G.P.R. v. A.K., 2026 ONSC 2148

G.P.R. v. A.K., 2026 ONSC 2148

CITATION: G.P.R. v. A.K., 2026 ONSC 2148

COURT FILE NO.: FC-22-395-01

DATE: 20260410

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

G.P.R.

Applicant Mother

– and –

A.K.

Respondent Father

Fadwa Yehia, for the Applicant Mother

Maninder (Monty) Sheena, for the Respondent Father

George van Hoogenhuise, counsel for the Office of the Children’s Lawyer, for the child, L.N.K.

HEARD: IN WRITING

RULING ON 14B MOTION Dated FEBRUARY 4, 2026

FOR LEAVE TO COMMENCE A MOTION TO CHANGE

JUSTICE ALEX FINLAYSON

PART I: OVERVIEW

1The Court heard a multi-day trial in this matter in May, June and July of 2025 concerning this family. The Court released its Judgment on September 22, 2025: see G.P.R. v. A.K., 2025 ONSC 5398, and a Supplementary Judgment about costs and other remaining matters, on January 21, 2026: see G.P.R. v. A.K., 2026 ONSC 409. This ruling should be read in conjunction with those Judgments.

2For the numerous and frankly troubling reasons set out in the main Judgment, the Court awarded the Applicant mother primary residence and sole decision making of the parties’ child, L. (age 13), and it ordered that the father could only have virtual supervised parenting time with the child, on strict conditions. The Court ordered that the father will require leave of this Court before bringing a Motion to Change either the parenting terms or child support, and it set out a process for leave to be obtained by 14B Motion.

3The father brings a 14B Motion dated February 4, 2026 seeking leave to commence a Motion to Change the parenting terms set out in the Judgment. Although it was dated February 4, 2026, the father’s 14B Motion was just sent to me in chambers for this week.

4The grounds in the father’s 14B Motion state that he has complied with the preconditions in the Judgment before any Motion to Change may be brought, they state that there is new evidence, being a mental health assessment that has been procured, they state that assessment directly addresses the risk factors identified by the Court in the Judgment, and they argue in general, that supervised parenting time is restrictive, so the father should be able to proceed. Additional details relevant to these statements and arguments are expanded upon in the father’s accompanying affidavit sworn February 4, 2026.

5The accompanying affidavit is 92 pages long, inclusive of exhibits. The exhibits include a therapy letter dated January 22, 2026, a psychological assessment, and notes from five supervised virtual visits that the father had since the Judgment, which occurred on dates between November, 2025 and early February, 2026.

6The father’s 14B Motion does not specify which parenting terms he would seek to vary in his proposed Motion to Change, should he be permitted to proceed. Were the Court inclined to grant leave, I would have limited the scope of the proposed new litigation to certain paragraphs of the Final Order respecting the father’s parenting time only. However the Court is not prepared to grant leave at this time.

7The father’s 14B Motion for leave to commence a Motion to Change is denied because:

(a) The father has not proven that he has “complied with the preconditions” that are required of him by the Judgment before commencing a Motion to Change;

(b) The notes of the five supervised virtual visits, reveal that the father continues to lack insight into his actions. He has actually breached, or tried to breach, several parenting provisions in the Judgment so far during his five virtual visits; and

(c) I am not satisfied based on the record that he filed, that the risk factors have been addressed, despite his argument in the 14B Motion to the contrary.

PART II: ANALYSIS

A. The Preconditions To Be Satisfied Before Brining a Motion to Change

8The preconditions for the father to obtain permission to bring a Motion to Change parenting time are set out in ¶ 680 (p) – (u) of the Judgment. For ease of reference, I reproduce that part of the Judgment/Final Order in full, here.

680(p) There shall be no Motions to Change the parenting terms set out in this Order until the father does the following:

i. The father shall receive therapy with a qualified therapist, who also has training and experience with family violence and the impact on children from high conflict separations and divorce;

ii. The therapist shall be provided with a copy of this Judgment;

iii. The father shall work with the therapist to address the issues identified in this Judgment, relating to the family violence the Court has found he committed, his anger, about how not to expose the child to adult conflict and inappropriate conversations about the past, and to help him gain insight into the consequences of his actions on the child;

iv. The father shall enroll in and complete the Partner Assault Response program;

v. The father shall obtain a comprehensive mental health assessment from a licensed psychologist or a psychiatrist who is a member of a college, such as the College of Psychologists of Ontario. The professional should also have training and experience in addressing family violence and the impact on children from high conflict separations and divorce. Membership in an organization such as the Association of Family and Conciliation Courts would be an asset. The father shall fully cooperate with the assessor, which means includes providing any information to him or her, such as any medical documentation that the assessor requests, and which includes submitting to any testing. Any comment in an assessment report that the assessor was unable to access information or documentation or complete testing due to the father’s lack of cooperation, or that the father in general did not cooperate with his or her process, may be taken into account by the Court in deciding to grant leave to commence a Motion to Change in the future;

vi. A copy of this Judgment shall be provided to the psychologist or psychiatrist undertaking this mandate; and

vii. The father shall provide a copy of the mental health assessment to his therapist, and to the mother when he receives it, and he shall implement its treatment recommendations;

(q) The father shall be required to obtain leave to bring a Motion to Change the parenting terms in this Order by 14B Motion. The 14B Motion shall not be served upon the mother. The affidavit in support of his 14B Motion for leave shall be no more than five pages in length, double spaced. He shall make reference to this Judgment and its citation in the 14B Motion, but he need not attach it given its length;

(r) Attached as exhibits to the father’s five page affidavit in support of any 14B Motion for leave, shall be a letter from his therapist setting out his or her qualifications, confirmation that he or she has read the Judgment, confirmation that he or she has read the mental health assessment, and setting out the frequency of the sessions that the father has had with the therapist, the topics addressed, and the father’s progress;

(s) The father shall also attach a copy of the mental health assessment, and in the body of the affidavit, he shall provide evidence as to the steps he has taken to implement any of the recommendations contained therein, his progress, and confirmation that a copy of the assessment has been provided to the mother;

(t) The father shall obtain and attach the notes of his supervised virtual visits; and

(u) The Court will then decide whether to permit the father to commence a Motion to Change on notice to the mother.

9I will now address why the father hasn’t met the preconditions, and why another round of litigation is not in L.’s best interests at this time, under the circumstances.

B. The Father’s Psychological Assessment

10The father did submit to a psychological assessment with Mehdi Lotfalizadeh. The psychological assessment report dated January 19, 2026 was supplied to the mother as ordered; and to the father’s therapist as ordered too (see below). In the circumstances of this case, the father’s disclosure of this assessment report only partially satisfies the preconditions.

11Mr. Lotfalizadeh’s clinical opinion, based on a single, virtual meeting with the father and the administration of “Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI)”, is that he was “not able to identify any clinically significant psychological impairment”. Mr. Lotfalizadeh goes on to write that there are “signs and symptoms of emotional stability problem and impulsive behaviours that, even though not clinically significant, still need to be addressed”. Mr. Lotfalizadeh then recommends ongoing treatment and counselling, and re-assessment after 12 months of treatment. The Court has several concerns with the substance of this assessment report, especially when considered in light of the Judgment.

12Regarding his qualifications, Mr. Lotfalizadeh is a licensed clinical psychologist in Ontario. The report states that he has more than 13 years of experience teaching psychology as a university lecture in Iran, 11 years of experience doing Independent Psychological Assessments, and 32 years of experience in the assessment and intervention with psychologically challenged claimants. The report states that the emphasis of Mr. Lotfalizadeh’s practice is on the assessment and treatment of the sequela of psychological trauma. It also states that he holds certain memberships, such as in the Ontario Psychological Association.

13But at paragraph 608(p)(v.) of the Judgment, I wrote that the psychologist undertaking the assessment should have training and experience in addressing family violence and the impact on children from high conflict separations and divorce. I do not see that in Mr. Lotfalizadeh’s qualifications. Perhaps he has this experience, but it is not so stated in the summary of his qualifications in the report.

14Relatedly, the Judgment states that membership in an organization such as the Association of Family and Conciliation Courts would be an asset. While not being a member of the AFCC is not necessarily a fatal defect to the Court granting leave, I nevertheless note that membership in the AFCC or a similar organization is also absent from the summary of Mr. Lotfalizadeh’s qualifications. In tandem with Mr. Lotfalizadeh’s failure to comment on his training and experience addressing mental health in the unique family law context that confronts this family, this is concerning. It is concerning specifically, given the evidence the father gave during the trial, about not wanting to submit to an assessment by any psychologist who might be one of the “usual suspects” (or something to that effect), all of whom he views as biased.

15As the father said during the trial, he is not willing to by assessed by a professional, who does mental health work, with litigants in the family court system. Yet they are the precise psychologists who have been qualified by family courts before to give expert opinion evidence. They are the precise psychologists who not only understand the unique challenges that family litigants suffering from mental health diagnoses, and who are in high conflict cases like this one face. They are the precise psychologists who are best suited to understand the important context, of the impact on children.

16Regarding the thoroughness of this assessment, paragraph 608(p)(v.) of the Judgment required as a precondition, the father to fully cooperate with the assessor. Full cooperation as defined in the Judgment, meant providing any information to the assessor, such as medical documentation as requested, and submitting to testing.

17There is reference in the assessment report to a mental status examination having been done, but it appears to have been based on self-reporting. There is no indication in the report as to whether medical documentation was sought by the assessor, and if it was, then there is no indication in the report that medical documentation was in fact then supplied to, or obtained by the assessor independently. Perhaps the assessor didn’t ask, but if so, then relying heavily on self-reporting in this case is problematic. It is problematic given the evidence I heard during this trial, about the father’s behaviour and about the gaps in his medical productions. That evidence was what warranted the order for the assessment in the first place. And there is also a post-trial submission the father made (see below), that is concerning.

18On page 2 of the assessment report, Mr. Lotfalizadeh writes that the father self-reported two incidents from his “psychological history” wherein he said he had been told by a psychologist, in 2013, of a “likely bipolar disorder”. This part of the report also refers to reports of manic and depressed episodes, long periods of depression, and lack of motivation. The father even apparently told Mr. Lotfalizadeh that he was advised to go for more tests back then, but he was feeling better and his family doctor “opined that there is no reason for those tests”. The father told Mr. Lotfalizadeh that there was no diagnosis formulated. For some reason, Mr. Lotfalizadeh appears to have accepted these statements, without probing further or looking into this history.

19Quite remarkably, in the father’s own costs submissions filed after the trial, the father claimed to have a bi-polar diagnosis that was now being treated. Specifically, at ¶ 13 of the father’s written costs submissions, the father claims he “is now being treated for his bi-polar so it does not play as significant of a role if future litigation is required”. The father made this statement in the context of costs submissions in which he was trying to limit his liability to pay based on bad behaviour. He has now contradicted that very submission, through his reports to Mr. Lotfalizadeh, to obtain a report that suits a different purpose.

20Either the father’s cost submission was inaccurate and misleading to suit one purpose, or what he said to Mr. Lotfalizadeh was inaccurate and misleading, designed to suit another. And if Mr. Lotfalizadeh was given inaccurate information, then that calls into question the reliability of this single visit, virtual mental health assessment that he did, and the opinions he gave.

21As already indicated, the assessment report refers to “standard psychological tests reflected in [the father’s] honest response” having been done. The PAI is the only test that was done. While the nature of the PAI testing is described, the testing data is not summarized in the report. There is little explanation as to why this testing, and not other tests, were selected and administered by the assessor.

22In summary, I have doubts that this assessment was “comprehensive” as required by ¶ 608(p)(v.) of the Judgment, and I am left questioning the reliability of the opinion contained therein.

23Finally, the report does not state that the assessor was provided (or read) the Court’s Judgment either, a requirement of ¶ 608(p)(vi.) of the Judgment. That is concerning for different, obvious reasons (possible non-compliance with the preconditions; Mr. Lotfalizadeh not being made aware of the Court’s findings).

24Therefore, the father has not satisfied me that:

(a) the assessor has experience in the assessment and treatment of mental health that are necessary in the unique family law context that presents here, and more particularly in the troubling circumstances of this case;

(b) the assessment report was comprehensive;

(c) the assessor’s conclusions are reliable; or

(d) that the assessor read the Judgment and was aware of all the facts.

C. The Father’s Therapy

25I heard evidence at the trial that the father had undergone some therapy (that he stopped before the trial was over) with Pat Coley. He did not call Ms. Coley to testify, and she was not cross-examined. As indicated in the Judgment, this proved problematic when it came to crafting a remedy.

26As indicated, at ¶ 680(p)(i)-(iii) of the Judgment, the father was ordered, as a precondition to seeking leave to bring a Motion to Change, to provide a copy of the Judgment to a therapist, and to re-engage in therapy. The therapist was to have training and experience with family violence and the impact on children from high conflict separations and divorce.

27The father has partially satisfied these preconditions, in that he has decided to return to Ms. Coley as of earlier this year. Ms. Coley has been provided with a copy of the Judgment, and in her letter of January 22, 2026, she confirms that she has read it. She says she has the qualifications and experience required.

28Furthermore, at ¶ 680(p)(iv) of the Judgment, the father was required to complete the Partner Assault Response program (PARS) as a precondition, too. The father says that he is not able to do so due to the PARS program’s rules, but he says that Ms. Coley is able to provide similar programming. Ms. Coley also confirms that she can provide similar treatment. I am prepared to accept that pre-condition can be satisfied through working Ms. Coley.

29However, that is the extent of the father satisfying the preconditions about therapy. He has not met another, indeed the most significant precondition, regarding his therapy.

30What the father says in his affidavit of February 4, 2026 (Ms. Coley also confirms this in her letter), is that he attended 18 sessions in the past. This is nothing more than a reference to prior therapy that pre-dates the Judgment, and about which the father chose not to call evidence at the trial. This is not evidence of the new therapy required to satisfy the precondition in the Judgment, to obtain leave.

31The father then says that Ms. Coley has confirmed that he has been very engaged in therapy, made progress, and so forth, and he goes on to explain what his “current [therapy] plan” is. While Ms. Coley does in her letter talk about the father’s level of engagement, once again both she and the father are speaking about the past therapy. What neither Ms. Coley nor the father do, is address ¶ 680(r) of the Judgment. That paragraph requires, as a precondition, that the father obtain a letter from a therapist setting out the topics addressed and the father’s progress in a new course of therapy, post-trial. While both the father and Ms. Coley talked about a future plan that they would now start working on, there is an absence of evidence of its implementation. There is an about the father’s current progress in that plan.

32Finally, Ms. Coley’s letter relies on the mental health assessment, that the Court has expressed concerns about.

D. The Father’s Supervised Visits Have Raised Additional Best Interests Concerns

33Relatedly, as set out in ¶ 680(p)(iii) of the Judgment, part of the mandate of the new course of therapy, was for the father to learn about how not to expose the child to adult conflict and inappropriate conversations about the past, and to help him gain insight into the consequences of his actions on the child. I am not satisfied that the father has started to acquire those skills, and I am concerned that behaviour he has engaged in since the trial, continues to be harmful.

34I have reviewed the notes of the five supervised visits that the father supplied the Court with, attached to his February 4, 2026 affidavit. While there are some positive aspects of the visits reflected in the notes, when coupled with his ongoing failure to produce proper mental health and therapy evidence, the notes reveal too many instances of continued problematic behaviour, now during his supervised virtual visits. In fact, there has been problematic behaviour documented in each of the visit notes that he supplied.

35In this regard, the notes reveal:

(a) At the very first visit on November 13, 2025, the father told L., to tell her mother, not to send him messages via App Close, because he didn’t want to use it. The supervision staff person had to place him in a virtual waiting room after he said this. It appears he then engaged in some argument or conflict with the supervisor, when they tried to give him feedback about why such a statement was inappropriate. He referred to other professionals previously involved in this case as “biased” in the process, allegations that he raised at the trial, and that I comprehensively addressed in the Judgment;

(b) This very behaviour is either a breach of other terms of the Judgment, or it is a statement (about App Close) that if acted on, would be a breach. It amounts specifically to actual or anticipated breaches of ¶ 680(g)-(i) of the Judgment (requirement to use App Close for certain purposes) and ¶ 680(s)(iv) (requirement not to discuss adult issues with the child);

(c) Next, at his visit on November 27, 2025, the father told the child that he had sent her emails, and he asked her to respond. He asked the child to invite him to her sports games. He also wanted to show the child a text message. When the father was re-directed by staff, he complained that the rules were too restrictive. This behaviour likewise violates or amounts to an attempt to violate several of the restrictions in the Judgment that permit supervised virtual contact only, on strict terms. The father was not authorized to see or communicate with the child outside of the virtual visits;

(d) Likewise, next on December 11, 2025, the father asked the child to go to a family function. He pressed the issue. The child said she was not comfortable. He also told the child she could email him if she wanted;

(e) Next, on January 8, 2026, the father asked the child if she missed him. L. shrugged and said yes. The father proceeded to tell the child that he wasn’t doing well, and that he wanted to hear her say that she missed him. He also told L. that she could call him if she wanted (another attempt to pressure her to have contact, outside of the supervised virtual visits); and

(f) On February 5, 2026, the father raised the subject of the child attending another school. He did this even though the mother is the parent who has decision-making responsibility, pursuant to ¶ 680(b) of the Judgment.

36What the notes cumulatively reveal as well, is that the supervisors tried to stop the father from acting in this fashion, more than once. This is continuing evidence of ungovernability. Having heard multiple days of evidence in this case and having made the findings that were made in the Judgment, I have no doubt that the behaviour summarized above amounted to unnecessary pressure on this child, and it made her feel uncomfortable.

37The father would be well served to re-read the rules of his supervised visits in ¶ 680(s) of the Judgment, and to re-read the consequences at ¶ 680 (s)(x), should for example the supervisor cease to continue to act, on account of ongoing violations of the rules.

E. Summary and Conclusion

38I am not satisfied that it is in this child’s best interests for her parents to re-engage in litigation at this time, even if it is just more narrow litigation focused only on the father’s parenting time, given the above. The preconditions have not been met. For these reasons, the 14B Motion is denied.

PART III: ORDER

39I make the following Orders:

(a) The father’s 14B Motion dated February 4, 2026 is dismissed;

(b) A copy of this Ruling shall be sent to the parties, through their counsel, and to counsel for the Office of the Children’s Lawyer; and

(c) The father or his counsel shall send to the mother’s lawyer and to counsel for the OCL, a copy of his 14B Motion and affidavit sworn February 4, 2026, for their records, as the 14B Motion was brought without notice as directed by me in the Judgment.