Court File and Parties
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: Elzbieta Wilamowski, Applicant
AND: Andrij Kostyrko, Respondent
BEFORE: The Honourable Madam Justice Law
COUNSEL: Monika Curyk, Counsel, for the Applicant Guy Hunter, Counsel, for the Respondent
HEARD: April 1 and 2, 2026
Endorsement
1This is a motion brought by the father, Andrij Kostyrko for the return of his two children, A. K. (11 years old) and J. K. (10 years old), from British Columbia back to their habitual residence in Ontario, and for the enforcement of parenting time as set out in a prior order, upon their return. The mother, Elzbieta Wilamowski, concedes that the children’s habitual residence is in Ontario and that she removed the children in contravention of a court order. She argues that the court should nevertheless retroactively grant her temporary request for relocation.
2This is a very difficult decision which forces this court to wrestle with the application of the test for interim relocations post-Diallo v. Bah, 2025 ONSC 2106 (Div. Ct.), where the parent proposing to move has repeatedly disobeyed court orders. Based on the evidence, the court is concerned that retroactively approving of the mother’s relocation may lead to the complete destruction of the children’s relationship with their father. Although the mother blames the father for the children’s current estrangement, on the evidence before me I am unable to determine the cause of the estrangement or whether the relocation is in the children’s best interests.
3For the reasons that follow, I have determined that the children must return to their habitual residence in Stoney Creek, Ontario, by July 10, 2026, that the children and the father must immediately begin reunification therapy over Zoom (which is then to continue in-person over the summer while they are in Ontario), and that a trial on the relocation issue shall be heard during the sittings commencing October 26, 2026.
Background
4The parties were married on November 15, 2013, and separated on March 22, 2016. The separation was acrimonious, with police and children’s aid involvement.
5On August 20, 2018, the parties entered into a consent final order, the relevant portions of which included the following parenting and geographic limitations:
a. The mother has sole custody of the children and primary parenting time.
b. The father has unsupervised access to the children for six hours, twice a week, during the weekdays and every other weekend.
c. All holidays are shared equally except the father would have one week every summer.
d. The mother may travel for two months a year outside of Canada without the written consent of the father, with travel itinerary to be provided.
e. The mother shall not change the residence of the children from more than 15 km of Mississauga without the prior written consent of the father or a court order.
6The August 20, 2018 consent order was never changed and remains the operative order up to today.
7The following are the undisputed facts after the August 20, 2018 order was entered into:
a. Both parties have re-partnered. The father started living with Lasha Racquel (Wilson) in late 2019. In September 2021, the mother met her new partner, Grzegorz Wilamowski. They began living together in late 2022 and married on January 12, 2025.
b. In March 2020, during the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic and on the advice of counsel, the father withheld the children from the mother. The mother obtained an order on April 7, 2020, ordering the father to return the children to her home in Mississauga. The father complied with the order.
c. In early January 2023, A.K., who was 9 years old at the time, decided he did not want to see his father. The mother continued to drive A.K. to visits, but he refused to go with his father. There is no evidence that the mother encouraged or otherwise pressed A.K. to comply with the court-ordered parenting time.
d. In 2024, at the mother’s insistence, the parenting exchanges were changed to occur at the 11th Division Police Station. J.K. continued to go to her visits.
e. In May 2024, the mother and her family received an N5 eviction notice advising they had 7 days to fix the issues, or risk eviction. She promptly found a place to live in Stoney Creek. Stoney Creek is more than 15km from Mississauga. She had her lawyer serve the father with a Notice of Relocation, as required under the Divorce Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.). The father did not consent to her move. Notwithstanding the lack of consent, in June 2024, the mother moved with the children to Stoney Creek. She did not obtain a court order authorizing the move.
f. On September 21, 2024, J.K., who was 8 years old at the time, also decided she did not want to see her father anymore. Again, the mother continued to drive J.K. and A.K. to the parenting exchanges at the police station, however, neither child agreed to go with their father. There is no other evidence that the mother encouraged or otherwise pressed the children to comply with the court-ordered parenting time.
g. On December 18, 2024, the father proposed that he and the mother attend therapy to address their strained relationship and the children’s refusal to see him. The mother rejected this proposal, accusing the father of “using children or therapy as pawns in your disgusting game just to be near me or to gain information about me.” She also said that his email could be considered criminal harassment.
h. The father continued to attend at parenting exchanges. The mother continued to drive the children to the parenting exchanges. The children did not go with him. The parties have different reasons for why this is the case. Neither party brought a motion to enforce or change the final parenting order.
i. On February 9, 2025, the children’s counsellor, Joanna Gut, prepared a “psychosocial assessment” of the children at the mother’s request. Ms. Gut had been privately retained by the mother to provide counselling for the children. That report stated that Ms. Gut met with the mother and the children on four occasions. According to Ms. Gut, the children said they did not wish to see their father. They complained about the conditions of the father’s home. They did not disclose any violent behavior by the father towards them.
j. In early 2025, the mother’s partner found employment with ESW Building Services. He was apparently hired as an operations manager in British Columbia, earning a salary of $140,000 per year. He moved to British Columbia and travelled to Ontario two to three times per month to be with the mother and the children.
k. The mother formed an intention to move and consulted a lawyer in March or April 2025. She moved with the children in July 2025. She did not serve the father with a Notice of Relocation. She admits to moving to British Columbia without the father’s knowledge or consent.
l. The mother filed a motion to change sworn on August 1, 2025. Her documents did not disclose that she had already moved to British Columbia. In fact, the mother stated that she would bring an urgent motion to seek authorization to permit her to move. She never brought the urgent motion. The mother sought “no access” between the father and the children in her motion to change.
m. It was not until August 8, 2025, that the mother told the father she and the children were not in Ontario. In a message sent to the father via Our Family Wizard, the mother only stated that she and the children “are currently out of the province” and that he would be receiving court documents shortly. She did not tell him where she moved with their children. On September 2, 2025, the father formally advised the mother, through counsel, that he did not consent to her moving with the children to British Columbia.
n. The father retained a lawyer and responded promptly to the mother’s motion to change, filing his response to motion to change on September 3, 2025, and obtaining an urgent DRO conference on November 27, 2025.
o. After the DRO conference, the father attempted to set a date to argue his motion. No motion date was available to the mother’s counsel and the court until December 3, 2025.
p. On December 3, 2025, Kril J. determined that the matter should be addressed on a long motion, set before me on April 1 and 2, 2026.
q. Since moving to British Columbia, the mother has facilitated zero parenting time between the children and the father, not even supervised parenting time over Zoom.
r. The mother has refused to provide her address in British Columbia to the father. Her court documents do not list her address.
s. The mother has one child with her new partner, born on June 2, 2025, and is expecting another child in June 2026.
The Parties’ Narratives
8Other than the above undisputed facts, the parties disagree on almost every other fact.
9The mother’s narrative can be summarized as follows:
a. The father was abusive and controlling throughout their marriage and after separation.
b. The father was charged with assault and mischief as a result of an incident that led to their separation. She says that the father’s conviction on April 6, 2017, is proof that he is abusive.
c. The children’s aid society was involved and verified risk of physical and emotional harm. This verification was made based on the parties’ conflict in the home. There was no verification of actual physical harm to the children.
d. Although the parenting orders in the August 20, 2018 order initially worked, the father continued to interfere and control her life.
e. The children reported that the father and his partner made derogatory and threatening statements about her during visits.
f. The reason A.K. refused visits was because the father hit him during the last visit he attended in January 2023.
g. Similarly, the reason J.K. refused visits was because of a violent incident at the father’s home in September 2024.
h. She was subjected to harassment by the father and his partner. They posted slanderous content about her on social media.
i. The father and his partner allegedly caused her to be evicted from her rental accommodations in Mississauga which led to her moving to Stoney Creek. She said that she had “no choice” but to move to Stoney Creek without the father’s consent.
j. She did not notify the father of her move to British Columbia because of his harassment and the fact that she had significant demands on her time due to being the sole caregiver for three children, including a newborn.
10The mother argues that the best interests of the children is the only factor the court should consider. She argues that it is the father’s burden to show that the return of the children from British Columbia is in their best interests. She says that given the father has had no parenting time with the children for years prior to the relocation, the children’s interests are best served by allowing them to remain in British Columbia, pending the resolution of her motion to change. She says that she and the children would be exposed to harassment and conflict if they are returned to Ontario and that the move back to Ontario would be disruptive for them.
11The father has a completely different story. His narrative can be summarized as follows:
a. The mother had repeatedly made false allegations about him and his family.
b. Any serious conflict between himself and the mother occurred prior to 2018, but not after they entered into a consent order.
c. The children’s aid society was involved prior to the August 20, 2018 order. However, after the parties entered into the August 20, 2018 order, the mother continued to call the children’s aid society with false allegations about him and her partner’s farm. These allegations were investigated by the children’s aid society and closed. He even invited the mother and another third party to see the farm to address her worries.
d. The mother has anger problems and mental health issues. This was apparent even during their relationship.
e. He had a good relationship with the children prior to 2023, and in particular, prior to the mother re-partnering. The children would reside with him and his partner during his parenting time without issue.
f. He denies ever hitting the children.
g. The last time A.K. visited with him, he had called the mother when A.K. was “acting strange”. When the mother came to the home, she immediately started blaming him and his family and accusing them of abusing A.K.
h. He and his family recounted J.K.’s abnormal behaviour on the last day she spent with them in September 2024. His brother provided an affidavit stating that after the visit, an officer from Peel Regional Police called stating that the mother had accused him of beating J.K. and hurting her arm, which was patently false. The police allegedly stated that the mother’s story did not make any sense.
i. While the mother brings the children in her car to the parenting exchanges, she refuses to let them come to him.
j. The mother put up defamatory “wanted” posters of him in her apartment so that the children would see him as a criminal.
k. He and his partner did not cause the mother to be evicted. The eviction notice received by the mother does not identify him and his partner as causing the behaviour that led to the notice. The eviction notice could have been a result of the behaviour of the mother, her partner, or other associates.
l. He did not proceed to court to enforce the August 20, 2018 order because he thought he could work it out with the mother. He thought that proposing therapy would be more appropriate, however, this was unsuccessful.
12The father argues that the mother should not be permitted to wrongfully retain the children in British Columbia. He argues that the mother had manufactured a situation where he has not seen his children for years. He says that the mother has engaged in a campaign to isolate him from his children. He says that the mother should not be permitted to create an advantageous status quo through self-help. The court should not reward a litigant who does not comply with court orders.
Legal Considerations
13The mother concedes that this court has jurisdiction to make an order and that the children’s habitual residence is Ontario. This is clearly correct. The mother removed the children in contravention of a court order which required her to remain within 15km of Mississauga, Ontario. The father did not acquiesce to the move. Any delay in having this motion heard was solely due to the court’s scheduling and not because of the father’s delay.
14Because there is a pre-existing parenting order, the court must first consider whether there is a material change in circumstances: Barendregt v. Grebliunas, 2022 SCC 22, [2022] 1 S.C.R. 517, at para. 112. Since the August 20, 2018 order, the mother relocated twice in contravention of the order: once to Stoney Creek and more recently to British Columbia. In addition, the relationship between the father and the children has drastically changed. There is clearly a material change in circumstances.
15Whether the mother’s move is a “relocation” or a “change of residence” was not fully argued by the parties. However, both parties appeared to concede that the mother’s move is a “relocation” as defined by the Divorce Act. Both parties provided caselaw that assumed the mother’s move was a relocation and argued the motion essentially on that basis.
16However, even if the parties had not conceded this issue, I would have determined that the mother’s move is a relocation. The mother’s move significantly impacts the father’s relationship with the children and is in direct violation of the August 20, 2018 final order which, to this date, remains the operative order and court-ordered status quo. In addition, given that there was a clear term in the final order of August 20, 2018 limiting the mother’s ability to move (which she clearly breached), I find that the mother’s move is most fairly characterized as a relocation.
17Therefore, the only issue to be determined by this court is whether it should authorize the mother’s relocation to British Columbia on a temporary basis, given the circumstances as described above.
18Prior to the amendments to the Divorce Act, Gordon v. Goertz, 1996 191 (SCC), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 27, was the governing authority for mobility applications. In Barendregt, the Supreme Court considered the continued applicability of Gordon and held that the legislative changes in the Divorce Act largely mirrored developments in the common law since Gordon, with a few notable exceptions. It is clear from Barendregt that the relocation provisions in the Divorce Act are meant to provide a framework for judicial decision-making in relocation cases.
19The relevant relocation provisions are located at ss. 16.9 to 16.94 of the Divorce Act:
Relocation Notice
16.9 (1) A person who has parenting time or decision-making responsibility in respect of a child of the marriage and who intends to undertake a relocation shall notify, at least 60 days before the expected date of the proposed relocation and in the form prescribed by the regulations, any other person who has parenting time, decision-making responsibility or contact under a contact order in respect of that child of their intention.
Content of notice
(2) The notice must set out
(a) the expected date of the relocation;
(b) the address of the new place of residence and contact information of the person or child, as the case may be;
(c) a proposal as to how parenting time, decision-making responsibility or contact, as the case may be, could be exercised; and
(d) any other information prescribed by the regulations.
Exception
(3) Despite subsections (1) and (2), the court may, on application, provide that the requirements in those subsections, or in the regulations made for the purposes of those subsections, do not apply or may modify them, including where there is a risk of family violence.
Application without notice
(4) An application referred to in subsection (3) may be made without notice to any other party.
Relocation authorized
16.91 (1) A person who has given notice under section 16.9 and who intends to relocate a child may do so as of the date referred to in the notice if
(a) the relocation is authorized by a court; or
(b) the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) the person with parenting time or decision-making responsibility in respect of the child who has received a notice under subsection 16.9(1) does not object to the relocation within 30 days after the day on which the notice is received, by setting out their objection in
(A) a form prescribed by the regulations, or
(B) an application made under subsection 16.1(1) or paragraph 17(1)(b), and
(ii) there is no order prohibiting the relocation.
Content of form
(2) The form must set out
(a) a statement that the person objects to the proposed relocation;
(b) the reasons for the objection;
(c) the person’s views on the proposal for the exercise of parenting time, decision-making responsibility or contact, as the case may be, that is set out in the notice referred to in subsection 16.9(1); and
(d) any other information prescribed by the regulations.
Best interests of child — additional factors to be considered
16.92 (1) In deciding whether to authorize a relocation of a child of the marriage, the court shall, in order to determine what is in the best interests of the child, take into consideration, in addition to the factors referred to in section 16,
(a) the reasons for the relocation;
(b) the impact of the relocation on the child;
(c) the amount of time spent with the child by each person who has parenting time or a pending application for a parenting order and the level of involvement in the child’s life of each of those persons;
(d) whether the person who intends to relocate the child complied with any applicable notice requirement under section 16.9, provincial family law legislation, an order, arbitral award, or agreement;
(e) the existence of an order, arbitral award, or agreement that specifies the geographic area in which the child is to reside;
(f) the reasonableness of the proposal of the person who intends to relocate the child to vary the exercise of parenting time, decision-making responsibility or contact, taking into consideration, among other things, the location of the new place of residence and the travel expenses; and
(g) whether each person who has parenting time or decision-making responsibility or a pending application for a parenting order has complied with their obligations under family law legislation, an order, arbitral award, or agreement, and the likelihood of future compliance.
Factor not to be considered
(2) In deciding whether to authorize a relocation of the child, the court shall not consider, if the child’s relocation was prohibited, whether the person who intends to relocate the child would relocate without the child or not relocate.
Burden of proof — person who intends to relocate child
16.93 (1) If the parties to the proceeding substantially comply with an order, arbitral award, or agreement that provides that a child of the marriage spend substantially equal time in the care of each party, the party who intends to relocate the child has the burden of proving that the relocation would be in the best interests of the child.
Burden of proof — person who objects to relocation
(2) If the parties to the proceeding substantially comply with an order, arbitral award or agreement that provides that a child of the marriage spends the vast majority of their time in the care of the party who intends to relocate the child, the party opposing the relocation has the burden of proving that the relocation would not be in the best interests of the child.
Burden of proof — other cases
(3) In any other case, the parties to the proceeding have the burden of proving whether the relocation is in the best interests of the child.
Power of court — interim order
16.94 A court may decide not to apply subsections 16.93(1) and (2) if the order referred to in those subsections is an interim order.
20The Divorce Act does not provide specific guidance as to the process or test to be followed for temporary relocation motions. However, it is clear from the scheme of the Divorce Act that the court must consider the following: the burden of proof applicable to the case and whether the relocation is in the best interests of the child.
21Prior to the amendments to the Divorce Act in 2021, the leading test applicable to temporary motions for relocation was Plumley v. Plumley, 1999 13990 (Ont. S.C.). More recently, in Diallo v. Bah, 2025, ONSC 2106 (Div. Ct.), the Divisional Court held that the factors set out in Plumley are now overtaken by the amendments to the Divorce Act.
22While Diallo does not explicitly set out a new test, subsequent cases have interpreted Diallo as meaning that temporary relocation decisions must be based on a child’s best interests: see Gomez v. Isaza, 2025 ONCJ 324, at para. 81. These best interests factors include the relevant considerations at s. 16 and the additional relocation considerations at s. 16.92 of the Divorce Act.
23However, in addition to considering the best interests factors, it is clear that the court must also consider the unique evidentiary and procedural features of temporary motions. On a temporary motion, materials are often hastily prepared and incomplete, affidavits are conflicting and untested, hearsay and double hearsay are regularly included. In a regular family law motion, a temporary order is meant to provide a reasonably acceptable solution on an expeditious basis for a problem that will be fully canvassed at subsequent conferences or resolved at a trial: see Coe v. Tope, 2014 ONSC 4002, at para. 25; Brown v. Brown (1999), 1999 15074 (ON SC), 45 O.R. (3d) 308 (S.C.); R.H. v. R.S., 2022 SKQB 52, at para. 51. The reason for this is that while important, temporary orders can be easily varied at trial after a hearing on the full merits of the case, without creating substantial unfairness to either party or the children. In those circumstances, it makes sense that decisions on temporary orders can be made despite “less than perfect” evidence and procedure.
24This logic does not apply to temporary relocation motions especially where they have long-term implications for children. Temporary relocation motions frequently create a new status quo which is impossible to displace even after a full hearing of the merits. Frequently, the court’s decision on a temporary relocation motion will have a strong influence on the final outcome. This is why courts will be more cautious about permitting a temporary relocation where there are material facts in dispute: see Goodship v. McMaster, 2003 53670 (Ont. C.J.); Fair v. Rutherford-Fair, 2004 48864 (Ont. S.C.).
25Concerns about the process used on motion was also clearly one of the reasons why in Gomez, supra, Sherr J. refused to permit the mother to relocate to the Philippines on a temporary relocation motion. In that case, Sherr J. determined that there were many material facts remaining in dispute despite providing the parties with limited cross-examination. Given the significant geographic distance of the proposed move and the profound consequences of approving such a move, Sherr J. declined to make the temporary relocation order requested.
26These principles were also implicitly acknowledged in Diallo, where the court noted that relocation decisions are hard to reverse at trial without causing major disruption to the children. Given the significant impact a temporary relocation order has on the outcome of the case, the court must be satisfied that the evidence presented on the temporary motion permits the court to make the relevant best interests findings required by the Divorce Act and Diallo. The court must carefully assess the quality of the evidence presented at a temporary motion for relocation and satisfy itself that the evidence is sufficient to find that the required party has met his or her burden pursuant to the Act.
Analysis on Temporary Relocation
27The mother has the burden of proving that the relocation is in the best interests of the children.
28Section 16.93(1) and (2) apply in situations where the parties have been substantially complying with a court order. That is clearly not the case here. As a result, and in accordance with section 16.93(3), the parties each have the burden of proving whether the relocation is in the best interests of the children. Given that the mother is the party proposing the move, she bears the onus.
29The quality of the evidence provided by both parties on this motion was significantly compromised. Both parties submitted conflicting affidavits, untested by cross-examination. Indeed, cross-examination was not requested by either party. Hearsay, double hearsay, speculation, innuendo, and opinion were all presented with little regard for the rules of evidence. Simply put, the parties’ evidence does not allow the court to find that a move to British Columbia would be in the children’s best interests. For example:
a. The court is unable to determine, from the evidence provided, that the father perpetrated family violence against the mother since the August 20, 2018 order was made.
b. The court is unable to determine, from the evidence provided, that the father abused or otherwise harmed the children while they were in his care. The evidence suggests that an alternate explanation, that the mother interfered with the children’s relationship with their father, is a real possibility.
c. The court is unable to determine, from the evidence provided, that the father is the cause of the estrangement from his children. It is just as likely, from the evidence presented on this motion, that the mother is the person who has influenced the children against their father.
d. The court is unable to determine, from the evidence provided, that it is in the children’s best interests, that their relationship with the father be confined only to online parenting time or, if the mother’s request in her motion to change is accepted, none at all. This is particularly the case since no work has been done to attempt to reunify the children with their father.
e. The court is unable to determine, from the evidence provided, that a move to British Columbia is in the children’s best interests. The court received minimal evidence of the children’s circumstances in British Columbia. The court received no evidence from the mother’s partner about his role in the family or his history as a caregiver. The court did not receive any evidence as to supports available to the mother in British Columbia. Beyond assertions, the court received no other indication that the children are doing materially better than when they were in Ontario.
30Notwithstanding that the mother is the children’s primary caregiver and they have not had visits with the father for some time, the mother has not met her onus of proving that the move is in the best interests of the children. I come to this conclusion for the following reasons:
a. The mother’s conduct, including her multiple breaches of court orders, her failure to facilitate any virtual parenting time while in British Columbia, and her decision to seek no parenting time in her motion to change, suggests that she is actively interfering with the relationship between the children and the father.
b. The mother failed to comply with the s. 16.9(1) notice requirements in the Divorce Act. She failed to do so even though she was clearly aware of the requirements: she provided the father with the proper notice when she first moved from Mississauga to Stoney Creek in 2024. While she claims that she was fearful of her safety because of the online comments made by the father and his partner, she could have applied under s. 16.9(3) to dispense with the notice requirements. She did not do so. Alternatively, she could have sought a restraining order. The answer was not to relocate to British Columbia without providing the father with the required notice or seeking court authorization.
c. The August 20, 2018 order clearly states that the mother is not to move 15km from the City of Mississauga. She did not comply with the order in 2024 when she moved to Stoney Creek. She also did not comply with the order in July 2025 when she moved to British Columbia. The fact that there were geographical limitations specifically included in the August 20, 2018 court order, which have now been breached by the mother on multiple occasions, carries significant weight in the court’s decision.
d. On the basis of the evidence provided, the court is concerned that the mother may have engaged in a campaign of false allegations against the father and his family and that she may have enlisted the children in these false allegations. This included making unverified allegations to the children’s aid society and the police, and posting “wanted” posters of the father in her apartment in full view of the children.
e. One reason for the mother’s move is that her new partner had obtained a better job in British Columbia. However, this was not a compelling reason to justify her move on a temporary basis, particularly when such a move was in contravention of a court order. Her own evidence is that her partner moved to British Columbia first and continued to come home to see the children several times a month. Although she says she was struggling with the children as their sole caregiver, she provided no evidence of any attempts to access supports here, and no evidence that despite those challenges, she was unable to care for the children. No evidence was provided that this situation could not have been sustained at least until the mother’s relocation application was heard.
f. The court has some significant concerns about Ms. Gut’s qualification to conduct a “psychosocial assessment” of the children and the opinions expressed in her report. Ms. Gut’s resume is sparse. There are few relevant details about her background and no indication that she has experience conducting assessments. Despite signing an “acknowledgement of expert’s duty”, it is unclear that Ms. Gut is actually an expert, qualified to give the opinions she does.
g. While the mother’s lawyer argued that Ms. Gut’s report should treated like a “Voice of the Child Report” rather than a psychosocial assessment, the court is not satisfied that the children’s views and preferences, as set out in the report, are independent. It is clear from the report that some of the reasons listed for the children’s refusal to see their father come from the mother. For example, it is difficult to accept that the children, who were 10 and 8 years old at the time the report was authored, would have been able to recall, with specificity, that they were kept by the father for “2-3 months” and not allowed to go to school when the children were only 5 and 4 years old at the time this occurred in March 2020. Other statements, including that the children reported the father using alcohol and cannabis during visitation are also lacking in specificity and appear to be the mother’s concerns rather than the children’s.
h. The mother’s proposal for parenting time is unreasonable. In her motion to change, she seeks no parenting time between the father and the children. It is only at this motion that she now proposes virtual parenting time. However, she concedes in her factum that even if this parenting time was offered, “she finds it unlikely that the children will speak to the father.” In other words, if the court grants the mother’s request, the children’s relationship with their father will be effectively terminated. This is unreasonable and cannot be in the children’s best interests.
i. There is a high likelihood that the mother will not comply with any future order, particularly for in-person parenting time between the children and the father. The mother’s track record of breaching orders supports this conclusion.
31As a result of the foregoing, the court orders that the children return to their habitual residence in Stoney Creek, Ontario. However, the court will allow the move to happen at the end of the school year, provided that reunification therapy and/or supervised online parenting time immediately commence. The court is requiring the parties to engage in online and in-person reunification therapy as a part of its order for the children to return.
32A final word to both parties. The father should know that if the mother’s allegations of harassment, denigration, and abuse are proven true, a trial judge will likely take those facts into strong consideration when deciding whether to permit the mother to move. Similarly, the mother should know that a trial judge will likely strongly consider her commitment to the children’s relationship with their father, or her lack thereof, when he or she makes a final decision about the mother’s relocation request. The court encourages both parties to consider their respective behaviour and how that will impact not only their children, but their preferred outcome of this case.
Orders
33For the reasons set out above, the court makes the following orders:
The children will be returned to Stoney Creek, Ontario by no later than July 10, 2026.
The mother’s claim for temporary relocation of the children to British Columbia is dismissed.
Within 14 days of this order, the parties shall retain a reunification therapist willing to work with this family online. The reunification therapy shall continue in-person after the children’s return to Stoney Creek, Ontario. The cost of the reunification therapy shall be shared equally.
Until the children are returned to the Province of Ontario, the father shall have supervised online parting time a minimum of twice per week for one hour supervised either by the reunification therapist or an agreed-upon third party agency. The cost of the supervision shall be shared equally.
Prior to the return of the children to the Province of Ontario, and with the assistance of the reunification therapist, the parties shall agree to a schedule of in-person parenting time to occur between the father and the children after they are returned. If the parties are unable to come to an agreement, then motions shall be brought.
The mother shall provide the father her address in British Columbia within 3 days of this order.
The relevant police force in British Columbia shall enforce this order if the mother fails to return the children to the Province of Ontario by July 10, 2026.
The father is directed to immediately remove all social media posts about the mother and shall ensure that social media posts made by his partner and family members about the mother are also removed.
The mother shall not remove the children from the Province of Ontario without a prior court order.
The trial of the mother’s request to relocate shall be heard during the October 26, 2026 sittings unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties or ordered by the court.
This matter is set for a TBST within the next 2 weeks on a date to be determined by the trial coordinator for an update as to the parties’ progress in retaining a reunification therapist and to set a date for a settlement conference.
If the parties are unable to agree on costs, the father shall file written costs submissions by April 24, 2026. The mother shall file her written submissions by May 1, 2026. The submissions shall be no more than 3 pages, double spaced, not including any bill of costs or offer to settle.
Justice Law
Date: April 10, 2026