CITATION: Naboulsi v. Naboulsi, 2026 ONSC 178
MOTION HEARD: 2026-01-08
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: Chadi Naboulsi, Applicant
- And –
Amanda Marie Naboulsi, Respondent
BEFORE: Associate Justice Kamal
COUNSEL: Aylin Berberian, for the Applicant
Shahrzad Lari, for the Respondent
REASONS FOR DECISION
DETERMINATION OF URGENCY – NOT URGENT
When a parent experiences a mental health episode, it does not automatically mean there is emergency that requires the Court’s urgent intervention. This is especially true when the parent acted appropriately during the mental health episode, has stabilized now and developed an appropriate safety plan with her support network.
The Respondent brings a motion to return the child because the Applicant has been withholding the child since she experienced a mental health episode in the Fall of 2025. There is an existing interim order from 2017 that sets out parenting time. That order continues to be in effect. Therefore, the Respondent’s motion essentially asks that the existing order continue to be in effect.
The Applicant brings a cross-motion for an urgent motion to vary the interim order. The Applicant seeks sole decision-making responsibility and supervised parenting time for the Respondent.
This court attendance was only to determine whether these motions should be heard on an urgent basis.
Background:
The Applicant is the father of the child.
The Respondent is the mother of the child.
The parties married in January 2016 after the Respondent became pregnant with the child. They separated in or around May 2017 when the child was less than one year old.
Since the parties’ separation, the child has primarily resided with the Respondent and her mother, Kimberly Duggan. The Respondent is a stay-at-home mother, and the child’s maternal grandmother has always been deeply involved in the child’s life.
From 2017 to 2019, the Applicant had supervised access with the child at his parents' home.
From 2019 onward, the established parenting regime has been that the child lives with the Respondent during the weekdays. The child has parenting time with the Applicant on the weekends.
Mental Health Incident and Resolution
In the summer of 2025, the Respondent began experiencing paranoia and anxiety.
In the Fall of 2025, the Respondent was experiencing a mental health crisis. The child’s maternal grandmother contacted the Mobile Crisis Team, who took the Respondent to the hospital for a mental health assessment.
While at the hospital, the Respondent contacted the Applicant to pick up the child so that the child could stay with him, as the Respondent believed the child would be better off with his father during that time.
The Respondent was hospitalized for approximately five days and was released on or around October 1, 2025.
The Children's Aid Society of Ottawa (CAS) became involved in October and closed their file in November.
During that time, the Respondent was hospitalized for a second time. During the second stay at the hospital, the doctor identified concerns relating to the Respondent’s medication and made adjustments.
The Respondent has been following the doctor’s recommendation since then. The Respondent has not experienced recurrence of paranoia or anxiety.
On November 11, 2025, the CAS closed the file they had opened after the October incident. In the closing letter, the CAS specifically stated that they do not take a position regarding parenting issues.
However, despite the stability in the Respondent’s mental health, the Applicant takes the position that the child should not be returned to the Respondent. The Respondent has not seen the child since October 5, 2025.
The Positions of the Parties
- The Respondent’s position is that the motion is urgent for the following reasons:
a. The Respondent has not seen the child since October 5, 2025.
b. The Respondent and her mother have been caregivers to the child
c. While the Respondent had a mental health issue, she sought help and is now stable.
d. The maternal grandmother has been supportive and acted appropriately with respect to the child. Furthermore, the maternal grandmother has recently retired, which adds more safety and stability for the child.
e. The Children’s Aid Society takes no position on parenting issues
f. The Respondent submits that the Applicant has engaged in self-help remedies and is attempting to establish a new status quo.
- The Applicant’s position is that the motion is urgent for the following reasons:
a. The Applicant experienced mental health concerns and was hospitalized twice in the fall of 2025. During that time, she called the Applicant and asked that the child be placed with the Applicant.
b. The Applicant alleges conflict between the Respondent and her mother and alleges that they do not have a stable relationship.
c. The Applicant also raises historical concerns relating to the Respondent, including her previous partner.
d. The Applicant also submits that he works full-time and can provide for the child.
Law and Analysis
In Garlow v. Lasri, 2025 ONSC 6216, Justice Pazaratz recently discussed the difference between “emergency” and “urgent” motions.
Motions that need to be heard before a case conference, pursuant to Rule 14(4.2) of the Family Law Rules, are usually referred to as “urgent motions”. The test for urgency is well known and is generally set out in Rosen v. Rosen, 2005 480 (ON SC)..
“Emergency” motions are the type of motions that require the court’s immediate attention and cannot wait for the motion to be heard in the regular que, regardless of whether a case conference has occurred.
Courts have generally held that situations of urgency or hardship contemplate issues such as abduction, threats of harm, or dire financial circumstances. See Rosen v. Rosen, 2005 480 (ON SC). This also applies to emergency motions.
In this case, a case conference occurred in 2018. A lot has happened since 2018. Therefore, I am considering this from the view of being an emergency motion, while also considering the test set out in Rosen.
The following factors are necessary to a finding of urgency , as set out in Thomas v. Wohleber, 2020 ONSC 1965:
a. The concern must be immediate; that is one that cannot await resolution at a later date;
b. The concern must be serious in the sense that it significantly affects the health or safety or economic well-being of parties and/or their children;
c. The concern must be a definite and material rather than a speculative one. It must relate to something tangible (a spouse or child’s health, welfare, or dire financial circumstances) rather than theoretical; and
d. It must be one that has been clearly particularized in evidence and examples that describes the manner in which the concern reaches the level of urgency.
These factors also apply to requests for emergency motions.
Based on the evidence before me, the test for an urgent or emergency motion has not been met.
The existing order is presumed to be in the child’s best interest, and I am not persuaded that it is appropriate to proceed with an urgent (or emergency) motion to amend the existing order.
In my view, the Respondent had a mental health crisis, and she sought help. Part of that help included having the child stay with the Applicant while she was in the hospital. The evidence before me is that the Respondent has stabilized now. A period of time where a parent is experiencing mental health concerns cannot and should not be used as a weapon. The mother should not be punished for asking for help when she was having a mental health episode. In the same way we would not punish a parent who was unable to parent because they were hospitalized for physical conditions, we should not be punishing a parent who was unable to parent because they were hospitalized for mental health conditions.
In Gerasimopoulos v. Sambirsky 2024 ONSC 2368, the Court stated that when working with parents that have mental health conditions, the Court should consider parenting plans that recognize it is in the children’s best interests to have a meaningful relationship with both parents, particularly since the parent with the mental condition is mentally healthy now, while balancing how to protect the children from future harm from a potential future episodes the parent may have. To do otherwise would mean that the Court is preventing the children from having a normalized parent-child relationship with a parent who has demonstrated he is loving, capable, willing, and attuned to their needs and interests based on the other parent’s generalized fear of the parent’s mental health condition. To make an order for supervised only parenting time for the parent with a mental health condition would mean that this Court is being swayed by a stereotype that a parent with an episodic mental health condition is unfit to parent a child on his or her own, which is problematic. See Gerasimopoulos v. Sambirsky at para. 2.
I agree with Justice Kraft when she wrote, “I do not believe the court would require supervision of a parent’s parenting time if he or she had an episodic physical health condition and this ought not to be treated differently.”
In P.P. v. A.V., 2021 ONSC 7459, Himel, J. referred to the Revised AFCC-Ontario Parenting Guide and the principles therein regarding mental illness (at page 48) as being instructive:
“Parental Substance Abuse or Mental Illness
Mental illness or substance abuse problems may adversely affect parenting if that parent is emotionally unavailable, is unable to adequately discipline and set limits, or provide a safe environment for the children. In such cases, it may be necessary to consider alternative parenting arrangements such as therapeutic intervention, supervised parenting time, or limited parenting time until the concerns have been satisfactorily addressed. Protocols may need to be put in place for ongoing or periodic monitoring and for a resumption or gradual increase in parenting time.
To the extent that parents with a mental illness or substance abuse issue are compliant with their treatment plan, or parenting is not affected, regular parenting time can be established or resumed. In many cases, it will be beneficial to proactively plan for a relapse, with provisions to address the affected parent’s responsibility to communicate the relapse and the arrangements that will be in place to ensure the children’s safety (e.g., supervisory arrangements, switch to virtual parenting time, temporary suspension of contact) while the parent takes steps to address their situation. Parents should also consider whether their children may benefit from psycho-educational programs to assist them in understanding the issue their parent is experiencing; in many situations, this may be an important element of safety planning.
Unless a parent with mental illness or substance abuse issues acknowledges their condition and its effect on parenting, it may be necessary for the courts to be involved in making a parenting plan. It should, however, also be appreciated that even if a parent has substance abuse or mental health issues, if those are properly addressed, in the long-term children will often want and benefit from a relationship with that parent.” [Emphasis added]
I agree with Justice Himel that the principles set out in the AFCC Ontario Parenting Guide are instructive for this Court.
In the case at Bar, the Respondent is compliant with her treatment plan and she has demonstrated that she acted appropriately in the past when there was a mental health episode. Regular parenting time can be resumed. Furthermore, the Respondent also put forward a safety plan that includes her mother, who has recently retired. The evidence demonstrates that the maternal grandmother has acted appropriately during the Respondent’s mental health episodes.
In Gerasimopoulos v. Sambirsky at para. 109, Justice Kraft also discussed the role of the Court is to recognize stereotypes, bias, and discrimination against marginalized groups and/or individuals when such issues present and ensure that decisions are not based on any such biases, or reliance on stereotypes. Similarly to that case, in the case at bar, the Applicant’s position on the limits needed on the Respondent’s parenting time, allegedly to protect the child, is rooted in negative stereotypes and a long-held stigma that mental health conditions and illness prevent someone from being a fit parent.
There is still a lot of stigma associated with mental health, mental illness, and addiction, despite a major effort to raise awareness and support education about these topics in society.
A parent's mental illness does not, by itself, justify limiting their parenting time or denying them decision-making authority. Like any parenting issue, the question is whether a physical or mental illness affects a parent's capacity to care for a child or puts the child at risk.
As the Court noted in Gerasimopoulos v. Sambirsky at para. 108:
If [the parent] had another lifelong episodic condition which was rooted in his physical health, such as Diabetes, Epilepsy, or chronic back pain, as opposed to Bipolar, which is rooted in his mental health, it would still be incumbent on [the parent] to manage his condition and self-report when he was unwell. If a parent looking after children, for example, went into a diabetic coma, had an epileptic seizure, or suffered a serious back spasm, he or she would be unable to look after the children without support. In any of those circumstances, children could potentially be exposed to a very scary circumstance. A Safety Plan intended to mitigate the children’s exposure to seeing their parent unwell would likely be what the Court would do to mitigate against future episodes of any of these physical health conditions for harm reduction purposes. Diabetic comas, epileptic seizures, and/or a parent being unable to move, could be very frightening but steps can be taken to help prevent these episodes, the most important one of which is to follow a treatment plan. However, I think it would be unlikely for a Court to order supervised only parenting time for a parent with chronic diabetes, epilepsy, or chronic back pain. I am not persuaded that [the parent’s] condition should be treated any differently. Bipolar, like Diabetes, Epilepsy, and chronic back pain, is a lifelong, chronic condition that is manageable, yet there are no guarantees that future episodes won’t happen. Manic episodes can be prevented if steps are taken by [the parent], the most important one being following his treatment plan.
This passage meaningfully applies to the case at bar. The Respondent in the present case is following her treatment plan and has created a safety plan. There is no reason for the Respondent’s mental health to be treated any differently than if she was dealing with a physical health issue.
The Applicant’s materials are filled with derogatory tones regarding the Respondent and her mental health. The Applicant is essentially asking this Court to deny the Respondent’s decision-making responsibility and limit her parenting time and ability to spend time with the child without someone else being present because of her mental health episodes and the future threat of an episode. This is particularly concerning for two reasons: the Respondent acted appropriately during the mental health episodes, and secondly, the Respondent’s mental health is now stable. The Respondent acted appropriately by seeking the assistance of the Applicant – this should not be weaponized. The Respondent also sought the assistance of her mother and medical professionals. The Respondent abided by the medical advice given to her. The Applicant ignores these positive aspects of the consideration for the Respondent’s mental health.
A mental health episode, the existence of a mental illness, and a mental health diagnosis does not give the other parent (or the Court) a licence to criticize and scrutinize every aspect of a parent’s life and every decision they have made.
In light of the Respondent's appropriate conduct during the mental health episode behavior, granting the Applicant's request would amount to this Court being influenced by the stigma and unfavorable preconceptions surrounding those with mental illness.
In Shipton v. Shipton, 2024 ONCA 624, the Court of Appeal made it clear that the Court should not engage in stereotypical reasoning with no basis in the record. While those comments were made with respect to a child or party’s culture, they should equally apply to stigma and stereotyping regarding mental health. Stereotyping means assuming personal traits based on presumptions about a group they are a part of. The Court must stay away from such approaches.
When the Court engages in stereotypes about mental illness in the context of parenting, it risks serious and far-reaching harm by replacing an individualized, evidence-based assessment with generalized and often inaccurate assumptions. Such stereotyping can result in inappropriate restrictions on a parent-child relationship based solely on the existence of a mental health diagnosis rather than on evidence of how the condition affects the parent’s actual caregiving abilities, daily functioning, or the child’s safety and well-being. This undermines fundamental legal principles of equality, fairness, due process, and non-discrimination, while reinforcing stigma that portrays parents with mental illness as inherently dangerous, unstable, or incapable. These assumptions may discourage parents from seeking or continuing mental health treatment out of fear that honesty or compliance will be used against them in parenting determinations.
Stereotypes can also lead to a skewed evaluation of the child’s best interests by overstating risks, ignoring protective factors, support systems, treatment success, and the parent’s demonstrated strengths, and failing to recognize that many mental health conditions are episodic, manageable, and compatible with effective parenting. The result would be that unnecessarily restrictive orders may be imposed, parent-child relationships may be disrupted, and avoidable emotional, psychological, and developmental harm to children may occur, while unjustly marginalizing parents based on disability rather than conduct or capacity.
As this court attendance was to deal with whether the motion should proceed on an urgent basis, it is important to emphasize that the Court should not allow stigma-driven urgency, particularly in relation to parenting motions.
Parents often feel that when another parent experiences a mental health episode, it is an emergency requiring an urgent/emergency motion. It is important to pause and take a moment to consider the situation from a holistic perspective. Consider whether the mental health concern was episodic and has resolved, whether treatment is now assisting, whether there is a safety plan, and whether the Court’s intervention is actually warranted.
The Court should not allow urgent family motions to proceed in a manner that stigmatizes mental health. Doing so would undermine both fairness and the best interests of the child. Framing mental health concerns as inherently dangerous, disqualifying, or indicative of parental unfitness perpetuates harmful stereotypes and discourages individuals from seeking treatment or being candid with the Court. Mental health conditions are common, treatable, and highly individualized; when they are raised urgently without proper evidentiary context, they risk being misused as tactical tools rather than assessed through objective, clinical information. Such stigma-driven urgency can lead to rushed decisions based on fear rather than facts, compromising procedural justice and potentially harming children and families. Courts should instead require careful, evidence-based consideration of mental health issues, free from stigma, to ensure decisions are grounded in reality, proportionality, and dignity.
In the face of a court order that is presumptively in the best interest of the child, it is more appropriate to proceed with the existing parenting arrangement when a parent with a mental illness is stable and has a clear safety plan in place. Mental illness alone does not determine a person’s ability to parent safely or effectively. This includes allowing the parent to have unsupervised parenting time. Many individuals successfully manage their conditions through treatment, medication, and support, and are fully capable of meeting their child’s physical and emotional needs. A safety plan provides structured safeguards, outlines warning signs, and identifies supports or steps to take if concerns arise, which helps protect the child while respecting the parent’s role. When stability is demonstrated and proactive measures are established, unsupervised parenting time supports the child’s right to maintain a meaningful relationship with both parents and promotes family stability without unnecessary restrictions.
It is appropriate to refuse to grant a request for an urgent motion when the parent is stable, and a safety plan is already in place because there is no immediate risk or emergency requiring court intervention. Urgent motions are reserved for situations involving imminent harm, serious neglect, or a sudden and material change that threatens a child’s safety. Where concerns related to mental illness are being managed, there is no evidence of instability presently, and protective measures exist, the matter does not meet the threshold of urgency. Addressing such issues through the regular court process ensures fairness, allows for a full assessment of evidence, and avoids unnecessary disruption to the child’s routine and established parenting arrangements.
It is inappropriate to bring an urgent motion in circumstances where a parent experienced a mental health episode but has now become stable because urgent relief is intended only for situations involving immediate and serious risk to a child, not speculative or managed concerns. Where a parent with a mental illness is stable, compliant with treatment, and has developed a safety plan, there is no imminent danger that would justify bypassing the ordinary court process. Bringing an urgent motion in the absence of new, time-sensitive evidence of harm misuses the Court’s emergency resources, undermines procedural fairness, and creates unnecessary disruption and anxiety for the child. Issues of this nature are more appropriately addressed through case conferences or regular motions, where the Court can fully assess the facts without the pressure and imbalance inherent in emergency proceedings.
In the context of a request for an urgent parenting motion, we all must approach mental health issues with caution, nuance, and a focus on evidence rather than assumptions, ensuring that any intervention is proportionate to the demonstrated risk to the child. The Court requires clear, current, and credible evidence showing how a parent’s mental health condition affects their parenting abilities or poses an immediate risk to the child, rather than relying on diagnosis, labels, or past episodes alone. An individualized assessment is essential, considering the parent’s present functioning, treatment compliance, stability, insight, support systems, and history of caregiving, as well as the child’s specific needs and circumstances. Given the nature of the urgent motions, orders should be limited to what is strictly necessary to address immediate safety concerns, avoiding premature or overly restrictive measures based on incomplete information.
In cases involving mental health issues and urgent parenting motions, counsel must avoid strategies that rely on stigma, fear, or generalized assumptions. They should not equate the mere presence of a mental health diagnosis (or even a mental health episode) with parental incapacity or risk, nor exaggerate symptoms, past crises, or treatment history without demonstrating a clear and current connection to parenting ability or the child’s safety. Lawyers should avoid inflammatory language, moral judgments, or speculative claims that invite the Court to act on stereotypes rather than facts. It is also important to avoid presenting outdated, incomplete, or selectively framed evidence, particularly where a parent’s condition is episodic or appropriately-managed. Counsel should refrain from seeking overly broad or punitive restrictions that exceed what is necessary to address immediate concerns.
The evidence demonstrates that the child experienced and witnesses some of the Respondent’s mental health episode. The child’s reality is that his mother lives with some mental health conditions. This is not a negative. However, the parents should consider whether the child may benefit from therapeutic support to assist him in understanding the issue his mother was experiencing and to process his own experiences in a therapeutic manner.
Furthermore, the Court does not encourage or reward self-help remedies.
Parents cannot resort to self-help remedies; ignore obligations under agreements or orders; present a fait accompli to the court on an interim basis; and expect the court to approve. That is a recipe for chaos, and disaster, and is unfair to children caught in the middle. See: Sain v Shahbazi, 2023 ONSC 5187.
Self-help is to be discouraged, and certainly not rewarded. A parent who engages in self-help tactics for strategic purposes -- despite the best interests of the child -- will generally raise serious questions about their own parenting skills and judgment. See: Southorn v. Ree, 2019 ONSC 1298 (SCJ); McPhail v. McPhail, 2018 ONSC 735 (SCJ); C.C. v. I.C., 2021 ONSC 6471 (SCJ); Rifai v. Green, 2014 ONSC 1377 (SCJ); M.H.S. v. M.R. 2021 ONCJ 665 (OCJ).
In the case at bar, it is understandable that the Applicant disobeyed the existing order while the Respondent was in the hospital because there was an implicit agreement between the parties and immediate safety planning for the child was required. However, now that the Respondent has stabilized, it is clear that the Applicant is using the Respondent’s mental health condition to leverage his position.
The evidence before me demonstrates that the Applicant is using the Respondent’s mental health episode to attempt to develop a new status quo by resorting to self-help remedies. This Court does not support this conduct.
As mentioned, the Applicant alleges conflict between the Respondent and her mother. This is based on conflicting evidence. The Respondent sees her mother as a support, and the evidence before me is that the grandmother acted in the best interests of the child when the Respondent was experiencing her mental health episode.
The Applicant also raises historical concerns relating to the Respondent, including he previous partner. In my view, these historical concerns do not establish a pattern and are not relevant to the current consideration of urgency.
Conclusion
The request for an urgent motion is dismissed. To be clear, the existing order continues to be in effect.
The Respondent sought costs in the amount of $3,500. The Applicant seeks costs in the amount of $4000. Neither party was successful in their request to proceed to an urgent motion. No costs are to be payable by either party.
Consent Orders:
- The parties consented to the following orders:
a. The parties may proceed to an expedited case conference before me on March 12, 2025, at 10:00 am, via Zoom.
b. The involvement of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer is requested.
c. The parties consent to the release of the Children’s Aid Society records.
Associate Justice Kamal
DATE: January 8, 2026