COURT FILE NO.: FC-23-00000715-0000
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: Preston Reid, Applicant
AND:
Sarah Reid, Respondent
BEFORE: The Honourable Madam Justice T. Law
COUNSEL: Applicant, Self-Represnted
Charanjit Gill Counsel, for the Respondent
HEARD: March 27, 2026
ENDORSEMENT
1This is a motion brought by the Applicant, Mr. Reid, for an order that I recuse myself on this matter, including not presiding on any further steps due to a reasonable apprehension of bias. The Respondent opposes this request.
2In addition, the Applicant requested today that the settlement conference, scheduled for April 9, 2026 be adjourned because he has not been able to comply with my order to produce a financial statement 30 days in advance of the conference date and says that he will be unable to complete the documents necessary for the conference. The Respondent wishes to have a productive conference and so agrees to this adjournment request.
Brief Background
3On August 29, 2025, I heard a motion brought by the Respondent for exclusive possession of the matrimonial home, and sole carriage and control of its sale. The Applicant did not file a formal cross-motion. However, in his affidavit, he also sought the same relief for himself plus occupation rent. Despite the deficiency in the Applicant’s motion materials, I allowed him to proceed with his request. On September 2, 2025, I released my decision on the motion, ultimately ruling against the Applicant and granting the Respondent the relief she sought.
4On December 8, 2025, a to be spoken to appearance was scheduled before me. The purpose of that appearance was for me to receive an update on the progress of the sale of the home. On that date, I was told that the matrimonial home had not yet sold and, as a result, the Applicant wished to revive his motion for occupation rent. A date was set for the argument of the motion and deadlines ordered. A settlement conference date before me was also set for April 9, 2026. At no time during the December 8, 2025 motion did the Applicant raise the issue of reasonable apprehension of bias.
5The Applicant’s follow-up motion for occupation rent ultimately did not go ahead. Instead, seven months after the initial motion was heard and two weeks before the scheduled settlement conference, the Applicant brings this motion for my recusal.
6The Applicant Reid argues that he apprehended bias as a result of certain statements I made during the motion on August 29, 2025 and in my subsequent decision on that motion. He says he did not bring the follow-up occupation rent motion because he felt I was biased against him. He says he feels that he will not receive a fair opinion at the settlement conference based on the statements I made at the motion and in my decision.
7He alleges that the following statements made by me during the motion support a reasonable apprehension of bias:
a. I said to his lawyer, “Really? Because this is like a question that I think would have been rather obvious. I’d like to know how much equity is in the house.”
b. When he raised his hand to clarify information to assist his lawyer, I stated “Mr. Reid, if you keep doing that, I’m going to, I’m going to put you in the waiting room. Do not raise your hand. It is causing the screen to flicker. It is very annoying, and it’s distracting from your lawyer’s presentation of this case, which is of detriment to yourself. If you have something that you want to say, I’m sure you can text your lawyer.”
c. When he insisted on clarifying, I said “Mr. Reid, you are not permitted to give unsworn evidence from the table, so hearing from you is really not going to be helpful because I’m not going to take it into any account. It has to be sworn evidence.”
d. I did not allow him to speak even though his agent lawyer told the court she was “newly retained as agent counsel”.
8He further alleges that the following findings made by me in my decision on the motion suggest a reasonable apprehension of bias:
a. I attributed blame and negative characterizations to him and expressed a lack of faith in his compliance and credibility.
b. I found that his “conduct and behaviour has largely contributed to a dysfunctional sale process.”
c. I attributed the delay in the sale to his conduct, including his refusal to reduce the price, refusal to pay for renovations, threats to realtor, and misrepresentation of court orders.
d. I said that “the court has no faith that the Applicant would comply with terms of a court order if he is given control over the sale of the matrimonial home”.
e. I ordered him to pay $7,000 in costs, finding that the Respondent was “entirely successful” and the motion “largely precipitated” by his behaviour.
f. I found that he had a “lack of insight” into the negative impact of his actions on his daughter.
g. I stated that “the evidence as a whole paints a picture of the Applicant being more concerned about being ‘right’ than with complying with professional advice that would lead to an expeditious sale of the property.”
h. I stated that his “failure to follow clear court orders and his misrepresentation of court orders are troubling.”
i. I stated that his financial hardship claims were assertions.
j. I expressed serious concerns about his judgment and stability given his uninvited attendance at the jointly owned matrimonial home and the manner in which it was manufactured.
k. I described an email he sent to the Respondent’s lawyer as being “bizarre.”
9I note that at no time did the Applicant appeal my decision.
Analysis on the Recusal motion
10Reasonable apprehension of bias has been discussed in many appellate cases including Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada, 2003 SCC 45 and R. v. S. (R.D.), 1997 324 (SCC).
11In McMurter v. McMurter, 2020 ONCA 772 at para. 26, the court succinctly set out the test as follows:
26Judges are presumed to be impartial and the test for apprehension of bias establishes a high threshold. It requires that any apprehension of bias be a reasonable one, held by reasonable and right-minded persons. It asks “what would an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically – and having thought the matter through – conclude. Would he think that it is more likely than not that [the decision-maker], whether consciously or unconsciously, would not decide fairly”: R. v. S. (R.D.), 1997 324 (SCC), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 484, 151 D.L.R. (4th) 193, at para. 31.
12In Ontario (Director, Family Responsibility Office) v Samra, 2008 ONCJ 465, Katarynych J. set out some additional principles relating to recusal motions:
a. Bias denotes a state of mind or attitude that is in some ways predisposed to a particular result or that is closed to a particular issue.
b. The grounds advanced for this apprehension must be substantial. The test is not related to the “very sensitive or scrupulous conscience”.
c. The applicant’s task is to show wrongful or inappropriate declarations showing a state of mind that sways judgment – a predisposition that is so great that the judge is not open to persuasion upon presentation of new evidence or new arguments.
d. The onus of demonstrating real or perceived bias lies with the person who is alleging its existence.
e. The belief of the applicant and his counsel that the Applicant would not receive a fair hearing before a particular judge is not the standard against which apprehension of bias is measured.
f. If the applicant is to succeed, the evidence in the motion must rise above the imaginary or conjectural sentiments of the applicant and demonstrate real likelihood or probability of bias.
g. The presumption of judicial impartiality will only be displaced with cogent evidence that something a judge has done gives rise to actual bias or a reasonable apprehension of bias.
h. The specific complaints raised by the applicant in support of his recusal motion are to be construed in light of the entire proceedings. Regard must be had to the cumulative effect of all of the relevant factors.
13Stern words from, or impatience or anger on behalf of the judge is not enough to establish bias: See Kingdon v. Kramer, 2015 ONSC 397 at para. 10(k).
14In this case, the reasonable person, properly informed and acting reasonably, would conclude that there was no reasonable apprehension of bias.
15Specifically, it is clear when reading the transcripts in its entirety, that none of my statements taken individually or together suggest a reasonable apprehension of bias.
16With respect to the Applicant’s allegation that my refusal to permit him to clarify information his limited-scope lawyer struggled to provide revealed bias, I note that there is no rule of evidence or of this court that permits any person to provide unsworn evidence to this court on motion. Similarly, there is no rule of evidence or of this court that would allow two people to make submissions at the same time. To permit the Applicant to provide unsworn evidence, and essentially “tag team” with his limited-scope lawyer would be in contravention of the rules of court and evidence and arguably unfair to the Respondent. I note that I had already granted the Applicant an indulgence at the beginning of the motion by accepting his affidavit, despite the fact that it was not in compliance with the Family Law Rules. I fail to see how holding the Applicant to the rules of court and the rules of evidence reveal an apprehension of bias to a reasonable person, properly informed and acting reasonably.
17In addition, it is the responsibility of counsel, pursuant to the Rules of Professional Conduct, to perform all legal services to the standard of a competent lawyer. The commentary to Rule 3.1-2 of the Rules of Professional Conduct clearly states that prior to accepting a case under a limited scope retainer, the lawyer must assess whether he or she can render those services in a competent manner. The fact that the Applicant’s lawyer is providing limited scope assistance does not exempt that lawyer from a duty to provide competent representation. I therefore fail to see how a reasonable person, properly informed and acting reasonably, would conclude that expecting the Applicant’s lawyer to be able to answer a relevant question on the motion, namely the amount of equity in the home, demonstrates bias.
18Finally, any admonishment to the Applicant to not raise his hand while on zoom was done because I had deemed it important for me not to be distracted from the submissions being made by his lawyer. Had I had a closed mind or attitude, I certainly would not have intervened when the Applicant’s behaviour was distracting to my ability to properly listen to his lawyer’s argument. A reasonable person, properly informed and acting reasonably, would not conclude that I was biased when I made this request.
19With respect to the statements I made in my written decision on the August 29, 2025 motion, I note that the Applicant did not appeal any of my orders or findings. As a motion judge, I was entitled to evaluate the evidence and draw conclusions based on the evidence.
20In addition, I note that again, the Applicant has misrepresented my statements out of context of the rest of my decision. When my decision is read as a whole, it is clear that I specifically justified my various negative findings about the Applicant with evidence. For example, when I stated that “the Applicant’s conduct and behaviour largely contributed to a dysfunctional sale process”, I specifically noted that I made that finding based on five separate incidences found in the evidence. When I stated that “the court has no faith that the Applicant would comply with terms of a court order if he is given control over the sale of the matrimonial home”, I did so on the basis of my finding that the Applicant had clearly misrepresented court orders. When I stated that his financial hardship claims were “assertions”, I did so on the basis of the Applicant’s failure to provide any evidence on point, including failing to provide an updated financial statement, failing to providing specifics about his current expenses, and failing to explain why he could not obtain cheaper rental accommodations. If the Applicant did not agree with those findings, he could have appealed the order. He did not do so.
21The Applicant is clearly unhappy about the negative findings I made about his behaviour and the costs award. This is his prerogative; however, his personal unhappiness does not mean that a reasonable person, properly informed and acting reasonably, would apprehend bias. Again, this court does not sit in appeal of itself. If the Applicant is dissatisfied with the orders made, he is always free to appeal.
22The Applicant’s motion is dismissed.
23The Respondent is entitled to costs of the motion. Her request for the payment of $3,000 in costs is entirely reasonable.
Other Issues
24Financial disclosure is apparently still outstanding. The Respondent had served a request for information on the Applicant which has not been responded to.
25The Applicant has not filed an updated financial statement since he started these proceedings. This is unacceptable.
Orders
26The Applicant’s motion is dismissed.
27The Applicant shall pay to the Respondent $3,000 in costs within 30 days.
28The settlement conference scheduled for April 9, 2026 at noon is vacated.
29The settlement conference shall be adjourned to July 9, 2026 at 2:30 pm, in person. Parties are to file financial statements 30 days in advance of the conference. Both parties are to file settlement conference briefs pursuant to the Rules. The settlement conference briefs shall include net family property statements and offers to settle.
30The Applicant shall respond to the Respondent’s Request for Information served on February 11, 2026. If he does not do so by April 30, 2026, the Respondent may bring a motion to strike his pleadings.
Justice T. Law
Date: March 30, 2026