Versteegh v. Kerr, 2026 ONSC 208

Court File and Parties

CITATION: Versteegh v. Kerr 2026 ONSC 208

COURT FILE NO.: FC257/25

DATE: 2026/01/12

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO

RE: Mathew Bradley Versteegh, Applicant

AND:

Bailey Kerr, Respondent

BEFORE: T. PRICE J.

COUNSEL: B. Lester - Counsel for the Applicant

H. Barsoum - Counsel for the Respondent

HEARD: December 3, 2025

ENDORSEMENT

Nature of Motion

1In this motion, the Applicant, Mathew Versteegh (hereinafter, Mr. Versteegh) seeks an order requiring the Respondent, Bailey Kerr (hereinafter, Ms. Kerr) to return with the parties’ two children, J., who is 8, and T., who is 5, to St. Thomas, Ontario, where she had been residing with them for 21 months following the parties’ separation. His reason is that Ms. Kerr moved surreptitiously with the children to Woodstock Ontario and, in doing so, failed to comply with the notice provisions set out in ss. 39.3(1) and (2) of the Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12, as amended (the CLRA).

2While acknowledging that, before moving, she failed to comply with the notice requirements set out in ss. 39.3(1) and (2) of the CLRA, Ms. Kerr resists Mr. Versteegh’s motion, claiming that the move to Woodstock was in the children’s best interests and that it has been “overwhelmingly positive and beneficial for the children and me.”

The Parties’ Materials: Non-Compliance with the Court’s Directives Can Have Consequences

3This long motion is illustrative of why there is a Provincial Practice Direction setting page limits for such proceedings.

4Mr. Versteegh’s affidavit in support of the motion, as well as his reply affidavit, both complied with the page limits in the Provincial Practice Direction. Ms. Kerr’s single responding affidavit did not. At twenty-one (21) pages, it marginally exceeded the page limit for affidavits. However, attached as an exhibit to the affidavit was a spread sheet consisting of thirty-five (35) pages of minuscule font which detailed, from Ms. Kerr’s perspective, events that had allegedly occurred between the parties or about the children during the twenty-two (22) months between February 2, 2024 and November 17, 2025. Given the size of the font and the extent of the detail contained in the attachment, had this narrative been included in the affidavit, where it would have been properly located, within acceptable page limits, I have no doubt that the affidavit would exceed 70 pages in length.

5There is a risk to counsel who fail to comply with the Provincial Practice Direction. In this case, it meant that I did not read the complete attachment, as I informed counsel for Ms. Kerr at the outset of the hearing.

Background

6The parties commenced cohabitation in or near Aylmer, Ontario in or around April 2012. They never married. Following a separation in 2017, the length of which they disagreed about, the parties reunited and continued to cohabit in Mr. Versteegh’s residence in Aylmer until they again separated in January 2023.

7Following the latter separation, they continued to cohabit in Mr. Versteegh’s residence until Ms. Kerr, after having told Mr. Versteegh of her intention to do so, moved with the children to St. Thomas in January 2024.

8At the time that Ms. Kerr moved from Aylmer to St. Thomas, the parties’ eldest child, J., was attending a French immersion public school in Sparta, Ontario, which is located near St. Thomas.

9When she moved to St. Thomas Ms. Kerr registered J. in the English language Mitchell Hepburn Public School in St. Thomas, which served the catchment area where her residence was located.

10While Mr. Versteegh informed Ms. Kerr that he did not agree with her plan to move to St. Thomas with the children, or with the proposed change of schools for J., he “acquiesced” to the move, despite the drive between his residence and Ms. Kerr’s rental unit in St. Thomas being 22 minutes, because he was still able to exercise his parenting time.¹

11The parties disagreed about who became responsible for transporting the children more often than the other, with each claiming that obligation and both laying the blame at the feet of the other for not carrying an equal share of the driving.

12At some point in August, 2025, a number of related events pertinent to this motion occurred. Ms. Kerr suggested to Mr. Versteegh that the children be registered to play hockey in Aylmer for the 2025-2026 season. Despite Mr. Versteegh’s preference that they be registered in St. Thomas, where she was residing, Ms. Kerr persisted. As a result, the children were enrolled to play hockey in Aylmer. During those discussions, Ms. Kerr informed Mr. Versteegh that she planned to move again with the children.

13While Mr. Versteegh’s position is that he was not told by Ms. Kerr where she was planning to move, Ms. Kerr’s position is that Mr. Versteegh clearly understood that she intended to leave St. Thomas because she had told him that the reason she wanted the children registered to play hockey in Aylmer was because she would no longer be residing in St. Thomas. In any event, Mr. Versteegh informed Ms. Kerr that he did not agree to her moving again with the children.

14Around the same time, Ms. Kerr suggested that Mr. Versteegh’s parenting time should occur on alternating weekends, ² a suggestion to which he also expressed disagreement. The parties had been operating on a, roughly, equal time, shared parenting arrangement during the summer of 2025.

15When school resumed in September 2025, the parties’ children returned to Mitchell Hepburn Public School in St. Thomas which they had been attending between January 2024 and June 2025.

16The children were in Mr. Versteegh’s care from September 8 to 15, 2025. He next saw them on September 18, 2025 when Ms. Kerr attended his residence to retrieve their hockey equipment.

17On this occasion, an incident occurred between the parties which resulted, a week later, in the police charging Mr. Versteegh with assault. He was also charged with mischief and assault arising from an interaction between the parties on May 30, 2025. Mr. Versteegh was released on an undertaking which contained a clause prohibiting him from communicating with Ms. Kerr.

18On September 30, 2025, Mr. Versteegh attended the children’s school to retrieve them for a week of parenting time. Ms. Kerr attended at the same time and refused to allow him to take the children. Because of his release terms, Mr. Versteegh was unable to resist the children leaving with Ms. Kerr.

19On or about that same day, Ms. Kerr moved with the children from St. Thomas to Woodstock to reside with the children in the residence of her boyfriend. Despite doing so, Ms. Kerr failed to tell Mr. Versteegh that she was moving to Woodstock, why she was moving there, or the address where the children would be residing.

20Mr. Versteegh learned that the children had moved when he later contacted their school in St. Thomas and was informed that they had transferred to a school in Woodstock. This represented the second time in two school years (2023-2024 and 2024-2025) that J.’s school had changed as a result of Ms. Kerr moving to a different residence. Thus, the school he currently attends is his third in three school years.

21Mr. Versteegh did not see the children for several weeks after they moved to Woodstock. They also missed hockey practices and games during the same period.

22The distances and one-way driving times between Mr. Versteegh’s residence in Aylmer and the two post-separation residences in which Ms. Kerr and the children have resided are as follows:

a. St. Thomas: 26.1 km; 24 minutes

b. Woodstock: 62.7 km; 50 minutes

23Consequently, the driving time for Mr. Versteegh to retrieve the children from Woodstock has more than doubled what it was before they were moved by Ms. Kerr. The parties disagree on whether the additional driving time is of concern to the children.

Mr. Versteegh’s Claims About his Parenting Time Prior to September 2025

24According to Mr. Versteegh, after separating in January 2023, while continuing to reside in the same residence with their children, the parties “worked cooperatively to create a fair and flexible parenting schedule.” He did not otherwise provide specifics.

25He also claimed that, between January 2024, when Ms. Kerr moved to St. Thomas, and September 2025, when she moved to Woodstock, the parties exercised a “flexible, but generally shared parenting schedule.” He specified that between January 2024 and November 2024 the parenting schedule was shared on an equal basis. He provided no details as to how the parties’ parenting time was broken down during this period.

26In November, 2024, Mr. Versteegh began to keep track of his parenting time in a diary because Ms. Kerr “started to become difficult.” This resulted in Mr. Versteegh’s parenting time “starting to become based on [Ms. Kerr’s] schedule and what was convenient for her.”

27According to Mr. Versteegh, the children stayed overnight with him:

a. seven times in November 2024;

b. ten times in December 2024;

c. sixteen times in January 2025;

d. sixteen times in February 2025;

e. fourteen times in March 2025;

f. fourteen times in April 2025;

g. eighteen times in May 2025; and

h. twenty-two times in June 2025.

28While Mr. Versteegh provided no specifics about when the children were in his care each of the months between November 2024 and June 2025, he again asserted that the parties’ parenting schedule was “generally… equal parenting time, albeit flexible.”

29Using these figures, according to Mr. Versteegh, the children were in his care overnight on 117 of the 232 nights between November 1, 2024 and June 30, 2025. He did not specify at what time the children arrived, at what time they departed the following day, where they went when they left his residence, or whether any of these nights were consecutive.

30In addition, he claimed that the children were in his care for evening or daytime visits between 31 and 33 times over the 8 months between November 2024 and June 2025, inclusive.

31As noted, the parties shared week-about parenting for the months of July and August 2025.

Mr. Versteegh’s Requested Relief

32If Ms. Kerr does not return to St. Thomas, Mr. Versteegh requests that the children be placed with him, with J. returning to the French immersion public school from which he was disenrolled by Ms. Kerr in January 2024. Ms. Kerr should be granted “reasonable parenting time” with the children on weekends and holidays.

33Should Ms. Kerr return with the children to St. Thomas, or Aylmer, where he continues to reside, Mr. Versteegh requested that the court order a week-about parenting schedule, with the parties to be required to share the driving.

34He also seeks interim decision-making responsibility.

Ms. Kerr’s Explanation for Not Notifying Mr. Versteegh About Her Move to Woodstock

35According to Ms. Kerr, she was prevented from telling Mr. Versteegh on September 30, 2025 about her move to Woodstock because the undertaking binding him after he was charged in September 2025 with assaulting her also prevented her from communicating with him directly, either to tell him of her move with the children or about other parenting matters.³

36She also “believed” that Mr. Versteegh knew her Woodstock address, although she had not provided it to him.

Ms. Kerr’s Reasons for Moving to Woodstock

37Ms. Kerr described her move from St. Thomas to Woodstock - a move she referred to as being “local” and “equivalent to moving between residences within one municipality “- as having been made for a couple of reasons.

38The main one appears to have been that it enabled her to “secure financial stability.”

39She alleged that she had remained in a relationship with Mr. Versteegh because she had been financially dependent on him, only able to work casual hours for several years because of being “a stay-at-home mother primarily caring for the children,” while also working without remuneration at his farming business. She claimed that Mr. Versteegh often pressured her to leave the residence, which she finally did after she secured full-time employment in September 2023 and was able to save enough money to support herself.

40When she moved to St. Thomas in January 2024, her rent was $2,500 per month which, she claimed, exceeded her financial means. She was notified in January 2025 that her rent would increase to $2,550 per month, “with further annual increases anticipated.” The proposed $50 monthly increase in costs created a financial strain.⁴

41Consequently, she determined that she would move to Woodstock to live with her boyfriend, with whom she has been in “a stable relationship” since November 2023,⁵ and would share with him the costs of cohabiting. ⁶ She now pays $1,500 per month towards her boyfriend’s undefined household expenses, while he pays the majority of utility costs and other [undefined] bills.⁷

42She claims a financial inability to return to St. Thomas, asserting that rents for available units in the attendance area for the school in which her children were enrolled prior to her move to Woodstock will now amount to approximately $2,600 per month, an amount she cannot afford.

43She blamed Mr. Versteegh for contributing to her financial instability and inability to afford a return to St. Thomas because of his decision to stop paying child support in February 2025. According to her, Mr. Versteegh paid child support of $1000 per month from January 2024 to January 2025, not including November 2024, when he withheld payments to reimburse himself for hockey equipment and registration. Moreover, she alleged that when she asked him to reinstate his child support payments or to share the cost of the children’s before-school program, he refused, telling her that he had been paying her too much based on his income.⁸

44Ms. Kerr’s other reason for moving appears to have been to introduce what she called “stability” into the lives of the children. According to her, the parties’ initial separation was the result of recurring conflict, instability and a lack of support from Mr. Versteegh which required that she leave him “for [her] own well-being and that of the children.”

45The rental unit into which she had moved in January 2024 was always intended to be a temporary first step after leaving “the high conflict and emotionally unsafe relationship” that she had with Mr. Versteegh. She described her primary goal as ensuring the immediate safety and stability of both her and the children.

46She portrayed Mr. Versteegh both as a “controlling” individual who forced decisions on her and the children, such as who was to be the children’s dentist, and as someone who was often unavailable because he was home only on “rare occasions,” and unwilling to assist with caregiving responsibilities.

47She referred multiple times to his “abuse” of her, asserting that on those “rare occasions” that he was home with her and the children he was often angry and hostile to her in the presence of the children. The “abuse” to which she referred, apart from the alleged events which gave rise to the criminal charges for May 30, 2025 and September 18, 2025, seems to have been more in the nature of emotional maltreatment rather than physical maltreatment, both of which Mr. Versteegh denied in any event.

48Ms. Kerr further claimed that her employment duties, childcare and “household responsibilities” in St. Thomas often left her “exhausted and overwhelmed.” The latter two, in addition to “financial responsibilities,” are now “share[d]” with her boyfriend, thereby reducing the stress she experienced living in St. Thomas.

Ms. Kerr’ Response to Mr. Versteegh’s Claims About his Parenting Time Prior to September 2025

49Ms. Kerr’s response to Mr. Versteegh’s claims about his parenting time focused on both its quantitative and qualitative aspects.

Quantitative[^9]

50Ms. Kerr denied that the parties ever had an equal shared parenting arrangement, or that they ever cooperatively co-parented. She claimed that the children were always anticipated to be in her primary care.

51She deposed that Mr. Versteegh unilaterally dictated the children’s schedules according to his convenience and often gave her little to no notice before either picking up or returning the children. Anytime she requested stability, compromise or predictability from Mr. Versteegh, the parties got into significant conflict, with Mr. Versteegh making threats or attempting to intimidate her. Her compliance was often motivated by fear.

52Ms. Kerr specifically cited the children being in Mr. Versteegh’s care for the week of September 8-15, 2025, despite her objection, as an example of both fear motivating her actions and Mr. Versteegh imposing his preferred schedule, regardless of the children’s needs or her concerns. As noted, she had wanted to revert to a schedule that would have the children in Mr. Versteegh’s care every other weekend. She deposed that she complied only because his behaviour was extremely high-conflict and unpredictable and she feared the consequences of refusing.

53Ms. Kerr claimed that, according to her “records,”¹⁰ Mr. Versteegh exercised parenting time on 191 days of the possible 655 days between February 1, 2024 and November 17, 2025. Over those days, she deposed that Mr. Versteegh had the children in his care a total of 4,789 of the 15,720 hours that occurred over the same period. This amounts to 30.5% of the time. She further estimated that about 30% of that parenting time consisted of the children spending only a short period in Mr. Versteegh’s care before she retrieved them from him after she finished work.

54Deducting Mr. Versteegh’s reduced parenting time that followed Ms. Kerr’s move to Woodstock in September 2025 yields an alleged average monthly percentage of parenting time exercised by Mr. Versteegh over the period from February 1, 2024 to August 31, 2025 of 31.5%, according to the information provided by Ms. Kerr.

55Over the 19-month period between February 1, 2024 and August 30, 2025, according to Ms. Kerr’s “records,” Mr. Versteegh had the children in his care more than 40% of the time in a month six times - during the months of August, October, and December 2024, and February, July and August, 2025.

56The months of August 2024, and July and August 2025 all coincide with the children’s school summer vacation. According to Ms. Kerr, the decision for the children to spend equal time with the parties in the summer of 2025 was made unilaterally by Mr. Versteegh in June 2025. She cooperated out of fear because of his alleged assault of her on May 30, 2025.

57The only explanation that she gave for the increased parenting time in August 2024 was that it was also school summer vacation. No mention was made of a unilateral decision by Mr. Versteegh to increase his parenting time during this month. Similarly, the increase in October 2024 was attributed to Mr. Versteegh taking J. camping for a week while the December 2024 increase was attributed to “extended holiday-season parenting,” with neither October’s nor December’s increases being attributed to Mr. Versteegh acting unilaterally.

58Also, the months of October and December, 2024, and February, 2025 all occurred before Mr. Versteegh’s first alleged assault of Ms. Kerr, so it seems reasonable to also conclude that her fear of physical retribution for not agreeing to allow Mr. Versteegh to have more time than she would claim that he usually has with the children was not a factor in the amount of time that he had the children in his care for those months.

Qualitative[^11]

59Ms. Kerr described Mr. Versteegh’s parenting time as a “consistent pattern of safety concerns, disrupted routines, poor communication, and unplanned or forced parenting time,” which frequently led to the children being unhappy about spending time with him, a claim denied by Mr. Versteegh. She specifically alleged that J. frequently expressed concerns about attending Mr. Versteeg’s residence for parenting time and that “he cries or become sullen” when told that he will be spending the weekend with Mr. Versteegh.

60She made a number of bare allegations against Mr. Versteegh about the quality of his parenting time with the children, including:

a. that he failed to seek medical attention when T. broke his arm, taking the child, instead, to a party for two days. He also failed advise her of the injury when he dropped the child off. She further alleged that Mr. Versteegh later admitted that T. had been crying and unable to sleep while also complaining about his arm for several days. When she took T. to the hospital, Mr. Versteegh refused to provide any information about how the child’s arm was broken or respond to any questions that would assist the medical staff;¹²

b. that the children suffered other “injuries and medical issues” which included “deep cuts, infections, sunburns resulting in blisters and untreated wounds” while in his care;

c. that he took the children to his farm worksites, where they were exposed to unsafe environments while inadequately supervised;

d. that he included the children in hunting activities involving loaded firearms without appropriate supervision or safety equipment; and

e. that he kept them home from school for his own convenience without notifying the school, or dropped them off at school late, or removed them early without notifying Ms. Kerr.

Ms. Kerr’s Reasons for Opposing the Children’s Placement with Mr. Versteegh

61Ms. Kerr denied that the children have any community ties with or close friends in Aylmer. She further asserted that, although they continue to play hockey in Aylmer,¹³ their connections with their teammates are limited and they do not socialize with those children outside of hockey.

62She also objects to Mr. Versteegh’s suggestion that J. be re-enrolled in the French immersion public school he last attended in January 2024, disagreeing with Mr. Versteegh that J. had done well in the program. She claimed, to the contrary, that it had been suggested to the parties during a parent-teacher meeting in January 2024 that J. should transition to an English language program.¹⁴

63She further claimed that if the children were to be returned to reside in the primary care of Mr. Versteegh, they would be required to attend a different public school, one they had never attended, a change she called a “significant change in their educational environment, requiring another transition that is unnecessary and not in their best interests.”

Ms. Kerr’s Primary Proposed Order (Including Terms Implied in her Evidence)

64Ms. Kerr proposed that she be permitted to remain with the children in Woodstock. She would have interim decision-making responsibility.

65Mr. Versteegh’s parenting time with the children would occur on a five-week rotational basis during the school year, with the children to be in his care four out of five consecutive Fridays from 6:00 p.m. until Monday morning at the commencement of school.

66Ms. Kerr would be responsible for delivering the children to Mr. Versteegh on the Fridays, and he would be responsible for transporting the children to school on the Mondays.

67During the school summer vacation, for the months of July and August, the parties would share parenting time equally on a week-on, week-off rotation, with exchanges occurring Fridays at 6:00 p.m.

68All Friday exchanges would be facilitated by a mutually trusted third-party,¹⁵ who cannot be one of Mr. Versteegh’s employees.¹⁶ If a mutually agreed-upon person cannot supervise Friday exchanges, she suggested that a paid service be utilized, with the costs to be divided between the parties.

69Mr. Versteegh would be prohibited from taking the children to his workplace or disrupting their routines.

70Mr. Versteegh would not be permitted to rely on an employee or acquaintance not known to Ms. Kerr to care for the children in the absence of Mr. Versteegh.

71The children would remain registered for hockey in Aylmer.

Ms. Kerr’s Secondary Proposed Order

72Ms. Kerr also proposed, if she is required to return with the children, that:

a. she be given a defined, reasonable time to secure a residence; and

b. the geographic area to which she would be ordered to return be within a driving time of 20 to 25 minutes from Mr. Versteegh’s residence.

Law and Analysis

How to Address Conflicting Evidence on a Motion

73Much of the evidence on this motion conflicts. Examples of such conflicts are found in: the amount of time that the children spent in the care of each parent while Ms. Kerr resided in St. Thomas; and the quality of Mr. Versteegh’s relationships with the children; the nature of the relationship between the parties.

74Because this is a motion, I am constrained about what use I can make of such conflicting evidence. As Justice Somji wrote at paragraph 35 of Li v. Wu, [2020] O.J. No. 5202 , in which she dismissed a motion by a mother to relocate with the parties’ child 170 kms. from the matrimonial home in Stittsville to Deep River Ontario for employment purposes:

[75] For the purposes of the interim order, I am not able to make findings of fact regarding the respective allegations of emotional abuse or parental neglect each parent makes against the other. Should this matter go to trial, it will be up to the trial judge to make such findings of fact after a full trial on the merits.

76Similar views have also been expressed by:

a. Justice Sproat in paragraphs 6 and 7 of Bernardi v. Bernardi, [2005] O.J. No. 3746:

6 As is typically the case, on this interim motion, there is conflicting affidavit evidence. Each party believes the party to have anger management problems and to be unreasonable. There is also agreement that the parties find it very difficult to communicate effectively with one another and each blames the other for this difficulty.

7 It is very difficult to determine the facts on an interim application. The goal, however, has to be to make an order that will be in the best interests of the children and to the extent possible, maintain the status quo pending trial.

b. Justice M.G.J. Quigley at paragraph 16 in Datars v. Graham, [2007] O.J. No. 3179 (S.C.J.), which involved an interim motion to restrain a mother from moving a child’s primary residence from Burlington to Oshawa:

16 The problem that this court faces on this motion, however, as McSorley J. observed in [Kennedy v. Hull, 2005 ONCJ 275, [2005] O.J. No. 4719 (O.C.J.)] is that it is difficult if not impossible in most cases to complete the [required] extensive child-focused inquiry…on the typically conflicting and incomplete affidavit evidence that is often available to the court on interim motions.

77Consequently, when considering the children’s best interests in this case, I will be focusing on the facts about which there is either some agreement or minimal disagreement, and on reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the evidence.

Status Quo

78An issue of significance on an interim motion is the determination of the pre-motion status quo.

79Justice D. Chappel discussed status quo as a legal concept in Whidden v. Ellwood, [2015] O.J. No. 3815 at paragraph 22, writing:

…On motions dealing with temporary custody, residence, and access, there is no presumptive rule in favour of the status quo that must be rebutted by the party seeking to change the existing arrangements. As the Court of Appeal emphasized in Papp,¹⁷ the applicable test is best interests of the child. In applying that test, there is an obligation on the part of the court to carefully scrutinize and weigh the quality, magnitude, and strength of the evidence adduced in support of a change, and to ensure that the evidence is sufficiently compelling before acting upon that evidence to vary the de facto arrangements.

80Justice Pazaratz expanded on the concept in Churchill v Elliot and Ward, 2024 ONSC 1907 at paragraph 36, writing:

36 Although the "status quo" is frequently mentioned as an important consideration in determining or continuing parenting arrangements - particularly at the interim stage -- the term "status quo" is not specifically mentioned in the legislation. However, section 24(3)(d) of the CLRA lists "the history of care of the child" as a factor in determining best interests. That factor appears to be another way of describing "status quo". Brownson v. Brownson, 2022 ONSC 5882(SCJ).

81Justice Pazaratz added, at sub-paragraph 36(e) that “[t]he status quo is particularly important on an interim motion because the court is often not in a position to make factual findings based on incomplete and untested evidence.

82At paragraph 38, Justice Pazaratz further wrote that:

a. The status quo does not refer to a situation unreasonably created by one party after separation to obtain a tactical advantage in the litigation. Cabral v. Parker 2021 ONSC 4574 (SCJ); Theriault v. Ford, 2022 ONSC 3619 (SCJ) Neither parent has the right to suddenly impose major changes in a child's life, or to unilaterally interfere with or impede the other parent's contact or role in the child's life. A parent cannot be permitted to gain a litigation advantage through manipulation of events, or by creating a new arrangement which they may later characterize as the "status quo." Rifai v. Green 2014 ONSC 1377 (SCJ); Ivory v. Ivory 2021 ONSC 5475 (SCJ); J.F.R. v. K.L.L. 2022 ONSC 5067 (SCJ); Wang v. Tang, 2023 ONSC 3609 (SCJ).

The Status Quo as of September 2025

83At sub-paragraph 37(a), Justice Pazaratz wrote that a status quo can be established “by reference to the parents' practice or the child's routine prior to separation; by any consensual arrangement made after separation; or by court order.”

84In this case, there were three residential and child-care arrangements that existed prior to Ms. Kerr’s move to Woodstock. They were: the parties cohabiting in a continuing relationship with the children; the parties residing in a same residence, with the children, post-separation’ and the parties residing in separate residences, with parenting time in dispute between them.

85The only evidence related to the care arrangements for the children prior to September 2023 was that provided by Ms. Kerr, who deposed both that she was “a stay-at-home mother primarily caring for the children” until then and that the children were always anticipated to be in her primary care. Mr. Versteegh did not specifically deny either of these claims in his reply affidavit.

86From that, I infer that, when she moved to St. Thomas in January 2024, Ms. Kerr took the children with her and established their primary residence with her there. Although claiming that he was initially “very opposed” to Ms. Kerr moving with the children to St Thomas, by his own admission, he “acquiesced” to it.

87Once in St. Thomas, and despite Mr. Versteegh’s disagreement, Ms. Kerr registered J. in Mitchell Hepburn Public School, where he remained in attendance between January 2024 and September 2025. Given his age, I infer that, at least as of September 2025, if not earlier, T. also was a student in the same school.

88In my view, this became, in January 2024, and remained, until September 2025, the status quo that existed regarding the children’s residence and school attendance until it was disrupted by Ms. Kerr’s move with the children to Woodstock to reside with her boyfriend – the children’s primary residence was with Ms. Kerr, and both were attending Mitchell Hepburn Public School in St. Thomas, one that J. had attended for half of the 2023-2024 school year, all of the 2024-2025 school year, and briefly at the start of the 2025-2026 school year..

89The other issue about which there was a status quo was the amount of time that they were having parenting time with Mr. Versteegh when Ms. Kerr moved with them to Woodstock. This is clearly an issue about which the parties are in disagreement.

90Mr. Versteegh described the parenting schedule to which he claimed the parties agreed in different terms over different periods:

a. between January 2024 and September 2025 –“a flexible, but generally shared parenting schedule;”

b. between January 2024 and November 2024 - “parenting was shared on an equal basis”, though Mr. Versteegh “was generally not keeping track;”

c. between November 2024 and June 2025 - “generally exercised equal parenting time, albeit flexible;” and

d. July and August 2025 – “week about” parenting time

91Ms. Kerr’s approach was to summarize, based on her “records,” the percentages of time that the children were in Mr. Versteegh’s care between February 2024 and August 2025. The percentages between were between 10.07% and 43.68% in the period from February 2024 to June 2025 (not including August 2024, when parenting was shared). The percentages for August 2024, July 2025 and August 2025 were, respectively, 60.22%, 45.36% and 57.39%.

92The approaches used by both parties to determine define Mr. Versteegh’s parenting time are vague, imprecise, and lack specificity. The best that can be deduced from both parties’ evidence is that:

a. Mr. Versteegh had regular parenting time with the children which was exercised on a somewhat ad hoc basis which likely included weekends as a more consistent component; and

b. while the extent to which he had parenting time is in dispute, even on the evidence of Ms. Kerr the children were in Mr. Versteegh’s care an average of 48.94% of the time in 6 of the 13 months between August 2024 and August 2025, with the average of the other seven months equalling 31.23%, and the average over the entire 13 month period equalling 37% of the time.

Changes in Residence vs. Relocations

93The issue of moves by persons having decision-making responsibility or parenting time with respect to a child, or by the child, is specifically addressed in two different sections of the CLRA – 39.1 and 39.3.

94Section 39.1 applies to moves which are a “change in residence” by a person who has decision-making responsibility or parenting time with respect to a child or moves which are a change in the child’s residence.

95Section 39.3 applies to parental moves which are “relocations.”

96A “change in residence” and a “relocation” are two distinct concepts. This is made clear by s. 39.(5), which provides, in effect, that if a parental move is a “relocation”, the provisions of s. 39.1 do not apply to that parental move.

97The phrase “change in residence” is not defined in the CLRA while the term “relocation” is. It is defined in s. 18(1) of the CLRA as follows:

“relocation” means a change in residence of a child, or of a person who has decision-making responsibility or parenting time with respect to the child or is an applicant for a parenting order in respect of the child, that is likely to have a significant impact on the child’s relationship with,

(a) another person who has decision-making responsibility or parenting time with respect to the child or is an applicant for a parenting order in respect of the child,…(Bolding added)

98The definition contains the words “change in residence.” Therefore, a relocation is a form of “change in residence.” The relationship between the two concepts can be described as follows: All moves by a child from one home to another are changes in residence. However, only some changes in residence are relocations.

Notice of a Change in Residence

99The notice obligations on a person who is undertaking a child’s change in residence are minimal. They primarily require the person intending to change a child’s residence to provide written notice to others who have decision-making responsibility for or parenting time with the child. The written notice must include “the date on which the change is expected to occur” and “the address of the new residence and contact information of the person or child, as the case may be.” (ss. 39.1(1) and 39.1(2))

100A court may waive the notice requirement on an ex parte application if it is appropriate to do so, including if there is a risk of family violence. No such application was brought in this case.

Notice of a Relocation

101The notice obligations on a person who is undertaking a relocation of a child are more onerous. They include giving written notice, in the form prescribed by O.Reg. 155/21, at least 60 days before the date of the proposed relocation. (s. 39.3(1))

102In addition to the information required for a change in residence, the written notice must also include “a proposal as to how decision-making responsibility, parenting time or contact, as the case may be, could be exercised,” plus any additional information required by regulation. While O.Reg. 155/21 sets out no additional information required to be given, it does specify in detail how the written notice is to be served.

103As in the case of a simple change in residence, a court on an ex parte application may waive the notice requirement if it is appropriate to do so, including if there is a risk of family violence. Again, no such application was brought in this case.

Was Ms. Kerr’s Move with the Children to Woodstock a Relocation?

104The answer to this question turns on whether Ms. Kerr’s move to Woodstock with the children “is likely to have a significant impact on [their] relationship with” Mr. Versteegh. In Hiebert v. Hiebert, 2025 ONSC 6595, I addressed this same question in the context of a Divorce Act¹⁸ motion by a mother seeking permission to move, before the move was undertaken, as follows:

105The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal considered this issue in D.T.D. v T.A.J., 2022 SKCA 34. The Court of Appeal upheld a motions judge’s decision that a move by a mother and children to another municipality constituted a change of place of residence and not a relocation.

106The following comments are pertinent to this case.

33 There is little in the way of jurisprudence, thus far, that has explored the contours of what constitutes a relocation versus a change in residence, even though this appears to be the threshold issue. That said, as Professor Rollie Thompson, Q.C., observes in his article"Legislating About Relocating Bill C-78, N.S. and B.C.", (2019) 38 CFLQ 219 (WL), there appears to be relatively little controversy on the subject "as the courts already apply a 'significant impact' test". By way of illustration, Professor Thompson refers to this Court's decision in Alix v Irwin, 2014 SKCA 46, 438 Sask R 30 [Alix-CA], which framed the analysis, as per Gordon, around the need for a material change in circumstance. That analysis demands an examination of whether the change (a) alters "the child's needs or the ability of the parents to meet those needs in a fundamental way" (Gordon at para 12), (b) "materially affects the child" (at para 13), and (c) "was either not foreseen or could not have been reasonably contemplated by the judge who made the initial order" (at para 13).

34 In Alix v Irwin (6 January 2014) Swift Current, FLD 9 of 2009 (Sask QB), the mother, who had primary parenting responsibilities for the couple's 5-year-old son, moved to a new community that was a 1.5 hours' drive from where she had been residing. The father applied to vary the parenting order or, in the alternative, for an order requiring the mother to return the child to the home community. The Chambers judge dismissed the father's application. However, that decision was reversed on appeal (Alix-CA), primarily because the Chambers judge was found to have limited his consideration of the issue to the question of the distance between the two communities, without examining the implications of how the mother's move would affect the child's relationship with his father.

35 The key point Professor Thompson draws from Alix-CA is simply that distance alone is not the controlling factor in determining if a move is a relocation. Rather, the issue of relocation (or mobility, as it was then referred to) turns on an examination of the impact of the move on the child's relationship with the non-moving parent….

45 In brief reasons set out under that issue, the Chambers judge concluded that the mother's "move to Martensville does not have such a significant impact upon the interim parenting arrangement ordered by Zerr J. as to constitute a relocation" (at para 29). Her determination was largely based on the short additional commute (an extra 15 minutes) of driving time for the father. And, as mentioned, to ensure that the mother's move did not reduce the father's actual parenting time versus the time he spends commuting with his children, the Chambers judge extended that parenting time by one hour.

46 The father argues that the Chambers judge had to do more than simply direct her focus to his additional commuting time. I agree with the father to this extent: as the courts in British Columbia have held, a child's best interests are part and parcel of the more fundamental question of whether the proposed move is a relocation. As the Court said in Berry,¹⁹ the relocation analysis examines whether the effect of the move will have a significant impact on the child's relationship with the other parent: "The use of the qualification 'significant', acknowledges that there will be some impact from a move but limits the courts involvement to those moves which will have a significant impact on relationships. The focus is on the best interests of the children" (at para 32).

47 What this means is that, in assessing the root question of whether the proposed move will have a significant impact on the child's relationship with the non-moving parent, a court must take into account more than just the commuting distance between residences. A contextual analysis is called for that would include considerations such as the following:

i. whether and how the move would change the amount and frequency of parenting time for the non-moving parent;

ii. whether and how the move would affect the degree of involvement of the non-moving parent in the child's activities, schooling and so forth;

iii. whether the moving parent is willing to bear the burden of any increase in the commuting time;

iv. how the distance or commuting time between the two residences would affect the quality of the child's relationship with the non-moving parent; and

v. whether the non-moving parent has the ability - financial or otherwise - to commute to and from the child's proposed new place of residence or an intermediate location.

48 Of course, the above is not an exhaustive list, and the factors are not prioritized in any way. The facts of each case will vary. Much will depend on the parenting order in place, the age of the children, the scope of parental involvement (e.g., shared parenting), etc.

107I concluded in Hiebert that “accounting only for increased driving times,” a proposed move that would necessitate an increase in driving time of 46 minutes by the father would not significantly impact the children’s relationship with him. As a result, I concluded that the increased driving time alone did not change the mother’s proposed move from a simple change in residence into a relocation.

108In this case, the increase in Mr. Versteegh’s driving time from his residence to the children’s new residence in Woodstock will, by his evidence, take an additional 26 minutes. For the same reasons as I arrived at my conclusion on the effect of the increase in driving time in Hiebert, I conclude that the additional driving time per visit that would have to be undertaken by Mr. Versteegh to exercise his parenting time with the children, by itself, is not likely to have a significant impact on their relationships with him, nor does it, alone, make this a relocation case.

109That conclusion, however, does not end the analysis. As was noted in Hiebert, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in D.T.D. v T.A.J. concluded that “a child's best interests are part and parcel of the more fundamental question of whether the proposed move is a relocation,” and “[t]he use of the qualification 'significant', acknowledges that there will be some impact from a move but limits the court’s involvement to those moves which will have a significant impact on relationships. The focus is on the best interests of the children" (at para 32).

110This same analysis was followed by Justice F. Kristjanson in Sain v. Shahbazi, [2023] O.J. No. 4118 (S.C.J.), a case decided under the Divorce Act. Justice Kristjanson held, in effect, that, even if what the court is considering is a challenge to a simple a change in residence, the best interests of the children must still be considered when analyzing whether to let the change in residence stand.

111The factors to be considered when determining a child’s best interests are listed in s. 24 of the CLRA. For relocations, they are augmented by a number of factors set out in s. 39.4(3) of the CLRA. I begin with a consideration of the best interests factors set out in s. 24 of the CLRA.

The children’s physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being

112At this stage, on contradictory evidence about Mr. Versteegh’s relationships with the children, it is difficult to assess their physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being. For instance, Ms. Kerr’s evidence about the children being left alone at the farm and therefore exposed unnecessarily to safety risks, is disputed by Mr. Versteegh.

113Since Ms. Kerr was not present while the children were in Mr. Versteegh’s care, any conclusory statements that she made about what was allegedly occurring at the farm, or other places the children may have been taken by Mr. Versteegh during his parenting time, or what he did while the children were in his care, have to have been based on reports from unidentified sources, including the children. Such information constitutes inadmissible hearsay, rendering Ms. Kerr’s conclusory statements to be of dubious value, unsound to be relied on at this juncture.

The children’s needs, given their ages and stages of development, such as their need for stability

114What is not in dispute is that the children need the stability of a safe and secure residence where they can be themselves, living without fear. While Ms. Kerr claims that they now have that in Woodstock, nothing in the evidence leads me to conclude that they did not also have that while residing with her in St. Thomas.

115The evidence about the children’s relationship with Mr. Versteegh is in dispute. Little was conveyed about T.’s relationship with Mr. Versteegh, apart from the concerning, unanswered allegations about him sustaining a broken arm while in Mr. Versteegh’s care. However, some very detailed and explicit evidence was deposed to by Ms. Kerr about J.’s absolutely clear desire to avoid attending parenting time with Mr. Versteegh.

116That evidence, and the concerns that she expressed about the children spending time in their father’s care, is undermined, however, by her proposal for Mr. Versteegh’s parenting time should she be permitted to remain in Woodstock. If, on the other hand, her comments all relate to such fears being said to arise from them attending the farm with their father, I return to the lack of admissible evidence touching on an underlying reason for such fears.

Each parent’s willingness to support the development and maintenance of the children’s relationship with the other parent

117Both parties express a willingness to support the development and maintenance of the children’s relationship with the other parent.

The history of care of the children

118I have noted that, on the evidence, it appears that, historically, the children have resided in the primary care of Ms. Kerr.

The children’s views and preferences, giving due weight to their ages and maturity, unless they cannot be ascertained

119I have no first-hand evidence of the children’s views and preferences.

Any plans for the children’s care

120While the parties’ plans for the care of the children conflict should they, but not Ms. Kerr, be ordered returned to Elgin County, their plans do more closely align should Ms. Kerr also be ordered to return with them. They would continue to have their primary residence with her while having parenting time with Mr. Versteegh. Where they would attend school would depend on who ends up caring for them.

The ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to care for and meet the needs of the children

121Ms. Kerr did provide some evidence, based on her own observations, suggesting that Mr. Versteegh’s general physical care of the children left something to be desired. He disputed her claims. As noted, T.’s broken arm is a cause for concern to the court. On the other hand, Ms. Kerr, her willingness to move the children so readily suggests that their needs were not foremost in her mind when she did so in the midst of the current school year.

The ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to communicate and co-operate, in particular with one another, on matters affecting the children

122Clearly, communications about matters concerning the children are a problem at this time, given the restrictions imposed on Mr. Versteegh by his criminal release orders. Also to be considered is the evidence of Ms. Kerr – all denied by Mr. Versteegh - about the parties’ deteriorated relationship and the hostility that has arisen from it on the part of Mr. Versteegh. Any order that is made at this time must include a clause permitting some form of indirect communication about matters concerning the children. That would likely occur through counsel. Such a clause would, hopefully, insulate Mr. Versteegh from criminal prosecution for breach of this release term while allowing him to remain apprised of matters concerning the children, should they remain in Ms. Kerr’s care. The alternative is to deny him, or Ms. Kerr, should the children be placed in his care, of any information about the children as long as the criminal matters are outstanding or Ms. Kerr refuses, as she has indicated is her position, to agree to a variation of his terms of release.

Family violence

123As to this factor, the case²⁰ relied on by counsel for Ms. Kerr in support of her submission that “’[c]ourts consider safety and emotional security as critical best-interest factors in mobility decisions” was decided after a trial, after which, having heard evidence from several witnesses on the issue of family violence, the trial judge wrote that she “accept[s] the mother's testimony that she suffered physical abuse at the hands of the father and his parents.”

124At this point, Mr. Versteegh’s criminal charges, and Ms. Kerr’s allegations against him of less-than-criminal problematic behaviour, are unproven. I was provided with no details about the alleged criminal acts. The other allegations of behaviours on his part might, if proved on a balance of probabilities, meet the definition of family violence. Those remain issues for trial, however. In the meanwhile, the existing criminal release restrictions bind Mr. Versteegh. A failure to keep the peace can lead to a revocation of his release. If that does not constrain him, then he will bear the consequences in the criminal proceeding.

Section 39.4(3) Best Interests Factors

The reasons for the relocation

125I have already canvassed Ms. Kerr’s reasons for moving to Woodstock.

126I am underwhelmed by her claim that she had to move to a different city in a different county because, as she alleged, her monthly rent was to increase by $50.00. She provided no evidence to suggest that she made any effort to locate another rental premises in St. Thomas, either within the Mitchell Hepburn school attendance area or elsewhere, at a lower rent. She did not indicate how she knows what available rental units of all types cost throughout the entirety of the attendance area of Mitchell Hepburn Public School.

127Additionally, if, as the evidence of Mr. Versteegh suggested, she could work either from home or from her office in St. Thomas, she provided no explanation for why she moved away from the city in which her office is located.

128Her silence on these matters strongly suggests that her intent, as she openly deposed, was to move in with her boyfriend. If, as she repeatedly claimed, the move from St. Thomas to Woodstock was “local,” and the drive time between the two cities is not significant, she provided no explanation of why her boyfriend could not have just as easily moved to St. Thomas to cohabit with her there and share the rent on the premises she was already inhabiting with the children.

129While I acknowledge, as was asserted by counsel for Ms. Kerr in her affidavit, that courts have held that a “child’s well-being is closely tied to the custodial parent’s financial, emotional, and psychological well-being” the case that cited to support the statement,²¹ one of many that exist in this regard, was based on fundamentally different facts. There, the mother, an immigrant, could not secure remunerative employment in Sarnia, where members of her community were few, and wished to move to Toronto, where there were many more opportunities to engage in her craft and the diaspora was much larger. The principle cited by counsel for Ms. Kerr is inapplicable in this case. Ms. Kerr is already employed, the financial difference in Nouri v. Watters amounted to far more than $600.00 per annum, and her well-being is claimed to hinge on her having another available to help her raise the children rather than minimizing social isolation.

130As for counsel’s submission that Ms. Kerr was, in St. Thomas, “isolated from family supports,” there is no evidence that she has any family in Woodstock. In fact, her parents and her sister are said to reside in London, which is further from Woodstock than it is from St. Thomas. Ms. Kerr moved further from her family supports.

The impact of the relocation on the children

131As counsel for Ms. Kerr wrote in her factum: “Courts consistently emphasize the importance of stability, consistent routines, and predictability in a child’s life. [Ms. Kerr has claimed] that since moving to Woodstock, the children benefit from consistent morning routines, regular school attendance, structured bedtimes, planned meals, organized after-school schedules, and steady emotional support.”

132While Ms. Kerr claims several improvements in the children’s well-being from residing with her and her boyfriend because of the “consistent, predictable daily structure,” “continued regular communications with their teachers, homework routines, chores and proper bedtimes,” given her claims that “it was always anticipated” that the children would be in her primary care, and that, in some months, Mr. Versteegh saw them as little as 10.07% of the time, I query whether the implication that they lacked these things while she resided in St. Thomas means that they were lacking only because of Mr. Versteegh’s involvement with them, or whether they are also a commentary about her parenting capabilities while residing alone. Moreover, as I have noted repeatedly, the assertions that these things were lacking while Ms. Kerr resided in St. Thomas are denied by Mr. Versteegh.

133Additionally, Ms. Kerr provided no evidence that the school now attended by the children is in any way a better educational fit for them than Mitchell Hepburn Public School. Both schools are under the authority of the Thames Valley District School Board.

134I also query how she was able to have the children registered in their new school in Woodstock, without the consent of Mr. Versteegh, in the absence of an order or separations agreement giving her sole decision-making responsibility over the children’s educational matters.

135Lastly, given the event that led to this entire proceeding, Ms. Kerr’s position that the children should not be returned to St. Thomas because they would be likely required to make another change of school, an event she called “unnecessary and not in their best interests,” is ironic since she did not seem to think that would be the case when she moved them to Woodstock.

The amount of time spent with the children by each person who has parenting time, and the level of their involvement in the lives of the children

136I have already written about the parties’ conflicting positions on how often Mr. Versteegh had parenting time with the children, given that their primary residence was with Ms. Kerr, and articulated what I perceive to have been the pre-September 2025 status quo in this regard.

137Additionally, it is evident that both parties remain involved with the children’s participation in hockey, with Mr. Versteegh’s ability to attend games constrained by any attendance by Ms. Kerr, due to his release conditions.

The reasonableness of the proposal of the person who intends to relocate the child to vary the exercise of parenting time, taking into consideration, among other things, the location of the new residence and the travel expenses

138I have already concluded that the additional driving time per visit that would have to be undertaken by Mr. Versteegh to exercise his parenting time with the children is not likely to have a significant impact on their relationships with him.

139I next consider the proposal made by Ms. Kerr to afford parenting time to Mr. Versteegh if she is permitted to remain in Woodstock with the children.

140Mr. Versteegh’s parenting time with the children would occur on a five-week rotational basis during the school year, with the children to be in his care four out of five consecutive Fridays from 6:00 p.m. until Monday morning at the commencement of school.

141Assuming that the children’s school begins on Monday at 9:00 a.m., that means that they would be in the care of Mr. Versteegh for 63 hours per week, four weeks out of five. That amounts to 37.5% of each week, four weeks out of 5. Over a five-week cycle, it amounts to the children being in the care of Mr. Versteegh 30% of the time.

142During the school summer vacation, for the months of July and August, the parties would share parenting time equally on a week-on, week-off rotation, with exchanges occurring Fridays at 6:00 p.m.

143The result of Ms. Kerr’s proposal over a school year²² means that there would be a 5.6%²³ reduction in the amount of Mr. Versteegh’s parenting time during that period.

144That reduction, of course, is based entirely on Ms. Kerr’s estimates which, as I have noted, are not verified, and are contested by Mr. Versteegh. If the amount of time that the children spent in the care of Mr. Versteegh during the school year prior to September 2025 was closer to his estimates, the percentage reduction in his parenting time under Ms. Kerr’s proposal would be greater. A trial is where these contested figures can be tested.

145Whether or not a reduction in parenting time of 5.6%, alone, is likely to have a significant impact on the children’s relationships with Mr. Versteegh, when one also considers the fact that:

a. he will have to spend part of his reduced time driving the children to Woodstock on four Mondays out of five at the start of the school day, which effectively further reduces his ability to engage in other activities with them during his parenting time, and

b. Ms. Kerr’s proposal includes restrictions on Mr. Versteegh taking the children to his workplace or “disrupting their routines,” whatever that might mean,

the impact on the children’s relationships with Mr. Versteegh is likely to be, if not significant, at least marginally close thereto. However, I conclude, for the purposes of this motion, that Ms. Kerr’s move to Woodstock is not a relocation.

146My conclusion notwithstanding, I am troubled by the fact that, after deposing how much the children, especially J., dislike spending time with their father on the weekends, and that the week-about parenting schedule of July and August 2025 was forced on her by Mr. Versteegh, Ms. Kerr’s parenting time suggestion would have the children in Mr. Versteegh’s care only during the very times that she claims are problematic for them – weekends - or her - half the summer on a week-about basis.

147Her suggestions raise serious questions about her evidence concerning the children’s alleged reactions to weekend access and about the basis for the week-about parenting schedule in the summer of 2025.

Whether the person who intends to relocate the children has complied with any applicable notice requirement under section 39.3

148Ms. Kerr acknowledges that she failed to provide such notice.

Was the Move to Woodstock in the Children’s best Interests?

149Having not been satisfied, for the purposes of this motion, that the move to Woodstock is likely to have a significant impact on the children’s relationships with Mr. Versteegh, the provisions of sections 39.4(5), (6) and (7), which all address the issue of who bears the burden of proving that a relocation is in the children’s best interests, do not apply.

150I am left, consequently, with the issue of whether the children’s move to Woodstock was in their best interests. In arriving at my conclusion, I returned to the issue of the status quo that existed before they were moved to Woodstock.

151In Churchill v Elliot and Ward, at paragraph 36, Justice Pazaratz wrote of some other principles relating to a status quo that courts should have regard to when being asked to change one. These included:

b) …The longer the status quo has existed, the greater the presumption that it should be maintained pending trial, unless there is material evidence that the child's best interests require an immediate change (internal citations omitted), and

d)…To disturb the status quo, there must be compelling evidence to show the welfare of the child would be in danger if the status quo is maintained. The evidence must clearly and unequivocally establish that the status quo is not in the child's best interests. Miranda v. Miranda, 2013 ONSC 4704(SCJ); Dayboll v. Binag, 2022 ONSC 6510(SCJ); A.L. v. C.M., 2023 ONCJ 412(OCJ); Tomkinson v. Baszak 2023 ONSC 4092(SCJ).

152Nothing in Ms. Kerr’s evidence “clearly and unequivocally” leads me to the conclusion that the welfare of these children would be in danger if the pre-September 2025 status quo, as I have found it to be, were to be maintained, or that their best interests as of September 2025 required an immediate change.

153At worst, Ms. Kerr’s primary concerns seem to be about the lack of a definite parenting schedule for Mr. Versteegh and about alleged risks to the children that she was concerned exist while they are in Mr. Versteegh’s care.

154Both of those concerns could have been addressed by an application to court, in St. Thomas, seeking to establish a parenting schedule and to place limits on his activities with the children while they are in his care. She certainly did not need to upend the children’s lives by removing them from their existing school in St. Thomas and moving them to Woodstock to reside with her boyfriend to have her concerns addressed.

155As for her complaint that she was required to move because of the minimal increase in her monthly rent because Mr. Versteegh was not paying her child support, she could have commenced a proceeding in St. Thomas seeking child support, and brought a motion for an interim order.

156She did none of that. Instead, she simply moved to Woodstock with the children to reside with her boyfriend, which appears to have been the real reason for her move.

157In the result, and for the reasons noted herein, I cannot conclude that Ms. Kerr’s act of moving the children to Woodstock was in their best interests.

158In reaching my conclusion, I also echo the following words of Justice Kristjanson in Sain v. Shabazi:

1 Parents cannot resort to self-help remedies…, present a fait accompli to the court on an interim basis, and expect the court to approve. That is a recipe for chaos, and disaster, and is unfair to children caught in the middle. Yet that is what has happened here…

20 …I also emphasize my concerns with the mother's self-help approach to the change in school and the change in residence…As Kurz J. held in Phillips v. Phillips, 2021 ONSC 2480 at paras. 61-63:

[61] In Rifai v. Green, 2014 ONSC 1377, Pazaratz J. decried self-help parenting measures. He pointed out that one parent does not start out with higher status than the other:

25 The starting point, of course, is that at the outset both parents are presumed to have equal status, equal rights, and equal authority over decisions in a child's life. In the absence of a formal agreement or court order, neither parent has the right to unilaterally impose major changes in a child's life. Neither parent has the right to unilaterally interfere with or impede the other parent's contact or role in the child's life.

[62] He described the parent who engages in self-help tactics that belie a child's best interests as raising questions about the new status quo and the moving parents' own parenting skills, writing:

22 A parent who engages in self-help tactics despite the best interests of the child will generally raise serious questions about their own parenting skills and judgment. In many cases, courts conclude manipulative, selfish or spiteful parents simply can't be entrusted with custodial authority they would likely abuse. Izyuk v. Bilousov (supra); Clement v. Clement, 2010 ONSC 1113 (SCJ).

[63] Fallis v. Decker, 2013 ONSC 5206 is another case in which Pazaratz J. considered the tactic of mobility self-help. In that case, the mother moved and then came to court arguing a new status quo. Pazaratz J. would have none of that argument. He described her tactics as "brinksmanship". He asserted at para. 27 that "[p]arents take unilateral action at their own peril. The court simply cannot sanction self-help in circumstances where the best interests of children may potentially have been jeopardized." He added that "[p]articularly at an early stage of litigation, the court should be reluctant to allow any disruption of the status quo."

21 There is a strong line of judicial disapproval of self-help tactics in family law. It demonstrates poor judgment. It harms children, who are often caught in the middle, unsure whether a parent's word can be relied on, and who absorb the stress of their parents. It drives conflict between parties, rendering settlement impossible. It wastes court time and the money of the parties. The consequences are often addressed through costs.

Decision-Making Responsibility

159Section 20(1) of the CLRA provides that, “Except as otherwise provided in this Part, a child’s parents are equally entitled to decision-making responsibility with respect to the child.”

160Section 20(4) is one of those exceptions. It provides that “If the parents of a child live separate and apart and the child lives with one of them with the consent, implied consent or acquiescence of the other, the right of the other to exercise the entitlement to decision-making responsibility with respect to the child…is suspended until a separation agreement or order provides otherwise.”

161Mr. Versteegh clearly acquiesced, by his own admission, to the children maintaining their primary residence with Ms. Kerr. Thus, she is presumptively entitled to continue to exercise decision-making responsibility for the children absent a court order to the contrary.

162There is no doubt that Ms. Kerr exercised poor judgment in moving to Woodstock in the circumstances and for the reasons that she did. For that, Mr. Versteegh seeks, at least, decision-making responsibility about the children’s education.

163I do not see that as necessary. Limits can be imposed on Ms. Kerr’s continued right to exercise decision-making responsibility through the order resulting from this motion.

Order

1. Ms. Kerr shall return the residence of the parties’ children to the city of St. Thomas in the County of Elgin by March 20, 2026. To that end, if she intends to return with them and maintain them in her care, she shall:

a. begin immediately to seek accommodations in St. Thomas located in the school attendance area for Mitchell Hepburn Public School;

b. provide evidence of her efforts to locate such accommodations to Mr. Versteegh, bi-weekly, through her counsel, who shall provide the evidence to counsel for Mr. Versteegh;

c. subject to paragraph 2, obtain and secure accommodations in St. Thomas located in the school attendance area for Mitchell Hepburn Public School and make that her and the children’s primary residence by March 20, 2025, providing notice to Mr. Versteegh, through her counsel, when she has secured and moved into such accommodations; and

d. subject to paragraph 2, register the children to resume attendance at Mitchell Hepburn Public School as of March 23, 2026.

2. Should Ms. Kerr, despite her best efforts, such best efforts being established by complying with the conditions set out in Paragraph 1(a) and 1(b), not succeed in securing accommodations in St. Thomas located in the school attendance area for Mitchell Hepburn Public School and making that her and the children’s primary residence by March 20, 2025, she shall obtain and secure accommodations for her and the children within a driving time, at posted speeds, of no greater than 25 minutes from the residence of Mr. Versteegh, preferably within the municipal boundary of St. Thomas, before the commencement of the 2026-2027 school year. To that end, she shall:

a. provide to Mr. Versteegh, bi-weekly, commencing no earlier than March 20, 2026, through her counsel, who shall provide the evidence to counsel for Mr. Versteegh, evidence of her efforts to locate such accommodations;

b. obtain and secure accommodations for her and the children within a driving time, at posted speeds, of no greater than 25 minutes from the residence of Mr. Versteegh, preferably within the municipal boundary of St. Thomas, providing notice to Mr. Versteegh, through her counsel, when she has both secured and moved into such accommodations; and

c. register the children to attend the public school serving the attendance area which encompasses the address of her and the children’s accommodations.

3. Should Ms. Kerr fail to comply with the provisions of paragraph 2, she shall pay a penalty equal to $100.00 per day for each day after the commencement of the 2026-2027 school year that the children continue to reside elsewhere than required by the terms of this order.

4. Should Ms. Kerr not secure and move into accommodations for her and the children within the attendance area for Mitchell Hepburn Public School on or before March 20, 2026, the issue of whether or not she used her best efforts to comply with the provisions of, and result intended by, Paragraph 1 shall be an issue for trial, with a consequence for a finding of non-compliance being left to the trial judge.

5. Ms. Kerr shall not move the children from their current residence in Woodstock for any reason except to comply with this order, without the written consent of Mr. Versteegh or a further order of this court, sought by way of a motion brought with notice to Mr. Versteegh.

6. Pending the return of the children to accommodations which fall within the parameters of this order, Mr. Versteegh shall have parenting time with them:

a. each weekend from Friday at 6:00 p.m. to Sunday at 6:00 p.m.; and

b. on a week-about basis during the months of July and August 2026.

7. Until the children are resident in accommodations which fall within the parameters of this order, Ms. Kerr shall provide all transportation of the children for the exercise of their parenting time with Mr. Versteegh.

8. So long as the children are not resident in accommodations which fall within the parameters of this order and Mr. Versteegh is subject to a release order which does not allow him to associate or communicate with, or be within a reasonable distance of Ms. Kerr, so as to allow for the parties to both participate in the exchanges of the children, the children shall be exchanged at a public location in Aylmer, chosen by Ms. Kerr, and each party may be represented at the exchange by a person of that party’s choice.

9. Subject to Paragraph 10, once the children are again resident in accommodations which fall within the parameters of this order, the parties shall:

a. negotiate when Mr. Versteegh shall have parenting time; and

b. share the driving between them equally, with the person who is to have parenting time with the children being the one to pick them up from the other.

10. Pending an agreement as to when Mr. Versteegh shall have parenting time in accordance with Paragraph 9, his parenting time shall be as follows, in accordance with the recommendations of the AFCC, as mandated by the Divisional Court in Tremblay-Chartier v. Tremblette, [2025] O.J. No. 4902:

a. one midweek evening per week (the same day each week), from after school until 7:00 p.m., with Mr. Versteegh to retrieve the children from school and Ms. Kerr or her designate to retrieve the children from Mr. Versteegh at 7:00 p.m.; and

b. alternating weekends from Friday at the end of school until Sunday night at 7:00 p.m., with Mr. Versteegh to retrieve the children from school on Friday and Ms. Kerr or her designate to retrieve the children from Mr. Versteegh on Sunday at 7:00 p.m.

11. Nothing in this order prevents Ms. Kerr’s current boyfriend, with whom she is residing in Woodstock, from residing in the accommodations which fall within the parameters of this order with Ms. Kerr and the children.

12. Should Ms. Kerr intend to not seek accommodations for the children which fall within the parameters of this order, she shall notify Mr. Versteegh through his counsel within 14 days. A further appearance of the parties before Justice T. Price will be scheduled to address the children’s residence with Mr. Versteegh and any conditions to be attached thereto, their school registration, Ms. Kerr’s parenting time and any other matters arsing from a change of the children’s residence.

13. Within 21 days of this order, Mr. Versteegh shall deliver an affidavit, of no more than five pages in length, to Ms. Kerr, through her counsel, and file it, with proof of service, requesting that it be directed to the attention of Justice T. Price. In the affidavit, Mr. Versteegh shall fully explain how the arm of the child Theo was broken, if it was broken, while in his care, and what, if any, steps he took to attend to the child’s care thereafter. In the affidavit, he shall also fully respond to Ms. Kerr’s other allegations about this event as set out in her affidavit sworn November 30, 2025.

14. Pending a further order of the court, to be made by Justice T. Price after receipt of the affidavit referred to in paragraph 12, Mr. Versteegh shall not take the children to his place of work at any time when they are in his care.

15. Costs and submissions with respect thereto will be addressed in the next endorsement, to be released in accordance with Paragraph 14.

Justice T. Price

Date: January 12, 2026

I must note my disagreement with Mr. Versteegh that J. should be returned to the French language immersion school he attended last two years ago should Ms. Kerr choose not to return to Elgin County, resulting in the children being placed into Ms. Versteegh’s care. The evidence clearly showed that the child was struggling in the program. He is now two years removed from it. To place him there would further disadvantage him and is clearly not in his best interests.

Footnotes

1. 1Following their 2023 separation, the parties neither entered into a separation agreement nor agreed on a specific parenting plan or formal parenting arrangements for the children. Neither sought an order pertaining to any issue arising from the separation. As will be seen, two of the issues now in dispute between the parties are how much time Mr. Versteegh parented the children following the parties’ physical separation in January 2024, and the manner by which it was determined when he would exercise his parenting time.
2. 2Ms. Kerr claims that this was the parenting time arrangement previously in place during the school year.
3. 3In this, she was incorrect. She was not bound by any criminal undertaking as a result of the charges against Mr. Versteegh. Moreover, Mr. Versteegh deposed that both parties were represented by counsel at the time, yet her counsel failed to notify his about Ms. Kerr’s move.
4. 4Ms. Kerr provided no financial income on the motion. She appears to have been working in a hospital in 2024, but did not indicate in what capacity or where the hospital is located. Mr. Versteegh deposed that Ms. Kerr had an income of $80,293.00 in 2024, without indicating how he knew that information. He further claimed a belief that her current “workplace has an office in St. Thomas” while “understand[ing] that she “largely works remotely.”
5. 5Mr. Versteegh deposed that Ms. Kerr had ‘reflected” to him “around February of 2025” that she and her boyfriend had broken up. He further deposed that he “understand[s]” that they “may have gotten back together in the spring or summer of” 2025.
6. 6She further asserted that she would remain in Woodstock even if she and her boyfriend terminated their relationship.
7. 7Ms. Kerr did not indicate whether her boyfriend lives in rented premises or a residence owned by him. In his reply affidavit, Mr. Versteegh refers to a “lease” which, he claimed, Ms. Kerr signed prior to September, 2025.
8. 8Mr. Versteegh denied Ms. Kerr’s financial claims against him, noting that she had not commenced any proceeding against him for child or spousal support. Moreover, his position is that, based on the equal shared parenting regime that he claimed the parties were following at the time of Ms. Kerr’s move, she would have been the one paying child support.
9. 10The records referred to by Ms. Kerr were based on her analysis of all text messages between her and Mr. Versteegh in which parenting time was a topic over the period between February 1, 2024 and November 17, 2025.
10. 12Mr. Versteegh’s blanket denial of these concerning allegations required more detail. Was he denying some or all of Ms. Kerr’s claims about his alleged incident? A more detailed response was required and other parts of his Reply ought to have been excised for that to have been provided.
11. 13As she suggested to Mr. Versteegh in August 2025
12. 14Mr. Versteegh denied that the suggestion had been made. He produced two documents from the French immersion school. One, a note from a teacher, could potentially support his position about J.’s continued enrollment in the school. The other, the record of the parent-teacher meeting, indicated that J. was struggling in Grade 1 and was not meeting grade expectations. It also noted him being absent from school on 29 days in JK, 25 days in SK and, to the point of the meeting in January 2024, 18 days in Grade 1. All of these days would have been missed before Ms. Kerr moved to St. Thomas, while the parties, although separated, remained living in the same residence.
13. 15Since Mr. Versteegh was charged, exchanges of the children, which are being supervised, have often involved Ms. Kerr’s father. She alleged that Mr. Versteegh has been rude to her father, which Mr. Versteegh denies. Mr. Versteegh, on the other hand, claims that Ms. Kerr’s father refuses to drop the children at his residence, insisting that the exchanges occur in Aylmer or at locations that are more convenient to him.
14. 16The rationale for this term is that Ms. Kerr claims to not know Mr. Versteegh’s employees or acquaintances and that it is “inappropriate and unsafe” to use one of the employees as a third-party assistant in family matters.
15. 17Papp v. Papp, 1969 219 (ON CA), [1970] 1 O.R. 331 (C.A.)
16. 18The provisions addressing “relocation” and” change in place of residence” (as it is called) in the Divorce Act are substantially the same as those in the CLRA, so the analysis applies equally in this case.
17. 19Berry v. Berry, 2013 BCSC 1095, 34 RFL (7th) 141
18. 20M.K. v. K.M., [2022] O.J. No. 4139 (O.C.J.)
19. 21Nouri v. Watters, 2022 ONSC 5181
20. 22I have used only the school year for comparison purposes because, going forward, Ms. Kerr proposes that summers be divided equally, as they were in 2025. The real change is seen in what she proposes be Mr. Versteegh’s parenting time during the school year and compared the percentages in his parenting time during those periods with what her “records” show his parenting time to have been during the last school year before she moved to Woodstock.
21. 23Using Ms. Kerr’s figures, the monthly parenting time average for Mr. Versteegh between September, 2024 and June, 2025, inclusive, which is the school year immediately preceding Ms. Kerr’s move to Woodstock, amounts to 31.8%.The ongoing percentage was calculated as follows: From September 1 to June 30, there are 303 days. A five-week cycle entails 35 days, so in that period, there would be 8.65 five-week cycles, during which the children would be in Mr. Versteeg’s care 30% of the time, or the equivalent to 2.6 five-week cycles, or 13 weeks. Compared to the 31.8% average amount of time that Ms. Kerr’s “records” suggest that Mr. Versteegh had the children in his care over the 2024-2025 school year (September 2024 to June 2025) with what she proposes going forward, the reduction in parenting time proposed for Mr. Versteegh amounts to 1.8%. which equals 5.6% of the 31.8% parenting time that he was receiving in the school year ending in June 2025.
22. 9Mr. Versteegh has denied the entirety of Ms. Verseegh’s evidence in this regard.
23. 11Mr. Versteegh denied most of Ms. Kerr’s evidence in this regard. In some instances, he provided alternate versions of events or an explanation at odds with her allegation.