ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
VINCENT PAQUET, GABRIEL ANGELI, JACQUES SAMUEL MOREAU-GOUGEON, NORDICFLOW INC., FIRST BLOCK INC., AND SOCIETE EN COMMANDITE HYDRO CALCUL BY ITS GENERAL PARTNER 9474-3342 QUEBEC INC.
Plaintiffs/Moving Parties
– and –
ROBERT LÉVESQUE, GABRIEL PEREIRA LÉVESQUE, CSC ÉNERGIE INC., KRIS RENEWABLE POWER LTD., AND HURDMAN DAM GENERATING STATION LTD.
Defendants/Responding Parties
COUNSEL:
Geoffrey Cullwick and Eric Dwyer, for the Plaintiffs/Moving Parties
Ryan Garrett, for the Defendants/Responding Parties
HEARD at Ottawa: February 20 and March 3, 2026
AMENDED Reasons for Decision1
Rees J.
I. Overview
1The moving parties brought a motion without notice for an interim Mareva injunction and Norwich order. The motion arose from proceedings in the Superior Court of Quebec. On October 31, 2025, I granted the interim orders. These orders were continued and modified by MacLeod R.S.J.
2The matter returned before me on a contested motion. The moving parties seek the continuation of the Mareva injunction against the responding parties until a final determination of the Quebec proceedings. They seek this relief either (i) in recognition or enforcement of the Quebec Mareva Order or (ii) as an exercise of this court’s jurisdiction to issue a Mareva injunction to preserve assets within Ontario until judgment in the Quebec proceedings. The moving parties also seek the interlocutory appointment of a receiver and manager for Hurdman Dam Generating Station Ltd. and Kris Renewable Power Ltd.
3The responding parties oppose this relief. First, they argue that the Quebec Mareva Order should not be recognized and enforced because the Quebec Defendants2 were denied procedural fairness by the Quebec Superior Court. Second, they argue that this court should not exercise its own equitable jurisdiction to continue the Mareva injunction because the moving parties do not have clean hands and did not make full, frank, and fair disclosure to the court. Third, they argue that the moving parties do not meet the test for a Mareva injunction. Finally, they argue that no receiver is required for Hurdman or Kris.
4At the conclusion of the hearing, I advised the parties that I was not persuaded that a receiver should be appointed. I reserved my decision on the continuation of the Mareva injunction. I also asked counsel to discuss terms of an order for the interim release of certain funds held by Hurdman. On March 3, 2026, I held a case conference and ordered the interim release of funds for legal fees and for Hurdman’s and Kris’s ordinary business expenses.
5For the reasons that follow, this court recognizes and enforces the Quebec Mareva Order in Ontario, subject to certain additional terms described below. The request for the interlocutory appointment of a receiver is denied.
II. Background
6The Quebec Plaintiffs3 commenced proceedings before the Quebec Superior Court alleging that the Quebec Defendants misappropriated revenue and assets from the Société En Commandite Hydro Calcul.
7The Quebec Plaintiffs obtained ex parte an interim Mareva injunction against the Quebec Defendants from the Quebec Superior Court on December 11, 2024 (per J.G. Bouchard J.), which also provided for the seizure before judgment of certain assets and property. A come-back hearing was held on December 20, 2024, at which the Quebec Defendants were represented by Quebec counsel. The Quebec Superior Court (per P.C. Bellavance J.) extended the interim order and made other orders.
8The Quebec Superior Court was satisfied that there was a strong prima facie case that Robert Lévesque, Gabriel Pereira Lévesque, and CSC Énergie Inc. engaged in conduct aimed at preventing enforcement of a future judgment against them, and that they had destroyed evidence, misled the court, contravened an earlier Norwich order, and misappropriated or diverted funds from Hydro Calcul’s operations for their personal benefit.
9On January 23, 2025, a further hearing was held before the Quebec Superior Court. On the parties’ consent, the court (per C. Samson J.) ordered a Mareva injunction until final judgment (the “Quebec Mareva Order”). The Quebec court made additional orders that are not at issue here. The moving parties only seek to enforce the Mareva portion of the order.
10The Quebec Defendants later brought a motion for the revocation of the Quebec orders. This was rejected by the Quebec Superior Court on November 7, 2025 (per D. Dumais J.)
11The Quebec proceedings are scheduled for trial in April 2026.
III. The parties
12The Quebec litigation arose from certain of the parties’ operation of Hydro Calcul, a limited partnership registered in Quebec. Hydro Calcul is in the business of establishing and operating data centres in relation to hydroelectric power stations. The Quebec Plaintiffs allege that Hydro Calcul was formed to operate data centres powered by the St-Raphael Dam in Quebec to generate or “mine” cryptocurrency.
13Hydro Calcul’s general partner is the plaintiff 9474-3242 Quebec Inc. (“9474 Quebec”), and its limited partners are the plaintiff NordicFlow Inc. and the defendant CSC. CSC is the owner of the St-Raphael Dam. CSC is owned and controlled by Robert Lévesque.
14NordicFlow is owned and controlled by Angeli, Paquet, and Moreau-Gougeon.
159474 Quebec is owned by Angeli, Paquet, and Moreau-Gougeon (collectively holding a 50% interest) and by Robert Lévesque (holding a 50% interest). These four individuals are 9474 Quebec’s directors.
16First Block Inc. is a Quebec corporation that operates in the IT services sector. Paquet and Angeli are its sole shareholders and directors.
17Before a corporate reorganization, First Block was a limited partner of Hydro Calcul in the place of NordicFlow. First Block is one of the largest, if not the largest, creditors of Hydro Calcul.
18Hurdman operates a hydroelectric dam in Mattawa, Ontario. Kris operates a hydroelectric dam in Bala, Ontario. Robert Lévesque owns all issued and outstanding shares in Hurdman and Kris and he is their sole director. In April 2018, he pledged all the issued and outstanding shares in Hurdman to a non-party as security for a loan.
19Gabriel Pereira Lévesque is Robert Lévesque’s son. The Quebec Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Pereira Lévesque is involved in the wrongdoing.
IV. Issues
20The motion raises the following issues:
a. Should the Quebec Mareva Order be recognized and enforced in Ontario?
b. In the alternative, should this court exercise its jurisdiction to prevent the dissipation of the responding parties’ assets within Ontario pending judgment in the Quebec proceedings?
c. Should an interlocutory receiver be appointed over Hurdman and Kris?
21I will address each issue in turn.
V. Analysis
A. This court should recognize and enforce the Quebec Mareva Order
Mareva injunctions in the interprovincial context can be recognized and enforced
22In my view, Mareva injunctions from another province, despite not being final, are capable of being recognized and enforced by this court.
23The traditional common-law rule limited the recognition and enforcement of foreign orders to final money judgments. But in Pro Swing Inc. v. Elta Golf Inc., 2006 SCC 52, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 612, the Supreme Court of Canada changed this rule to permit the recognition and enforcement of foreign non-monetary orders, if they are final and of a nature that comity requires the domestic court to enforce them. This includes equitable orders. The domestic court has the discretion to consider relevant factors to ensure that foreign non-monetary orders do not disturb the structure and integrity of the Canadian legal system: at para. 31.
24The specific question in Pro Swing was whether the Ontario Superior Court should recognize and enforce a U.S consent decree and contempt order. Pro Swing did not arise in the interprovincial context.
25The majority in Pro Swing held that the finality requirement is “indispensable” to the enforcement of equitable orders, but observed that the requirement was “more complex” for an equitable order than for a common law order (i.e., a money judgment). The majority left the elaboration of the finality requirement for future cases: at para. 29.
26Here, the moving parties argue that the Quebec Mareva Order is final, in the sense that it continues until judgment. The finality of the Quebec Mareva Order was not disputed by the responding parties. Even so, I am compelled to address this point.
27When is a foreign order final? The traditional answer is that the foreign order “must be final and res judicata in the foreign jurisdiction. This occurs when the judgment of the foreign court is final in the sense that the court that made it no longer has the power to rescind or vary it”: Four Embarcadero Center Venture v. Kalen (1988), 65 O.R. (2d) 551 (H.C.), at p. 563.
28The Quebec Mareva Order is the opposite of final—it is an interlocutory order. It was made pending the final judgment in the Quebec proceedings, and it can be varied or revoked by further order of the Quebec Superior Court if there were a change of circumstances.
29In my view, this is not fatal to the recognition and enforcement of the Quebec Mareva Order. I come to this conclusion for five reasons.
30First, the minority decision in Pro Swing (per McLachlin C.J.) contextualized the finality requirement in a way that suggests that where the foreign order is not final but is nevertheless clear, this criterion may be met.
31The minority held that foreign non-money judgments must satisfy the “twin requirements” of finality and clarity. McLachlin C.J. explained, “[f]inality and clarity are distinct concepts. The first requires completeness; the second lack of ambiguity. However, in practice they may overlap. An order that is not final is likely to be unclear and vice versa”: at para. 91.
32In my view, these observations are not inconsistent with the reasons of the majority in Pro Swing.
33McLachlin C.J. also explained the purposes served by the finality and clarity requirements, at para 92:
It avoids enforcing courts re-litigating issues considered by the foreign court, which would be inappropriate because an enforcing court must not consider the merits of the foreign decision, absent fraud, violation of natural justice or violation of public policy.
It avoids practical difficulties of the enforcing court supervising an incomplete or unclear order. These difficulties may relate to the enforcing court’s unfamiliarity with the foreign law and its procedures or to the cost burden on the enforcing court. Further, an order that is not final may be changed by the foreign court, resulting in the domestic court enforcing an order that is no longer in effect in the foreign country.
An enforcing court should not be obliged to re-litigate foreign disputes or use scarce resources to duplicate what is best done in the originating jurisdiction.
34The practical difficulties apply with less force to the interprovincial enforcement of Mareva injunctions. In the context of commercial litigation within Canada, Mareva orders are largely based on standard term templates, which are easy to apply and interpret. At least among the common law provinces, there is no concern about unfamiliarity of “foreign law”. Even in the context of the Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, which has distinctive substantive and procedural requirements for interim relief, its Mareva-type orders share much in common with our Mareva orders. Further, Canadian courts regularly coordinate litigation crossing provincial boundaries. As discussed below, terms can be included in the recognition and enforcement of Mareva orders originating in sister provinces that facilitate such coordination and mitigate the concern that if the originating court’s order is changed, the Ontario court could be enforcing an order that is no longer in effect.
35Second, there were parallel developments in Ontario’s jurisprudence that have relaxed the finality requirement for enforcing foreign non-monetary orders, provided that the orders are clear and the purposes served by the finality requirement are met. Two Ontario decisions were released while Pro Swing was on reserve which permitted the recognition and enforcement of interim foreign non-monetary orders. Neither case was considered by the Supreme Court in Pro Swing.
36In my view, the Ontario decisions relaxing the finality requirement can be read harmoniously with Pro Swing given that the majority left the elaboration of the finality requirement for another day and given that the cases are consistent with the minority’s explanation of the purposes served by the finality and clarity requirements.
37In Re Cavell Insurance Co. Ltd. (2006), 80 O.R. (3d) 500 (C.A.), Cavell brought an application in the United Kingdom for the approval of a scheme of arrangement under s. 425 of the Companies Act, 1985 (U.K.), 1985, c. 6. The Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice granted an initial order in the application, directing Cavell to convene a meeting of its creditors affected by the scheme, and providing for the location and notice to be given for the meeting. Cavell applied in Ontario for an order recognizing and enforcing the U.K. order. It was granted by this court. On appeal, the Court of Appeal agreed that the U.K. order, despite it not being final, should be recognized and enforced in Ontario.
38As the minority did in Pro Swing, Goudge J.A. considered the purposes served by the finality requirement. He was satisfied that despite not being a final order, the U.K. order satisfied the purposes served by finality. He also held that there were strong policy reasons for its enforcement, including comity, reciprocity, and the realities of transnational commercial activity: at paras. 43-54.
39A few months later, this court applied the Court of Appeal’s decision in Cavell in Re Grace Canada Inc., [2006] O.J. No. 3643 (S.C.). In Grace, the Manitoba Cout of Queen’s Bench held that a law firm was entitled to act on behalf of a plaintiff against a group of companies in an asbestos-related proposed class action in Manitoba. The plaintiff brought a motion in Ontario seeking a declaration that the Superior Court of Justice give full faith and credit to the Manitoba order and for an order that there was no conflict of interest which restricted the plaintiff’s firm from acting in the CCAA proceedings in Ontario.
40Morawetz J. (as he then was) granted the order sought. He held that “the non-monetary and interlocutory nature of the Manitoba Order is not an impediment to its recognition in Ontario and… concluded that, in the circumstances of this case, it is appropriate for this Court to recognize the Manitoba Decision”: at para. 23.
41Third, since Pro Swing, this court has recognized and enforced interlocutory orders for the freezing of assets.
42In Johnson & Johnson v. Butt, [2007] O.J. No. 4655 (S.C.), the defendants sought a declaration in Ontario that an interlocutory ex parte order of the United States District Court directed to the Royal Bank of Canada had no force or effect in this province. The plaintiffs brought a cross-motion seeking to enforce the interlocutory U.S. order. After considering the authorities, including Pro Swing, this court held that the interlocutory freezing order was capable and appropriate for recognition in Ontario: at para. 15.
43More recently, this court recognized and enforced an ex parte Mareva injunction and Norwich order issued by the Alberta Court of Queen’s bench in FirstService Residential Alberta Ltd. v. Lloyd, 2016 ONSC 1418. Dunphy J. explained, at para. 1, that:
There should be no doubt that courts in this province will assist courts in other provinces by enforcing their orders. Rubber stamps are potentially dangerous things and no court should be expected to wield one. There should be a very high level of confidence that discretion will almost always be exercised in favour of extending comity and assistance to courts in other provinces absent exceptional circumstances. Such cooperation is a small but important part of the glue that holds this federation together.
44I agree. In addition, although most decisions seem to go unreported, this court regularly recognizes and enforces Mareva orders issued in other provinces.
45Fourth, there are good reasons to relax the finality requirement in the interprovincial context. As recognised in FirstService, at par. 8, the requirement in Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077, to extend full faith and credit to the decisions of other Canadian courts, so long as the originating court has properly exercised its jurisdiction, is not limited to money judgments.
46In Morguard, the Supreme Court wrote forcefully of the “strong need for the enforcement throughout the country of judgments given in one province” given our federal structure: at p. 1099. Not least among the reasons for this is that our Constitution took “significant steps... to foster economic integration”: at p. 1099. Economic integration remains a pressing concern today.
47Finally, the recognition and enforcement of Mareva orders made in sister provinces avoids the potential for re-litigation, the danger of inconsistent results, and unnecessary expense. It gives primacy to the originating jurisdiction as the most appropriate forum to litigate these issues.
48There seems little reason for plaintiffs to have to litigate multiple Mareva injunctions afresh in the interprovincial context. As happened here, it leads to the re-litigation of issues already decided in the originating jurisdiction. Although I would have granted the continued Mareva injunction had I considered it afresh, the re-litigation of Mareva relief generally creates the potential for inconsistent findings between the courts in sister provinces. Re-litigation creates additional barriers to accessing justice, imposes needless expense on the parties, and imposes unnecessary burdens on already overburdened courts.
49For these reasons, Mareva injunctions issued in another province are capable of being enforced and the procedure for doing so should be expeditious. It goes without saying that the general requirements for enforcement must be satisfied and a defendant can raise fairness considerations (such as fraud, public policy and natural justice) that would render enforcement inadvisable or unjust: Pro Swing.
The Quebec Mareva Order should be enforced
50Here, the Quebec Mareva Order is clear. There are no concerns about this court or the parties understanding what this court is enforcing. As it stands, the Quebec Mareva Order continues pending final judgment in the Quebec proceedings. To ensure that this court does not continue to enforce an order that changes in future, I direct the parties to return before this court forthwith if the Quebec Mareva Order were varied or terminated. I also direct the parties to bring these reasons and order to the attention of the trial judge or any judge seized in the Quebec Superior Court with a motion to vary or revoke the Quebec Mareva Order.
51I am thus satisfied that the purposes served by finality are met.
52The responding parties argue that the Quebec Mareva Order should not be enforced because the Quebec Superior Court did not consider the Quebec Defendants’ responding expert report regarding the operation of certain computer servers. The Quebec Defendants’ expert report contradicts the Quebec Plaintiffs’ expert report on this subject.
53In essence, the responding parties argue that I should not enforce the Quebec Mareva Order because it was procedurally unfair. I disagree. The Quebec Defendants brought a motion before the Quebec Superior Court to revoke the Quebec Mareva Order and asked the court to consider their responding expert report. The court declined to do so because they had not exercised reasonable diligence and their motion to set aside the Quebec Mareva Order was out of time. It was brought more than 30 days after their responding report became available to them. This decision was procedurally fair, according to the rules in Quebec, which the Quebec Defendants must follow. The responding parties are simply trying to relitigate an issue that was adjudicated in Quebec. It is not for this court to second guess these rules and the Quebec court’s decision. In any event, I see no denial of natural justice.
54Further, I am satisfied that the Quebec Mareva Order applies to Hurdman and Kris, even though they were not named in the order and were not parties to it.
55The Quebec Mareva Order provides:
ORDERS the Defendants Robert Lévesque, Gabriel Pereira Lévesque, and CSC Énergie Inc. not to directly or indirectly sell, withdraw, dissipate, transfer, dispose of, give away, mortgage, or otherwise dispose of the assets they hold personally and/or indirectly through another person (natural or legal) and/or jointly with one or more other persons, regardless of where such assets are located, until the final judgment is rendered; [Translation] (emphasis added)
56I am satisfied that the order applies to Hurdman and Kris as indirectly held assets and as assets that they “hold personally and/or indirectly through another person (natural or legal)”. This reflects the law in Ontario. In Buduchnist Credit Union Ltd. v. 2321197 Ontario Inc., 2024 ONCA 57, 169 O.R. (3d) 641, the Court of Appeal for Ontario confirmed that a corporation directly or indirectly controlled by an individual defendant could be captured by the terms of a Mareva order. Here, Robert Lévesque is the sole shareholder and sole director for Hurdman and Kris. In a word, he is their controlling mind.
57In addition, the December 11, 2024 interim order (per J.G. Bouchard J.) ordered the seizure before judgment of Robert Lévesque’s shares in Hurdman and Kris. This interim order confirms that Hurdman and Kris were in the contemplation of the court when it made the Quebec Mareva Order and that it intended its asset freezing order to include Hurdman and Kris as indirect assets.
58Finally, the Quebec court did not limit the territorial scope of the order to Quebec. The order expressly states that it applies “regardless of where such assets are located”. I am satisfied that the Quebec order applies extra-provincially.
Ordinary business expenses
59The Quebec Mareva Order is silent on the payment of Hurdman’s and Kris’s genuine business expenses. To make the order consistent with Ontario law, an exception must be made.
60The purpose of a Mareva injunction is to prevent a defendant from improperly putting assets beyond the court’s reach. Its purpose is not to prevent the defendant from carrying out ordinary business operations or to meet genuine liabilities: see, e.g., Iraqi Ministry of Defence v Arcepey Shipping Co SA (The Angel Bell) (No 2), [1981] Q.B. 65 (per Goff J.).
61I am satisfied that Hurdman and Kris have genuine liabilities that they must meet. Although Kris’s operations are modest, it still appears to have insurance costs and other liabilities.
62Hurdman and Kris should file a budget for the court’s approval. I encourage the parties to reach an agreement on a budget for genuine, ordinary business expenses. If they cannot agree, the matter may return before me on a contested basis.
63By interim order, I released funds from Hurdman for the payment of its legal expenses associated with this motion. The parties may address me if a further order is necessary in this respect.
64Given my conclusion that the Quebec Mareva Order should be recognized and enforced, I need not consider the moving parties’ alternate ground of relief. Suffice it to say, I would have granted the continuation had it been necessary to consider the Mareva afresh. The moving parties made full, frank, and fair disclosure and I was not persuaded by the responding parties that the moving parties came to the court with unclean hands.
B. An interlocutory order for the appointment of a receiver should be denied
65In addition to the enforcement of the Quebec Mareva Order, the moving parties seek the appointment of a receiver and manager over Hurdman and Kris. The responding parties oppose this.
66The court may appoint a receiver or receiver and manager by interlocutory order where it appears just or convenient: Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 101(1) and Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 41.
67Strathy J. (as then was) summarized the principles governing the interlocutory appointment of a receiver in Anderson v. Hunking, 2010 ONSC 4008, at para. 15. These include:
The appointment of a receiver to preserve assets for the purposes of execution is extraordinary relief, which prejudges the conduct of a litigant, and should be granted sparingly.
The appointment of a receiver for this purpose is effectively execution before judgment and to justify the appointment there must be strong evidence that the plaintiff’s right to recovery is in serious jeopardy.
The appointment of a receiver is very intrusive and should be used only sparingly, with due consideration for the effect on the parties as well as consideration of the parties’ conduct.
In deciding whether to appoint a receiver, the court must have regard to all the circumstances, particularly the nature of the property and the rights and interests of all parties in relation thereto.
The test for the appointment of an interlocutory receiver is comparable to the test for interlocutory injunctive relief, as set out in RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General).
68I decline to appoint a receiver and manager. Doing so would be disproportionate and unnecessary. The recognition and enforcement of the Quebec Mareva Order adequately protects the moving parties’ interests pending final judgment in the Quebec proceedings.
69The moving parties contend that the responding parties have lost the right to decide how the companies use their funds. I disagree. As discussed, the purpose of interim relief is to prevent the dissipation of assets pending final judgment. It is not to prevent Mr. Lévesque from operating his businesses and to meet their genuine, ordinary business liabilities.
70The moving parties suggest that they require the appointment of a receiver and manager to obtain a complete picture of Hurdman’s and Kris’s operations and the value of their assets. I am not persuaded that this calls for the appointment of a receiver. The moving parties could have brought a contempt motion if they seriously contended that the responding parties had not provided the disclosure required by this court’s interim Mareva order.
71The moving parties also argue that Kris has recently defaulted on its lease with the municipality, which has impaired its value and which the receiver may be able to remedy by working with the municipality. Again, I disagree that this is a proper reason to appoint of a receiver.
72Kris’s lease with the municipality expired August 31, 2022, well before the Quebec proceedings. Kris did not renew or enter into a further lease because the municipality would have required Kris to incur repair costs of over $2.3 million related to the hydroelectric dam. Despite the expiry of Kris’s lease, the municipality has allowed Kris to continue producing power, which generates modest revenue averaging between $4,000 and $5,000 per month. Further, Mr. Lévesque and Hurdman are enjoined from disposing of Kris’s assets under the Quebec Mareva Order. Nothing here calls for the appointment of a receiver.
73Accordingly, the request for the interlocutory appointment of a receiver is denied.
VI. Disposition
74The Quebec Mareva Order is recognized and enforced in accordance with these reasons.
75The interim Mareva order issued on October 31, 2025, as extended and modified by MacLeod R.S.J., is no longer in effect.
76The request for the interlocutory appointment of a receiver is denied.
77Costs are reserved to the trial judge in the Quebec proceedings. If the judge in Quebec concludes that he or she lacks jurisdiction to deal with the costs in Ontario or is reluctant to do so, this court will remain seized and the parties may make costs submissions following the final judgment in Quebec.
Justice Owen Rees
Released: April 9, 2026
Footnotes
- Following the release of my decision, the moving parties raised a jurisdictional issue with the original costs order and asked that I vary it. On April 15, 2026, I amended the costs order at paragraph 77 of the reasons. The amended version appears here.
- Robert Lévesque, Gabriel Pereira Lévesque, and CSC Energie Inc. Before this court, the defendants/responding parties also include Hurdman and Kris.
- Paquet, Agneli, Moreau-Gougeon, NordicFlow, and First Block. Before this court, the plaintiffs/moving parties also include Hydro Calcul by its general partner 9474 Quebec.