Court File and Parties
CITATION: Valencia v. Juhasz, 2026 ONSC 1943
COURT FILE NO.: FS-24-43366-0000
DATE: 2026-04-10
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: IVONNE VALENCIA, Applicant
AND:
ALEXANDER JUHASZ, Respondent
BEFORE: The Honourable Mr. Justice M.D. Faieta
COUNSEL: Ana Kraljevic, for the Applicant
Self-represented, Respondent
HEARD: March 31, 2026
ENDORSEMENT
[1] The applicant mother brings this motion for temporary spousal support and other relief following the breakdown of a 24-year long marriage retroactive to the date of separation, October 17, 2018, of $4,700 per month, along with an order requiring the respondent father to maintain dependent medical, dental, and extended health plan coverage under his employer’s plan. The respondent submits that spousal support of $2,340 per month should be paid to the applicant solely on a prospective basis.
[2] This Application was commenced on June 25, 2024, for a divorce, spousal support, and equalization of net family property. The respondent did not file an Answer until eight months later, on February 21, 2025. A DRO conference was held on July 22, 2025. The parties agreed to exchange Requests for Information and offers to settle once disclosure was exchanged. There is no evidence that any of this occurred. This motion was brought on February 25, 2026 under r. 14 of the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99, and, at the respondent’s request, was adjourned on March 10, 2026.
Issue #1: Temporary Spousal Support
[3] Subsections 15.2(4) and (6) of the Divorce Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.) describe the objectives and factors to be considered by a court when making an order for spousal support and interim spousal support:
(4) In making an order under subsection (1) or an interim order under subsection (2), the court shall take into consideration the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse, including
(a) the length of time the spouses cohabited;
(b) the functions performed by each spouse during cohabitation; and
(c) any order, agreement or arrangement relating to support of either spouse.
(6) An order made under subsection (1) or an interim order under subsection (2) that provides for the support of a spouse should
(a) recognize any economic advantages or disadvantages to the spouses arising from the marriage or its breakdown;
(b) apportion between the spouses any financial consequences arising from the care of any child of the marriage over and above any obligation for the support of any child of the marriage
(c) relieve any economic hardship of the spouses arising from the breakdown of the marriage; and
(d) in so far as practicable, promote the economic self-sufficiency of each spouse within a reasonable period of time.
[4] Given the summary nature of a motion for interim spousal support, and its the temporary effect, it is not surprising that in such cases, s. 15.2(2) of the Divorce Act provides a court with the discretion to order the payment of such sums that it “…thinks reasonable for the support of the other spouse, pending the determination of the application” for spousal support.
[5] The principles related to the award of temporary spousal support were described by Justice Lococo in Carrubba-Gomes v. Gomes, 2025 ONSC 6377 (Div. Ct.), as follows, at paras. 47-48, 57-58:
[47] The overall goal of the spousal support provisions of the Divorce Act is to effect “a fair and equitable distribution of resources to alleviate the economic consequences of marriage or marriage breakdown for both spouses”: Moge v. Moge, 1992 25 (SCC), [1992] 3 S.C.R. 813, at pp. 849-850; R.L. v. M.F., at para. 39.
[48] Consistent with that goal, in making a spousal support order, s. 15.2(4) of the Divorce Act requires the court to take into consideration “the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse”, including the factors set out in that provision, namely (a) the length of time the spouses cohabited; (b) the functions performed by each spouse during cohabitation; and (c) any order, agreement or arrangement relating to support of either spouse. As well, s. 15.2(6) sets out the objectives that the court should take into account when making a spousal support order. No one of those factors and objectives is paramount and all of them must be considered: R.L. v. M.F., at para. 38; Moge, at p. 852.
[57] A judge making a spousal support order is required to consider and give effect to the factors and objectives set out in the Divorce Act, whether the order is interim or final. However, in previous cases, the judges have recognized the temporary nature of interim spousal support orders as being a relevant consideration when making such an order.
[58] In Sypher, at p. 413, on appeal from an interim spousal support order, the court noted that “the purpose of the interim order is simply to provide a reasonably acceptable solution to a difficult problem until trial.” Subsequent case law has provided further guidance for determining interim spousal support, including Driscoll, which set out a “helpful a list of principles governing interim support motions”, at para. 14 … :
On applications for interim support the [recipient’s] needs and the [payor’s] ability to pay assume greater significance;
An interim support order should be sufficient to allow the [recipient] to continue living at the same standard of living enjoyed prior to separation if the payor's ability to pay warrants it;
On interim support applications the court does not embark on an in-depth analysis of the parties' circumstances which is better left to trial. The court achieves rough justice at best;
The courts should not unduly emphasize any one of the statutory considerations above others;
On interim applications the need to achieve economic self-sufficiency is often of less significance;
Interim support should be ordered within the range suggested by the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines unless exceptional circumstances indicate otherwise;
Interim support should only be ordered where it can be said a prima facie case for entitlement has been made out;
Where there is a need to resolve contested issues of fact, especially those connected with a threshold issue, such as entitlement, it becomes less advisable to order interim support.
[6] The condition of a spouse includes such factors as their age, health, needs, obligations, dependents, and their station in life. The means of each spouse includes their financial resources, capital assets, income from any source, investments, pensions, and any other sources from which they derive a benefit. The needs of each spouse takes into account their accustomed lifestyle during the relationship subject to the ability of the payor spouse to pay. “Other circumstances” includes consideration of the parties’ respective debts and liabilities, their ability to manage those debts in the future, the payor’s ability to pay spousal support, and any benefit that the spousal support claimant has received as a result of the allocation of debts: Khan v. Khan, 2024 ONSC 4045, 8 R.F.L. (9th) 305, at paras. 265-67.
[7] The parties were married in June 1994 and separated in October 2018 once the respondent vacated the matrimonial home in Barrie, Ontario. This amounts to a 24 and a half year marriage. The applicant is now 62 years old and the respondent is 55 years old.
[8] There are two adult children of the marriage, born in 2001 and 2002, who are now financially independent. Shortly after the birth of the children, the respondent attended the Ontario Police College in London, Ontario. The respondent was hired as a Police Constable by the Toronto Police Service shortly after graduation and remains employed in this capacity. The respondent does not dispute the applicant’s evidence that his employment income in 2024 was $118,563. His May 2025 paystub shows gross earnings of $4,662.88 on a bi-weekly basis which equates to an annual income of $121,234.88.
[9] The parties had a traditional marriage. The applicant managed all domestic duties, including the cooking, cleaning, and childcare. The respondent pursued and advanced his career. Early in the marriage, he worked as an office administrator and shortly following the birth of their children, the respondent changed careers to become a police officer. In about 2004, upon graduating from Ontario Police College, the respondent was hired as a Police Constable by the Toronto Police Service, where he continues to be employed.
[10] The respondent states that their marriage was defined by debt, limited discretionary spending, and chronic financial stress arising from reliance on a single income. The applicant also describes financial struggles during their marriage. The applicant states that the respondent refused to add her as a joint account holder to his bank account. She states that bills would not be paid on time even though the respondent was earning more than $100,000 per year. She states that the respondent had a serious spending problem and accumulated significant debt.
[11] The applicant states that the respondent demanded that she not work outside of the home for the benefit of the family. The applicant states that she did all domestic duties, including cooking, cleaning, and taking care of the children. The applicant has little formal education. She took a course as a Dental Assistant in the 1990s but did not complete that course after becoming pregnant. The applicant states that she had minimal spending money during their marriage and relied on the baby bonus (now known as Canada Child Benefit) to pay for household expenses and for some small personal expenses as the respondent refused to provide her with any funds. When the children became older, she took a seasonal position at the LCBO at Christmas time in order to have some pocket money given the respondent’s control of the finances. She states that she quit this job as the respondent threatened that if she continued working, she would have to pay for half of the babysitter’s fees and the household expenses. The applicant also states that the respondent refused to pay for a driver’s education course and as a result, she never learned how to drive a car.
[12] The applicant states that she suffers from multiple health issues including depression and irritable bowel syndrome (“IBS”) which prevents her from obtaining employment. The applicant also states that she suffers from memory problems. The respondent states that the applicant is healthy, able-bodied, and capable of employment. He states that the applicant was diagnosed with depression and IBS prior to their marriage and worked during the early years of their marriage without impediment.
[13] In August 2018, the applicant travelled to Chile to care for her ill mother. The applicant returned to Canada in June 2019 and returned to Chile a few months later. The applicant returned to Canada permanently in November 2022.
[14] The matrimonial home in Barrie was sold on December 14, 2020. The applicant has no income. She does not receive any form of social assistance such as Ontario Works or ODSP benefits. The applicant states that she has been paying her living expenses of about $4,300 per month, including rent of $1,500 for a one bedroom basement apartment in Toronto, from the $150,000 payment that she received from the sale of the matrimonial home.
[15] The respondent states that on October 24, 2022 he was involved in a violent arrest at work resulting in a physical injury to his hand which has left him in chronic pain, has exacerbated his inability to sleep, and made it impossible to function at full capacity. The respondent states that he has been diagnosed with severe Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder relating to workplace issues. The respondent states that he is currently on a Mental Stress Injuries Program and unable to return to work with the TPS in any capacity. The respondent states that he is being evaluated for long term disability benefits. No medical or documentary evidence was provided to support these assertions.
[16] In September 2024, the respondent purchased a home with his partner in Newmarket for about $1,007,500. The respondent states that he owns a 50 percent interest in this home. After their separation, the respondent also purchased a 2022 GMC pickup truck. On the date of separation, the respondent states that he owned a cottage that had a value of $380,000 (that was sold in November 2019 for $400,000) and that his 50 percent interest in the matrimonial home located in Barrie had a value of $225,000.
Entitlement
[17] The objectives of spousal support under s. 15.2(6) of the Divorce Act recognize both a compensatory and non-compensatory basis for the spousal support: Davies v. Jane, 2025 ONCA 752, at para. 47. A compensatory award of spousal support recognizes the sacrifices, contributions and benefits experienced or conferred which can leave one spouse in a much more advantageous financial position than the other post-separation: Moge v. Moge, 1992 25 (SCC), [1992] 3 S.C.R. 813, at p. 870.
[18] A non-compensatory, or needs basis for spousal support is founded on the claimant spouse’s economic need at the time of separation even if such need is unconnected to any disadvantage arising from the relationship. Need will be measured against the parties’ marital standard of living. Such need may arise from health conditions, the roles adopted during the marriage, or as a result of a spouse being out of the workforce: Fisher v. Fisher, 2008 ONCA 11, 88 O.R. (3d) 241, para. 21.
[22] Given the circumstances described above, I find that there is both a compensatory and non-compensatory basis for spousal support.
Amount of Spousal Support
[19] Given that interim spousal support should be ordered within the range suggested by the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines unless exceptional circumstances indicate otherwise, the following steps must be taken: (a) determine each spouse’s income; (b) choose the correct SSAG formula; (c) calculate the SSAG ranges for those incomes; (d) determine and explain the location in the range, after reviewing the factors listed in the SSAG: Carol Rogerson & Rollie Thompson, Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines: The Revised User’s Guide (Ottawa: Department of Justice Canada, 2016).
[20] Both parties rely on financial statements filed in 2025. The applicant’s Notices of Assessment for 2022, 2023, and 2024 show NIL for Line 15000 income. The respondent did not file his Notices of Assessment for 2022, 2023 or 2024 and these documents were not attached to his financial statement or affidavits.
Income
[21] Income for spousal support purposes is calculated in the same manner as income for child support purposes under the Federal Child Support Guidelines (“CSG”): Slongo v. Slongo, 2017 ONCA 272, para. 130. Under s. 16 of the CSG, the starting point is the income shown on Line 15000 of a spouse’s income tax return. Under s. 17-19 of the CSG, this stated income may be adjusted in the circumstances described therein to “fairly and fully” reflect a party's income: Mason v Mason, 2016 ONCA 725, at para. 161.
[22] The applicant’s Notices of Assessment for 2022, 2023 and 2024 show NIL for Line 15000 income.
[23] The respondent submits that the applicant’s income should be imputed to $36,708 reflecting a full-time, minimum wage annual income on the basis that she has not made reasonable efforts to earn and income and cannot rely indefinitely on support where employment is available and health permits.
[24] The applicant states that she has no ability to become self-sufficient at this stage of her life. She does not explain why she chosen to dissipate her capital rather than bring this motion earlier or apply for Ontario Works.
[25] The respondent’s argument implicitly relies on clause 19(1)(a) of the CSG which states:
The court may impute such amount of income to a spouse as it considers appropriate in the circumstances, which circumstances include the following:
(a) the spouse is intentionally under-employed or unemployed, other than where the under-employment or unemployment is required by the needs of a child of the marriage or any child under the age of majority or by the reasonable educational or health needs of the spouse; …
[26] In Kohli v. Thom, 2025 ONCA 200, the Ontario Court of Appeal stated:
108 The decision to impute income as part of the calculation of support is discretionary. The only limitation to that discretion is that there must be some evidentiary basis for the amount of income imputed: Monahan-Joudrey v. Joudrey, 2012 ONSC 5984, at para. 21; see also Homsi v. Zaya, 2009 ONCA 322, 65 R.F.L. (6th) 17, at paras. 27-28; and Staples v. Callender, 2010 NSCA 49, 85 R.F.L. (6th) 236, at paras. 21-22 …
111 The onus is on the party seeking to impute income to the other party to establish that the other party is intentionally unemployed or under-employed. The person requesting an imputation of income must establish an evidentiary basis upon which this finding can be made: see Homsi, at para. 28, citing Drygala v. Pauli, (2002), 2002 41868 (ON CA), 61 O.R. (3d) 711 (Ont. C.A.). …
123 This court, in Drygala, at para. 23, set out the following three questions that should be answered by a court in considering a request to impute income:
Is the party intentionally under-employed or unemployed?
If so, is the intentional under-employment or unemployment required by virtue of his or her reasonable educational needs, the needs of the child or reasonable health needs?
If not, what income is appropriately imputed?
See also Lavie v. Lavie, 2018 ONCA 10, at para. 28.
124 Intentional unemployment is particularly complex. The court need not be satisfied that a payor spouse has acted in bad faith before it imposes a support order based on imputed income: Drygala , at paras. 29-30, and 36. Rather, the court must consider whether the parent's decisions around work choices are reasonable: Drygala, at paras. 38-40; see also Duffy v, Duffy, 2009 NLCA 48, 73 R.F.L. (6th) 233, at para. 25; Tillmanns, at paras. 59-60.
[27] Throughout the marriage the respondent was the sole income earner. The applicant did not work on a full-time or part-time basis during her 24 ½ year marriage, aside from a two-week long period with the LCBO many years ago. The fact that the applicant has not delivered any medical evidence to show that she is not healthy enough to work on a full-time basis is not determinative of whether the applicant is intentionally unemployed. The onus rests with the respondent to establish that income should be imputed to the applicant. At 62 years of age, with no particular work skills, not having been employed for decades, and in her current medical condition, there is no reasonable basis to impute a full-time, minimum wage, income to the applicant. The respondent has not discharged his onus of establishing, on an evidentiary basis, that the applicant is intentionally unemployed. As was the case in Homsi, I find that the respondent has not established the evidentiary basis to find that the applicant’s annual income should be imputed at $36,708.
SSAG Ranges
[28] Applying the “without child support” formula, the SSAG range for spousal support for a 24 and a half year long marriage is as follows:
SSAG Low Range
SSAG Mid Range
SSAG High Range
Amount
$3,631
$4,236
$4,700
Net Disposable Income (NDI)
Alexander – $4,707 Ivonne – $3,176
Alexander – $4,294 Ivonne – $3,628
Alexander – $3,968 Ivonne – $3,968
After Tax Cost/Benefit
Alexander – $2,466 Ivonne – $3,132
Alexander – $2,879 Ivonne – $3,607
Alexander – $3,205 Ivonne – $3,968
Percent of NDI
Alexander – 59.7% Ivonne – 40.3 %
Alexander – 54.2% Ivonne – 45.8%
Alexander – 50% Ivonne – 50%
[29] The above amounts are based on an annual income of 118,563 for the respondent and NIL for the applicant.
[30] Having regard to the SSAGs, and in particular Chapter 9, regarding where along the range temporary spousal support should be ordered, the following considerations are engaged:
(a) The recipient’s needs may push an award to the higher end of the ranges for amount and duration where the recipient has limited income and/or earning capacity, because of age or other circumstances. The applicant’s latest financial statement states that her monthly expenses total $4,350.71 per month including rent of $1,500, groceries of $400, public transit and taxis of $400, meals outside the home of $300, clothing of $900, and hair care of $150.
(b) Need and limited ability to pay on the part of the payor spouse may push an award to the lower ends of the ranges.
(c) In September 2024, the respondent and his current partner purchased a house in Newmarket for over $1 million. The respondent provided a bank statement which shows that as of December 31, 2025, there was mortgage balance of $772,806.28 against that home that is serviced by a payment of $2,253.32 on a bi-weekly basis. The respondent has also incurred expenses related to the maintenance of this new home of about $23,000. In August 2025, the respondent purchased a pick-up truck that was entirely financed by a loan of $85,091.36 which is serviced by a bi-weekly payment of $518.75. The respondent also states that he paid $100,000 for his son’s university education after separation.
(d) The need to preserve work incentives for the payor. However, this factor has less significance on an interim motion for spousal support.
(e) An absence of property to be divided might suggest an award at the higher end of the range. If the recipient receives a large amount of property, the low end of the range might be more appropriate. The applicant received $150,000 from the sale of their home but nothing from the sale of the cottage and nothing in respect of the respondent’s OMERS pension which he states has a family law value of $441,459.50.
(f) Similarly, if the recipient holds sizeable exempt or excluded assets after division, that too might militate in favour of the lower end of the range. There is no suggestion that the applicant holds such assets as equalization of net family property has not been settled. The applicant claims that the cottage, registered solely in the respondent’s name when purchased in 2003, was a second matrimonial home as it was used extensively by the family during the marriage. The respondent sold the cottage and kept the proceeds of sale. Neither party has completed a net family property statement.
Misconduct During the Marriage
[31] The respondent submits that the amount of interim spousal support paid to the applicant should be reduced below the low range of the SSAGs on the grounds that he was abused by the applicant during their marriage. The respondent relies on the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, s. 33(10) which states:
The obligation to provide support for a spouse exists without regard to the conduct of either spouse, but the court may in determining the amount of support have regard to a course of conduct that is so unconscionable as to constitute an obvious and gross repudiation of the relationship
[32] The respondent submits that spousal support should be awarded below the low end of the SSAG range on the grounds that the applicant physically and verbally abused him throughout their marriage which, in part, led to his PTSD. I place no weight on this submission. There is no evidence to corroborate the respondent’s allegations of domestic violence. Similarly, there is no medical evidence to support the respondent’s assertion that he suffers PTSD or that this PTSD arises from the alleged abuse that he suffered during the marriage. Justice Kraft adjourned this motion on March 10, 2026 at the respondent’s request to provide the respondent with an opportunity to obtain such evidence and he did not do so. Further, s. 33(10) of the FLA appears to conflict with s. 15.2(5) of the Divorce Act which states that in making a temporary or final order for spousal support, a court “… shall not take into consideration any misconduct of a spouse in relation to the marriage”. To the extent that s. 33(10) of the FLA leaves open the possibility that misconduct may be considered in determining entitlement to provide support, this provision is not engaged in cases, such as this case, where Divorce Act applies.
Conclusion
[33] Based on the above considerations and evidence, I find that the mid-range amount of the SSAG should be used for making an award of spousal support of $4,236 per month based on the applicant’s annual income being NIL and the respondent’s annual income being $118,653.
Issue #2: Retroactive Spousal Support
[34] The applicant seeks spousal support retroactive to the date of separation, being October 17, 2018. Whether such award should be made turns on “… the needs of the recipient, the conduct of the payor, the reason for the delay in seeking support and any hardship the retroactive award may occasion on the payor spouse”: Kerr v. Baranow, 2011 SCC 10, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 269, at para. 207. In this case, whether retroactive spousal support should be ordered for the last eight years should await trial when there should be a better evidentiary record. Further, given that only temporary relief is available on a motion under r. 14 of the Family Law Rules, it is appropriate to have such determination made at trial, as is the usual case, rather than on a motion. Accordingly, this aspect of the motion is dismissed on a without prejudice basis.
Issue #3: Health Care Benefits
[35] The applicant seeks an order that the respondent maintain dependent medical, dental, and extended health plan coverage for the applicant under his employer’s benefits package. She submits that the respondent’s employer pays 100 percent of the respondent’s medical premiums and therefore, this order would impose minimal cost on the respondent which providing substantial benefit to the applicant who has not health coverage.
[36] However, there is no evidence regarding the coverage afforded under the respondent’s group plan and therefore this Court is no position to determine whether such coverage is available, particularly as the respondent as re-partnered, and whether such order is appropriate. Accordingly, this aspect of the motion is dismissed on a without prejudice basis.
Other Matters
[37] Information about the family law proceedings for self-represented persons can be found on the Ontario Superior Court of Justice’s website: https://www.ontariocourts.ca/scj/areas-of-law/family/help-self-represented/
[38] The parties are directed to review:
(a) Rule 17 of the Family Law Rules.
(b) Rules 84-114 of the Consolidated Provincial Practice Direction for Family Proceedings.
(c) Rules C.9 and C.13 of the Consolidated Provincial Practice Direction for Family Proceedings. Consolidated Practice Direction – Toronto Region.
[39] In an attempt to have the parties efficiently resolve this case, pursuant to r. 2(5) of the Family Law Rules, I have scheduled a Settlement Conference and made certain orders pertaining to disclosure to maximize the chances that the Settlement Conference will result in a settlement.
Order
[40] Order to go as follows:
(1) The respondent shall pay interim spousal support in the amount of $4,236 per month to the applicant commencing March 1, 2026 and on the first day of each subsequent month until further order or agreement. This amount is based on an annual income of 118,563 for the respondent and NIL for the applicant.
(2) This temporary support order is without prejudice to either party seeking a higher or lower amount or claiming retroactive spousal support at trial.
(3) Support Deduction Order to issue.
(4) Given the divided success, the parties shall attempt to agree on costs. If they cannot do so, each party shall written costs submissions of no more than three pages, aside from any offers to settle and outline of costs, by April 17, 2026. Each party may serve and file responding costs submissions of no more than two pages by April 24, 2026.
(5) By May 8, 2026:
(a) Each party shall serve on the other party in an organized fashion:
a. their income tax returns, notices of assessment and notices of reassessment, if any, for years 2018-2025;
b. a copy of a recent credit report;
c. all statements since January 1, 2018 in respect of their bank accounts, investment accounts, RRSP accounts, TFSA accounts, line of credit accounts, credit card accounts.
d. a copy of all benefit information circulars or benefit booklets outlining all employee benefits for health care, dental care, prescriptions and life insurance. If no circular or booklet is available, a detailed statement from the employer or group plan insurer outlining all benefits the party is entitled to receive.
(b) The respondent shall serve on the applicant all documents pertaining to the sale of the cottage property including the agreement of purchase and sale and any letters and trust ledgers from the real estate lawyer that had carriage of the sale for the respondent.
(c) If a party is unable to comply with the above disclosure requirements by May 8, 2026, then they shall serve and file an affidavit by May 15, 2026 that details their efforts to provide the above disclosure and explains why such disclosure not been provided (or when it will be provided).
(6) By May 22, 2026:
(a) The applicant shall serve on the respondent any medical records that she relies upon for the submission that she is unable to work due to illness or disability.
(b) The respondent shall serve on the applicant any medical records that he relies upon for the submission that he is unable to work due to illness or disability.
(c) If a party is unable to comply with the above disclosure requirements by May 22, 2026, then they shall serve and file an affidavit by May 29, 2026 that details their efforts to provide the above disclosure and explains why such disclosure not been provided (or when it will be provided).
(7) By June 19, 2026, each party shall deliver: (a) an updated Financial Statement (Form 13.1) along with all supporting documents; (b) a Certificate of Financial Disclosure (Form 13A); (c) a Net Family Property Statement (Form 13B) along with all supporting documents; (d) a Comparison of Net Family Property Statement (Form 13C);
(8) Any issue involving disclosure must be resolved before the Settlement Conference, by motion if necessary. No motion for disclosure will be entertained at the Settlement Conference and no Order for disclosure will be made at that event.
(9) By September 9, 2026, each party shall serve and file a Settlement Conference Brief and an Offer to Settle.
(10) The parties shall attend a Settlement Conference on September 18, 2026, at 2:00 pm.
(11) This Order is effective immediately without the issuance and entry of a formal order. Nevertheless, any party may submit a formal draft Order to be issued and entered.
The Honourable Mr. Justice M.D. Faieta
Date: April 10, 2026

