following factors, as applicable, as they relate to the importance and complexity of the issues in the step:

(i) Each party’s behaviour.

(ii) The time spent by each party.

(iii) Any written offers to settle, including offers that do not meet the conditions set out in subrule (12) or the requirements of rule 18.

(iv) Any legal fees, including the number of licensed representatives and their rates.

(v) Any expert witness fees, including the number of experts and their rates.

(vi) Any other expenses properly paid or payable; and

(b) any other relevant matter.

[15] Overall, costs rules in family law are designed to encourage settlement, discourage inappropriate behaviour, indemnify successful litigants, and ensure that cases are dealt with justly and in accordance with rule 2(2).[^6]

[16] First, consideration of success is the starting point in determining costs.[^7] I am satisfied that Ms. La France was entirely successful on the issue that consumed the overwhelming majority of time at trial. Almost all of the evidence that related to the issues of unjust enrichment or the restraining order was relevant to, and necessary for, the determination of the spousal support issue. Ms. La France would have called the same evidence to prove that the parties cohabited in a conjugal relationship, the dates the cohabitation started and stopped, and her contributions to their relationship. Even if the trial had been narrowed to the issue of spousal support alone, it would not have taken much, if any, less time. I find that Ms. La France is presumptively entitled to an award of costs.

[17] Second, I find that Ms. La France did not behave unreasonably during a step in the case. I see no reason to deprive her of all or part of her costs for behaving unreasonably. It is true that her initial claims were overly ambitious. However, by the time of trial, she had narrowed the claims very significantly.

[18] Third, I am satisfied that Ms. La France made a qualifying offer to settle the proceeding within the meaning of rule 24(12). On November 6, 2025, Ms. La France offered to settle the proceeding on the basis that Mr. Saroli pay her $3 million “in full and final resolution of all claims in the proceeding.” If he had accepted this offer before November 15, 2025, Mr. Saroli would not have to pay prejudgment interest or costs to Ms. La France.

[19] Although not strictly relevant to my analysis, I note that Ms. La France made other pre-trial offers to settle that were even more favourable to Mr. Saroli. For his part, Mr. Saroli neither accepted any of these offers nor made any offer to settle this case until after the completion of trial.

[20] Ms. La France’s offer to settle dated November 6, 2025, complied with all of the requirements of rule 24(12) and Ms. La France obtained an order that is as good as or better than the offer. Without further explanation, Mr. Saroli submits that this was not a case “where a party has met or exceeded the terms of an offer to settle.” This submission is puzzling and incorrect. I do not accept it.

[21] Ms. La France incurred $610,883.09 in legal fees (including HST) after November 15, 2025. Pursuant to rule 24(12), Ms. La France is entitled to full recovery of costs from that date to the conclusion of trial. I see no reason to depart from that presumption.

[22] I do not accept Mr. Saroli’s submission that the amount claimed is disproportionate to the complexity of the issues before the court. This was high-stakes, complicated litigation. Mr. Saroli was under no obligation to concede any of the points at issue, but having done so, cannot now be heard to say that the process of disproving his evidence was too time-intensive or costly.

[23] I accept that Mr. Saroli’s bill of costs indicates that he incurred $326,148.81 in legal fees. He submits that the size of the gap between Ms. La France’s bill and his bill demonstrates the unreasonableness of her request for costs. I disagree. Mr. Saroli denied many things that required Ms. La France to mount a formidable forensic and documentary case. Marshalling the evidence to demonstrate the inaccuracies in his evidence was time consuming and required significant amounts of preparation and careful litigation planning.

[24] I share Mr. Saroli’s concern about the duplication in efforts between the first set of lawyers retained by Ms. La France and the second set of lawyers who took the case to trial. An individual is always entitled to retain their counsel of choice, but that does not mean that the opposing party should be required to pay for any duplication of effort.

[25] I do not accept Mr. Saroli’s suggestion that Ms. La France should not be permitted to recover for a junior counsel at trial. Having watched the trial unfold, I have no doubt that a junior lawyer was an essential part of the trial team. I also note that the trial team has carefully and thoughtfully reviewed its accounts and frequently excluded time for articling students and multiple lawyers involved in the same meeting.

[26] Stepping back and looking and the claim for costs in its entirety, I think it is fair to adjust it downwards for two reasons. First, I am concerned that the involvement of two law firms necessarily led to duplication of work that should not be charged to Mr. Saroli. Second, I am concerned that Ms. La France’s ambitious early claims (which were later abandoned) may have incurred unnecessary legal expenses. I do not think the overall amount claimed is reasonable.

[27] Taking all of the circumstances into account, I award Ms. La France her costs of the proceeding fixed in the all-inclusive amount of $670,000. Mr. Saroli shall pay this amount as directed by counsel for Ms. La France on or before May 13, 2026.

Robert Centa J.

Date: April 13, 2026

[^1]: La France v. Saroli, 2026 ONSC 1783, 2026 CarswellOnt 4769, [2026] O.J. No. 1310.

[^2]: Vanasse v. Seguin, 2009 4237 (ON SC), at para. 28; Borrens v. Perreault, 2025 ONSC 1811, at paras. 55-56.

[^3]: Ms. La France also withdrew her claim for damages on without costs basis prior to trial. As the parties agreed that this withdrawal would be without costs, I will not consider it further as I determine the costs issue.

[^4]: Family Law Rules, r. 24(3) and (7).

[^5]: Family Law Rules, r. 24(12).

[^6]: Serra v. Serra, 2009 ONCA 395, at para. 8; Mattina v. Mattina, 2018 ONCA 867, at para. 10; Liu v. Huang, 2020 ONCA 450, at para 37.

[^7]: Mattina, at para. 13.