Court File and Parties
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: Jagranie Ramotar
AND:
Vinoo Ramotar et al.
BEFORE: J.T. Akbarali J.
COUNSEL: Richard K. MacGregor and Izabella Chamberland, for the applicant
Shahzad Siddiqui, for the respondent
HEARD: March 27, 2026
ENDORSEMENT
Overview
1On this application, I am asked to declare that the respondent’s interest in the property municipally known as 149 Rochman Boulevard, Scarborough (the “Property”) is subject to a resulting trust in favour of the applicant. Alternatively, I am asked to find that the respondent exercised undue influence over the applicant to obtain an interest in the Property and was unjustly enriched, such that a constructive trust ought to be declared in favour of the applicant. In the further alternative, I am asked to vest full title and ownership of the Property back to the applicant and direct the Land Register to amend its records. I am also asked to make an order directing the respondent to vacate the Property.
Background
2The applicant, Jagranie Ramotar, is the mother of the respondent, Vinoo Ramotar. Because the parties share the same last name, respectfully and for clarity, I use first names in these reasons.
3Jagranie is 88 years old and suffers from macular degeneration. She has been visually impaired since 2014 and has difficulty seeing things up close. She underwent surgery in 2016, but her eyesight has not improved; it is getting worse. She struggles with reading.
4Jagranie was married to her husband, Soogrim Ramotar, for 67 years before his death in December 2021. Together they had six children, of which Vinoo is one. Jagranie was estranged from her other children apart from Vinoo, although she has since reconciled with two of them: Seelo and Radha. The timing of the estrangement and reconciliation is not clear on the record.
5Vinoo has been a licenced real estate agent since 1987.
6In 2009, Jagranie and Soogrim purchased and moved into the Property.
7Although Vinoo owns another property, he moved into the Property with his parents in 2014. Jagranie deposes that he moved in ostensibly because he separated from his common law partner, but that she was deceived on that point. She further deposes that Vinoo has not paid rent, utilities, groceries, or any bills related to the Property until he was ordered to do so by Gilmore J. in an order dated January 6, 2025. The evidence indicates that he has paid some expenses since that time, but not all that are required to be paid by the order.
8Jagranie deposes that when Vinoo moved in, although Jagranie suffered from vision issues, Vinoo relied on Jagranie to clean, shop, and cook for the household. As Soogrim aged and grew in need of care, especially in 2021, Vinoo did not assist, but left the caregiving to Jagranie. Jagranie deposes that Vinoo becomes loud and aggressive when he is upset, so Jagranie did not challenge him because she did not want to create conflict. She also deposes that he sometimes drinks too much. She deposes that her relationship with Vinoo deteriorated in 2021.
9As noted, Soogrim died in December 2021. Jagranie was his sole heir pursuant to the terms of his will, dated August 31, 2019. If Jagranie predeceased Soogrim, Vinoo was the sole contingent heir of Soogrim’s estate.
10The evidence does not include a copy of Jagranie’s will, although the parties agree that Jagranie and her spouse made mirror wills. I thus infer that Jagranie’s will benefitted Soogrim, and that Vinoo was her sole contingent beneficiary in her 2019 will. The couple’s 2019 wills were prepared by a lawyer, Zahid Bashir.
11In December 2020, Mr. Bashir also prepared a power of attorney for personal care for Jagranie, in which she named Vinoo as her attorney. She did not prepare a power of attorney for property.
12Jagranie deposes that following Soogrim’s death, she was in a dazed state. She could not eat or sleep and she felt like she was living in a fog.
13Less than two months after Soogrim died, on February 7, 2022, Jagranie deposes that Vinoo took her to Mr. Bashir to effect a transfer of the Property from Jagranie to Jagranie and Vinoo as joint tenants. According to Jagranie, Vinoo made the appointment. Vinoo deposes that Jagranie made the appointment and advised him of it the day before. She asked him to take her to the lawyer’s office. Vinoo states that he met Mr. Bashir for the first time on February 7, 2022.
14Jagranie deposes that Vinoo told her that he was the executor of Soogrim’s estate, and the transfer was taking place to assist her in managing her assets. Jagranie deposes that she believed Vinoo, in part because of his real estate experience, that the transfer was for management purposes only and was being done in her interests.
15During cross-examinations, Jagranie inconsistently testified that she understood the purpose of the visit to Mr. Bashir was to register survivorship documents to remove Soogrim from title to the Property. In any case, the documents Jagranie signed transferred the Property to herself and Vinoo as joint tenants, for no consideration.
16Jagranie deposes that although she could not read the documents she was told to sign at Mr. Bashir’s office, no one read or explained them to her. She alleges that she was not given time to consider what she was signing, nor advised to obtain independent legal advice. She deposes that she felt like she was in a fog due to her ongoing grief.
17It appears that a lawyer, Mr. Ali Hamza Memom, who shared space with Mr. Bashir, attended to provide Jagranie with independent legal advice. Jagranie deposes that Mr. Memom did not explain anything to her about the transfer of the Property into joint tenancy. She denies that he was her lawyer.
18Mr. Bashir’s file was ordered produced pursuant to the order of Gilmore J. dated January 6, 2025. The documents received include a joint retainer agreement which is attached to an affidavit Jagranie swore in this proceeding. On cross-examination, she initially said she did not recall signing a retainer agreement with Mr. Bashir. She later denied signing anything more than a single document, which she states she understood to be a survivorship application. Yet she clearly signed more than one document at Mr. Bashir’s office.
19Mr. Memon’s file was also produced pursuant to the order of Gilmore J.
20Neither Mr. Bashir’s file nor Mr. Memom’s file was properly entered in evidence on this application, apart from the select portions attached to Jagranie’s affidavit. The documents were placed before Jagranie during her cross-examination, and ostensibly marked as Exhibit 1 to the examination, but Jagranie’s counsel objected to the documents being proved in that way. Jagranie was not able to see the documents properly and could not identify them. They should have been marked as a letter exhibit only.
21No affidavit from Mr. Bashir or Mr. Memom was filed, either deposing to the events of February 7, 2022, or even simply authenticating their files and indicating the files are complete. Neither Mr. Bashir nor Mr. Memom was served with a notice of examination at which time their evidence could have been taken, including identifying their files. There is no affidavit from anyone authenticating Mr. Bashir’s or Mr. Memom’s files as the files received from them pursuant to the order of Gilmore J.
22Following the visit to the lawyers, it appears that the relationship between Jagranie and Vinoo continued to face challenges. Jagranie is clearly upset with Vinoo for what she described as his threatening to admit her into a nursing home.
23Because of her fear that Vinoo would seek to place her in a nursing home, Jagranie executed a continuing power of attorney for property in September 2023 naming one of her daughters as her attorney for property. There is no evidence that Jagranie changed or revoked her power of attorney for personal care.
24Jagranie deposes that it was when she signed the power of attorney for property that she learned about the implications of the transfer of the Property that had taken place in February 2022. Thereafter, she took steps to sever the joint tenancy, but she remains concerned about Vinoo’s legal half interest in the Property, which could operate to disinherit her other children to the extent of half of the value of the home. She deposes that she never intended to gift Vinoo half (or all) of the Property.
25Jagranie asked Vinoo to relinquish his remaining 50% title to the Property but he refused.
26The dynamic in the home is tense. Jagranie deposes that she keeps her bedroom door locked at all times. Vinoo has refused to vacate the Property.
27On one occasion, an incident occurred between Vinoo and one of Jagranie’s daughters necessitating police involvement. Police were subsequently called on two other occasions in response to what Jagranie characterizes as Vinoo’s aggressive behaviour, including making death threats against Jagranie. Jagranie deposes that she cannot enjoy her home freely and peacefully while Vinoo resides there.
28Jagranie seeks an order that the Property be transferred fully to her as the sole registered legal and beneficial owner. She relies on the doctrine of resulting trust. She seeks an order that Vinoo vacate the Property immediately. She also relies on the doctrines of undue influence, unjust enrichment and constructive trust. Alternatively, she seeks a vesting order restoring her full legal and beneficial interest of the entire Property, in her name alone.
29Vinoo’s principal submission is that there are significant credibility disputes in this case that necessitate a trial, and that the oral evidence of Mr. Bashir and Mr. Memom will be necessary. He cannot explain why this position was not advanced at any case conference held in this matter, nor why neither lawyer was asked to deliver an affidavit nor compelled to attend an examination under r. 39.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194.
30In the alternative, Vinoo argues that the evidence in the record rebuts the presumption of resulting trust and proves that Jagranie intended to gift him with the Property in joint tenancy. He acknowledges she was entitled to sever the joint tenancy but maintains that the original gift cannot be revoked.
Issues
31This application raises the following issues for determination:
a. What is the scope of the evidence before me, and what, if any, use can be made of Mr. Bashir’s and Mr. Memom’s files?
b. Should this matter be converted to a trial?
c. Does the presumption of resulting trust apply, and if so, has it been rebutted?
d. Does the record establish undue influence and/or unjust enrichment, such that a constructive trust should be found?
e. Should a vesting order be made?
f. Should Vinoo be ordered to vacate the Property?
g. Costs.
The Scope of the Evidence on this Application
32The first question to be answered is the scope of the evidence.
33I conclude that the files of Mr. Bashir and Mr. Memom attached as Exhibit 1 to Jagranie’s cross-examination are not properly before me. Jagranie could not identify the files. They have not been properly identified and attested to by any other witness. As a result, the only portions of the documents I can consider are (i) the portions identified and attached to any of the affidavits before me, and (ii) any portion about which Jagranie gives evidence on cross-examination for the purpose of understanding her evidence, but not for proof of the truth of the contents of the document, unless Jagranie was able to identify the particular document in the lawyers’ files.
Should this application be converted to a trial?
34In my view, this application should not be converted to a trial.
35This application was commenced in 2024. If Vinoo sought a trial, it was incumbent on him to do so before the hearing of the application on the merits. Vinoo did not take any steps to obtain an affidavit from Mr. Bashir or Mr. Memom, nor did he take any steps to secure their evidence under r. 39.03. Having failed to do so, it is not appropriate at this stage of the litigation to say a trial must be held to obtain their evidence.
36Further, I see no reason why the evidence of the lawyers could not have been obtained through an examination outside of court or in written form. I see no reason why the regular evidence-gathering processes of an application would not suffice in this case.
37Vinoo has adduced next to no evidence; the only matter he puts in dispute through his own affidavit is who made the appointment with Mr. Bashir: him or Jagranie. The court is accustomed to making credibility determinations on a written record, and I see no points of departure that are so significant in this case that a trial would be required to resolve them.
38At the same time, an adjournment of the hearing on the merits to allow a trial to proceed would prejudice Jagranie, who at 88 years old, deposes that she is living in tense circumstances, and who has been waiting to have her matter heard for some time. There is no guarantee Jagranie will be available to testify at trial if this matter is adjourned to permit a trial to be held.
39Adjourning the hearing at this point for a trial would also lead to unnecessary costs to the parties and would not be a good use of the court’s resources.
40I conclude the matter can be adjudicated in its current form, and I proceed to do so.
Resulting Trust
41The gratuitous transfer of a property between a parent and a non-disabled adult child is subject to a presumption of a resulting trust: Pecore v. Pecore, 2007 SCC 17; Kerr v. Barranow, 2011 SCC 10, at paras. 17-18.
42As the Supreme Court of Canada held in Kerr, discussing its earlier holding in Pecore, in cases of gratuitous transfers, the actual intention of the grantor is the governing consideration. Where a gratuitous transfer is challenged, the trial judge commences her inquiry with the applicable presumption and weighs all of the evidence to ascertain, on a balance of probabilities, the transferor’s actual intention: Kerr, at para. 18.
43Where a gratuitous transfer is at issue, the onus is on the person receiving the transfer to demonstrate that a gift was intended, otherwise the transferee holds the property in trust for the transferor. Equity presumes bargains, not gifts: Kerr, at para. 19, Pecore, at para. 24.
44In this case, the transfer of the Property from Jagranie to Jagranie and Vinoo as joint tenants was made without consideration. The presumption of resulting trust applies. The question is whether Vinoo has rebutted the presumption.
45I find that he has, for the following reasons:
a. Soogrim’s will describes a testamentary plan under which Jagranie would be his heir, and if she predeceased him, Vinoo would become the sole heir. Jagranie made a mirror will. At least in 2019, the couple’s testamentary plan was to benefit Vinoo only on the death of the survivor of them.
b. The transfer of the Property from Jagranie to Jagranie and Vinoo jointly effected an inter vivos completion of the testamentary intention.
c. The conclusion that the transfer of Property was an inter vivos completion of the testamentary intention is supported the fact that Mr. Bashir had been Jagranie’s and Soogrim’s lawyer in connection with their wills, and Jagranie’s power of attorney for personal care; moreover, Vinoo had not met him before February 7, 2022. It defies common sense to think that Mr. Bashir, who had an existing relationship with Jagranie, would facilitate the transfer of the Property to Jagranie and Vinoo without Jagranie’s instructions, on the very same day he first met Vinoo.
d. I find that Jagranie made the appointment with Mr. Bashir and provided him with instructions to transfer the Property, which instructions he carried out.
e. On her cross-examination, Jagranie gave evidence that she decided to sever the joint tenancy because Vinoo was “threatening me to put me in nursing home. All the time [he] threaten me to put me in nursing home.” She agreed that threat was the “real reason” she wanted to “change everything.” While Jagranie now argues that these comments relate to the change in the power of attorney, it is clear from the transcript that they also relate to the severance of the joint tenancy. Notably, she did not say she sought to sever the joint tenancy because she never intended to grant it.
f. The evidence about Vinoo’s threat to put Jagranie in a nursing home in fact reveals Jagranie’s true motive: she regrets having put the house in joint tenancy with Vinoo because she is afraid of what he will do, or is angry about his threats to put her into a nursing home.
g. Moreover, Jagranie’s evidence was inconsistent during her cross-examination. While she originally deposed that the meeting with Mr. Bashir was to complete the transfer for asset management purposes (which suggests she understood there would be a transfer of interest to Vinoo), on cross-examination she said it was to complete the survivorship application. As another example, Jagranie denied signing more than one document, and thus the joint retainer with Vinoo, but also attached it to an affidavit purporting to identify it. I find that Jagranie’s evidence is not reliable.
46In conclusion on this issue, the presumption of resulting trust applies, but Vinoo has rebutted it having regard to the entirety of the evidence. At the time of the transfer of the Property from Jagranie to Jagranie and Vinoo jointly, Jagranie’s intention was to gift an interest in the whole of the Property and the right of survivorship to Vinoo.
Undue Influence
47Vulnerability and dependency are the hallmarks of undue influence: McMaster Estate v. McMaster, 2021 BCSC 1100, at para. 48.
48As the court held in Scott v. Cousins, [2001] O.J. No. 19 (ON SC), at para. 114, when considering whether undue influence has been established, the court looks to matters such as the willingness or disposition of the person alleged to have exercised it, whether an opportunity to do so existed, and the vulnerability of the transferor.
49In Abbruzzese v. Tucci, 2024 ONSC 957, at para. 201, aff’d 2025 ONCA 70, Gilmore J. reviewed indicators on which the court may rely to prove testamentary undue influence; these factors are equally relevant (modified as necessary) to proving undue influence with respect to an inter vivos transaction:
a. where the testator is dependent on the beneficiary for emotional and physical needs;
b. where the testator is socially isolated;
c. where the testator has experienced recent family conflict;
d. where the testator has experienced recent bereavement;
e. where the testator has made substantial pre-death transfer of wealth to the respondent;
f. where the testator has made a new will not consistent with prior wills;
g. where the testator has failed to provide a reason or explanation for unexpectedly excluding a family member;
h. where the testator uses a lawyer previously unknown to him or her and chosen by the respondent.
50Jagranie’s argument appears to centre on actual undue influence, as opposed to presumed undue influence. She argues that she was vulnerable, due to her vision impairment, the recent loss of her spouse, and her dependence on Vinoo, with whom she resided and whom she trusted.
51At the same time, Jagranie argues that her relationship with Vinoo had deteriorated, especially since 2021 when he failed to assist in Soogrim‘s care. When I asked counsel how Jagranie can have been completely trusting of Vinoo, while also maintaining that their relationship had deteriorated, I was told that Jagranie had no one else except Vinoo. When I pointed out that Jagranie’s affidavit indicates she was always close with two of her daughters, I was told that they did not live nearby. However, Jagranie’s affidavit also clearly states that her daughters lived within driving distance, and she saw them frequently.
52Jagranie’s written evidence does not fully square with her evidence on cross-examination, when she testified she had been estranged from her five children other than Vinoo, but had reconciled with two of them. The inconsistencies in Jagranie’s evidence cause me concern; as I have noted, I find her evidence to be unreliable.
53Nevertheless, I accept that Jagranie was at some risk of vulnerability vis à vis Vinoo, who has a history of taking advantage of Jagranie, including by living in her home without contributing to expenses or household chores, and by inviting his son and his son’s fiancée to move in without making any contribution to the household expenses. Vinoo may well have been willing to exploit any vulnerability Jagranie had for his own benefit.
54I also note the following evidence:
a. There is no suggestion that Jagranie’s competence is in issue.
b. I do not accept that Jagranie was socially isolated. Her own affidavit indicates she was close to her daughters and saw them frequently.
c. Jagranie was dependent on Vinoo for some of her physical needs, including driving her to Mr. Bashir’s office.
d. The family conflict present, to the extent there was any in February 2022, was between Jagranie and Vinoo. This conflict would not tend to make Jagranie more vulnerable to Vinoo, but rather less trusting of him.
e. Jagranie had experienced recent bereavement with the loss of her beloved husband of 67 years.
f. The transaction at issue was consistent with the 2019 testamentary planning of Soogrim and Jagranie.
g. The exclusion of Soogrim and Jagranie’s other children from their 2019 testamentary planning is not clearly explained, but it is clearly noted in Soogrim’s will. Some explanation may be found in Jagranie’s evidence on cross-examination that she had been estranged from her children other than Vinoo, although reconciled subsequently with two of them. Again, I have noted the inconsistency in this evidence with the evidence that she was very close to two daughters whom she saw frequently.
h. Finally, as I have found, Jagranie used a lawyer with whom she had a relationship, who had in fact done the testamentary planning that provided for Vinoo to be the sole contingent beneficiary for Jagranie and Soogrim, and subsequently the power of attorney for personal care for Jagranie in which she named Vinoo as her attorney. I have found that she made the appointment with Mr. Bashir and instructed Mr. Bashir herself. Vinoo only met him for the first time on the day of the transfer. I do not consider it plausible that Mr. Bashir disregarded Jagranie’s instructions. Jagranie’s evidence about what she expected to happen at her meeting with Mr. Bashir shifted between her affidavit evidence and her cross-examination transcript; her evidence of the encounter with Mr. Bashir is not reliable and I do not accept it.
55Thus, even assuming he were willing to take advantage of Jagranie, I find that Vinoo did not have the opportunity to exercise undue influence over Jagranie in the context of the transfer of the Property.
56I find that Jagranie has not discharged her burden of proof to establish actual undue influence.
57To the extent that Jagranie argues presumed undue influence, I note that a parent-child relationship does not always give rise to a presumption of undue influence. As the court held in McMaster Estate, at para. 50, a gratuitous transfer from a parent to an adult child does not automatically create a presumption of undue influence. To establish such a presumption, the plaintiff must establish the existence of a relationship of potential dominance between the parent and adult child. Once established, to rebut the presumption, the transferee must establish that the transferor entered into the transaction of her own full, free, and informed thought.
58Gilmore J. noted in Abbruzzese, at para. 284 that the presumption of undue influence may apply if the relationship between the parent and child is one of dependency, which is more prevalent in situations where the child has played a dominant role in the parent’s life, particularly as the parent grew older and had greater health concerns.
59Here, even assuming the relationship between Jagranie and Vinoo gives rise to a presumption of undue influence, I am satisfied on the evidence that Jagranie entered into the transaction of her own full, free, and informed thought. I have reviewed the evidence relevant to this conclusion above, but of particular note are my findings that Jagranie made the appointment with Mr. Bashir, whom Vinoo had not met before the date of the transfer, and Jagranie instructed him to complete the transfer herself, consistent with the testamentary plan she and Soogrim had developed in the wills Mr. Bashir completed for them in 2019, and consistent with the power of attorney for personal care Mr. Bashir prepared for her in 2020.
60I thus find that actual undue influence has not been established, and the presumption of undue influence, assuming it arises, has been rebutted.
Unjust Enrichment/Constructive Trust
61A constructive trust is a broad and flexible equitable tool used to determine beneficial entitlement to property where there has been unjust enrichment and monetary damages are inadequate: Kerr, at paras. 50-52.
62Unjust enrichment is established where there is an enrichment on the part of one party, a corresponding deprivation on the part of another, and no juristic reason for the enrichment: Kerr, at paras. 36-40.
63The claim Jagranie advances in unjust enrichment is simply answered: the juristic reason for Vinoo’s enrichment and Jagranie’s subsequent deprivation is her gift to him of a joint interest in the Property, followed by her decision to sever the joint tenancy. Unjust enrichment is not made out.
64Without unjust enrichment, there is no basis to grant the remedy of constructive trust.
Vesting Order
65The court is empowered under s. 100 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C. 43 to grant vesting orders.
66But vesting orders are not a mechanism to withdraw a gift that one regrets giving. Gifts are not revocable: Jackson v. Rosenberg, 2024 ONCA 875, at para. 31.
67In the circumstances, I am not prepared to grant an order vesting 100% of the legal ownership of the Property in Jagranie.
Should Vinoo be required to vacate the Property?
68I am concerned that Vinoo’s presence in the Property is a problem. Jagranie deposes that the relationship is tense. She should not be forced to live out her advanced years in such stressful circumstances.
69I am also concerned that Vinoo is not paying his full share of the upkeep of the Property.
70Although Jagranie seeks an order for the payment of Vinoo’s share of expenses, there is no properly founded request for that relief before me, nor any evidence that would allow me to assess what amount is outstanding.
71Moreover, Jagranie already has an order from Gilmore J. directing that Vinoo pay 50% of the groceries, utilities, tax, and insurance, which she can take steps to enforce.
72In these circumstances, I make no order with respect to expenses unpaid by Vinoo.
73With respect to Jagranie’s request that Vinoo be compelled to vacate the Property, I see no basis before me on which I can evict Vinoo from the Property given that I have found he is a 50% owner of it. If counsel can identify a basis on which Vinoo’s continued residence in the Property can be terminated, it will require, at the very least, a new motion, if not a new proceeding.
Costs
74At the hearing of the application, I proposed to the parties that they upload their costs outlines and any offers to settle, clearly marked, so I would not inadvertently review them prior to writing reasons on the merits. I suggested that once the reasons on the merits were done, I would review the costs materials filed and make a determination of costs based on those documents. Counsel were agreeable to my suggestion. This is the process I have followed.
75The three main purposes of modern costs rules are to indemnify successful litigants for the costs of litigation, to encourage settlement, and to discourage and sanction inappropriate behaviour by litigants: see Fong v. Chan (1999), 1999 2052 (ON CA), 46 O.R. (3d) 330, at para. 22.
76Subject to the provisions of an act or the rules of this court, costs are in the discretion of the court, pursuant to s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act. The court exercises its discretion considering the factors enumerated in r. 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, including the principle of indemnity, the reasonable expectations of the unsuccessful party, and the complexity and importance of the issues. Overall, costs must be fair and reasonable: see Boucher v. Public Accountants Council for the Province of Ontario (2004), 2004 14579 (ON CA), 71 O.R. (3d) 291 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 38. A costs award should reflect what the court views as a fair and reasonable contribution by the unsuccessful party to the successful party rather than any exact measure of the actual costs to the successful litigant: see Zesta Engineering Ltd. v. Cloutier (2002), 2002 25577 (ON CA), 21 C.C.E.L. (3d) 161 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 4.
77Vinoo is the successful party on this application and is presumptively entitled to his costs. In his costs outline, he seeks costs of $6,760.87. In contrast, Jagranie’s costs outline indicates that her partial indemnity costs total $58,618.12.
78The only offer to settle delivered was made by Jagranie, and more or less, sought Vinoo’s capitulation on the application. She did not beat it. It is not relevant to my assessment of costs.
79In my view, the costs sought by Vinoo are more than reasonable. Although I am not surprised that his costs are significantly lower than Jagranie’s, given that he did not produce much material on the motion, his counsel did produce a brief affidavit, and a factum, had to review Jagranie’s material, attended cross-examinations and made argument at the hearing. The costs sought are fair and reasonable having regard to the work done. Moreover, given Jagranie’s own costs, they are well within her reasonable expectations.
80I thus conclude that Jagranie shall pay Vinoo’s costs of this application, fixed at $6,760.87 within thirty days.
Summary of Orders Made
81I make the following orders:
a. Jagranie’s application is dismissed, without prejudice to her ability to commence a motion or an application seeking to remove Vinoo from the Property on a basis other than his alleged lack of ownership interest in the Property; and
b. Jagranie shall pay Vinoo’s costs of this application, fixed at $6,760.87 within thirty days.
J.T. Akbarali J.
Date: April 10, 2026