Court File and Parties
Court File No.: CV-20-84853 Date: 2026-03-25 Superior Court of Justice - Ontario
Re: Mari France Ladouceur, Plaintiff
And: Alain Dupuis, His Majesty the King in Right of Ontario, Constable Pierre Leo Bourgeois, Constable Miquel Clement, Sargeant Eric Mueller Constable C. Leblanc, Defendants
Before: C. MacLeod RSJ
Counsel: Jeffrey Langevin, for the Plaintiff (Responding Party) Michael J. Sims, for HMK and police defendants (Moving Parties) Russel A. Molot, for defendant Dupuis (Moving Party)
Heard: March 16, 2026
Endorsement
[1] This is a motion for summary judgment by the defendants. There is a motion by the Crown and the police defendants and a parallel motion by the defendant Dupuis. In both cases, the defendants contend that it is impossible for the plaintiff to succeed in her claims against them and the court is asked to dismiss the action pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
[2] The action concerns the arrest and prosecution of the plaintiff for assault during the early stages of a family law dispute. In her amended statement of claim, the plaintiff claims damages for "malicious prosecution", "intentional infliction of mental suffering", "negligent investigation", "false arrest", "false imprisonment" and/or "violation of the Plaintiff's section 9 Charter rights". She also claims reimbursement for the cost of defending the criminal proceedings and the costs of this action.
[3] As set out below, I have concluded that the defendants are correct, and I am dismissing the action. The available evidence does not support findings of negligence or misconduct on the part of the O.P.P. officers. Nor is there a sufficient basis in fact to impose liability on the plaintiff's ex-husband.
Background
[4] Briefly, the facts are as follows. The plaintiff and the defendant Dupuis were married in April of 2008 after a period of cohabitation. There are two children of the marriage. The parties separated in May of 2017.
[5] In July of 2018 the plaintiff began divorce proceedings seeking a range of corollary relief. The parties acknowledge that the separation and divorce were high conflict although they were ultimately able to enter into a comprehensive settlement. There was a final order disposing of all of the corollary relief proceedings in October of 2021 and an uncontested divorce order was issued in August of 2022. (L'Orignal court file no. FC-18-148)
[6] In August of 2018, early on in the divorce proceeding, there was an incident at the former matrimonial home in Embrun. At the time the parties had agreed to a parenting schedule and the defendant was residing in the home. There was a dispute in relation to the time when the plaintiff was to be allowed to pick up the children and both parties called the police. Based on information provided by the defendant, the police then arrested the plaintiff and charged her with assault. Subsequently, she was also charged with assaulting one of the children. At the time the police took statements from the defendant, his girlfriend and both children.
[7] According to the evidence before me, the criminal charges were resolved after negotiations between the plaintiff's criminal counsel and the Crown and with the consent of the complainant (the defendant, Dupuis). The Crown had agreed that upon completion of three parenting courses offered by Valoris for Children and Adults of Prescott-Russell (Valoris), the Crown would withdraw the charges. The charges were formally withdrawn before D'Amours J. of the Ontario Court of Justice on July 31, 2019.[^1]
[8] On October 30, 2020, the plaintiff launched this action. She sues her ex-husband who was the complainant, the O.P.P. officers who were involved in her arrest and the Crown in right of Ontario which is statutorily liable for acts or omissions of members of the O.P.P. committed in the course of their employment.[^2] For reasons that are not apparent, this action was not resolved when the parties resolved the family law proceedings in 2021 and 2022. Neither party argued that the order disposing of the divorce proceeding had any significance for this motion.
Summary Judgment
[9] Summary judgment is a process of determining all or some of the issues in a case without a full trial. It is important for a justice system to provide a number of options to achieve a just result and for trials to be reserved for those cases in which there are genuine issues of fact or law that can only fairly be determined with the full forensic mechanisms of a traditional trial. Summary judgment is appropriate where a trial would serve no purposes. In Ontario the applicable rule is Rule 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.[^3]
[10] The Supreme Court of Canada has endorsed robust application of the rule because a full blown trial is time consuming and expensive and entirely unnecessary where the issues can be fairly, proportionately and justly determined using the process outlined in Rule 20.[^4] The rule now includes expanded fact finding powers but it is not always necessary to use those powers.
[11] There are actually several roads to summary judgment depending on who brings the motion, the nature of the case and the basis on which summary judgment is sought. While some types of summary judgment are complex, there is a very simple route for a defendant in cases where the cause of action requires specific elements of proof. In those cases, a defendant can obtain summary judgment simply by demonstrating that the plaintiff lacks an essential element of proof or that the facts which the plaintiff can prove can never in law entitle the plaintiff to succeed.[^5] In those instances, the rule requires that summary judgment be granted and the case brought to a conclusion. There can be no genuine issue requiring a trial if there is no genuine issue at all.
[12] In this case it is the defendants who bring the motion. The critical parts of the rule bear repeating. They read as follows:
To Defendant
20.01 (3) A defendant may, after delivering a statement of defence, move with supporting affidavit material or other evidence for summary judgment dismissing all or part of the claim in the statement of claim.
Evidence on Motion
20.02 (1) An affidavit for use on a motion for summary judgment may be made on information and belief as provided in subrule 39.01 (4), but, on the hearing of the motion, the court may, if appropriate, draw an adverse inference from the failure of a party to provide the evidence of any person having personal knowledge of contested facts.
20.02 (2) In response to affidavit material or other evidence supporting a motion for summary judgment, a responding party may not rest solely on the allegations or denials in the party's pleadings, but must set out, in affidavit material or other evidence, specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue requiring a trial.
20.04 (2) The court shall grant summary judgment if,
(a) the court is satisfied that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial with respect to a claim or defence …
[13] In most basic terms, where a defendant moves for summary judgment, and meets the onus of bringing the case within the rule, the plaintiff must put its "best foot forwards" to demonstrate that the plaintiff has the evidence necessary to succeed at trial. If the plaintiff lacks necessary evidence or if the law renders success impossible on the available evidence, there will be no "genuine issue" and no need for a trial. No trial will be required if the evidence fails to show any reasonable prospect of success and in that case summary judgment must be granted.[^6]
[14] The question on this motion is whether or not this is such a case. If, as the defendants submit, this is the kind of case with strict evidentiary prerequisites, then the action cannot survive if those prerequisites are missing. On the other hand, since the plaintiff is not asking for summary judgment herself, the plaintiff need not show that she will win at trial but only that it is possible.
[15] Possible, that is, on the evidence that is available and not on evidence that might be available if the plaintiff is given more time. There are circumstances in which summary judgment might be premature and unfair if the defendant is withholding critical evidence but those cases are rare.[^7] In most cases where parties are required to put their best foot forwards, the court is "entitled to proceed on the basis that the parties have put into the record all of the evidence that would be forthcoming at trial."[^8]
Analysis
[16] Citizens have a right of action against the police and the Crown if they have been maliciously prosecuted for a crime of which they are innocent. The police may also be liable for negligent investigation where they have pursued a particular line of investigation carelessly and recklessly and their conduct falls below the conduct of a reasonable and responsible investigation.
[17] To succeed in either of these kinds of claims, the plaintiff must show that laying charges and proceeding with a prosecution were unreasonable steps under the circumstances. Malicious prosecution or Charter breach cases also require proof that the defendant acted out of malice or for an improper purpose. Negligent investigation cases require proof that the investigation fell below the standard of care of a reasonable police officer. In either case, however, it is a threshold requirement that the criminal proceeding must have terminated in favour of the plaintiff.[^9]
[18] In the case at bar, the assault charge was not withdrawn because there was no prospect of conviction. Rather, it was a negotiated resolution in which the Crown agreed to withdraw the charges upon the plaintiff completing certain parenting courses. As noted above, the defendant Dupuis supported that decision as no one believed it was in the public interest to continue with the prosecution or to saddle the plaintiff with a criminal record. In essence this was a diversion agreement.
[19] There are circumstances in which a plea agreement or diversion agreement could be found to have been a resolution in favour of the plaintiff but none of those factors are present in this case.[^10] The evidence does not support a finding that there was no basis for the charges or that the plaintiff could not have been convicted. In this case, the agreement is not a termination in favour of the plaintiff or an admission by the Crown that there was no basis for the charges.
[20] To the contrary, the evidence before the court demonstrates that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to lay the charges. With the statements from the complainant and the other witnesses, it was not unreasonable for the Crown to prosecute the plaintiff. Given the minor nature of the assaults ( a push and a slap) and the absence of a criminal record, the resolution was eminently reasonable. It was a resolution without admission of guilt but it does not meet the test for a resolution in favour of the plaintiff.
[21] If I am in error on that threshold finding, summary judgment in favour of the police and Crown defendants is still appropriate. There is simply no evidence of malice on the part of the police or the prosecutor. The plaintiff has no evidence that there were standards of investigation that were breached. The mere fact that the police acted on information from the defendant Dupuis is insufficient to demonstrate that the police were at fault.
[22] It follows that there will be summary judgment dismissing the action against the police and the Crown.
The claim against Dupuis
[23] The claim against Mr. Dupuis requires a somewhat different analysis. In the first place, Mr. Dupuis cannot be liable for Charter breach because the Charter only applies to government actors. Similarly, he cannot be liable for false arrest or negligent investigation.
[24] Mr. Dupuis could in theory be liable for malicious prosecution or intentional infliction of mental distress even if the police and government actors were blameless. It would be necessary for the plaintiff to show that the defendant purposely lied to the police with the intention of having her arrested and prosecuted and to cause her mental distress. These are her allegations but there is insufficient evidence to withstand the motion for summary judgment.
[25] Firstly, the evidence does not support a finding that the defendant tried to have the plaintiff charged with assault. It appears the police took statements from the defendant and from other witnesses. The main purpose of those statements was to investigate the domestic disturbance and the legal status of the parenting arrangements. Recall that both parties had called the police.
[26] In the course of that investigation, the police formed the view that an assault had occurred and that charges should be laid. That was not a choice made by the defendant. He did not initiate the prosecution and he certainly did not investigate it.
[27] The plaintiff asserts that the defendant lied to the police. The defendant denies that and there is no conclusive evidence to show that he did so. While the question of whether an assault did or did not occur could be a genuine issue requiring a trial, that is not the only issue the plaintiff would have to prove to succeed in this claim. It is exceptionally difficult to succeed against an individual complainant for malicious prosecution.[^11] The plaintiff must also deal with the fact that the criminal case was not clearly resolved in her favour which remains an important question to avoid relitigating the same issue endlessly or mounting a collateral attack against the outcome of the criminal process.[^12]
[28] In addition to asserting that the plaintiff deliberately lied to the police about an assault, the plaintiff alleges malice on the part of the defendant. She alleges that the objective of having her wrongfully charged was to gain an advantage in the matrimonial litigation. There is no evidence to support the assertion that this is the case. The parties had already agreed to share parenting time at the time of the events in question. The dispute which resulted in calling the police was about when, not if, the children would be picked up by the plaintiff. As mentioned above, the ultimate resolution in the family dispute was an equal parenting regime. Presumably both parents and the court accepted that was in the best interests of the children. There is nothing to indicate that the assault charges were used to manipulate the outcome of the divorce proceeding.
[29] As pointed out by counsel for the defendant, there is no evidence the defendant urged the prosecution of the criminal case just to cause mental anguish. More importantly, the plaintiff has no evidence that she suffered mental anguish requiring medical treatment.[^13]
[30] In summary, the evidence before the court does not establish that the defendant Dupuis lied about the circumstances giving rise to the charges laid against the plaintiff. But even if I accepted that the determination of that issue is a credibility question that can only be resolved at trial, the trial would serve no purpose.
[31] Lying or exaggerating to the police is not enough to establish liability for the torts asserted against Mr. Dupuis. On the assumption that the plaintiff has put her best foot forwards in response to this motion, as she is obliged to do, she lacks the elements of proof that would be necessary to establish liability.
[32] I conclude that summary judgment should be granted dismissing the action against the defendant Dupuis.
Conclusion
[33] In conclusion, the motions for summary judgment will be granted. The action is dismissed against all defendants.
[34] I did not hear submissions on costs. I invite the parties to resolve that issue but if there is no agreement within 30 days then counsel may contact my office for a date to make costs submissions.
Justice C. MacLeod
Date: March 25, 2026
[^1]: It is worth noting that in the consent final order in the divorce proceedings, in 2021 both parties acknowledged the high conflict nature of their separation and its impact on the children. They were both required to complete classes on high conflict separation, parenting adolescents and helping anxious children.
[^2]: S. 63 of the Community Safety and Policing Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 1, Sched. 1
[^3]: R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, as amended
[^4]: Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 87 see in particular paras 4 - 5
[^5]: Wong v. Toronto Police Services Board, 2009 CanLII 66385 (ON SC)
[^6]: Hryniak, supra @ para. 68
[^7]: See The Bank of Nova Scotia v. 1736223 Ontario Limited, 2018 ONSC 4449 @ para. 40
[^8]: Switzer v. Petrie, 2024 ONCA 474 @ para. 8
[^9]: Romanic v. Johnson, 2013 ONCA 23
[^10]: Mammoliti v. Niagara Regional Police Service, 2007 ONCA 79 at para. 39
[^11]: Bullock v. Doe, 2025 ONSC 947 and D'Addario v. Smith, 2018 ONCA 163
[^12]: Gottlieb v. Stikeman Elliott LLP, 2007 CanLII 49871 (ON SC)