SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO
491 Steeles Avenue East, Milton ON L9T 1Y6
RE: PADFIELD, DONNA, Plaintiff
AND:
KNICKMANN, RAINER, Defendant
BEFORE: Justice Kurz
COUNSEL: Natalie Carr, Agent for Csl. Michelle Jowett, for the Plaintiff Email: carr@stratfordlawyers.com
Self Represented Defendant Email: rainer@golden.net
HEARD: In Writing
ENDORSEMENT
1I begin this endorsement by apologizing for its tardiness, which comes as a result of the volume of my work.
2As I indicated in my September 9, 2025 endorsement, this is a standard mortgage enforcement action. However, the Defendant, Rainer Knickmann (“Knickmann”), has brought a motion, seeking, among other relief:
a. Directions on “how to file the MP [moving party]’s new claim or counterclaim”; and
b. That “[t]he Crown must consult [sic] prior to the Padfield motion on November 27, 2025.”
3The Plaintiff, Donna Padfield (“Donna”) has served and filed a Request for Stay or Dismissal Under r. 2.1, claiming that Knickmann’s motion is frivolous or vexatious and should be dismissed under r. 2.1.02.
4On September 9, 2025 I stayed Knickmann’s motion until the r. 2.1 issue could be resolved. I set out a litigation timetable for the service and filing of written submissions. I have now received and reviewed those submissions.
5For the reasons which follow, I grant Donna’s r. 2.1.02 motion.
Background
6As set out above, this action is a simple mortgage enforcement action. Knickmann granted a mortgage to Donna (the “Mortgage”) on his property, located at 531 Oakview Crescent, Mount Forest (the “Property”). I note as Emery J. did in his endorsement of April 15, 2025 in file no. CV-25- 147, that the Property is not on First Nations land.
7In this action, Donna claims that Knickmann is in breach of payments due under the Mortgage. She seeks to enforce that mortgage through possession and sale of the subject property so that the proceeds of that sale can pay the outstanding Mortgage debt.
8In his statement of defence, Knickmann:
a. Asserted that he “self-determine[s] as an Un-conquered Indigenous Man”.
b. Pleads that a non-party, Brian Padfield, promised not to foreclose on him;
c. States that the issues in this action are also the subject of a collateral application, Guelph file no. CV-25-147, which he brought against Donna Padfield, John Padfield and Bill Nelson Respondents (the “Guelph Application”). John Padfield and Mr. Nelson are respectively the son and friend of Donna. Neither are parties to the Mortgage or this action.
d. Pleads that Donna’s counsel agreed to join this proceeding to the Guelph Application proceeding.
e. Referred to the issue of venue under r. 13, pleading that “matters between the UN-Conquered Indigenous and Canada are still Nation to Nation”, citing three cases “and the consent and acknowledgements of CIRNAC”.
f. He added “I have further asserted the Law from R. v. Desautel 2021 SCC 17 and The UNDRIP entrenched into s. 35 as the Supreme Law of the Land”.
g. Pleaded that the Guelph Application “is for enforcement of an Alliance of Indigenous Nations Tribunal Order in the amount of $750,000, which is to be set off by any amount found owing by me to Donna Padfield”.
9In the Guelph Application, Knickmann sought to enforce an “Order” issued by the fictitious “Alliance of Indigenous Nations Tribunal” (the “AIN Tribunal”) which purported to stay this mortgage enforcement action. Knickmann claimed that the Plaintiff and her co-Respondents in the Guelph Application had failed to obey an “AIN Tribunal Order”, that this alleged failure “is Contempt of Court and shall result in fine of $25,000 per day …and an Arrest Warrant may issue”.
10Knickmann did indeed later move to join the Guelph Application to this action.
11As Emery J. wrote in his April 15, 2025 endorsement in the Guelph Application, Knickmann “was not born an indigenous person. He states that he was adopted as an indigenous person two or three years ago. He admits there is nothing in his application materials about his indigenous status or standing”.
12In the result, Donna and her co-Respondents brought a r. 2.1 request to dismiss the Application as frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process.
13Following service of that r. 2.01 request, Knickmann served Donna with a second purported “AIN Tribunal Order”, described as a “DEFAULT ORDER” for the payment of $750,000 against all three Respondents in the Guelph Application, jointly and severally, “which may be set off against the mortgage…” Knickmann alleges that the “DEFAULT ORDER” called for a fine of $25,000 for failure to obey it.
14Knickmann also brought two motions of his own in the Application after Donna made her r. 2.01 request. Knickmann’s notices of motion sought resolution of a number of irrelevant, esoteric and frankly nonsensical legal issues which lacked a connection to any real issues between the parties. The issues were described in those notices of motion as follows:
Motion 1:
i. “Who has the constitutional authority to appoint Justices in Canada?” and
ii. “Does the Governor General have any legal authority in Canada following the passage of The Statute of Westminster of 1931?”
Motion 2:
iii. A request for an order transferring this action to the Guelph court (where Knickmann brought the Application) and then “to be transferred to an Indigenous Tribunal of [Knickmann’s] choice”;
iv. “Addressing or granting the Indigenous Challenge regarding s. 96 of the Constitution, including releasing the Restriction on the Instructions for the Appointment of the Governor General at Archives Canada”;
v. “AIN Tribunal Order staying any Mortgage Action is to be enforced, leading up to August 26, 2025 scheduling hearing where the Crown must serve and file their Response to the Indigenous Question”;
vi. “AIN Tribunal Order #2 in favour of Rainer is to be enforced, and the alleged debt of the Padfield mortgage is to be possibly set off, provided the Padfields can demonstrate they gave valuable consideration to Rainer, that defeats the Autochtonous Title via Indigenous Common Law”
15On July 4, 2025 Lemon J. dismissed the Guelph Application and all motions brought by Knickmann under that proceeding as frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process. At para. 6 - 7 of his endorsement, Lemon J. wrote:
In Ye v. Zhang et al., 2024 ONSC 2646, Sutherland J. summarized the case law with respect to motions such as this one. An application can be dismissed where the abusive nature of the proceeding is apparent on the face of the pleading. A “frivolous” action is a proceeding that lacks a legal basis or legal merit. A “vexatious” action is a proceeding without reasonable ground or where it is obvious that the action cannot succeed. An abuse of process occurs when the court’s process would be manifestly unfair to a party to the litigation.
All of those descriptions apply to this application.
16Following that dismissal and after Lemon J. requested written costs submissions, Knickmann brought a third motion, this time to have Lemon J. recuse himself. In his notice of motion, Knickmann asserted that Lemon J. “was not appointed pursuant to S. 96 of the Constitution, but was appointed by the Minister of Justice”. Knickmann continued, raising what he claimed to be issues regarding the Governor General and insisting on Crown consultation and the conclusion of a “Treaty with [his] Tribe Nation to Nation”.
17On August 7, 2025, Lemon J. summarily dismissed that motion on his own initiative, under r. 2.1.01. Lemon J. pointed out that Knickmann had simply repeated many of the “unpersuasive” arguments which he previously propounded and Lemon J. had rejected. Lemon J. stated that the issues raised were either the proper subject of appeal or, regarding the challenge to the authority of the Governor General to appoint justices of this court, bereft of legal authority.
18Lemon J. ordered Knickmann to pay costs of $20,000 to the Respondents in the Application.
19Knickmann appealed the decisions of Lemon J. to the Court of Appeal of Ontario. On October 2, 2025, the Court of Appeal dismissed Knickmann’s appeal under r. 2.1 as frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process. The appeal panel, led by Tulloch C.J.O., wrote:
This is another case in which a person claiming indigenous ancestry argues that he is not responsible for paying a mortgage. Such an argument cannot succeed. See Home Trust Co. v. Campbell, 2025 ONCA 558. Accordingly, it is abusive for the reasons given by Lemon J. on July 4, 2025, which we adopt…
20In Campbell, Lauwers J.A., sitting as a motions judge, dealt with a motion to stay a judgment for payment and possession on a defaulted mortgage on grounds similar to those claimed by Knickmann in this action. Lauwers J.A. wrote:
10 There is no merit to the argument that Ms. Miner's claimed Indigenous heritage excuses her from paying her debts.
13 The Indigenous debtor in National Bank of Canada [National Bank of Canada v. Guibord, 2021 ONCA 864] made a similar argument, which Nordheimer J.A. rejected. He said, at para. 4:
I see little merit to the appellant's grounds of appeal. While I do not question the importance of some of the issues that the appellant raises that surround the question of land claims by Indigenous peoples, those issues, as the appellant attempts to invoke them in his appeal and on this motion, do not relate to any of the issues raised by the motion for summary judgment. That motion dealt with a straightforward commercial arrangement between the parties on which there had been default by the appellant. That default entitled the respondent to exercise its rights under the security which it held, namely a mortgage. The respondent sought, and obtained, summary judgment arising from the default, which included obtaining a writ of possession. The various principles and proclamations to which the appellant refers, including the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, simply have no proper application to the issues raised on the summary judgment motion.
21To this, Lauwers J.A. added:
14 I agree. These observations apply equally in this case. Indeed, were any court to give effect to Ms. Miner's argument, Indigenous peoples would thereafter have great difficulty raising money by way of a valid mortgage or charge on land they owned off-reserve.
Analysis of this Motion
22Having reviewed the materials which the parties have submitted in response to Donna’s r. 2.1 request, I see little to no difference between Knickmann’s proposed motion in this action and the three frivolous, vexatious and abusive motions that he brought in the Application.
23Knickmann’s litigation strategy against Donna bears many of the hallmarks of vexatiousness identified by Myers J. in Gao v. Ontario WSIB, 2014 ONSC 6497, at para. 14 – 16. In fact, as set out above, they have already been described as vexatious by the Court of Appeal for Ontario.
24In Mukwa v. Farm Credit Canada, 2021 ONSC 1632, at para. 21, Akbarali J. found the purported Indigenous groups to which Knickman claims to belong are not recognized as First Nations “on a comprehensive list of all First Nations across Canada that is compiled by Crown-Indigenous Relations, Northern Affairs Canada, and Indigenous Services Canada.”
25That case, like this, represented an attempt by a purported Indigenous litigant to use their alleged status and broad arguments regarding Indigenous rights to avoid liability on a mortgage. At para. 28 – 29, Akbarali J. found that the claims of the Plaintiff before her, based on membership in purported Indigenous groups were “designed in furtherance of illegitimate litigation tactics commonly referred to as Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Arguments, as described in Meads v. Meads, 2012 ABQB 571.” She declined to entertain them. Those arguments were similar to those raised by Knickmann in his motion in this action and the motions he brought in the Application.
26In determining Donna’s r. 2.1.02 request, I adopt para. 14 -16 of her written submissions as follows:
[Knickmann’s] motion is nonsensical, contains random allegations, fails to identify the legal authority under which it has been brought or any proper legal claim or legal basis for relief, there are references to international obligations that do not make sense, and fails to plead any material or relevant facts or grounds. There is no legal merit to his motion. [Knickmann] uses pseudo–legal terminology, and rambling discourse with use of legal and other terms. This is similarly applicable to [Knickmann’s] written submission. His written submissions provide more reason to conclude that his motion ought to be dismissed and was brought for a purpose, other than the assertion of legitimate rights.
[Knickmann] continues to engage in tactics known as Organized, Pseudolegal Commercial Arguments (as described in Meads v. Meads 2012 ABQB 571) in an effort to abuse the court system because he has otherwise no reasonable expectation of litigation success to defend against [Donna’s ] enforcement of the mortgage on the merits.
[Knickmann] advances a multitude of pseudo legal arguments that reject the authority of the court, the court’s jurisdiction over him, and the legitimacy of the Canadian state and are not relevant or proper. [Donna] submits that [Knickmann] is attempting to cause chaos, confusion, and delay.
Conclusion
27To allow Knickmann’s motion to proceed would allow him to repeat the ills he occasioned in the Guelph Application. It would also amount to an abuse of process as Knickmann attempts to relitigate the findings of both Lemon J. and the Court of Appeal for Ontario.
28Accordingly, I dismiss Knickmann’s motion under r. 2.1.02 as frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process.
29Further, Knickmann has demonstrated that he is a persistent vexatious litigant, willing to repeat similar meritless arguments, which only serve to delay the hearing of Donna’s mortgage enforcement action. It is high time to allow this proceeding to advance in the normal course, without interruption by constant pointless proceedings based on pseudolegal claims.
30Accordingly, under r. 2.1.02(3) I prohibit Knickmann from bringing any further motions in this proceeding without leave.
Postscript
31By way of postscript, it is necessary to repeat the words of two respected jurists regarding the type of litigation tactic adopted by Knickmann and his attempt to bootstrap Indigenous rights to an attempt to defend a private claim completely unrelated to those rights.
32In Sarac v. Wilstar Management Inc., 2021 ONSC 7776 (a case in which a litigant attempted to use pseudolegal arguments regarding Indigenous rights to defeat an eviction order), Myers J. wrote at para. 25:
25 This country recognizes that real injustices have been inflicted upon its Indigenous communities including the Metis People. Litigants who try to avoid their financial responsibilities by wrapping themselves in the garb of Indigenous Peoples' real victimhood and suffering to tie up the courts with illegitimate and abusive claims deserve not another moment of court time or attention.
33In Woodley v. Cipolla, 2022 ONSC 7096, at para. 34- 35 (a parenting case in which a litigant attempted to use pseudolegal arguments regarding Indigenous rights to challenge the jurisdiction of this court), McDermott J. adopted the comments of Myers J. in Sarac and then added the following at para. 35:
35 I cannot agree more. There is no question that Indigenous people in Canada, especially children, have suffered greatly and deserve redress and respect. To make arguments in an in personam case based on an Indigenous land claim supported by a made-up tribunal promulgated by an illegitimate organization posing as a First Nation does nothing more than a disservice to the efforts of Canada's First Nations. It dilutes and cheapens legitimate claims by Indigenous peoples in Canada and deserves no consideration by this court, which must focus only on the best interests of the child who is the subject matter of this case…
Costs
34Ordinarily, costs do not follow an order under r. 2.1.02. But for the reasons set out by Lemon J. on August 7, 2025 in dismissing the Application, I find that this is an appropriate time to consider an award of costs.
35As Donna is the successful party, she shall serve and file her costs submissions of up to three pages, double-spaced, one-inch margins, plus a bill of costs/costs outline and offers to settle within 14 days of release of this endorsement. She need not include the authorities upon which she relies so long as they are found in the commonly referenced reporting services (i.e., LexisNexis Quicklaw, or WestlawNext) and the relevant paragraph references are included. Knickmann may respond, subject to the same limitations set out above, within a further 14 days. No reply submission will be accepted unless I request it.
36If I have not received any submissions within the time frames set out above, I will assume that the parties have resolved the issue and will make no costs order.
Electronic Signature of Justice Marvin Kurz