ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
His Majesty The King
– and –
Elizabeth Augustyniak
Accused
S. Nijjar, counsel for the Crown
B. Vincents, for the Accused
HEARD: March 20, 2026
THE HONOURABLE JusticE L. STANDRYK
REASONS FOR SENTENCE
Overview
1On August 14, 2025, following an eight-day jury trial, Elizabeth Augustyniak was found guilty of the following offences that occurred on March 31, 2023 in St. Catharines, Ontario:
(i) willful obstruction of a peace officer in execution of their duty contrary to s. 129(a) of the Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46;
(ii) possession of a motor vehicle of a value less than $5,000, knowing that the vehicle had been obtained by an offence punishable by indictment contrary to s. 354(1) the Criminal Code;
(iii) possessed fentanyl for the purposes of trafficking contrary to s. 5(2), of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19 (the “CDSA”); and
(iv) possession of proceeds knowing that all or part of the proceeds were obtained directly or indirectly from the commission of an offence punishable by indictment of a value exceeding $5,000 contrary to s. 354(1) of the Criminal Code.
2This decision follows an oral sentencing hearing, at which Crown and defence counsel made submissions respecting sentence. 1
3The court was also provided with briefs of authority, a copy of a pre-sentence report for Ms. Augustyniak (PSR), and letters of support from: Diana Jane Red Peralta, Ms. Augustyniak’s aunt; Princess Hinds, a close friend; Cattleya Avila, Ms. Augustyniak’s cousin and her brother, Dwayne Haslett.
4I have taken all of the foregoing into account in determining a fit and proper sentence to impose upon Ms. Augustyniak.
Circumstances of the Offences
i. Possession for the Purpose of Trafficking
5On March 31, 2023, the Niagara Regional Police Service observed a Toyota RAV4 vehicle bearing an Ontario marker CANJ 613. Police conducted a query, which confirmed the vehicle was stolen. The police located the vehicle unoccupied in a parking lot at 176 Oakdale Avenue, St. Catharines. CCTV footage captured the vehicle arriving at 176 Oakdale Avenue, St. Catharines, and Elizabeth Augustyniak exiting from the driver’s seat with another woman exiting from the passenger seat, whose identity was not confirmed at trial. Both Ms. Augustyniak and the other woman exit the vehicle and enter the building of 176 Oakdale Avenue.
6Approximately 11 minutes after arriving at 176 Oakdale Avenue, Elizabeth Augustyniak left the building with her then common-law partner, Daiquon Kelly.
7Police asked Ms. Augustyniak her name, to which she responded Amelia Shaw with a date of birth of June 31, 2002. Ms. Augustyniak was subsequently placed under investigative detention, after which police conducted a pat-down search and found identification located in her pocket. The identification confirmed the identity of the detained female as Elizabeth Augustyniak. At approximately 10:20 p.m. she was placed under arrest for obstructing a peace officer. The key to the Toyota RAV4 was found in Ms. Augustyniak’s pocket during a search incident to arrest.
8Police searched the Toyota RAV4. Within a black bag located within the vehicle police located 45 grams of fentanyl. In the center console, police found $5,885 in Canadian currency and a Fuzion digital scale. In the glove compartment, police located a box of zipper seal baggies. A further five pieces of paper containing fentanyl were found within plain view on the center console area of the vehicle, each marked with the word “Daytona” and a phone number. The total weight of the fentanyl between the five pieces of paper was 4.7 grams.
9A black Samsung cell phone was found on the dash of the vehicle. An iPhone found on Ms. Augustyniak at the time of arrest was also seized. A search warrant was executed on her cell phone. No conversations indicative of trafficking behaviour were found on her phone. The phone number on her iPhone did not correspond with the number found on the pieces of paper containing fentanyl.
10Ms. Augustyniak was subsequently placed under arrest for possession of a Schedule I substance for the purpose of trafficking.
11These are the facts upon which the jury found Ms. Augustyniak guilty of all counts with the exception that she was found guilty of the lesser included offence of possession of property, namely the Toyota RAV4, obtained by crime under $5,000.
12In reaching their verdict, the jury found that Ms. Augustyniak had constructive possession of the fentanyl located in the motor vehicle at the time of her arrest.
13Based on the Crown’s expert evidence, the quantum of fentanyl was more consistent with trafficking than personal use. The estimated street value of the fentanyl, depending on the method of sale, was close to $10,000.
ii. Circumstances of the Offender
14Ms. Augustyniak was born and raised in Toronto. Her early childhood was marked by instability: her parents separated shortly after her birth, her father was deported to the Philippines following criminal charges, and her mother struggled significantly with addiction. As a result, she and her brother were apprehended by the Children’s Aid Society when she was approximately four or five years old. They initially lived together in a foster home for several years before her brother was moved to a group home. Although she reports no physical abuse in foster care, she recalls verbal mistreatment and left the home at age 15, after which she experienced periods of couch‑surfing.
15At 16, she reconnected with her grandmother, aunt, and cousin, who have since remained her primary supports. As an adult, she has moved between family homes, a shelter, and subsidized housing, and now resides again with her grandmother and aunt while awaiting new housing. She is the sole caregiver of her two young children, with no involvement from either biological father.
16Reference letters from family and a close friend consistently describe her as a devoted and attentive mother committed to providing her children with a more stable upbringing than her own. They emphasize her lack of substance‑use issues, her remorse, her efforts to stabilize her life, and her strong rehabilitative potential. The letters also note that her offending arose from the influence of a negative partner.
17She left school at 16 to work but had been a capable student and intends to complete her diploma with only eight credits left to achieve. She does not use drugs nor does she suffer a drug or alcohol dependency.
Impact on the Victim/Community
18Courts across Canada have consistently recognized the opioid crisis and profound harm associated with fentanyl trafficking. Even small quantities can be lethal, posing a risk to public safety. Fentanyl has a central role in the national opioid crisis. As Moldaver J. observed in R. v. Parranto, 2021 SCC 46, [2021] 3 S.C.R. 366, at para. 96, fentanyl has had “a real and deadly impact on the lives of Canadians.…so deadly that various courts have described it as a national crisis”.
19The offence in this case also involved Ms. Augustyniak’s use of a stolen vehicle. As noted in R. v. Casseus, 2024 ONCJ 654, vehicle theft is far from a victimless crime. It fuels organized criminal activity, increases insurance costs, undermines community security, and imposes significant financial and emotional burdens on victims.
20In addition, the act of obstructing a peace officer by providing a false name and date of birth meaningfully undermines the administration of justice. Such conduct delays lawful investigations, diverts limited police resources, and compromises officers’ ability to assess risk and ensure public safety. Even brief acts of obstruction carry real consequences, and courts have consistently treated them as serious impediments to effective law enforcement.
Right of Allocution
21Ms. Augustyniak exercised her right of allocution. She was tearful, accepted responsibility for her conduct, and expressed a genuine commitment to doing better. She spoke of her desire to provide a better life for her daughters and of her determination not to repeat the cycle of behaviour that was modelled for her during her childhood and later by her former partner, Mr. Kelly.
The Positions of the Crown and Defence Respecting Sentence
The Crown’s Position on Sentence
22The Crown submits that the appropriate sentencing range for the offence of possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking is five years’ custody. Concurrent sentences of 90 days’ custody are sought on each of the two counts of possession of proceeds of crime, together with a concurrent 30‑day custodial term on the obstruct peace officer count. The Crown further submits that a mandatory 10‑year weapons prohibition order under s. 109 of the Criminal Code must be imposed, along with a DNA order, noting that while an offence under s. 5(2) of the CDSA is a secondary designated offence, the order is nonetheless in the best interests of the administration of justice and the protection of society. A forfeiture order is also sought for all offence‑related property and proceeds of crime.
23In support of its position, the Crown refers to Parranto; R. v. Lynch, 2022 ONCA 109, 160 O.R. (3d) 241; R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089; and R. v. Bennett, 2023 ONCJ 616, which discusses the significant public health crisis associated with trafficking fentanyl and the appropriate sentencing range. The Crown highlights the devastating impact of fentanyl on individuals, families, and communities, and the particular prevalence and harm experienced within the Niagara Region.
24Reliance is also placed on Casseus, at para. 32, to underscore the court’s ability to take judicial notice of the increasing prevalence of motor vehicle thefts across Southern Ontario and the corresponding need for denunciation and deterrence.
25While the evidence does not establish that the defendant participated in the theft of the vehicle at issue, the Crown submits that she was in possession of a stolen vehicle being used as a vessel for drug trafficking, and that she did so with knowledge that the vehicle was stolen, thereby aggravating her moral blameworthiness.
26The Crown further references R. v. Owusu, 2024 ONSC 671; R. v. Loor, 2017 ONCA 696; R. v. Haye, [2013] O.J. No. 6493, aff’d [2014] O.J. No. 6575 (C.A.); R. v. Bailey‑Ricketts, 2024 ONSC 1834; R. v. Ramon‑Vasquez, 2025 ONSC 1255; and R. v. Campbell, 2024 ONSC 2220. The Crown submits that these authorities establish the sentencing range for comparable cases involving the trafficking of fentanyl in quantities similar to those present in this matter.
27Based on the foregoing authorities and submissions, the Crown submits that the appropriate sentencing range in this case is a custodial term of four to six years.
Defence Position Respecting Sentence
28The defence seeks the imposition of a global conditional sentence of two years less a day, followed by probation. The proposed structure of the conditional sentence is 15 months of house arrest and nine months of curfew. The defence acknowledges that this disposition falls outside the conventional range for possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking and the four convictions on the indictment. However, the defence submits that any sentence on the remaining counts must run concurrently with the primary offence of possession for the purpose of trafficking.
29Relying on Lacasse, at para. 58, the defence argues that this case presents the type of exceptional circumstances that justify a sentence below the usual range. The defence submits that the accused’s moral blameworthiness is significantly attenuated. She was 19 years old at the time, is a first‑time offender, and her involvement amounted to brief constructive possession of the drugs, money, and vehicle. The evidence established that she was not a trafficker but became incidentally involved through her relationship with a boyfriend suspected of trafficking.
30The defence further notes that the accused’s personal circumstances strongly mitigate her culpability and moral blameworthiness: she endured a difficult upbringing in foster care, has no prior criminal history, has complied flawlessly with bail since 2023, and is the sole caregiver of two very young children. Letters of support describe the offences as out of character and emphasize her rehabilitative potential.
31The defence relies on R. v. Benjamin, 2025 ONCJ 129 at paras. 35 and 37, and R. v. Habib, 2024 ONCA 830 at paras. 29–36, to submit that for youthful first offenders—even in serious trafficking cases—the principles of denunciation and deterrence must be balanced with restraint and rehabilitation to achieve a proportionate sentence.
32The defence places particular reliance on R. v. Sauvé, 2023 ONCA 310, submitting that the circumstances closely parallel those of Ms. Augustyniak. In Sauvé, the Court of Appeal recognized that youthful, first‑time offenders who become peripherally involved in trafficking‑related conduct through association with more culpable partners may possess substantially reduced moral blameworthiness. The defence submits that the same considerations apply here and that Sauvé supports the proposed conditional sentence: the offender’s limited role, personal vulnerabilities, and contextual circumstances justified a sentence meaningfully below the conventional range.
33Additional cases referred to by the defence include R v. Grant, 2021 ONCJ 507; R v. Benjamin, 2025 ONCJ 129; R v. Shearer, 2022 ONCJ 288; R v. Gordon, 2023 ONCJ 157; and R v. Lawal, 2024 ONSC 3621.
Principles of Sentencing
The relevant principles of sentencing
34Section 718 of the Criminal Code sets out the fundamental purpose and objectives of sentencing.
35A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility borne by the offender: s. 718.1 of the Criminal Code; R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, [2020] 1 S.C.R. 424, at para. 30. In determining an appropriate sentence, the court must consider any aggravating or mitigating circumstances that may increase or reduce the sanction imposed. Sentences should also be consistent with those imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances, reflecting the principle of parity: s. 718.2 of the Criminal Code.
36In matters involving convictions for trafficking or possession of controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking, the relevant case law establishes that deterrence, denunciation and the protection of the public are paramount sentencing objectives. The nature and quantity of the substance are significant considerations, as are the presence of any commercial element, the offender’s role, and their personal circumstances.
37In assessing an appropriate sentence, the court may consider the vulnerability of younger persons who may be at risk of drug use and may impose a sanction that reflects the need to safeguard the community. The court will also take into account the individual circumstances of the offender, including whether the offender suffers from a substance‑use disorder.
38Finally, the principle of restraint is codified in s. 718.2(e) – that all available sanctions, other than imprisonment, that are reasonable in the circumstances and consistent with the harm done to victims or to the community should be considered for all offenders. The principle of restraint includes that when incarceration is necessary, the court must impose the shortest sentence of imprisonment that will achieve the various purposes of sentencing: R. v. Batisse, 2009 ONCA 114, 93 O.R. (3d) 643, at paras. 32-35; R. v. Ali, 2022 ONCA 736, 164 O.R. (3d) 81, at paras. 40-42; and R. v. A.B., 2023 ONCA 254, at para. 55. The principle of restraint applies with particular force in sentencing a youthful first offender: R. v. Priest (1996), 30 O.R. (3d) 538 (C.A.), at p. 545, [1996] O.J. No. 3369 (C.A.), at para. 23.
Range of Sentence
39The gravity of harm caused by trafficking in hard drugs is reflected by Parliament prescribing a maximum penalty of life imprisonment for offences under s. 5(2) of the CDSA.
40On the conviction of possession for the purpose of trafficking, there is no identifiable victim in this case. However, as I have noted with respect to motor vehicle theft, just because there is no identifiable victim in a particular case, it does not mean the offence is a victimless one.
41The range for trafficking in fentanyl is still evolving: R. v. Gallant, 2025 ONCJ 238, at para. 34. Moldaver J. wrote that for individuals who assumed leadership roles in a trafficking operation and trafficked fentanyl in large quantities, a “heavy penitentiary sentence” is appropriate; he noted, though, that his comments “do not apply to sentences for street-level trafficking, or where traffickers are motivated by a need to support their own addiction”: Parranto, at paras. 99-100. It is clear that the offender before me is one of the individuals to whom these comments should not apply.
42The Crown tendered a helpful chart summarizing decisions that address the sentencing range for fentanyl‑related offences.
43In Ontario, meaningful guidance comes from the Court of Appeal’s decision in Loor. There, Laskin J.A. emphasized (at para. 50) that offenders who traffic in substantial quantities of fentanyl—including those with no prior record—should ordinarily expect significant penitentiary sentences. In that case, the offender possessed 45 fentanyl patches, and a six‑year sentence was upheld. Mr. Loor also had a prior record related to the offence, was found to have actively trafficked, and the case did not benefit from a guilty plea.
44In R. v. Gagnon, 2017 ONSC 7470, Conlan J. concluded that 12.34 grams of powdered fentanyl constituted a “significant amount” and warranted a four‑year custodial sentence. The amount of fentanyl in the case before me, at 47.9 grams, falls within the higher quantities attracting significant penitentiary sentences. Notably, though, Mr. Gagnon had an extensive criminal record, including for drug-related offences, and there was no guilty plea.
45The cases to which the defence refers are also instructive. Several of those cases involve trafficking offences, youthful offenders, multiple charges and an acknowledgement by the courts that a conditional sentence is available for consideration by this court.
46In addition to the cases to which counsel have referenced, I have also considered R v. Richer, 2025 ONCA 439. The circumstances in Richer are very similar, albeit not identical, to those before me. Coroza J. allowed the appeal from the trial judge’s imposition of a four-year custodial sentence and substituted a three-year sentence. In that case, the offender was found guilty of either participating in or aiding the trafficking of one ounce of fentanyl. She was a first-time offender, had a 12-year-old child and had been re-partnered for two years at the time of sentencing. The offender had also made significant rehabilitative efforts by the time of sentencing. Coroza J. held that the trial judge, on sentencing, overlooked the offender’s efforts at rehabilitation and the consequences of family separation arising from imposing a four-year custodial sentence. He specifically referenced the Court of Appeal’s decision in Habib, which was also cited by defence counsel in this case.
47In Ramon-Vasquez, a 2.5-year custodial sentence was imposed. The offender was of a similar age to Ms. Augustyniak at the time of the offence. He possessed a smaller amount of drugs but was considered by the court to be a street to mid-level tracker on evidence that he showed heavy involvement in the drug trade, including being armed with a knife. In that case, Mr. Ramon-Vasquez entered a plea of guilty, which was a mitigating factor. That is not the case here.
48Taken together, these authorities illustrate that sentencing for fentanyl trafficking is a highly individualized exercise. Each case turns on its own constellation of facts, including the nature and quantity of the drug, the offender’s level of involvement in the trafficking operation, the persistence of the trafficking, the offender's personal circumstances, and the presence or absence of mitigating and aggravating factors.
49In my view, the appropriate range for sentencing in the case before me is 2.5 to six years.
50With respect to the balance of offences of obstructing and possession of property derived from crime with a value under $5,000, neither the Crown nor the defence provided a body of case law to address the appropriate sentencing range, except that the Crown referred the court to the decision of Latimer J. in Casseus. Latimer J. identified a sentencing range of three to six months’ incarceration for the offence of attempted theft of an SUV. Both the Crown and the defence submit that this decision provides some guidance as to the appropriate range for these secondary offences. In considering an appropriate and fit sentence on the possession for property charge, the Crown does not suggest that Ms. Augustyniak was in any way involved in the theft of the Toyota RAV4.
51With respect to the offence of obstruction, I will consider that offence as one within the continuum of circumstances giving rise to the balance of the charges as an aggravating factor.
Mitigating and Aggravating Circumstances
52The aggravating circumstances in this case arise from the nature of the offences and their impact on the community, including the presence of fentanyl and the accused knowing she was in possession of a stolen vehicle.
53In Bennett and R. v. Jama, 2023 ONCJ 183, ODonnell J. considered the prevalence of fentanyl trafficking, and the impact fentanyl has had on the Niagara Region. He noted that in 2021, 163 people died from total opioid overdoses largely driven by fentanyl, or almost one person every two days in a region that has less than 500,000 inhabitants.
54The nature of the substance involved and its impact on our region is a significant aggravating factor. Fentanyl is an extremely addictive, dangerous and destructive opioid that has contributed to an epidemic of overdoses and deaths within the Niagara Region and across the country. It is lethal even in very small quantities. The courts routinely observe the devastating consequences of fentanyl addiction, including the extent to which individuals, driven by dependency, resort to criminal behaviour to sustain their use. Those who traffic in fentanyl enable and perpetuate the ongoing societal harms associated with this substance. By trafficking in fentanyl, an offender participates in the distribution of a drug that continues to fuel widespread community harm, heighten public‑safety risks, and contribute directly to the cycle of addiction, overdose, and death.
55Taken together, the sizable quantity of fentanyl, the use of a stolen vehicle, and the deliberate obstruction of a peace officer underscore the seriousness of the conduct and the broader harm these offences inflict on the community.
56Balanced against these factors are several compelling mitigating considerations. The accused was only 19 years old at the time of the offences, suffered with depression, and had no prior criminal record. Her background reflects a difficult and disrupted upbringing. She and her brother spent years in the foster system.
57She now serves as the sole caregiver to her two young children, soon to be three and ten months. She no longer maintains any contact with the biological fathers: she does not maintain any contact with Daiquon Kelly, who, at the time of the offence, police suspected was the drug trafficker.
58The letters of support filed with the court attest to the strength of her familial network, her commitment to her children, and her efforts toward rehabilitation
59She has complied fully with her release conditions for an extended period and has not reoffended, demonstrating stability and an ability to abide by court‑imposed restrictions. These circumstances collectively support the conclusion that she is a suitable candidate for a community‑based sanction and that the objectives of sentencing can be met without resort to a custodial term.
60Unlike the offenders in several of the cases relied upon by the Crown, there was no evidence that Ms. Augustyniak herself engaged in any drug trafficking activity.
Reasons
61Defence counsel has proposed consideration of a conditional sentence. A conditional sentence is available pursuant to s. 742.1 of the Criminal Code. If a person is convicted of an offence and the court imposes a sentence of imprisonment of less than two years, the court may, for the purpose of supervising the offender’s behaviour in the community, order that the offender serve the sentence in the community subject to conditions imposed by s. 742.3. In considering a conditional sentence the court must be satisfied that:
a. service in the community would not endanger the safety of the community and would be consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing set out in section 718.01 to 718.2
b. the offence is not punishable by a minimum term of imprisonment
c. the offence is not an offence under section 239 (attempt to commit murder); 269.1 (torture) or s. 318 (advocating genocide); and
d. the offence is not a terrorism offence, or a criminal organization offence, prosecuted by way of indictment, for which the maximum term of imprisonment is 10 years or more.
62In R. v. Proulx, 2000 SCC 5, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61, the Supreme Court of Canada stated at para. 100 that “a conditional sentence can achieve both punitive and restorative objectives” and that “a conditional sentence will be preferable to incarceration in cases where a conditional sentence can achieve the objectives of denunciation and deterrence as effectively as incarceration”.
63The jurisprudence is clear that a penitentiary sentence is usually imposed upon a conviction of possession for the purpose of trafficking in a serious drug, such as fentanyl. However, in more recent cases, including R. v. Woods, 2024 ONCA 664, courts have imposed conditional sentences when exceptional circumstances were found. As noted in R. v. Hastings, 2024 ONSC 6328, at para. 55, those exceptional circumstances almost always began with a guilty plea and strong evidence that the offender expressed remorse for the offence and had taken significant steps toward rehabilitation, thereby reducing the risk of reoffending. That being said, again as in Hastings, the absence of a guilty plea does not rule out a finding of exceptional circumstances and the consequent imposition of a conditional sentence (see also R. v. Ul-Haq, 2025 ONSC 513, where the amount of fentanyl was significantly less but there was direct evidence of trafficking and an absence of many of the mitigating factors at play here).
64While there was no guilty plea here, Ms. Augustyniak’s circumstances are exceptional.
65A custodial sentence will carry significant consequences for Ms. Augustyniak and her family, including her two children. I must consider these consequences in determining a fit sentence: R. v. D.B., 2025 ONCA 577, 451 C.C.C. (3d) 400, at para. 3.
66In Habib, Tulloch C.J.O. offered guidance on how courts should approach these collateral consequences. At paras. 42-47, citing R v. Spencer (2004), 72 O.R. (3d) 47 (C.A.), he explained the unfortunate reality of sentencing defendants to prison, which often harms their families: family members are deprived of the defendant’s love and care and suffer the emotional pain of separation. However, the court must be cautious not to let the consequences of a custodial sentence overwhelm the other principles of sentencing; the consequences cannot justify imposing a disproportionate sentence: Habib, at para. 43, citing R. v. Dent, 2023 ONCA 460, 167 O.R. (3d) 161, at para. 124.
67If incarceration is necessary, sentencing judges must give serious and sufficient consideration to the consequences of family separation when determining the length of prison terms. At para. 45 of Habib, Tulloch C.J.O. said, depending on the facts, “family separation consequences may justify a sentence adjustment – even a significant one – a or departure from the range”.
68Ms. Augustyniak is a single mother of two very young children. A custodial sentence would separate her from her children during their formative years. The evidence establishes that these children have no relationship with their biological fathers, making Ms. Augustyniak their sole stable parental figure. In these circumstances, the preservation and stability of the family unit carry considerable weight.
69Ms. Augustyniak has been on release conditions since March 2023 without any breaches or subsequent criminal charges. Her sustained compliance over an extended period demonstrates a meaningful commitment to rehabilitation and an ability to abide by court‑imposed restrictions.
70While sentencing ranges for fentanyl trafficking cases have yet to be well-defined, what is clear is that a conditional sentence for a fentanyl trafficking conviction is the exception: R. v. Grant, 2021 ONCJ 507; R v. Gordon, 2023 ONCJ 157; R v. Williams, 2023 ONCJ 259. Conditional sentences are the exception in fentanyl cases because they have been imposed in rare circumstances in which the paramount objectives of deterrence and denunciation can be achieved through the imposition of a conditional sentence. As the Ontario Court of Appeal noted in R v. Fabbro, 2021 ONCA 494 at para. 27, these are the exceptional cases where “a conditional sentence recognizes the seriousness of the offences while at the same time acknowledging and promoting the significant strides in rehabilitation that the [offender] has made.…[and where] [i]mposing a custodial sentence was likely to have a serious negative effect on the [offender’s] progress and would not serve the genuine societal interest.”
71In my view, a conditional sentence of two years less a day, followed by three years of probation, with restrictions, would place Ms. Augustyniak under strict supervision for more than five years, taking into account the time she has spent on bail.
72In addition, the proposed conditions—15 months of house arrest and a curfew for the balance of the sentence—would impose further significant constraints on her liberty. These conditions substantially limit her movements, daily activities, and autonomy. In the court’s view, they meaningfully address the principles of deterrence and denunciation, and their impact should not be underestimated. A lengthy period of house arrest and curfew represents a serious and tangible deprivation of liberty, one that is felt continuously and that carries real consequences for non‑compliance.
73A conditional sentence served in the community would allow Ms. Augustyniak to remain present in her children’s lives while subject to substantial restrictions, enabling her to focus on their best interests and to provide them with stability and opportunities for a childhood markedly different from her own.
74The court further observes that the circumstances of both the offence and the offender are uniquely different from those that typically inform the established sentencing range of four to six years relied on by the Crown. While the quantity of fentanyl seized in this case and the use of a stolen vehicle are factors with significant adverse impacts on the community, the mitigating factors distinguish Ms. Augustyniak from the more sophisticated and entrenched traffickers whose conduct anchors that range.
Sentence
75For the foregoing reasons, I assess the appropriate sentence for Ms. Augustyniak as follows:
Conditional Sentence
a. On count 1, a global sentence of two years less a day, a conditional sentence to be served in the community, followed by three years of probation.
b. For the first 15 months of the sentence, Ms. Augustyniak will be subject to house arrest every day, with the exception that she may be absent from her residence to:
i. go to and from, and while attending at, employment pursuant to a schedule to be provided in advance to her conditional sentence supervisor
ii. to go to and from, and while attending at, any further academic or vocational education or training, with details of such educational or training program to be provided in advance to the conditional sentence supervisor
iii. to perform community service as directed by the conditional sentence supervisor
iv. to attend counselling as may be directed by your conditional sentence supervisor
v. to travel to and from court as required
vi. to attend to the necessaries of life for a period of four hours per week on a date and time to be agreed upon with the conditional sentence supervisor
vii. to attend emergency medical or dental care for herself, her immediate family, and to attend routine medical or dental appointments, scheduled in advance, and provided to the conditional sentence supervisor
viii. for any other specific reason approved in advance in writing by the conditional sentence supervisor.
c. For the last nine months of her sentence, Ms. Augustyniak shall be subject to a curfew from 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. with the following exceptions:
i. medical emergencies involving her or her immediate family
ii. while commuting to and from work, or during work or attending educational programs or training, and
iii. with the prior written approval of her conditional sentence supervisor, and such permission to be carried with her at all times.
d. For the three-year term of probation, she is to obey all of the conditions set out below:
i. report in person to a probation officer within two working days of the expiry of the conditional sentence order and after that, at all times and places as directed by the probation officer or any person authorized by a probation officer to assist in your supervision
ii. keep the peace and be of good behaviour
iii. appear before the court when required to do so by the court
iv. notify the court or the probation officer in advance of any change of name or address and promptly notify the court or the probation officer of any change in employment or occupation
v. attend and actively participate in all assessments, counselling or programs as directed by the probation officer and complete them to the satisfaction of the probation officer
vi. sign any release of information forms as will enable her probation officer to monitor her attendance and completion of any assessments, counselling or programs as directed
vii. provide proof of attendance and completion of any assessments, counselling or programs as directed.
e. On the conviction of possession of proceeds of crime in a value exceeding $5,000: 90 days’ conditional sentence served concurrently.
f. On the conviction of possession of property obtained by crime: 90 days’ conditional sentence served concurrently.
g. On the conviction of obstructing a peace officer, a 30-day conditional sentence to be served concurrently.
76In addition, I make the following ancillary orders:
(i) a 10-year weapons prohibition order under s. 109(a) of the Criminal Code
(i) a DNA Order
(ii) forfeiture of the $5,885, digital scale and Samsung phone.
77The victim fine surcharge is waived.
Justice L.E. Standryk
Released: March 31, 2026
CITATION: R. v. Augustyniak, 2026 ONSC 1911
COURT FILE NO.: CR-24-00000605-0000
DATE: 2026-03-31
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
His Majesty the King
– and –
Elizabeth Augustyniak
REASONS FOR SENTENCE
Justice L.E. Standryk
Released: March 31, 2026