Court File and Parties
Court File No.: CV-24-722245 Date: March 25, 2026
Superior Court of Justice - Ontario
Re: Simone Stewart, Karie Stewart, K.S., a minor, and C.S., a minor, as represented by their litigation guardians, Simone Stewart and Karie Stewart v. The Ontario Conference of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, Crawford Adventist Academy, Lauren Chichester, Reynold Hazelwood, Kevin Benta, Sefton Dale Brown and Beverley Mae Solijon;
Before: Associate Justice C. Wiebe
Counsel: Vitali Luchko for The Ontario Conference of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, Crawford Adventist Academy, Lauren Chichester, Reynold Hazelwood, Kevin Benta, Sefton Dale Brown and Beverley Mae Solijon (together "the Defendants");
Frances A. Marinic for Simone Steward, Karie Stewart, K.S., a minor, and C.S., a minor, as represented by their litigation guardians, Simone Stewart and Karie Stewart (together "the Plaintiffs");
Heard: March 24, 2026.
Reasons for Decision
[1] On March 24, 2025 I heard a motion by the Defendants for an order requiring that the Plaintiffs post security for the Defendants' costs in the amount of $116,380.50. I read the material in advance, heard argument on March 24, 2025 and on March 24, 2025 rendered an oral ruling with written reasons to follow. I also reviewed the filed costs outlines, heard argument as to the costs of the motion and rendered an oral decision on costs with written reasons to follow. These are those reasons in brief.
[2] The underlying action is a claim by the Plaintiffs for damages due to alleged negligence and breaches of fiduciary duty concerning an incident at the Crawford Adventist Academy, a school owned and operated by the Ontario Conference of the Seventh-day Adventist Church. This school has a dress code that includes a requirement that dresses worn by girls to school must be at least knee-length.
[3] On March 8, 2024, two girls, K.S. and A.A., were followed into a room by teachers, Sefton Dale Brown and Beverley Mae Solijon. In this room the two girls were questioned about the undisputed fact that their dresses were at the time above their knees. A.A. was more compliant and eventually showed the teachers that she had pulled up her dress. K.S. was more resistant. Events concerning K.S. included a test Mr. Brown instituted whereby K.S. bent down to pick up a piece of paper in front of A.A. to see whether this exposed K.S. It did not. When K.S. eventually relented and showed how her dress had been pulled up using a belt, the teachers got her to undo the belt and pull her dress down. At this point Ms. Solijon tugged at the dress to make sure it was secure. Ms. Solijon stood in front of the door throughout. The girls were let go with a warning.
[4] Here is a brief summary of what then happened. K.S. said she was the victim of sexual harassment and intimidation and that she suffered mental trauma. Her parents communicated with school staff demanding a meeting and an investigation. The school investigated. A.A. provided a written statement. The school provided some accommodation such as home-schooling for several weeks and offered to pay for some counseling. The Plaintiffs allege there was then retaliation by the school and bullying by other students and parents. The Plaintiffs involved their lawyer. The police commenced an investigation. Mr. Brown was put on administrative leave during that time. The police closed their investigation without laying charges. Mr. Brown returned.
[5] The Plaintiffs commenced this action on June 17, 2024. It was defended on August 19, 2024. Nothing else has happened in this action. On January 16, 2025 the Defendants' lawyer began correspondence seeking disclosure of the Plaintiffs' residence and assets. The Plaintiffs disclosed their residence (ie. Alberta) but not their assets. This all eventually led to this motion that was scheduled in late 2025.
[6] The Defendants relied upon two provisions of Rule 56.01(1) for this motion: Rule 56.01(1)(a) which provides that the court may make an order for security for costs that is "just" where the plaintiff is ordinarily resident outside Ontario; Rule 56.01(1)(e) which provides that the court may make an order for security for costs that is "just" where there is "good reason to believe" that the plaintiff's claim is frivolous and vexatious and the plaintiff has insufficient assets in Ontario to pay the defendant's costs. I based my ruling on the first provision, Rule 56.01(1)(a), as the Plaintiffs openly admitted for some time that they reside in Alberta, and, indeed, that they have no assets in Ontario. Furthermore, I was not convinced that Plaintiffs' claim was so devoid of merit as to be frivolous and vexatious.
[7] But that is not the end of the exercise. As stated by Master Glustein (as he then was) in his authoritative decision in Coastline Corporation Ltd. v. Canaccord Capital Corporation, 2009 CanLII 21758 (SCJ) at paragraph 7, where the defendant has proven one of the stated grounds for the motion in Rule 56.01(1), the onus shifts to the plaintiff to prove that the order for security for costs is "unjust." The court exercises a broad discretion here. But the plaintiff generally can meet this onus in one of three ways: (a) by showing that the plaintiff has sufficient assets in Ontario or a reciprocating jurisdiction to pay the defendant's costs; (b) by showing that the plaintiff is impecunious and has a claim that is not "plainly devoid of merit" thereby forcing the court to allow the action to continue with no order for security for costs as a matter of justice; and (c) where the plaintiff cannot show that it is impecunious but does not have sufficient assets to pay the defendant's costs, by showing that the plaintiff's claim meets a "high threshold" as to its chances of success. In Zeitoun v. Economical Insurance Group, 2008 CanLII 20996 (ON SCDC), 91 O.R. (3d) 131 (Div.Ct.) at paragraph 50 the Divisional Court described this last test as a requirement to show "a good chance of success."
[8] I found that the Plaintiffs failed the first test as they refused to disclose any of their assets. I found that the Plaintiffs failed the second test as they openly admitted they are not impecunious. That left only the third test. This one was also difficult as, again, the Plaintiffs did not disclose their assets thereby making it impossible to determine what the Plaintiff can afford; but the defendants also did not reveal until three days before the hearing (and then not in any evidence) as to what security for costs they were seeking. Both sides lacked proper transparency. I decided as a result to focus on the issue of whether the Plaintiffs had proven that their claim has "a good chance of success." In the circumstances, if the Plaintiffs met this test, I might consider waiving security for costs given the Defendants conduct.
[9] I found that the Plaintiffs failed to meet this onus. Here are my reasons. On the issue of liability, the evidence of the two teachers, Mr. Brown and Ms. Solijon, as to what happened in the room on March 8, 2024 was corroborated by the statement of A.A. The evidence of K.S. as to what happened, on the other hand, was not corroborated. This indicates that the version that probably will be believed will be that of the teachers. This version did not clearly show conduct amounting to sexual harassment. The bending test instituted by Mr. Brown might come close; but there was no expert evidence from the Plaintiffs as to whether this conduct breached the governing standard of care, namely the standard of a reasonable and prudent parent. There was no evidence from the investigating office, Officer Benson, indicating that he thought this conduct might attract liability, as the Plaintiffs claimed. As for the other Defendants, there again was no expert or other evidence showing that what these officials and institutions did or did not do amounted to a breach of that governing standard of care. There was no corroboration for the allegations by K.S. that the school retaliated against her. There was also no credible evidence that the Defendants Chichester, Hazelwood and Benta acted outside the scope of their employment thereby attracting personal liability to the Plaintiffs. As for damages, there was no expert or other evidence that K.S. and C.S. suffered mental trauma at the level that gives rise to a right to compensation in damages. Furthermore, there is a real issue of causation as it appears that much of what may have disturbed K.S. and C.S. and their parents was the ostracization and bullying they received from other persons, not the Defendants.
[10] As a result, I found that there should be an order for security for costs in favour of the Defendants. But, using my broad discretion, I also determined that the security should not be anywhere near what the Defendants claimed given their conduct. First, they did not serve and file an affidavit sworn by the Defendants' trial counsel, Mr. Juriansz, attaching and explaining the Defendants' Proposed Bill of Costs on which they relied. The Proposed Bill of Costs was a document the Defendants filed for the first time as a part of the Compendium three days before the hearing. This was unacceptable. Second, by not showing the Plaintiffs upfront starting in January, 2025 what the Defendants were seeking in security and why, as they should have done, they gave credence to the Plaintiffs' claim that this issue appeared to be nothing more than a bullying tactic to get the Plaintiffs to stop the whole action. It showed no real desire on the part of the Defendants to resolve the issue of security for costs. Such conduct must be sanctioned. On the other hand, the Plaintiffs' steadfast and unreasonable refusal to disclose any information about their assets and what they could afford, particularly as they admitted they are not impecunious, merited an order for security for costs that was not insignificant.
[11] The Defendants' Bill of Costs appears to contemplate five days of discovery, one day for mediation and five days for trial. That was confirmed in argument by Mr. Luchko. I decided in the end to make the following order for security for costs, and I did so order:
the total security for costs must be $50,000, namely less than half of what was shown on the Defendants' Proposed Bill of Costs, and must be paid into court in stages as follows;
$10,000 must be paid into court by the Plaintiffs on or before 60 days from March 24, 2026;
$10,000 must to be paid into court by the Plaintiffs on or before 30 days from the date the examinations for discovery are scheduled; and
$30,000 must be paid into court by the Plaintiffs on or before 30 days from the date the action is set down for trial.
[12] Concerning the costs of the motion, both counsel filed costs outlines and a bill of costs. The Defendants costs outline showed $15,991.97 in partial indemnity costs. It showed a total of 69.7 hours of work, half of which were the hours spent by Mr. Luchko. Mr. Luchko argued that the Defendants should get $10,000 in costs given their success and the work their lawyers had to do. The Plaintiffs' bill of costs showed $5,339.25 in substantial indemnity costs. It showed a total of 21 hours spent by Ms. Marinic. She argued that the Defendants should get only $3,000 in costs given what she argued was the "power imbalance" between the parties and the Plaintiffs' ability to pay.
[13] Again, there was no evidence as to what the Plaintiffs could and could not afford. Given that reality, and the level of the Defendants' success on this motion, and the Defendants' conduct as described above, I decided that the most reasonable and fair award of costs was $5,000 in partial indemnity costs to be paid by the Plaintiffs to the Defendants in 30 days from March 24, 2026. That is what I ordered.
DATE: March 25, 2026
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE C. WIEBE