R. v. Blackwood, 2026 ONSC 2111

Court File and Parties

CITATION: R. v. Blackwood, 2026 ONSC 2111 COURT FILE NO.: CR-26-90000018/ CR-25-90000609 DATE: 2026-05-06

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

Between:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

– and –

WAYNE BLACKWOOD Defendant

Counsel: Mitschele, J. and DeFilipis, J., for the Crown Baldassi, J. for Mr. Blackwood

HEARD: January 19-23 and 29, 2026

REASONS FOR DECISION on CHARTER application AND TRIAL

P.T. SUGUNASIRI J:

Overview:

1What started as a Toronto Police investigation of stolen bikes from the backyard shed of an East York home ended in Mr. Blackwood’s arrest at a condominium unit on Bremner Blvd. in Toronto, for possession of various controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking, possession of a firearm and ammunition, breach of a weapons prohibition order and breaches of bail release conditions.

2This was a blended Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms voir dire and judge alone trial. Mr. Blackwood argued that I should stay his charges due to systemic police misconduct or exclude evidence to maintain the reputation of the administration of justice.

3I gave Mr. Blackwood my oral ruling on April 10, 2026 with brief reasons. I found that there was no basis to strip search Mr. Blackwood or delay his access to counsel. However, these violations of Mr. Blackwood’s rights did not warrant staying his charges or excluding the drugs, gun and ammunition.

4I found him guilty of possessing heroin, fentanyl and carfentanil for the purpose of trafficking (Counts 1, 2 and 3). I had reasonable doubt about Mr. Blackwood’s knowledge and control of the handgun and ammunition found in the bedroom and find him not guilty on Counts 4-6. I had reasonable doubt whether Mr. Blackwood breached the terms of his release order and find him not guilty of the two counts on indictment CR-25-90000609.

5These are my written reasons.

Background

6On October 4, 2020, a team of eight Toronto police officers went to unit 2606 at 65 Bremner Blvd. to execute a valid Criminal Code¹ search warrant to search for a bike, other potentially stolen items, proceeds of crime and any documentation that could confirm the identity of the person residing in that unit. Several days prior, two officers had attended the building, were told that Mr. Blackwood was the tenant of unit 2606 and observed some CCTV footage where they observed a person using a fob to access the unit on two occasions. They believed the person to be Mr. Blackwood. At the time, Mr. Blackwood was on bail and was required to live at an address in Ajax with a surety. One of the occasions that they believed to have observed Mr. Blackwood was in the early hours of September 23, 2020, when investigating officers believed Mr. Blackwood was supposed to be at his bail residence or out only with his surety.

7Upon entering the one-bedroom unit using a Fob that the security desk provided, the police found Mr. Blackwood and arrested him immediately for possessing stolen property and breaching bail. Soon after, the police located multiple baggies – big and small – of drugs in the kitchen, a gun and ammunition under a mattress in the bedroom, two cell phones, some documents identifying Mr. Blackwood, and the pieces of identification from other people.

8At the time of arrest Mr. Blackwood spit and yelled, stiffened his body and stated that he could not breathe. The police first took him to 55 Division and then to Michael Garron Hospital where he spent the night and underwent an X-ray and MRI. Before arriving at the hospital, Mr. Blackwood had been given his rights to counsel, but he was non-responsive. Some time during his hospital stay a voicemail for Mr. Blackwood’s counsel of choice had been left. The next morning Mr. Blackwood was paraded at 55 Division, and he asked to speak to defence counsel. The police strip searched him first due to concerns that he might have drugs hidden away that he could ingest or dispose of while in the booth speaking to counsel. He then exercised his right to counsel immediately after.

Analysis:

The police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest Mr. Blackwood before finding the drugs and gun

9DC Chadwick and DC Colaco arrested Mr. Blackwood upon entering unit 2606. They acted on DC Grills’ belief that she had grounds for arrest.² It is the Crown’s obligation to establish that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest Mr. Blackwood. This is a lesser standard than a balance of probabilities but is more than a mere suspicion or possibility.³ The Crown has not met its burden with respect to the breach of a release order but has satisfied me with respect to possession of stolen property.

There were reasonable and probable grounds to arrest Mr. Blackwood for possessing stolen property without finding the stolen bike

10DC Grills testified that Mr. Blackwood became the subject of a police investigation when an East York resident reported a stolen bike from his backyard shed. The resident believed that his bike was advertised on Kijiji by a person named “Goldie” with the phone number 647-823-5265. DC Grills investigated and found on the police database that the number was associated with Mr. Blackwood. The police database also identified Mr. Blackwood as being associated with unit 2606 at 65 Bremner Blvd. in Toronto and that he had been arrested there in 2019.

11DC Grills had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest Mr. Blackwood for possessing stolen property. An officer has reasonable and probable grounds to arrest someone when she has a subjective belief that the arrestee has committed an offence that is objectively reasonable. I consider this objective standard from the perspective of an officer standing in DC Grills’ shoes, with her training and experience, and I take a holistic view of all the information I accept was available to DC Grills at the time.

12Defence argued that DC Grills did not observe anyone taking a bike into unit 2606 nor was there a storage locker attached to the unit that could house the stolen bike. This however is not the test. The police do not need a prima facie case to have reasonable and probable grounds. Based on the information from the complainant, the police database, the Kijiji advertisement and the link between the number on that advertisement and Mr. Blackwood, and the link between Mr. Blackwood and 65 Bremner Avenue, it was reasonable for DC Grills to believe that Mr. Blackwood possessed the stolen property. They did not need to see the bike being moved into 65 Bremner to have reasonable grounds to arrest him for the offence.

No reasonable and probable grounds to arrest Mr. Blackwood for breach of a release order

13DC Grills testified that on October 2, 2020, she formed reasonable and probable grounds for the police to arrest him for breaching the terms of a release order because she identified him entering 65 Bremner after midnight on September 23 and September 29. She believed that he was subject to a curfew although she could not say what it was. Arresting officers relied on her understanding when they arrested Mr. Blackwood. The issue is whether DC Grills’ subjective belief was objectively reasonable. Her belief was not objectively reasonable because a) her identification of Mr. Blackwood was unreliable and b) it is unclear what evidence DC Grills had available to her about the terms of Mr. Blackwood’s release order.

a) DC Grills’ identification of Mr. Blackwood and the person on CCTV is unreliable

14DC Grills and DC Colaco went to 65 Bremner Blvd. on October 2, 2020. DC Grills said that on October 2, 2020, she formed grounds to arrest Mr. Blackwood for failing to comply with the terms of his release order when she observed an aerial view of a person, wearing a black and red jacket and a red hat with white writing on the top, enter 65 Bremner after midnight. DC Grills said that she had a general description of Mr. Blackwood having likely seen a photo in the police database but did not know what reference photo she relied on to identify him. There was no evidence about what he might be wearing, and the aerial view of the person does not show their face.

15DC Grills testified that she also looked at September 29 footage of the ground floor and the ninth-floor lobby of 65 Bremner. The ground floor footage was again an aerial view of a person whose face was not visible, and the ninth-floor footage is too dark to discern the person’s face. The person was again wearing a red hat with white writing. DC Grills’ evidence was that it was the person’s stature and height that caused her to believe that the person was Mr. Blackwood. DC Grills did not explain how she would have known Mr. Blackwood’s “stature” and height at the time she was reviewing the footage. Regardless, stature and height in this context are not meaningful identifiers. DC Colaco had taken some stills of CCTV footage of a person he believed to be Mr. Blackwood. DC Grills agreed in cross-examination that she could not say for certain that the person was Mr. Blackwood.

16What DC Grills did have was information that Mr. Blackwood was the tenant of unit 2606 and that tenants access the building and their units with a fob. The only plausible way that DC Grills identified Mr. Blackwood was through an assumption that only tenants use fobs and therefore the person she observed keying in using the fob assigned to unit 2606 must have been Mr. Blackwood. Even considering this basis for identifying Mr. Blackwood, DC Grills agreed in cross-examination that she did not know how many fobs there might have been for unit 2606 and did not look at footage from any of the other fob entries recorded for multiple other dates to see if anyone else gained entry using a unit 2606 fob. Even a spot check of other dates and times might have solidified the reliability of DC Grills’ identification.

17DC Grills formed her grounds before the search warrant execution briefing on October 5, 2020, where officers received a photo of Mr. Blackwood, his date of birth and a description – male, black, 5’8”, shaved head and brown eyes. Even if she had been equipped with this description on October 2, the same frailties of her CCTV identification of him exist.

18For similar reasons, DC Colaco’s identification that it was Mr. Blackwood who was entering the building after midnight is not reliable. He largely relied on DC Grills’ information, he could not remember whether he had seen a photo of Mr. Blackwood and had no notation in his book nor recollection at trial how he was able to identify him. Even if DC Colaco arrested Mr. Blackwood based on his own grounds, it was not objectively reasonable for him to have formed a subjective belief that Mr. Blackwood had violated the terms of his release order. On October 2 at 9:10 p.m., Officer Colaco watched CCTV footage of a person entering an elevator at 7:45 p.m. Officer Colaco took a screenshot of the person’s face and from that believed it to match a description that he had been given of Mr. Blackwood. On cross-examination DC Colaco was uncertain how he knew what Mr. Blackwood looked like, believing (though this was not noted anywhere) that it was from viewing a photo on the police database at 55 Division. I do not accept that DC Colaco knew what Mr. Blackwood looked like before viewing the footage.

19DC Colaco testified that while he was reviewing this footage, building security advised that Mr. Blackwood had just walked by. The security desk was on the ninth floor. Officer Colaco observed the live CCTV footage of the ninth floor hoping to capture the person who just passed the security desk. DC Colaco captured an image of someone who he believed to be the same person, in the elevator getting off at the 26th floor. DC Colaco testified that the person on screen in real time was wearing the same clothing as the person he observed in the elevator at 7:45 from CCTV footage. In addition to the problems I have already identified with DC Colaco’s identification evidence, the security guard’s comment is hearsay and cannot be accepted for its truth. Without further information and Mr. Blackwood’s ability to cross-examine the security guard on who he thinks he saw, the guard’s evidence does not bolster the reliability of DC Colaco’s identification evidence.

b) The police did not know the terms of Mr. Blackwood’s release order

20Even if DC Grills had reliably identified Mr. Blackwood as the person using the unit 2606 FOB after midnight on September 23 and 29, 2020, the Crown has not proved that her subjective belief was objectively reasonable. The Crown did not tender the release order as an exhibit, and DC Grills was unclear about its terms. The Crown argued that the parties’ Agreed Statement of Facts (ASF) stated that Mr. Blackwood was to live at an address in Ajax. This does not assist in identifying how his movements might have been restricted. DC Grills could not say what the terms of Mr. Blackwood’s release order were nor confirm that she saw it. DC Colaco testified that he relied entirely on DC Grills’ understanding of the release order. She testified about recalling a curfew but could not say what it was.

21The police had one basis to arrest Mr. Blackwood, but not the other. He should only have been arrested for possession stolen property. Arresting him for failing to comply with his release order violated section 9 of his Charter rights.

The police violated Mr. Blackwood’s right to counsel pursuant to section 10(b)

No violation on first and second giving of right to counsel upon arrest

22When officers arrested Mr. Blackwood on arrival into the unit, I am satisfied that DC Chadwick read him his rights to counsel and that Mr. Blackwood did not respond or request to speak with counsel. I accept that the police assessed whether Mr. Blackwood was unwell (due to his behaviour including saying that he could not breathe), at risk, or otherwise unable to understand what they were saying. DC Chadwick was with Mr Blackwood on scene and was satisfied that he understood his rights to counsel at the scene in part because he knew that Mr. Blackwood had been arrested before. I would not second guess his assessment. The police did not have to take any further action to ensure that Mr. Blackwood understood⁴ nor did they have to take any further action to implement his right to counsel.⁵

23I also find that the police were Charter compliant when DC Briggs called out that they had found what police believed to be fentanyl. I accept that DC Chadwick gave Mr. Blackwood his right to counsel in the hallway about the drugs, that Mr. Blackwood can be presumed to have understood his rights, and did not respond.

The police violated implementing right to counsel while Mr. Blackwood was at the hospital

24At about 8:00 p.m. on October 5, 2020, the police transported Mr. Blackwood to 55 Division. DC Akie testified that the interaction with the booking sergeant was difficult. Mr. Blackwood was not responding to routine questions and insisted that he could not breathe. Out of an abundance of caution the police called the ambulance and paramedics took Mr. Blackwood to Michael Garron hospital. Because he had been struggling with officers from the moment he was arrested, Mr. Blackwood was handcuffed to the hospital bed. While at the hospital DC Ghazarian informed DC Chadwick about the firearm found in the unit and DC Chadwick again gave Mr. Blackwood his right to counsel. I accept that Mr. Blackwood did not respond in that moment. I also accept DC Chadwick’s evidence that he continued to have no concern about Mr. Blackwood understanding what was told to him, now with the additional observation that Mr. Blackwood was speaking with the medical staff. Mr. Blackwood remained there overnight with two police officers supervising him. The next morning Mr. Blackwood went for an MRI and CT scan and was medically cleared to leave.

25At some point during his hospital stay, Mr. Blackwood requested to speak with Mitch Engel because when he returned to 55 Division, PC Stewart advised the booking sergeant that a voicemail had been left for Mr. Engel. PC Stewart also testified that the night officers, PC Au and PC Benning, said they had left a voicemail for counsel. PC Stewart started his shift at 6:30 a.m. on October 6.

26However, neither PC Au nor PC Benning testified, and whether they in fact left a voicemail for Mr. Engel cannot be tested. PC Stewart and PC Price had no notation or recollection of following up on the voicemail that was apparently left despite PC Stewart clearly believing that one had been left. Whatever the situation, the police had an obligation follow up on whether in fact a voicemail was left, and either follow up on that voicemail or check in with Mr. Blackwood on whether he wanted to speak with counsel and facilitate the call. As noted is R. v. Suberu, “the purpose of s. 10(b) is to ensure that individuals know of their right to counsel, and have access to it, in situations where they suffer a significant deprivation of liberty due to state coercion which leaves them vulnerable to the exercise of state power and in a position of legal jeopardy.”⁶ Understanding that there might have been a request for counsel and doing nothing more while a man was handcuffed to a hospital bed under serious legal jeopardy did not fulfill the state’s Charter obligations to Mr. Blackwood. The police failed to properly implement his right to counsel.

The police did not have reasonable and probable grounds to strip search Mr. Blackwood and should have allowed him his right to counsel before conducting that search

No reasonable and probable grounds to strip search Mr. Blackwood

27The more concerning violations of Mr. Blackwood’s rights occurred at 55 Division when the staff sergeant approved a strip search and conducted it before Mr. Blackwood was able to speak with Mr. Engel. DC Stewart paraded Mr. Blackwood and misinformed Sergeant Thompson that Mr. Blackwood was the subject of a Controlled Drug and Substances Act search.

28This brush painted the rest of Mr. Blackwood’s booking procedure. Sergeant Thompson testified that the strip search was done out of concern for Mr. Blackwood’s well being because he said that he had used fentanyl recently, had tried to die by suicide and still had suicidal thoughts. The additional concern was that he might ingest drugs secreted in his body or in his underwear. I do not accept either basis to strip search Mr. Blackwood. As stated in R. v. Golden mere suspicion that someone may have drugs on their person is an inadequate reason to conduct such an invasive, humiliating and degrading search. The police must establish that they have reasonable and probable grounds to conclude that a strip search is necessary in the particular circumstances of the arrest.⁷ It appears that no one considered the fact that Mr. Blackwood had just been in police custody for over 12 hours, shackled to a bed, with two officers guarding him, and subject to both an MRI and X-ray.

29I find that the police treated the strip search as a routine search to conduct on Mr. Blackwood as an arrestee of a drug charges. This is squarely contrary to the constitutional principles set out in Golden where the Supreme Court states that the fact that the police have reasonable and probable grounds to arrest does not confer on them automatic authority to carry out a strip search.⁸ The enduring intention to strip search Mr. Blackwood no matter what he said or what his particular circumstances were is evident from the fact that: a) the staff sergeant who had no interaction with Mr. Blackwood had ordered a strip search before Mr. Blackwood was even paraded; and b) the cursory and performative manner in which the officers conducted a level two search before moving to the strip search.

No basis to delay call to Mr. Engel before the strip search

30In October of 2020, the police were governed by a policy that required them to allow an arrestee and chance to consult with counsel before conducting a strip search unless there was a safety concern. The required process was that police were to conduct a level two search first and then allow an arrestee to speak with counsel before the level three strip search. Sergeant Thompson testified that he did not allow the call first because he was concerned that Mr. Blackwood might have fentanyl secreted in his body given that what police believed was fentanyl was found in small packaging in the condo unit. The phone booth in the booking hall allowed a person to turn their back to police and the concern was that Mr. Blackwood would have access to his waistband and underwear without officers seeing him.

31Again, Sergeant Thompson did not consider Mr. Blackwood’s unique circumstances in denying him access to Mr. Engel, who was waiting on the line for him, as they should have.⁹ They did not consider the likelihood of Mr. Blackwood having anything in his underwear after spending 12 hours at Michael Garron and being subject to an MRI and X-ray. Further, the phone booth was very small and had windows on both sides, making it unlikely for Mr. Blackwood to take drugs out of his underwear or waistband and ingest them. There were no legitimate safety or destruction of evidence concerns as required to suspend Mr. Blackwood’s right to speak to Mr. Engel before the strip search.¹⁰ The police failed to implement Mr. Blackwood’s right to counsel as required both by their own policy and the Charter.

No stay is warranted pursuant to [section 24(1)](https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11/latest/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11.html) of the [Charter](https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11/latest/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11.html)

32Despite the police unlawfully arresting Mr. Blackwood for breaching the terms of his release order, failing to implement his request for counsel in a timely manner, and strip searching him without reasonable and probable grounds, I decline to stay the charges against him.

33A stay is available only in the clearest of cases where prejudice to the accused’s right to make full answer and defence cannot be remedied or where irreparable prejudice would be caused to the integrity of the judicial system if the prosecution were continued.¹¹ The “clearest of cases” falls into two categories: (1) cases in which state conduct compromises the fairness of the accused’s trial; and (2) cases in which state conduct risks undermining the integrity of the judicial process.

34Mr. Blackwood has not persuaded me that this case falls into either of these categories.

The evidence should not be excluded

35After arresting Mr. Blackwood and executing a lawful search warrant at unit 2601 of 65 Bremner Blvd., the police located:

a. A handgun and two cartridges of ammunition; b. $13,000 in cash; c. Drug paraphernalia and cutting agents; d. Documents in Mr. Blackwood’s name; e. Multiple identification documentation of other people; f. 66.76 grams of heroin and fentanyl; g. 54.94 grams of fentanyl; and h. 12.22 grams of heroin and carfentanil.

36I decline to exclude this evidence pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter. In so concluding, I considered whether the contraband was obtained in a manner that infringed Mr. Blackwood’s rights, the seriousness of the Charter infringing conduct, the impact of the breach on Mr. Blackwood’s Charter protected rights; society’s interest in adjudicating the charges in their merits, and balanced these factors.¹²

The evidence was obtained in a manner that infringed Mr. Blackwood’s rights

37The police located the seized items after arresting Mr. Blackwood. Mr. Blackwood was arrested at about 7:00 p.m. on October 4, 2020. While the police had Mr. Blackwood in the hallway they found the drugs. I accept Mr. Blackwood’s submission that his arrest was temporally connected to the police finding the drugs. About one hour and 45 minutes later Mr. Blackwood was at Michael Garron hospital. Shortly after he arrived there, DC Chadwick advised him that the police had found the firearm and ammunition. This too was temporally connected to the partially unlawful arrest.

38The chain of Charter infringing events continued unbroken from there. At 11:35 PC Au and PC Benning were on duty. PC Stewart and PC Price took over at 6:30 a.m. the next morning. Some time between 11:35 p.m. on October 4, 2020, and 6:30 a.m. on October 5, 2020, Mr. Blackwood had asked either PC Benning or PC Au to speak with Mr. Engel, and a voicemail was left. No one followed up and the next morning, the police continued to deny Mr. Blackwood his right to speak to Mr. Engel until he was strip searched. As noted in numerous cases from the Supreme Court of Canada, “evidence will be tainted if the breach and the discovery of the impugned evidence are part of the same transaction or course of conduct”¹³ and a causal connection is not needed.¹⁴

The breaches of Mr. Blackwood’s rights pull moderately towards exclusion

39Mr. Blackwood argued that the police’s disregard for his Charter rights was extremely serious because they continuously disregarded his rights through the “numerous breaches of section 8, 9 and 10(b)”. This first line of inquiry addresses whether the police engaged in misconduct that the court should dissociate itself from. The concern is not the punish the police but to preserve the public’s confidence in the rule of law and its processes.¹⁵ The task is to situate the Charter infringing conduct on a scale of culpability, with wilful or reckless disregard of Charter rights, a systemic pattern of Charter infringing conduct or a major departure from Charter standards being at the more serious end. I do not find the breaches extremely serious as defence have urged.

40The section 9 violation was not serious. The police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest him for one offence but not the other. Further, my finding that the Crown had not proved that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest him for failing to comply with a release order was largely due to evidentiary issues at trial rather than a substantive finding of unreasonableness.

41With respect to Mr. Blackwood’s right to speak to counsel, the police lacked urgency in fulfilling the implementational component of section 10(b). That said, someone did leave a voicemail message for Mr. Engel and had him on the line to speak with Mr. Blackwood immediately after the strip search. This moves police conduct away from wilful or systemic disregard for Mr. Blackwood’s right to counsel and I categorize the breach as moderate.

42The unlawful strip search was a serious infringement because the police treated it like a routine search for anyone accused of drug offences.

43In sum, this first line of inquiry pulls moderately towards exclusion of the evidence.

The impact of the breaches on Mr. Blackwood pulls significantly towards exclusion

44This second line of inquiry asks whether the breaches undermined the interest protected by the Charter right that was infringed. The task again is to situate the impact on a spectrum ranging from fleeting or trivial to that which is profoundly intrusive or a serious compromise of the interests underlying the rights. The greater the impact, the greater the risk that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.¹⁶

45The arrest minimally impacted Mr. Blackwood because he would have been detained in any event for the lawful arrest and to search unit 2606. In other words, his liberty would have been otherwise restricted.

46The delay in allowing Mr. Blackwood his right to speak to counsel was more impactful because it undermined the very interest that section 10(b) of the Charter protects. Mr. Blackwood spent potentially almost 12 hours without the benefit of counsel despite an ever-evolving legal jeopardy.

47There was a significant impact on Mr. Blackwood’s right to be free from unreasonable search by the state because a strip search is inherently intrusive and violated his privacy and dignity. As noted in R. v. Thompson, consulting with counsel could inform an arrestee that he has a right to remain silent during the search and that refusing the search may lead to a more intrusive procedure. Speaking with counsel may equip the arrestee with information to decide to reveal hidden contraband to avoid the intrusive search, may help them feel less alone, and understand the process better to mitigate psychological harm.¹⁷

48Overall, I find that the impact of the Charter infringing conduct on Mr. Blackwood pulls significantly towards exclusion.

Society’s interest in the adjudication of the case on the merits pulls strongly towards inclusion

49In this third line of inquiry I consider whether the truth-seeking function of the criminal trial process is better served by admitting the evidence or excluding it.¹⁸ In this case, the police found the drugs, a firearm and ammunition in a condominium unit in which they also found Mr. Blackwood and his identification. This is reliable evidence that is critical to the Crown’s circumstantial case and pulls strongly towards including it.

The final balancing favours inclusion

50The final step I take is to balance the three lines of inquiry to assess the impact of admission or exclusion of evidence on the long-term reputation of the administration of justice. The goal is to address any systemic concerns and to ensure that evidence obtained through Charter breaches does not further damage the reputation of the justice system.¹⁹

51In my view, the facts taken collectively favour inclusion. The Charter breaches were temporally linked to the police lawfully finding fentanyl, a gun and ammunition, a combination described by Justice Moldaver in R. v. Parranto as “public enemy number one”²⁰. But it was not causally linked. While there need not be a causal connection for evidence to be tainted, I consider it a factor when I weigh the three lines of inquiry. Excluding the evidence lawfully located by the police would punish them for their Charter transgressions, which is not the purpose of section 24(2). Excluding the evidence of this deadly trio would damage the reputation of the criminal justice system in the eyes of the community rather than protect it. While there may be instances when the court must distance themselves from police conduct no matter how harmful firearms and fentanyl are to society, this is not one of them. This is not a situation where the court needs to distance itself from police conduct, address systemic concerns, or prevent further damage to the justice system.

Mr. Blackwood possessed the drugs found in unit 2606

52Counts 1, 2, and 3 of the indictment charge Mr. Blackwood with possessing fentanyl, heroin and carfentanil for the purposes of trafficking. He concedes that if the Crown proves possession beyond a reasonable doubt, then the possession was for the purpose of trafficking.

53In this case, drugs were not found on Mr. Blackwood. The Crown relies on constructive possession to prove each count.²¹ To do so, the Crown must prove that Mr. Blackwood’s knowledge: (i) had knowledge of the controlled substance identified in the count; (ii) knowingly put or kept that substance in unit 2606, irrespective of whether he lived there or owned the unit; and (iii) intended to have each drug in the unit for his or another’s person’s use or benefit:²² The Crown must also prove that Mr. Blackwood had control over the drugs which in this case, means having the ability to control access to unit 2606.

54The Crown’s case is entirely circumstantial which means that I can only find Mr. Blackwood had knowledge and control of each substance if that is the only reasonable inference arising from the evidence as a whole.²³ To determine if the circumstantial evidence meets this standard of proof, I consider all plausible theories and reasonable possibilities grounded in logic that are inconsistent with guilt. Having done so, I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Blackwood possessed the fentanyl, heroin and carfentanil and find him guilty of Counts 1, 2, and 3.

Mr. Blackwood had control of unit 2606

55I address control first. The Crown relied on following pieces of circumstantial evidence to argue that Mr. Blackwood had control over unit 2606 where the drugs were located:

a. He was spotted entering 65 Bremner and going to the 26th floor on September 23, 29 and October 4, 2020 therefore showing some regularity in attending the unit; b. His name was on a lease for unit 2606 dated November 30, 2017; c. He was listed as a tenant on a tenant information card found in the unit file stored with building management; d. On October 2, 2020 building security advised DC Grills and DC Colaco that Mr. Blackwood was the tenant of unit 2606; e. Building security told DC Colaco that Mr. Blackwood had just passed by while he was looking at CCTV footage on October 4, 2020; f. When Mr. Blackwood was found in the unit there was a red Supreme hat on the counter near his key fob and at least one cellphone connected to him – this is the same hat police observed on September 23and 29 worn by the person they believed to be Mr. Blackwood; g. The police had information that Mr. Blackwood was arrested at unit 2606 in 2019 for a domestic matter; h. Mr. Blackwood had a key fob for the unit and was found inside when the search team entered the unit on October 4, 2020; i. There were two documents in the unit bearing Mr. Blackwood’s name and address, and his OHIP card; j. There were men’s clothing and shoes in the unit.

No weight to CCTV evidence or comments by building security

56As stated in the Charter analysis, I disregard any comments that building security might have made to DC Grills or DC Colaco because the Crown did not call the security guard to testify about what he said, and the Crown did not apply to have this hearsay admitted. I also do not find reliable the evidence that the black male wearing the three different colours of Supreme hats and keying and entering the lobby and using the elevator to the 26th floor was Mr. Blackwood. The video was grainy, and the person’s face was undiscernible. There was a red Supreme hat found in the unit when the search team entered, however, the person that DC Colaco observed earlier in the day on October 4, 2020 was wearing a black Supreme hat. There is simply insufficient evidence for me to safely rely on the CCTV evidence to conclude that prior attendances tie Mr. Blackwood to the unit.

The lease and tenant information card is admissible as a business record

57The Crown called Ms. Alexandrina Irini who started as a property manager for 65 Bremner in 2024. She testified that owners who lease the condo units need to provide a copy the lease agreement. She stated that the condo corporation kept a digital and paper file for each unit. The file stored historical information about the unit including past leases. She found the lease bearing Mr. Blackwood’s name in the file along with a card listing Mr. Blackwood as the owner. The card lists a phone number for Mr. Blackwood – the same number that DC Grills found was associated with Mr. Blackwood on both the police database and the Kijiji ad for the bike. It was also the same number of one of the phones that the police seized from unit 2606.

58Defence counsel challenged the admissibility of the lease agreement dated November 30, 2017 because Ms. Irini could not speak to the condo corporation’s practices in 2017 nor prior to 2024 when she started working there. Subsections 30(1) and (6) of the Canada Evidence Act²⁴ set out the business records exception to the hearsay rule:

(1) Where oral evidence in respect of a matter would be admissible in a legal proceeding, a record made in the usual and ordinary course of business that contains information in respect of that matter is admissible in evidence under this section in the legal proceeding on production of the record.

(6) For the purpose of determining whether any provision of this section applies, or for the purpose of determining the probative value, if any, to be given to information contained in any record admitted in evidence under this section, the court may, or production of any record, examine the record, admit any evidence in respect thereof given orally or by affidavit including evidence as to the circumstances in which the information contained in the record was written, recorded, stored or reproduced and draw any reasonable inference from the form or content of the record.

59I accept the lease and the unit card fall within the business record exception of the CEA and he was therefore a tenant of unit 2606 at 65 Bremner Blvd. at least in 2017.²⁵ While Ms. Irini was not the manager in 2017, her evidence is sufficient to admit those documents.

I can rule out that someone else had exclusive control of unit 2606

60Excluding what the security guard told police during their investigations on October 2 and 4, 2020, and the CCTV footage purporting to show Mr. Blackwood attending the unit on September 23, 29 and the morning of October 4, 2020, I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Blackwood had control of unit 2606 and the drugs found there.

61Mr. Blackwood was found in unit 2606. The only way he could have entered it was with the key that was found beside a phone that responded to Mr. Blackwood’s phone number listed for him in the building’s files. He was named on a 2017 lease that was found in a file for unit 2606. Ms. Irini had no record of a move out date for Mr. Blackwood. Another business record, a vehicle transfer document, listed 65 Bremner as Mr. Blackwood’s address as late as September 18, 2019.

62It is a reasonable possibility that Mr. Blackwood no longer lived at 65 Bremner Blvd. at the time the police executed the search warrant and that someone else was the formal tenant. The police did not look at all CCTV footage available to determine if multiple people were using a fob to access the unit despite having records of multiple entries from September 28–October 4, 2020. Ms. Irini testified that she was aware that others lived there after 2017 but could not say when. A person named “Lu” was listed on the unit card found in the file. Mr. Blackwood was on bail and was required to live at another residence in October of 2020, and there is no evidence that he breached that bail because the CCTV evidence of such alleged breaches is unreliable. The search warrant entry video showed the unit quite lived in – a shoe rack of shoes, a full closet of clothes with no clear evidence of whether it contained men or women’s clothing, and items everywhere, demonstrating that more than one person could have been living there. There was also the police evidence that Mr. Blackwood was arrested at the unit in 2019 for a domestic occurrence. The unit information card revealed Ms. Kospanan as his emergency contact. Giving the widest latitude to the evidence, it is possible that Ms. Kospanan or “Lu” was the either the tenant or main resident of unit 2606 in October of 2020.

63None of this evidence suggests however that they or someone else had exclusive control of unit 2606 such that Mr. Blackwood was a mere visitor. The fact that his OHIP card and two documents indicating his address as 65 Bremner Blvd., as recent as September 18, 2019 combined with having a key to the unit suggests that Mr. Blackwood was more than a visitor. I would add to this evidence the inference that Mr. Blackwood would not have been given access to a unit with the value of drugs that were found in the kitchen cupboards. In total, the street value of the drugs found ranged between $14,340 and $29,466 depending on how it was sold. Taking the reasonable other possibilities at their highest, Mr. Blackwood had joint control over unit 2606. The Crown does not have to prove sole control to satisfy this component of the test for possession.

64I also rule out the possibility that the unit was exclusively controlled by one of the other people who identification was found in the lower drawer of the oven. Aside from this evidence of the identification, there is nothing else tying them to the unit. It is purely speculative that one of them might have had exclusive control. Villaroman does not require the Crown to negate every speculative or fantastical possibility.

Mr. Blackwood had knowledge of the drugs found in the kitchen

65I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Blackwood had actual knowledge of the presence and nature of the drugs in unit 2606. The police found identifying documents with items Officer Passmore stated in a report jointly tendered by the parties that are associated with drug trafficking:

i. Mr. Blackwood’s health card and visa was found with small clear baggies, seven digital scales and a bundle of Canadian currency in the amount of $13,000; ii. A vehicle transfer document in Mr. Blackwood’s name and bearing the 65 Bremner Blvd. address was found with two small and one large Ziploc bag of a powder substance and a larger digital scale – the parties accept that the substances are a cutting agent and that this cutting agent was found in the fentanyl, carfentanil and heroin that found in the unit; and iii. A chequebook in Mr. Blackwood’s name with the Bremner address was found with a large digital scale, small baggies.

66In addition, the documents identifying Mr. Blackwood and accompanied by paraphernalia associated with drug trafficking were not isolated to one location such that it was possible for Mr. Blackwood to use the kitchen without knowing the substances were there. Further, all controlled substances were found in the in the same kitchen cabinet unit as Mr. Blackwood’s vehicle transfer documents and accompanying paraphernalia – a couple of drawers apart.

67Even if there may have been others occupying the unit or and/or using the unit to store the drugs for the purpose of trafficking, Mr. Blackwood was part of that enterprise.

Mr. Blackwood did not possess the gun or ammunition found in the unit

68I am not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Blackwood had knowledge and control of the Iven Johnson, Safety Hammer Automatic Model 3 handgun found in a fanny pack under the mattress in the bedroom along with two cartridges in a clear plastic bag found under the mattress. It is reasonably possible that Mr. Blackwood did not reside at the unit in October of 2020 but attended there to obtain the drugs for the purpose of trafficking them. I have doubt whether he would have gone to the bedroom or spent any time there given the evidence that he was to reside with his surety in Ajax and the absence of reliable evidence that he did not. It is reasonably possible that someone else could have kept the gun under the mattress without Mr. Blackwood knowing about it.

Conclusion:

69For these reasons, I enter a conviction on counts 1, 2,3, acquit Mr. Blackwood of all other charges on indictment CR-26-9000018-000, and acquit him of the two charges for failing to comply with his bail conditions on indictment CR-25-90000609-000.

P.T. Sugunasiri J.

Released: May 6, 2026

CITATION: R. v. Blackwood, 2026 ONSC 2111 COURT FILE NO.: CR-26-90000018/CR-90000609 DATE: 2026-05-06

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

– and –

WAYNE BLACKWOOD

REASONS FOR DECISION

P.T. Sugunasiri J.

Footnotes

1. 1R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
2. 2There is nothing wrong with officers acting on grounds to arrest formed by another officer – see for example R. v. Hosang, 2026 ONCA 51, 456 C.C.C. (3d) 100 at para. 70; R. v. Shokar, 2006 BCSC 770 at para. 21.
3. 3Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 SCC 40, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 100 at para. 114; R. v. Morelli, 2010 SCC 8, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 253 at para. 91.
4. 4R. v. Dunford, 2017 SKCA 1, 345 C.C.C. (3d) 374 at para. 27.
5. 5R. v. Willier, 2010 SCC 37, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 429 at para.30; R. v. Dykstra, 2015 ONSC 6012, 330 C.C.C. (3d) 30.
6. 6R. v. Suberu, 2009 SCC 33, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 460 at para. 40.
7. 7R. v. Golden, 2001 SCC 83, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 679 at para. 99.
8. 8Golden at para. 98.
9. 9R. v. La, 2018 ONCA 830, 366 C.C.C. (3d) 351 at para. 39.
10. 10Ibid at paras. 39, 41, 43-45.
11. 11R. v. O’Connor, 1995 51 (SCC), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411 at pp. 413-414.
12. 12R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353.
13. 13R. v. Tim, 2022 SCC 12, [2022] 1 S.C.R. 234 at para. 78.
14. 14R. v. Wittwer, 2008 SCC 33, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 235 at para. 21; Tim at para.78.
15. 15R. v. Grant at paras. 72 and 73.
16. 16Tim at para. 90 citing Grant at paras. 76 and 77.
17. 17R. v. Thompson, 2025 ONCA 500, 450 C.C.C. (3d) 383 at paras. 61-68.
18. 18Grant at para. 79.
19. 19Tim at para. 98 citing Grant at paras. 68, 86 and 140.
20. 20R. v. Parranto, 2021 SCC 46, [2021] 3 S.C.R. 46 at para. 93.
21. 21Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 4(3).
22. 22Criminal Code, s. 4(3)(a)(ii); R. v. Morelli, 2010 SCC 8, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 253 at para. 17.
23. 23R. v. Villaroman, 2016 SCC 33, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 1000 at para. 30.
24. 24Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5
25. 25See for example the decision in R. v. Choudhry, 2020 ONSC 7215, 175 W.C.B. (2d) 522 at paras. 20-24.