ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
Victoria McDougall, counsel for the Respondent
Respondent
- and -
DASHMINDER SINGH DEOL
Geneviève Eliany, counsel for the Applicant
Appellant
HEARD: March 20, 2026
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(These reasons for judgment were delivered orally on May 28, 2026. In the event of any differences between the oral ruling and this written text, the written text will prevail).
Valente, J.
Overview
1This is an appeal brought by the Appellant, Dashminder Singh Deol, against conviction imposed on April 23, 2025, by K.S. Neill, J. of the Ontario Court of Justice.
2Following a trial on April 16, 2025, the Appellant was convicted of one count of assault contrary to section 266 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c – C – 46 (the ‘Code’) and one count of failing to comply with a probation order contrary to section 733.1 of the Code.
3The Appellant raises one ground of appeal in his notice of appeal, dated May 13, 2025. He submits that the trial judge erred by finding that recognition evidence with a first name alone can link the accused before the court with the Information.
Summary of Background Facts and the Evidence at Trial
4The Appellant was charged with one count of assault, one count of assault by choking contrary to subsection 267(c) of the Code and one count of failing to comply with a probation order.
5Prior to the court enquiring with respect to the counts on which the Crown intended to proceed, the order of witnesses and making an order excluding witnesses as well as addressing other preliminary issues, Appellant’s counsel stated to the court: “This is Mr. Deol. We are ready to proceed to trial”.
6Immediately prior to being arraigned, the Clerk Registrar asked the Appellant: “Sir, are you Dashminder Deol?” to which the Appellant responded: “Yes”.
7The Appellant subsequently plead not guilty to all three counts.
8The Crown called three witnesses.
9The first witness was Lovepreet Singh. Mr. Singh testified that on the date of the incident, he was working as a security guard at an apartment building located at 205 Melvin Ave., in Hamilton. He testified that on September 11, 2024, in the course of his employment, he observed a male and female known to him enter the building arguing. His evidence was that he saw the female try to push the male away before the male assaulted her. His trial testimony of the assault was detailed and included observations of the male dragging the female across the apartment lobby and kicking and punching her while she was on the ground.
10Mr. Singh’s evidence also included a review and authentication of a video of the assault captured on the CCTV lobby cameras.
11Mr. Singh identified the Appellant before the court as the male he observed assaulting the female in the apartment lobby as well as the male assailant in the CCTV video.
12Mr. Singh testified that he recognized the Appellant because he was “the only Indian guy who used to visit that building as a guest”. He further testified that he knew the male’s first name to be “Dashminder”. As an Indian person himself, Mr. Singh’s evidence was that he is very familiar with the name Dashminder because it is a very common name in India and “the name got stuck in [his] mind”. Mr. Singh did not, however, know Dashminder’s last name.
13Mr. Singh further testified that he called Dashminder by his name to stop but he did not respond.
14The Appellant concedes in his factum that Mr. Singh “provided excellent recognition evidence, identifying the man on the video and in court as “Dash”, short for Dashminder”.
15The second and third witnesses called by the Crown were Police Constables Hass and Gagnon. Their evidence focused on their interactions with the victim, Alicia Harper, including observations of the injuries. Neither of the police witnesses were able to provide the court with Dashminder’s last name.
16Neither Ms. Harper nor the officer who arrested the Appellant were called as trial witnesses.
17With the consent of the Appellant, a certified copy of the probation order, dated October 30, 2023, naming Dashminder Deol as the offender (the “Probation Order”), was entered as a trial exhibit.
18The Defence stipulated on the record that its consent to the admission of the Probation Order was not an admission of identification.
19No evidence was called by the Appellant.
The Judgment
20The justice of first instance provided oral reasons for her finding the Appellant guilty of assault and breach of the Probation Order. The trial judge outlined relevant legal principles, reviewed case law and assessed the evidence of the trial witnesses.
21In addressing the evidence of Mr. Singh, the trial judge specifically referenced the witness’ recognition of the Appellant as a frequent guest at the apartment, his knowledge of the Appellant’s first name as Dashminder, the frequent use of the first name, Dashminder, in his shared culture with the Appellant and his many conversations with the Appellant. The trial judge also found Mr. Singh’s evidence to be consistent with the video evidence.
22In considering the totality of the evidence, the trial judge was left with no reasonable doubt with respect to the Appellant’s guilt of having assaulted the victim. Likewise, after having considered the Probation Order, the justice of first instance was left with no reasonable doubt of the Appellant having breached it.
Position of the Parties
23While the Appellant takes no issue with any of the recognition evidence of Mr. Singh and the finding that the male in video was the Appellant before the court, known as Dashminder, the Appellant submits that the trial judge committed an error in confounding recognition evidence and a first name of the assailant with identification sufficient to tie the Appellant to the Information and to the Probation Order.
24The Appellant’s position is that the arraignment process cannot be used as evidence of identity. In addition, the fact that the Probation Order may have been certified is of no assistance in solving the identification issue without an evidentiary link between the person named in the Probation Order and the accused before the court.
25The Crown submits that the trial judge did not rely solely on the Appellant’s arraignment as sole proof of identification. Rather she relied on defence counsel’s confirmation that Dashminder Deol as stipulated in the Information was before the court, the court’s own records which it is entitled to do as well as the circumstantial evidence of Mr. Singh. The Crown submits that based on the entirety of the record, the trial judge properly connected the Appellant before the court with the person named in the Information and Probation Order.
Guiding Principles
26Pursuant to s. 686(1)(a) of the Code, appellate courts can set aside a verdict when (a) the verdict is unreasonable or cannot be supported by the evidence; (b) there was a wrong decision of law; or (c) on any other ground where there is a miscarriage of justice.
27It is settled law that when considering an unreasonable verdict or an error in the trial judge’s overall assessment of the evidence, deference must be afforded (see: R v. W.H., 2013 SCC 22).
28A trial judge is not held to a standard of perfection in the context of reasons.
29An appellate court is not entitled to re-try the case and substitute its view of the evidence. The question is not whether the evidence is capable of raising a reasonable doubt. Rather, the court must thoroughly re-examine, and to an extent at least, conduct a limited re-weighing and consider the effect of the evidence (see: R v. W.(R.), 1992 SCC 56, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 122). The question is whether the verdict was one that a properly instructed jury or judge acting reasonably could have reached (see: R v. Biniaris, 2000 SCC 15; R v. Yebes, 1987 SCC 17, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 168).
30The test for demonstrating an unreasonable verdict is an exacting one. A verdict may be found unreasonable if the trial judge has drawn an inference or made a finding of fact essential to the verdict that is plainly contradicted by the evidence relied on by the trial judge in support of the finding or is shown to be incompatible with the evidence that has not otherwise been contradicted or rejected by the trial judge. As Doherty J.A. held in R. v. Morrissey, (1995), 1995 ONCA 3498, 97 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 92: “…any error, including one involving a misapprehension of the evidence by the trial judge must be assessed by reference to its impact on the fairness of the trial. If the error renders the trial unfair, then s. 686(1)(a)(iii) requires that the conviction be quashed”.
31In R v. Lohrer, 2004 SCC 80, at para. 2, the Supreme Court summarized the stringent standard for this ground of appeal in this way:
Morrissey, it should be emphasized, describes a stringent standard. The misapprehension of the evidence must go to the substance rather than to the detail. It must be material rather than peripheral to the reasoning of the trial judge. Once those hurdles are surmounted, there is the further hurdle (the test is expressed as conjunctive rather than disjunctive) that the errors thus identified must play an essential part not just in the narrative of the judgment but “in the reasoning process resulting in a conviction”.
32One year later, the Supreme Court in R v. Clark, (2005) SCC 2, at para. 6 provided this further guidance to appellate courts:
Appellate courts may not interfere with the findings of fact made and the factual inferences drawn by the trial judge, unless they are clearly wrong, unsupported by the evidence or otherwise unreasonable. The imputed error must, moreover, be plainly identified. And it must be shown to have affected the result. “Palpable and overriding error” is a resonant and compendious expression of this well-established norm: [Citations omitted].
33Finally, I am reminded that an error of law may arise when the trial judge misdirects themselves with respect to relevant evidence (see: R. v. B. (G.), 2 S.C.R. 57, at para. 57). Errors of law are reviewed on a standard of corrections (see: s. 686(1)(a)(ii) of the Code; Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, at para. 8).
Analysis
34It is undisputed that to uphold the Appellant’s conviction on the assault and breach of probation counts, the Crown must have proven beyond a reasonable doubt at trial that the Appellant was the person described in the Information and in the Probation Order. Whether the Crown proved this link is the only issue on this appeal.
35The most common way to link the accused before the court to the person named in the charge is for the arresting officer to make an in court identification.
36The issue before the Alberta Court of Appeal in R v. Nicholson¸1984 ABCA 88 (‘Nicholson’), was whether the trier of fact could convict an accused despite the failure of the arresting officer to pick the accused out from the body of the courtroom at their trial. The Alberta Court of Appeal held that an in-dock identification of the accused before the court as the person arrested was not essential to prove the identity of the accused. The Court found that this could be proven by means other than in court identification.
37In Nicholson, the Court held that on the trial record there was sufficient evidence of identification, including the fact that the accused showed the police officer his driver’s licence with a photograph, the similarity in the names, and the testimony of the accused’s brother who testified that the accused admitted that he had been charged with the subject offence.
38The Court also made much of defence counsel’s admission that the person in the courtroom was the accused. The Court found at para. 19:
By his counsel, the man in the courtroom admitted that he was the accused, which means the person referred to by the informant in the Information: It was that person who was the accused and who now stands convicted. Unsurprisingly he seems to answer to the name used in the Information.
39In R v. Levene, [2007] OJ No. 103 (OCJ) affirmed on appeal at [2008] OJ No. 5964 (ONSC) (‘Levene’), the Ontario Court of Justice adopted without reservation the ratio of Nicholson that identity could be proven by means other than direct evidence.
40The court in Levene also found, however, in that case where the accused was charged with giving a false name to police and refused to plead to the charge that:
“The fact that an accused does not dispute the jurisdiction of the court over his or her person is not equivalent to some proof of his or her true identity as an element of the offence that the Crown must prove” (at para. 20);
“A plea cannot constitute evidence at the trial of an accused” (at para. 36); and
“… the arraignment or the fact that the accused attorns to the jurisdiction of the court absent his or her consent should not be utilized to prove the accused is guilty of the crime charged” (at para. 48).
41It is my view, however, the finding that attorning to the jurisdiction of the court or attendance at the arraignment process is not evidence of an accused’s identity as a particular person must be viewed within the context of the charge that the defendant faced in Levene. On the charge of giving a police officer a false name, the proper identity of the defendant is an essential element that must be proved by the Crown. For this reason, I find that the ratio in Levene has limited application to the matter before me. Unlike the Appellant, the defendant in Levene did not enter a plea at his arraignment. The defendant was acquitted because there was no conduct that could be taken as an admission by him that he was the person identified in the Information (see: R v. Evaglok, 2010 NWTCA 12 (‘Evaglok’) at para. 18).
42The matter of the defendant’s identity was also the issue before the Northwest Territories Court of Appeal in Evaglok. In that case, the accused was charged with assault. The accused’s daughter gave detailed eyewitness testimony of the assault and identified the assailant as her father by his name, “Colin Evaglok”. The accused’s daughter was not, however, asked to point out the accused in court.
43In addition to adopting the ratio in Nicholson that in-dock identification is not an absolute requirement for identity to be established, the Court held that the trial judge did not err in referring to the Court process in arriving at her decision (at para. 11). The Court of Appeal acknowledged that in doing so the trial judge canvassed several authorities including the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in R v. Hunt, [1986] O.J. No. 1210 (‘Hunt’). This province’s Court of Appeal held in Hunt that “a court has at all times the power to look to its own records and take notice of their contents” (at para. 10).
44Furthermore, Vertes J.A. writing for the Court in Evaglok found “[b]ased on the authorities … if the person before the court does not raise an objection, the court is entitled to assume that the person appearing in court and answering to the charge is the person charged” (at para. 21). In considering whether this assumption amounts to a reversal of the burden of proof, the Court also concluded at para. 25:
… I do not see either a reversal of the burden of proof or any threat to the presumption of innocence. The burden of proof rests with the Crown to prove guilt to the required standard of proof, that being proof beyond a reasonable doubt. What there may be, however, is an evidentiary burden to raise an issue for consideration. For example, there is often an evidentiary burden on an accused to demonstrate an “air of reality” before certain defences are considered. There may also be what Professors Paciocco and Stuesser describe, in their text The Law of Evidence (5th ed.), as a “tactical burden” (at p. 531):
Tactical burdens are not assigned by rules of law but arise simply because of the strength or nature of the opposing litigant’s case. For example, although there is no rule of law requiring the accused to present evidence, the strength of the Crown’s case may make it a practical necessity.
45At the commencement of trial, defence counsel introduced the person in the courtroom as “Mr. Deol” and stated that the Defence was ready to proceed to trial. In addition, prior to his arraignment, the accused in the courtroom confirmed to the Registrar that he was Dashminder Deol.
46To my mind, these statements by the accused and his counsel can be taken as an admission that the accused in the courtroom is the person identified in the Information as Dashminder Deol. To paraphrase the Alberta Court of Appeal in Nicholson, I find based on these statements to the Court ‘that if there was some innocent person in this world named Dashminder Deol who might somehow accidently have got involved in this lawsuit, it did not happen’ (at para. 19).
47If the person before the court is of the view that they have been confused with the accused and been summonsed to appear in error, they should not say they are the accused (see: Nicholson, at para. 20).
48To confirm that you are the named accused in the Information when you are not, is to deceive the court.
49In other words, I find that based on the Appellant’s independent confirmation of his identity and counsel’s confirmation of his identity, that is sufficient conduct to tie the accused before the court to the Information.
50If these statements form a part of the arraignment process, then based on the facts of Levene as I have distinguished them, I am not prepared to follow the decision of the Ontario Court of Justice as affirmed by this Court.
51If I am incorrect, however, in my analysis that the statements of the Appellant and his counsel link the person in the courtroom with the person named in the Information, I find that there is sufficient circumstantial evidence to support the trial judge’s conclusion as to identification. I specifically refer to the eyewitness testimony of Mr. Singh who knew the Appellant and referred to the Appellant as Dashminder in his testimony. Further, while according to Mr. Singh, Dashminder may be a common first name in Indian society, the name is relatively unique in Canada.
52I acknowledge that the ratio in Hunt might be limited to circumstances where a statutory scheme is created for the purpose of identifying persons charged with offences and that the court of first instance in Levene rejected the proposition that a court can take into account matters found within an information as some proof of identity. However, I find that where there is, as in this instance, circumstantial evidence of identity it is appropriate for the court to look at its own records and take notice of their contents. In this instance, the Appellant’s first name as described by Mr. Singh in his testimony and the first name of the accused as stipulated in the Information are identical.
53Finally, I agree with the Court in Evaglok that if the person before the court does not raise an objection as to their identity, the court may assume that the person appearing in court and answering to the charge is the person charged. Based on the record, I note that there was no cross-examination of the Crown witnesses on the issue of identification of the accused; the issue of identification was not raised until closing submissions; and the Appellant called no evidence.
54In sum, I find that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence with respect to the issue of identity which, together with the Information, and the absence of any contrary evidence, left it open to the trial judge to conclude that identity had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, or in other words, there was a proven link between the Appellant and the person named in the Information.
55In light of the finding that I have made, I conclude that the trial judge’s verdict on the assault charge was not unreasonable. I also find for the same reason that the verdict can be supported by the evidence and that the trial judge made no error in law in finding the Appellant guilty of assault.
56Because there is no basis for appellate intervention on the finding of guilt on the charge of assault, it follows that the Appellant committed an act which would constitute a breach of the Probation Order provided that there was sufficient evidence before the trial judge to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the person before the court was the person subject to the Probation Order and the trial judge did not otherwise commit an error of law in convicting the Appellant of failing to comply with the terms of the Order.
57The Appellant relies on the decision of R v. Ali, 2011 ONCJ 760 (‘Ali’) in support of his position that there was insufficient evidence before the trial judge to connect him with the Probation Order. In Ali, Bovard J. of the Ontario Court of Justice stated at paragraph 51:
Simply because the name and address of a person is the same on a Recognizance and on an Information charging an accused with breach of Recognizance does not mean that the accused is the person named in those documents. The court may take judicial notice of the court’s documents and their contents, but without an evidentiary link between the person named in the documents and the accused before the court it cannot rely on the documents to prove that the accused is the same person as the one named in the documents.
58Ali was, however, decided before the Court of Appeal’s decision in R v. St. Pierre, 2016 ONCA 173 (‘St. Pierre’). In St. Pierre, the Court of Appeal held that where the name and date of birth on the promise to appear filed as evidence, and the name and date of birth on the current Information before the court are the same, there is evidence to establish that the defendant before the court is the person named in the promise to appear (at paras. 9 and 10).
59As Copeland J. (as she then was) pointed out in R v. T.W.-H., 2016 ONCJ 194 (‘T.W.-H.’), “the clear holding that emerges from this decision is that a trial court can consider the similarity of information on the current Information before the Court as compared to the information in previous court documents filed as evidence, in assessing whether the Crown has proven that the person before the Court is the same person named in the previous court documents” (at para. 43).
60In this case, the trial judge had before her the Information and the Probation Order. In comparing the two documents, I note that the first and last names are the same. The last name is just as unique as the first name as I have previously found it to be. Further, the specific date of birth on both the Information and Probation Order are identical. Although the Probation Order stipulates a municipal street address and the Information records no fixed address, both documents specify that the named person lives in the City of Hamilton.
61I find that because of the specificity of these pieces of information – first and last name; date of birth; and city of domicile – are identical, the only explanation for the identity of this information in both the Information and Probation Order is that the Appellant is the same person who was placed on probation on October 30, 2023. The comparison of the two documents proves this beyond a reasonable doubt.
62For this reason, I once again find that on the basis of the record before the trial judge, there is no basis for appellate intervention with respect to the court of first instance’s finding of guilt regarding the Appellant’s failure to comply with the Probation Order.
63In sum, I find that the verdict of the trial judge is both reasonable and supported by the evidence to which Neill J. correctly applied the relevant legal principles.
Disposition
64For the reasons as I have explained them, the Appellant’s appeal is dismissed.
Justice M. Valente
Released: May 29, 2026
CITATION: R. v. Deol, 2026 ONSC 1952
COURT FILE NO.: CR-25-1315-AP
DATE: 2026-05-29
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
Respondent
- and –
DASHMINDER DEOL
Applicant
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Justice Valente
Released: May 29, 2026